Motivation vs. causation

[Bob's World]

Bob's World, Marx kinda thought the same way as you. Find a contradiction between the classes and exploit it (propaganda) until you create an armed conflict.

A leader with a message designed to rally the masses, taking positions that the government is either unable or unwilling to adopt as their own.

But such motivation must fall upon a distinct (targetable, actionable) segment of the populace that has perceptions of poor governance for this to really take off. This "poor governance" is what I define as some combo of perceptions of:
- Illigitimacy of the current government,
- Disrespect from the current government,
- Injustice from the current government,

coupled with a perception that there is no legiitimate recourse to address these grievances.

Marx said you'd find these people in the city. Mao looked in the cities and couldn't find them. So he went to the countryside and found them there. The "rules" didn't apply, but the principles did. And no, I really don't think that communism was an existential threat then any more than I think Islamism is an existential threat now. These were just the approaches that spoke/speak to the target populaces that also take positions that the counterinsurgent is either unable or unwilling to co-opt.

To overly focus on Motivation is to totally miss the ball on Causation. This is my big beef with all of our current "experts" in Terrorism, Islam, COIN, etc. They are all shooting the hell out of the wrong target.

Those all need to be scoped, supporting efforts to a main effort that is focused on a complete overhaul of US foreign policy.

Similarly, I think most European states must be much more focused on Domestic Policy (taking a page from the US Civil Rights movement and response in the 60s) to mitigate what poses the greatest risks to their countries, and that by overly engaging down range to support current US foreign policy enforcement is actually probably counter-productive to dealing with what threatens them most.

But, it is very comforting for politicians to be able to blame their shortcomings on others...

[jmm99]

As to this:


from BW
To overly focus on Motivation is to totally miss the ball on Causation. This is my big beef with all of our current "experts" in Terrorism, Islam, COIN, etc. They are all shooting the hell out of the wrong target.

Could you define and distinguish for me each of the terms "Motivation" and "Causation" in a factual historical context ?

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

As to this:



Could you define and distinguish for me each of the terms "Motivation" and "Causation" in a factual historical context ?

Regards

Mike

American Colonies Vs Britain:

Causation:
Colonists widely perceieved as second class citizens by those living in Britain, and treated as such across the board: Disrespect

Governors selected by the Crown and imposed upon the Colonists; An island attempting to rule a continent; etc: illegitimacy

taxation without representation, sending the Army and Navy to Boston to inforce the rule of law: Injustice

Disbanding of colonial governments, ignoring or refusal to hear Colonial grievances, etc: Perception that no legitimate means existed to address all of the above.

Motivation:
Concepts of Liberty; Events like Concord, Breeds Hill, the Boston Masacre; The writen and spoken words of men like Thomas Paine, Sam Adams, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin.


Vietnam:

Causation:
French colonization; American reinstatement of French colonization; Western divsion of the country into two; American support for the Government established over the southern half: Illigitimacy, Disrespect, Injustice; no legitimate recourse to address.

Motivation:
The example of China in freeing itself from western colonialism through communism and insurgency; The leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Giap, etc;


Pick an insurgency, any insurgency. This isn't a card trick. The model fits virtually all the time. Depending on one's perspective though it is often hard to see due to a variety of reasons.

[Ken White]

You live in a simplistic world, Robert...

In the American Colonies versus Britain, you left out the bit about the costs of the French and Indian war from which the Colonies greatly benefited and for which they promised to help pay -- then reneged on raising taxes. Add to that a series of provocations by groups of people who were NOT in accord with mainstream Colonial thinking and half dozen or more other things (not least French activities before during and after...) and that conflict wasn't nearly as simple as you infer. You tend to cherry pick your history and ignore things that are inconvenient

Same is true of Viet Nam. That was far more complex than your statements imply -- as was the Chinese example. For example, you ignore the impact of the death of FDR on the acceptance of the French as de-facto rulers of Indo China and you ignore the fact that American support for the southern half was very low key until the Brothers Kennedy decided to use Viet Nam to stimulate the US economy. There were a a lot of wrongs in Viet Nam but not all were US or western wrongs. Not by a long shot.

Bob's World is nice and simple.

The real world is filled with a lot of gray and half tones -- most of which are ignored only at some peril. The good news is that you're smart enough to realize that with statements like this:
...Depending on one's perspective though it is often hard to see due to a variety of reasons...

...But, it is very comforting for politicians to be able to blame their shortcomings on others...You acknowledge the existence of human fallibility but your prescriptions and descriptions usually fail to account for it.

That sort of ambiguates your message... ;)

[Bob's World]

You live in a simplistic world, Robert...

In the American Colonies versus Britain, you left out the bit about the costs of the French and Indian war from which the Colonies greatly benefited and for which they promised to help pay -- then reneged on raising taxes. Add to that a series of provocations by groups of people who were NOT in accord with mainstream Colonial thinking and half dozen or more other things (not least French activities before during and after...) and that conflict wasn't nearly as simple as you infer. You tend to cherry pick your history and ignore things that are inconvenient

Same is true of Viet Nam. That was far more complex than your statements imply -- as was the Chinese example. For example, you ignore the impact of the death of FDR on the acceptance of the French as de-facto rulers of Indo China and you ignore the fact that American support for the southern half was very low key until the Brothers Kennedy decided to use Viet Nam to stimulate the US economy. There were a a lot of wrongs in Viet Nam but not all were US or western wrongs. Not by a long shot.

