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Merv Benson
06-28-2006, 06:01 PM
The Christian Science Monitor (http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20060628/ts_csm/aofficersx;_ylt=AviUUhTf4UbqHtyBITwV9Ams0NUE;_ylu= X3oDMTA3b2NibDltBHNlYwM3MTY-) has an article on the changes in subject matter at the Army war college:


Some of the changes are as obvious as the addition of counterinsurgency and language electives to the curriculum. Yet at the most fundamental level, Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff College has had to reorient itself to stay relevant for veterans like Gardner, who come seeking to make sense of wars when tactics seem to change every hour.

Where once the college sought to instill its officers with the tactical know-how to defeat the Soviets, it has now turned to the challenging prospect of teaching soldiers how to think for themselves.

"It's a shift from a baccalaureate education to a master's-level education," says Brig. Gen. Volney Warner, deputy commandant of the college. "It's about developing in an individual the capacity to handle a broad range of problems."

In many respects, this is a task allotted to the entire military, as the uncertainty of today's unconventional wars calls for more thoughtful privates and sergeants, as well as officers. Yet some of today's majors will become tomorrow's three- and four-star generals, who help set the course and character of the Army. The Command and General Staff College, then, is something of a weather vane for the future of Army thought.

... The college has already added eight counterinsurgency-related courses, and students can now take electives in Arabic and Pashtun. In a dim hallway outside the main auditorium, a metal rack holds reams of suggested reading lists – but the slots for "cultural awareness," "counterinsurgency," and "militant Islam" have already been emptied.

In Gardner's class, tabletops teem with copies of "The Sling and the Stone" and "No True Glory" – officers' must-read texts on the nontraditional warfare of the new century. The topic for this day's seminar, too, is a twist on the traditional.

...

There is more. I disagree with the assertion that the US military hasn't been teaching officers to think for themselves. I have a clear memory of Basic School teaching the importance of thinking through a problem and coming up with a solution whether it was two up and one back or attempting an envelopment, or what kind of prep fire was needed on an objective. I think it has always been one of the differences we had with the more top down societies like the Soviets or Saddam's Iraq.

Tom Odom
06-28-2006, 08:02 PM
Merv,

Agreed. But sometimes making something "new" is a way to get attention drawn to old lessons. Gratefully the article did go on to relate how surprised some of tthe students were to learn that we had been doing this since "Roger's Rangers" were in the field during the French and Indian Wars.

I too tire of simple references to "Cold War" thinking as if the Cold War was actually a cold affair with massive ground forces in a "sitzkrieg" standoff alone the inner German border. The most excellent 1962 Rand Study that Jedburg posted this week touches on some but not all of those Cold War conflicts, some of which continue in various forms today.

Teaching Soldiers and Leaders to think has always been a base plate of military art.


There is much evidence to show that officers who have received the best peacetime training available find themselves surprised and confused by the difference between conditions as pictured in map problems and those they encounter in campaign. This is largely because our peacetime training in tactics tends to become increasingly theoretical. In our schools we generally assume that organizations are well-trained and at full strength, that subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements function, that communications work, that orders are carried out. In war many or all of these conditions may be absent. The veteran knows that this is normal and his mental processes are not paralyzed by it. He knows that he must carry on in spite of seemingly insurmountable difficulties and regardless of the fact that the tools with which he has to work may be imperfect and worn. Moreover, he knows how to go about it. This volume is designed to give the peace-trained officer something of the viewpoint of the veteran.
By the use of numerous historical examples, the reader is acquainted with the realities of war and the extremely difficult and highly disconcerting conditions under which tactical problems must be solved in the face of an enemy. In so far as there was material available, these examples pertain to American
troops and have been drawn from the personal experience monographs on file at The Infantry School. The combat experience of other armies, however, has been utilized to supplement that of our own. This work does not purport to be a complete treatise on minor tactics of infantry. The aim of its authors has been to develop fully and emphasize a few important lessons which can be substantiated by concrete cases rather than to produce just another
book of abstract theory.
GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Colonel, Infantry.
May 1, 1934.
From Infantry in Battle
And from the same

Chapter I: Rules
Combat situations cannot be solved by rule.
THE ART OF WAR has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice. Mission, terrain, weather, dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables whose mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. Thus, in battle, each situation is unique and must be solved on its own merits.
It follows, then, that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formula that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is a process of years. He must realize that training in solving problems of all types, long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind, are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war.
The leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situation has already set his feeton a well-traveled road to ruin.