Bob's World is nice and simple.

The real world is filled with a lot of gray and half tones -- most of which are ignored only at some peril. The good news is that you're smart enough to realize that with statements like this:You acknowledge the existence of human fallibility but your prescriptions and descriptions usually fail to account for it.

That sort of ambiguates your message... ;)

The universe, however, is indescribably complex.

So you're right, simple was my goal. None of the shades of grey or half-tones have been ignored, they have all been factored in or by-passed where they are true, but immaterial to understanding the essence of the problem.

No one said the American colonist's causation or motivation was rationale, just that they perceived it to be so. I think it is quite typical for the counterinsurgent to see the insurgents Causation as completely irrational. But that does not change the perception of the counterinsurgent. This is one reason that most counterinsurgencies go violent rather than being resolved at the subversion level, because the government is too focused on the facts and the law rather than the very powerful perceptions of injustice, disrespect or their very illegitimacy in the eyes of their populace. History shows that this is both common, and folly for the counterinsurgent.

My work has been focused on rendering the facts of dozens of insurgencies, studying the writings of dozens of theorists and historians, my own experiences throughout my life; to include 4 years focused on Asia, and now in Afghanistan to get to exactly what you accurately call "simple."

Genius is simple. That is my goal (and a difficult one as I am not exactly equipped for genius, so for me it is a hard, circuitous journey and not just a casual glance leading to that "Eureka!" moment.

In my opinion too many people spend too much time mucking around in the "facts" (and arguing about the 100's of different nuances of what those facts are), rather than looking past the fact to find the essence behind; to see how those facts interact in common patterns and trends.

That is why I put the Latin on my signature. To know the facts is education. To understand how the facts interact and what they mean and to be able to draw inferences from them is wisdom. Many men seek knowledge, but Solomon asked for wisdom.

Besides, "simple" is far more difficult to achieve than "complex."

Or, as I have told action officers who bring me insanely complex solutions to insanely complex problems: "Don't complify; simplicate."

So yeah, I'm trying to simplicate this hairball.

[slapout9]

American Colonies Vs Britain:

Causation:
Colonists widely perceieved as second class citizens by those living in Britain, and treated as such across the board: Disrespect

Governors selected by the Crown and imposed upon the Colonists; An island attempting to rule a continent; etc: illegitimacy

taxation without representation, sending the Army and Navy to Boston to inforce the rule of law: Injustice

Disbanding of colonial governments, ignoring or refusal to hear Colonial grievances, etc: Perception that no legitimate means existed to address all of the above.

Motivation:
Concepts of Liberty; Events like Concord, Breeds Hill, the Boston Masacre; The writen and spoken words of men like Thomas Paine, Sam Adams, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin.


Vietnam:

Causation:
French colonization; American reinstatement of French colonization; Western divsion of the country into two; American support for the Government established over the southern half: Illigitimacy, Disrespect, Injustice; no legitimate recourse to address.

Motivation:
The example of China in freeing itself from western colonialism through communism and insurgency; The leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Giap, etc;


Pick an insurgency, any insurgency. This isn't a card trick. The model fits virtually all the time. Depending on one's perspective though it is often hard to see due to a variety of reasons.


Bob,you forgot money.....we printed our own money which the UK couldn't stand and at one point refused to accept.......next thing you know folks is shooting at each other.:eek: link to short paperon the subject.
http://www.ajlambert.com/revolt/pap_mon.pdf

[Steve the Planner]

The story I heard was that the Southern Planters were up to their eyeballs in loans to London.

So when the economic slump hit, pressuring the Crown to want to make the colonists pay for their own security (taxes), a thing of great importance to the northerners, the southerners were being equally pounded by lenders in London.

Repudiation of british debts was a big deal to the southern plantation types.

Always seem to be a coalescence of events, and a broad cast of characters, each with their own motivations.

Steve

[jmm99]

I think these posts (along with this post and any that follow on the same topic):

this is classic "motivation" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91140&postcount=31)

Motivation vs Causation (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91142&postcount=33)

Line up your insurgencies... (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91147&postcount=34)

As Paul Harvey used to say, "The rest of the story..."

E= MC2 is simple (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91164&postcount=37)

Slapout9 (untitled) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91166&postcount=38)

Funny....Money (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91173&postcount=39)

should be moved to a new thread cuz they are beyond the scope of this thread's topic. Perhaps this post's heading (Motivation vs Causation; Theory and Practice) could title the new thread. But, that's up to the Powers That Move Things. :)

I believe it would be worthwhile cuz this discussion has been going on (in one form or the other) for better than a year - the Eagle Landed here in Nov 2008. ;)

The American Revolution and Vietnam seem to me excellent contexts in which to frame the discussion: both were major events (a complex of conventional and unconventional warfare); a lot will be known to members here; and as past events, we don't have to worry about OpSec and other current considerations.

Without answering (yet) prior posts, I am coming at this from the following basic levels:

1. Practitioner, not theoretician.

2. Tactics, not strategy.

And, those at the lowest local level - just the "little" things.

Now, it so happens that I also subscribe to the theory that the practitioner must interface with the theoretician; and tactics have to interface with strategy. Those interfaces are where I am having a problem.

So, if a Power That Moves Things could oblige, I would like to continue this long-standing discourse elsewhere.

Best to all the discoursers

Mike

[marct]

I think these posts (along with this post and any that follow on the same topic):

should be moved to a new thread cuz they are beyond the scope of this thread's topic. Perhaps this post's heading (Motivation vs Causation; Theory and Practice) could title the new thread. But, that's up to the Powers That Move Things. :)

So let it be written, so let it be done :D

[jmm99]

That was nearly as quick as the retreat of the Languedoc Grenadiers from Johnson at Baron Dieskau's Defeat near Lake George in 1755. Ah, he who fights and runs away, gets to farm at Maskinongé. :D

Regards

Mike

[marct]

de nada, Mike :D!

[jmm99]

As to all these (realizing that others have added or want to add more):


from BW

American Colonies Vs Britain:

Causation:
Colonists widely perceieved as second class citizens by those living in Britain, and treated as such across the board: Disrespect

Governors selected by the Crown and imposed upon the Colonists; An island attempting to rule a continent; etc: illegitimacy

taxation without representation, sending the Army and Navy to Boston to inforce the rule of law: Injustice

Disbanding of colonial governments, ignoring or refusal to hear Colonial grievances, etc: Perception that no legitimate means existed to address all of the above.

Motivation:
Concepts of Liberty; Events like Concord, Breeds Hill, the Boston Masacre; The writen and spoken words of men like Thomas Paine, Sam Adams, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin.


Vietnam:

Causation:
French colonization; American reinstatement of French colonization; Western divsion of the country into two; American support for the Government established over the southern half: Illigitimacy, Disrespect, Injustice; no legitimate recourse to address.

Motivation:
The example of China in freeing itself from western colonialism through communism and insurgency; The leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Giap, etc;

I first have a hard time seeing why some factors in those conflicts are placed in the Causation box and others in the Motivation box. Both boxes include tangibles and intangibles, for example.

How do I make up my own little Causation and Motivation boxes for my little piece of heaven; and make them meaningful ?

Example: double role playing in a small village complex (ville + 5 hamlets; say 5000 population, located somewhere between Saigon and the Parrot's Beak (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svay_Rieng_Province)):

1. "NLF" cadre commandant (actually regular PAVN, but of a peasant family from the village complex, who as a teen went North in 1954 and then was infiltrated back in the 60s).

2. VN Pacification commandant (regular ARVN, also from the village complex, but from a family of local notables; long service, but relatively low grade because he lacks "Saigon connections").

Posit roughly equivalent military resources.

How do the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary each use your Causation and Motivation constructs for his own purposes ?

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

So which is primary Motive or Causation? I say motive because insurgencies are caused by people and people have a motive before they start causing things to happen. Thoughts?

[Ken White]

People (in the individuals sense) try to look for simple, mechanistic theories to explain the things that People (in the collective sense) do. Wasting effort, angels on the head of a pin, etc.

Each and every cause has many differing causations and all the people involved have differing motivations. You can generalize but you must realize that's the best you can do...

For each event then, one must look below the surface causative factors for the real, not expressed, motives and...

Ah, humbug. Wasting pixels I is -- what Slap said!

[Kiwigrunt]

I’ve got a few spare pixels here that I wasn’t planning on using for anything else.

So is it not a spiralling chicken and egg situation? Causation leads to motive leads to causation leads to motive etc. So in reverse, searching for the underlying causation or motive may be like trying to identify either the original egg or the original chook.

[Entropy]

Bob's World,

I have some questions and criticism of your theory I've been meaning to put to you, so thanks for starting this thread and providing the opportunity:

To begin, have you considered the possibility that "good governance" may not be possible in some cases? IOW, is it not possibile that a state's internal tensions may ultimately be irreconcilable? That gaining the legitimacy and respect of one constituency will cause illegitimacy and disrespect from another group? This possibility seems particularly relevant to places like the Balkans, Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia where the tribal and ethnic rivalries are fierce and violent. Your theory seems to assume that there is always some kind of "governance" that will be viewed as legitimate enough by everyone to prevent or end insurgency. That's seems quite doubtful - otherwise fantastical scenarios enter the realm of possibility - think world government or a united India and Pakistan (Indiastan?).

Secondly, if my contention is true and there exist situations where governance within a state is not possible, then that would seem to indicate that state borders matter greatly in the application of your theory. And if so, then I would think that border demarcation becomes at least as important, if not more important, than governance since redrawing a border could bring good governance where it could not exist previously. Consider the case of East Pakistan, for example.

The point being, have you considered the possibility that "good governance" is not practically achievable (or achievable only through violent means) in several "nations" (quoted intentionally), particularly those I previously mentioned?

[jmm99]

Since Entropy has added "good governance", which is central to COL Jones' populace-centric construct, I'm going to add one more term, "legitimacy", as viewed by Timothy J. Lomperis, Vietnam's Offspring:The Lesson of Legitimacy (http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/CQ/vol006_1winter1986/lomperis.pdf) (Winter 1986, Conflict Quarterly).

From that, we have this chart:

1023

In this chart (more fully discussed in the article), Lomperis is not considering "legitimacy" from the viewpoint of a nation-state; but from the different viewpoints of persons (three levels) in each of two incumbant models and the revolutionary insurgency model.

The individual "legitimacy issues" (which Lomperis considers fluid and variable) look much to me like "causation" or "motivation" issues - whichever box you put them in.