Best
Tom

Xenophon
06-29-2006, 12:57 AM
There is more. I disagree with the assertion that the US military hasn't been teaching officers to think for themselves. I have a clear memory of Basic School teaching the importance of thinking through a problem and coming up with a solution whether it was two up and one back or attempting an envelopment, or what kind of prep fire was needed on an objective. I think it has always been one of the differences we had with the more top down societies like the Soviets or Saddam's Iraq.

It certaintly is taught that way at the Basic School. Could this be an Army/Marine Corps difference?

SWJED
06-29-2006, 01:18 AM
It certaintly is taught that way at the Basic School. Could this be an Army/Marine Corps difference?

First, TBS is hardly an example to use when comparing course curriculum changes at the Command and General Staff / Command and Staff College level. Same could be said for Captain's level schools such as EWS.

The Marine Corps, like the Army, completely revamped its CSC curriculum this past AY with much more emphasis on Small Wars issues... Obviously the Marine Corps decided a change was required to meet today's (and tomorrow's) challenges.

I cannot speak for TECOM, but it is my impression that they are taking a serious look at 'all' professional military education - from NCO through the War College levels. I would suspect that, again, the Marine Corps believes we can do a better job in preparing our leaders...

Merv Benson
06-30-2006, 02:34 PM
First, TBS is hardly an example to use when comparing course curriculum changes at the Command and General Staff / Command and Staff College level. Same could be said for Captain's level schools such as EWS.

Are you suggesting that Command and Staff level training does not require independent thinking? While I have not experienced these course, I have read biographies of several generals who describe it as very much a problem solving enviroment requiring independent thought as opposed to rote memory excercises. Eisenhower and Patton are a couple who really excelled in that environment.

The main reason I raised TBS was to demonstrate that this training went all the way down to the junior officers.

SWJED
06-30-2006, 04:37 PM
Are you suggesting that Command and Staff level training does not require independent thinking? While I have not experienced these course, I have read biographies of several generals who describe it as very much a problem solving enviroment requiring independent thought as opposed to rote memory excercises. Eisenhower and Patton are a couple who really excelled in that environment.

The main reason I raised TBS was to demonstrate that this training went all the way down to the junior officers.

I think you might have not read correctly or misunderstood my post. Comparing TBS with CSC is apples and oranges. One prepares you for the basics (hence the name) the other for higher level command and staff duties (hence the name).

Gnaeus
07-01-2006, 03:32 PM
The Marine Corps, like the Army, completely revamped its CSC curriculum this past AY with much more emphasis on Small Wars issues... Obviously the Marine Corps decided a change was required to meet today's (and tomorrow's) challenges.

I am a recent graduate of TBS and can tell you that there is a greater emphasis on Small Wars and Counterinsurgency. We have taken classes on IED's, MOUT, Convoy Ops and have executed field exercises in mock-up Middle Eastern villages. But despite this TBS continues to teach the basics. All the classes and exercises mentioned previously happen toward the end of the POI. TBS teaches conventional infantry tactics at the beginning and builds on this foundation for counterinsurgency later. One thing that has not changed is how they teach young Lt's to operate in these environments. We never got all the information we needed to execute a mission, we never got the right mix of gun trucks or helos for a mission, we never got enough sleep, or enough time to issue an order then execute, and comm was always a problem. TBS does not allow its Lt's to operate in an optimal environment. It is purposly designed to be a stressful reflection of combat.