I understand that the 1986 article was expanded and became a chapter in Lomperis' 1996 book, From People’s War to People’s Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (http://www.amazon.com/People%C2%92s-War-Rule-Insurgency-Intervention/dp/0807845779). Only two reviews, but the second (from 2005) is interesting:


This is a book about the non-lesson "lessons" of the Vietnam War. Published in 1996, it could be considered the most horribly confusing book about political-military strategy ever conceived. Based tightly on articulating research bounded inside a "paradigmatic presupposition," many early readers would venture to believe Lomperis wasted a decade of research to make sense of a society "in the throes of a revolutionary insurgency struggling to form and consolidate an independent and modernizing state." But reading this book in 2005 makes it all relevant. It actually makes perfect sense, so much so that when read and digested properly, it can be used to predict not only how the newly formed Iraqi government will stabilize and prevail, but will also predict when it will happen by month and year, and that will determine the US exit strategy.
....
To bring about the change of government from turmoil due to insurgency and into a sphere of stability, Chapter 11 is the most interesting and useful because it demonstrates how to create a timeline for an exit strategy. Using lessons from six case studies ranging from Mao's long march in China from 1920-1949, Greece 1941-1949, Philippines 1946-1956, Malaya 1948-1960, Cambodia-Laos 1949-1975, to Sendero Luminoso's Peru 1970-1992, Lomperis benchmarked insurgent successes and defeats in a smartly laid out timeline that identifies factors important to legitimate governments. He then plots categories and possible futures which are laid out for policy analyst to mull over. Lomperis' work shows that from legitimate national elections to victory will take approximately five years to achieve, if, all involved will stay the course.

I guess I will get sucked in to see what he actually says.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

Jeeez. I post something, minding my own business, wake up in the morning and find I am now hosting a thread? As they say in the US Army, "Buddy is only half of the word...")

So, going back in time a bit, one of the things that got me thinking about this was what I saw as a powerful, yet misguided, obsession with Islamism and ideology. The US position was, (and probably remains), that Islamist ideology is the center of gravity for the entire damn GWOT/long war/global insurgency, etc, etc.

That just didn't square up with me. Sure, the ideology of a movement is what is in your face, as are the terrorist events; but does that mean one is dealing with an ideologically driven terrorist movement? I think not. I think CvC is correct that war is politics; and that insurgency is about internal politics and wars between states are more about external politics.

Slap says that Motivation is most important. I could argue that either way; but I would stand firm on the point that motivation alone will not ignite a successful insurgency unless you have conditions of causation in place first.

I would describe those things I bundle under motivation (dynamic leadership; ideology; dramatic events, etc) as Critical Requirements (CRs) to a COG of "Support of the Populace"; but not as standalone COGs. You must have them, but these are the things that ignite and sustain an insurgency; but why is it you can have them in one society and have an insurgency, and in another a 200 word story on page 5 of the local paper?

Why is one man a "crackpot" spewing "crazy talk"; while another is a dynamic leader with a profound message??? It’s a fine line, and that line moves as conditions among the target populace change. But change in what way? What changes are critical and must be addressed, and what changes are immaterial? One could argue that over his reign of activity in post WWI Germany that Hitler morphed from Crackpot, to dynamic leader and back to Crackpot again. What changed? I argue that what changed were the perceptions of the German populace.

As I like to say, "The Pied Piper is a fairy tale." What I find though, is that there are many smart people who are willing to believe in fairy tales. I, however, am a skeptic. I do not believe that some dynamic leader can come along, and play his magic flute of ideology, and lead a satisfied populace (experiencing "good governance") to its insurgent doom. I just don't buy it.

I also found Maslow's work instructive. Most were focusing on "effectiveness of governance" and were pounding away at the importance of the bottom of his pyramid. And that may well be true for the average fighter who comes to Helmand in Poppy season as a migrant worker to make some money working the poppy harvest; and then stays to make some money through the summer planting IEDs or fighting with the Taliban. For a Pashtun, getting paid to fight is like paying a teenage American boy to date Megan Fox.

But what is it that creates the conditions that would cause men like our US founding fathers to risk their fortunes, families, reputations and very lives to form the sustaining nucleus of an ultimately successful insurgency? As mentioned above, the FACTs in the Southern colonies were very different than in the middle colonies, and then in the New England colonies. So get past the facts. How did those men FEEL about the facts that they were experiencing?

This takes us to the top of Maslow's pyramid. Respect, Justice, etc. Much higher order aspects of human fulfillment than chasing one's next meal. If I am hungry I will poach a deer in the King's forest. If I am disrespected and live in a world with no justice I will go after the King himself.

Those who think that millions of Muslims living in the Middle East are supporting efforts against the West either directly or indirectly because of the leadership of Bin Laden or the skewed perspective on Islam that he employs as ideology do these people a tremendous disservice. It also very conveniently takes a position that allows the West to ignore its own transgressions against these very people.

Ok, so that's a start at what I am getting at, look forward to hearing what others think. And to all of you "lurkers" out there, please to weigh in, even if it is just with a sentence or two. At the end of the day, I don't want to prove that I am right, I want to figure out what is right. And one of you may well hold the key that will unlock that door.

Regards,

Bob

[Bob's World]

Just by coincidence I ran by this quote today. I like it.

"Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex... It takes a touch of genius - and a lot of courage to move in the opposite direction."
Albert Einstein

[slapout9]

Slap says that Motivation is most important. I could argue that either way; but I would stand firm on the point that motivation alone will not ignite a successful insurgency unless you have conditions of causation in place first.



Bob


I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.

[davidbfpo]

Bob's use of causation and motivation is far easier for the non-academic and non-specialists to follow IMHO. Other papers I have read are far more complex, partly as they try to cover all civil conflicts / terrorism / political violence. Maybe it is a marketing device, I think not. Nor does the failure of good governance and related points diminish looking at conflicts through causation and motivation.

[jmm99]

This comment from Slap:


I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.

got me thinking. What I come up with is that we use the same word "cause" to mean two quite different things:

1. In one sense, we look at "cause" and "effect" based on a set of more or less objective facts: e.g., what factors "caused" the accident. Those factors span a spectrum from the most "proximate" to the most remote ("but for causation", "ultimate causation" - but for a nail, the kingdom was lost). In the accident case, we focus on the more proximate causes and the extent to which each of them contributed to the accident in assessing comparative fault (where the motivations of the parties does come into play). In this rather inexact form of art, the jury finds A, X%; B, Y%; C, Z% at fault and awards damages accordingly. And, certainly, folks use a similar process to consider the "causes" of an insurgency.

2. In another sense, we look at "cause" not with respect to effect, but as one or more of the "Causes" that appear in the "Narratives" of the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Each of those "Causes" may or may not have a basis in a "cause" that we find objectively (Meaning 1). Each of them does, however, have a basis in the perceptions and motives of the populace as they view their individual situations. As to those "Causes", "Motives" are very much intermixed and crucial to the feedback process which frames the "Narrative" (whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary). That is the basis for Mao's "from the people, to the people", where the "Narrative" is taken in raw form from the People, shaped by the Party, and then returned to the People, who reshape it in a continued "chicken & egg" scenario. The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".

To sum the distinctions in blunt terms: People die because of a "cause"; people die for a "Cause".

-------------------------------
This continuation is somewhat thinking out loud; although the thoughts have occured to me before.

In Southeast Asia, we can look at four countries: Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. As to them, we can accept some common factors:

1. All were feudal (as the Marxists used that term) and colonial, pre-WWII.

2. All were occupied by the Japanese during WWII (showing the people that an Asian military could defeat Western militaries).

3. During WWII, nationalist movements were strengthened.

4. At the end of WWII, the colonial powers returned (length of stay varied).

5. After WWII, insurgencies developed in all (in Indochina and Indonesia, we have I and II cases).

We could (simplistically, IMO) look at WWII as the "cause" of those insurgencies and that the "Causes" were "anti-feudalism" and "anti-colonialism". There is some truth in that, but the realities were more complex.

In considering those six insurgencies (Indochina I & II, Malaya, Indonesia I & II, the Philippines), Bill Pomeroy (CPUSA author and special operator) left us with some good advice in his Guerrilla Warfare & Marxism (1968, International Publishers (http://www.intpubnyc.com/OnlineCat.htm), the CPUSA bookstore - book no longer in catalog), p.200:


The theory that there is an "Asian model" of contemporary guerrilla liberation struggles (it is assumed to be patterned on the Chinese experience) breaks down with a close examination of each struggle. This has been pointed out in the Introduction, but it needs to be stressed further that liberation movements in the region have been variegated, each with its own historical roots, deriving from the peculiar nature of the colonial system in each colony, and each pursuing its own course of development.

With that caveat in mind, considering the "Causes" expressed in the "Narratives" (both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary) in each of these six instances gains some understanding as to one factor (among many) that made each of them different from the others, in both development and outcomes. That is an exercise that I've not yet completed.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

jmm99, to me all problems start at the level of either nature made or man made. Nature..... Tornado's,Hurricanes,etc. vs. Man made.... Crimes and Wars. Man made requires Active Agency......I think that is the legal term,i.e. guns do not kill people until a human (Active Agent) picks it up and shoots somebody.

So for an insurgency to happen requires a motivated person (Active Agent) to motivate other humans to join with him/her to fight for the common motive which becomes a United Common Cause.

[jmm99]

agree with this:''


from Slap
So for an insurgency to happen requires a motivated person (Active Agent) to motivate other humans to join with him/her to fight for the common motive which becomes a United Common Cause.

So, then the questions are: whether we look for the factors that motivated the Active Actor (and those who join); how far back we should go in looking for them; and whether we should then try to fix them ?

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

So, then the questions are: whether we look for the factors that motivated the Active Actor (and those who join); how far back we should go in looking for them; and whether we should then try to fix them ?

Regards

Mike

I would go back as far as practical until you come to the factor and it will be a person or persons ,that started it. I don't know if you should fix them or just shoot them:eek:

PS a good principle for Law to. Don't ask what you were fighting about.....ask WHO started it. My 2 cents.

[Bob's World]

I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.

But what an organization's "Cause" is is a very different thing from what the "causation" for a conflict is.

For an example, I listed above some aspects of what I believe contributed to causation for the American insurgency against Great Britain. Their cause however, was probably best summed up in one word:

Independence


I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation, motivation, and cause when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or insurpport of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.

Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.

[Bob's World]

Mike,

Thanks for the legal assist. That is exactly what I was trying to get at in clarifying the difference between cause and causation. Its unfortunate the words are so similar inconstruction, becuase the meanings in application are very different indeed.

Bob

[jmm99]

as to this:


from BW; [ ]s by JMM
I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation [small "c" "cause"], motivation, and cause [cap "C" "Cause"] when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or in support of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.

but I really am cut to the quick by your criticism of my favored approach to washing clothes:


from BW
Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.

Who cares if the underwear turns pink & the red sweatshirt is now a darker shade of pink - some people like that. :D

Cheers

Mike

PS: Always happy to assist a fellow legal beagle, who is now doing more important work. :)

[slapout9]

But what an organization's "Cause" is is a very different thing from what the "causation" for a conflict is.

For an example, I listed above some aspects of what I believe contributed to causation for the American insurgency against Great Britain. Their cause however, was probably best summed up in one word:

Independence


I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation, motivation, and cause when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or insurpport of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.

Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.

I would say it is Independence from Person(s) Acting as Tyrant(s).

[William F. Owen]

So let me get this right...

a.) War = the setting forth of Policy/politics via violent means, and the interactions that are inherent to that?

b.) Strategy = the use of force to get things done - in terms of the military contribution to strategy - and the adaptations that flow from the passion, reason and chance that are inherent to the use of force?

....thinking I read this somewhere else before...... :rolleyes:

I think in the case of Hitler, Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon, the Tsarist White Russians and Julius Caesar, folks fought very hard and in great numbers to ensure they had a tyrant in control of their lives - because they liked the idea of the stability that a single leader brought and did not like the idea of a ultimately "corrupt" democratic process. Funny that.

[marct]

What I come up with is that we use the same word "cause" to mean two quite different things:

1. In one sense, we look at "cause" and "effect" based on a set of more or less objective facts: e.g., what factors "caused" the accident. Those factors span a spectrum from the most "proximate" to the most remote ("but for causation", "ultimate causation" - but for a nail, the kingdom was lost). In the accident case, we focus on the more proximate causes and the extent to which each of them contributed to the accident in assessing comparative fault (where the motivations of the parties does come into play). In this rather inexact form of art, the jury finds A, X%; B, Y%; C, Z% at fault and awards damages accordingly. And, certainly, folks use a similar process to consider the "causes" of an insurgency.

2. In another sense, we look at "cause" not with respect to effect, but as one or more of the "Causes" that appear in the "Narratives" of the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Each of those "Causes" may or may not have a basis in a "cause" that we find objectively (Meaning 1). Each of them does, however, have a basis in the perceptions and motives of the populace as they view their individual situations. As to those "Causes", "Motives" are very much intermixed and crucial to the feedback process which frames the "Narrative" (whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary). That is the basis for Mao's "from the people, to the people", where the "Narrative" is taken in raw form from the People, shaped by the Party, and then returned to the People, who reshape it in a continued "chicken & egg" scenario. The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".

To sum the distinctions in blunt terms: People die because of a "cause"; people die for a "Cause".

You know, Mike, I really like this. Personally, I would go one step further and point out that, barring "natural" events (tornados, hurricanes, etc.), we as a species don't "know" about the first category in any really objective sense, only inter-subjectively. This gets us to the point that we cannot ascribe cause and effect relationships or factors unless we have a knowledge system, a "narrative" if you will, of how reality is constructed.

"Cause and effect" is, really, just another term for a specific type of relationship (an "if-then" one). But if we say that X causes Y (or a percentage of it), then we have to have at least a rough, inter-subjective agreement on what constitute X and Y. The process of getting that agreement, which we could call "indoctrination", "enculturation", "radicalization" or any other similar concept pertaining to the adoption of one symbol system by a person, carries with it its own "causal" logic (i.e. implied relationships). Even the case of "natural events" is not privileged as a natural/universal category with absolute membership, since many systems ascribe them to the operation of supernatural entities (Katrina as the curse of God, Haiti as punishment for signing a pact with the Devil, etc.).

When you say


The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".

I think you are spot on. In fact, I don't think you go far enough with its implications. Narratives structure lived, day-to-day experiences by providing both expressive and explanatory means for people to comprehend these experiences; they are the "interpretive schemas" I keep talking about. Where we get a really interesting "convergence" is between ideological and religious narratives which, basically, cover the same ground area by offering sometimes complementary, sometimes antithetical schemas.

Cheers,

Marc

[slapout9]

So let me get this right...

a.) War = the setting forth of Policy/politics via violent means, and the interactions that are inherent to that?

b.) Strategy = the use of force to get things done - in terms of the military contribution to strategy - and the adaptations that flow from the passion, reason and chance that are inherent to the use of force?

....thinking I read this somewhere else before...... :rolleyes:

I think in the case of Hitler, Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon, the Tsarist White Russians and Julius Caesar, folks fought very hard and in great numbers to ensure they had a tyrant in control of their lives - because they liked the idea of the stability that a single leader brought and did not like the idea of a ultimately "corrupt" democratic process. Funny that.


Sorta, except we (US) wanted the right to choose our own Tyrant not use somebody elses.

[jmm99]

I'm happy to see that the Local Governance-Local Populace Section of the Ad Hoc SWC Civil Affairs Team (created by Steve the Surfer - :D) is on the same page.

Admittedly, I could have gone further with Causation (both with multiplicity of causes and their proximity to the material situation - and which ultimate causes are "Acts of God" and which are "Acts of Man"). Been there and done that to some extent with civil litigation (where we look more to multiple causes and attribution of comparative fault than in criminal litigation, where its nature requires simpler solutions).

As you say:


....we as a species don't "know" about the first category in any really objective sense, only inter-subjectively.

and we get into a process similar to a Thomist proof of God taught to me by my mother (she taught RC religion). Fine for a matter of belief (after all, Credo means "I believe"), but not really a matter of objective knowledge (Scio = "I know").

-----------------------
So, as a practitioner, I'd rather focus on the "Causes" in the respective "Narratives" - and how those Narratives meet the realities of the situational environment. The best theoretical Narrative in the world will fall on its tail if it is not implemented on the ground at the local level (whether urban or rural).

Yes, I could have gone into "Causes" and the "Narratives" further - and suggested a study program (see last half of post, Distinguishing "Causes" from "causes" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91233&postcount=22) - that discussion would be a bookshelf added to what already exists). I'm not sure how much Mao-Giap and other Marxist-Leninist theory SWC wants to hear - not all here are red diaper or pink diaper babies (:D). The Marxists wrote the original books, except for the Indonesian Gen who wrote his original book from a center-right viewpoint.

In fact, if the Narrative is really "from the People, back to the People" in a positive feedback loop, where theses and anti-theses are worked into syntheses, and the syntheses are implemented at a local level so that the People can see that the Narrative works, then we have in your wonderful academic language:


Narratives structure lived, day-to-day experiences by providing both expressive and explanatory means for people to comprehend these experiences; they are the "interpretive schemas" I keep talking about. Where we get a really interesting "convergence" is between ideological and religious narratives which, basically, cover the same ground area by offering sometimes complementary, sometimes antithetical schemas.

Was your mother a Librarian ? :)

Best as always, Canuck

Mike

[slapout9]

Link to cross post on similar topic on good government.


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=91337#post91337

[marct]

Hi Mike,


Admittedly, I could have gone further with Causation (both with multiplicity of causes and their proximity to the material situation - and which ultimate causes are "Acts of God" and which are "Acts of Man"). Been there and done that to some extent with civil litigation (where we look more to multiple causes and attribution of comparative fault than in criminal litigation, where its nature requires simpler solutions).

I remember getting into a really great discussion with some colleagues years ago on just where we picked up this idea of "causation" and "causality"; interesting, even if the final hours are sort of blurry ;). What is an "Act of God"? I find it fascinating how the line of inclusion / exclusion operates on it even as the category is still accepted.


and we get into a process similar to a Thomist proof of God taught to me by my mother (she taught RC religion). Fine for a matter of belief (after all, Credo means "I believe"), but not really a matter of objective knowledge (Scio = "I know").

The ex nihil, nihil fit? Hmmm, maybe, but the problem I have with the concept of "objective knowledge" is not that it can not and does not exists but, rather, the assumption that we as individual humans can perceive it and, after such a perception, communicate it inter-subjectively.

I notice that you are going back to Latin. Have you followed the earlier etymology of the word to its proto-Indo-European root, sci*? It means "to cut" or "parse", which has some interesting implications :wry:.


So, as a practitioner, I'd rather focus on the "Causes" in the respective "Narratives" - and how those Narratives meet the realities of the situational environment. The best theoretical Narrative in the world will fall on its tail if it is not implemented on the ground at the local level (whether urban or rural).

Totally! I'm more focused on the modelling so that I can figure out the mechanisms of local adaptation more than anything else. I already have a pretty good model that describes how local adaptations take place in categories and relationships, but it's still not good enough to really work that well; it describes the process nicely, but falls down on projecting outcomes....


Was your mother a Librarian ? :)

Nope, a self-educated (via drinking with profs) Anthropologist and theologian who was heavily involved in the CR movement in the 1960's.

Cheers,

Marc

[jmm99]

Hi Marc

As to this:


from marct
The ex nihil, nihil fit? Hmmm, maybe, but the problem I have with the concept of "objective knowledge" is not that it can not and does not exists but, rather, the assumption that we as individual humans can perceive it and, after such a perception, communicate it inter-subjectively.

juries do it everyday in civil cases by allocating causation and fault. :D

Yes, that is "inter-subjective communications" based on their perceptions. The problem, of course, is that another jury given the same facts could come up with a different allocation. Thus, a problem in predictability.

There are jury verdict reporting services (used by insurance companies and trial lawyers) which give ranges in different situations - "fuzzy patterns", which provide some guidance and perhaps an argument in settling cases.

So, in my book, "Causation" is something of a voodoo science - a mixture of credo and scio. PS: the only reason I use those terms is that my high school Latin teacher drilled them into my skull.

When you put together your model on "Causes" and the "Narrative", please let us know. This sounds interesting, but difficult:


I'm more focused on the modelling so that I can figure out the mechanisms of local adaptation more than anything else. I already have a pretty good model that describes how local adaptations take place in categories and relationships, but it's still not good enough to really work that well; it describes the process nicely, but falls down on projecting outcomes....

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I think BW has valid points if we're discussing insurgency. There's a certain problem in applying those points to our current conflicts, though, because we're not fighting against insurgencies. One of the reasons our current problem set looks so complex is that we keep slamming square pegs into round holes and trying to impose grandiose but imaginary and counterproductive constructs such as "war on terror" and "global insurgency".

We're fighting a war against AQ, but AQ is not an insurgency, unless we stretch the definition of insurgency far beyond the breaking point. AQ is not populace-based or nationally based, nor is it directed toward the overthrow of an existing government. It's never been able to muster sufficient support in any national environment to drive a true insurgency, though it has managed to exploit existing insurgencies that it did not create. AQ doesn't need to move the populace of any given nation to establish a COG and overthrow a Government, it draws its strength from diffusion and holding a relatively small but very highly motivated core of true believers spread out among a large number of national environments. An insurgency needs to establish a support base among a national populace, a terrorist group does not.

I don't see the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as insurgencies either. We didn't start these fights to defend a government from insurgents, we started them to remove governments we found distasteful. We succeeded, and created power vacuums in both areas. What we are seeing now is not insurgency against established governments, it is armed competition to fill that vacuum. In each case we support one one of the contending parties, which we choose to call a government.

In this environment "good governance" may be less an issue than it would be in a traditional government vs insurgent scenario. The armed parties are not fighting for good government, they are fighting for power, which they will use to advance their own interests. The populace is less concerned with good governance than with staying out of the line of fire and with supporting whatever faction they think will best advance the interests of the groups they actually identify with, more likely to be defined by family, clan, tribal, or sectarian distinctions than by any concept of nationhood. "Good governance" is only an issue to the extent that it is defined as "governance that brings benefits and protection to me and mine".

In some cases, especially in Afghanistan, people may be fighting not because they object to bad government but because they simply don't want to be governed. In this case any external government constitutes bad government.

In short, I think BW makes valid points about what we might call the Cold War pattern of insurgency. I'm just not sure our current fights fit into this pattern.

[jmm99]

Hi Dayuhan et al,

My two centavos worth since I cite two posts. ;)

We may be on the same page.

As close as I can come, AQ is waging global special operations warfare. If you want to say they are waging global unconventional warfare, that's OK since AQ's operations take place in areas it regards as "eneny-occupied" territory. See this post:

Hi John - part 2 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91309&postcount=243)

As to "global", but not "insurgency" (except as part of the toolkit), see this post:

You're moving in the right direction (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91203&postcount=36)

Those are my current best shots at the 25m target.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

As close as I can come, AQ is waging global special operations warfare. If you want to say they are waging global unconventional warfare, that's OK since AQ's operations take place in areas it regards as "eneny-occupied" territory. See this post:


I can agree with that. The problem I have with calling AQ an insurgency is that the term seems to invoke a reflexive "COIN" response, which in turn assumes a set of conditions that I don't believe are pertinent to this particular problem.

[Bob's World]

Nice to see more people noticing that "Global Insurgency" is a concept that probably confuses and hinders efforts against AQ far more than it helps.

Consider the following items that AQ lacks:

1. A state.
2. A populace.

Makes it kind of hard to hold a decent insurgency when you are lacking the two key ingredients. Like conducting a Global Margarita party, except without Tequila or Limes...

But one needs neither a state nor a populace to conduct UW. One only needs the will to incite and support insurgency among the populace of another's state, and the means to do so. The current information age provided AQ the Means to develop a UW network that incites and supports insurgency among Sunni Muslim populaces in a wide range of countries. To include your own, where ever you might currently be.

If you feel the urge to conduct COIN, I suggest, like charity, you begin at home. Ensure the populace of your own country is experiencing "Good Governance." That every significant segment of the populace perceives itself to be included; to be respected and have justice under the law; to have legitimate and effective means available to them to address their grievances and participate fully in the governmental process. That is good COIN. Do this and you will immunize your populace from possible infection from those like AQ who would come to your home and conduct UW for their own selfish, political ends.

COIN is typically waged in the countryside of lands far away; but Insurgency is won and lost in one's very own capital cities. Insurgency in the Philippines will fade when the Government in Manila finally decides to provide good governance to all of its populace equitably. Similarly in Kabul and Afghanistan.

When one can see COIN as simply governments doing what governments are supposed to do, day in and day out; with the military component of COIN only being implemented when the civil governance has lost control and needs some assistance, one is prepared to prevail. To think of COIN as warfare that is caused by insurgents is to let our politicians off the hook for their failures. Good COIN is “peacefare.” It denies Causation; and when Causation is denied, Motivation falls flat.

[Dayuhan]

Nice to see more people noticing that "Global Insurgency" is a concept that probably confuses and hinders efforts against AQ far more than it helps.

I noticed that about 30 seconds after reading the term for the first time. It took that long because I had to read it several times to convince myself that I was seeing what I thought I was seeing. Unfortunately, I was.



But one needs neither a state nor a populace to conduct UW. One only needs the will to incite and support insurgency among the populace of another's state, and the means to do so. The current information age provided AQ the Means to develop a UW network that incites and supports insurgency among Sunni Muslim populaces in a wide range of countries. To include your own, where ever you might currently be.


I wouldn't say AQ has been terribly successful at this. I think they've been more successful at using pre-existing insurgencies as tools and cover than they have at actually generating or exacerbating those insurgencies. In most cases where AQ is involved in local insurgency it is the local issues, not the AQ agenda, that drive the insurgents to fight.



COIN is typically waged in the countryside of lands far away; but Insurgency is won and lost in one's very own capital cities. Insurgency in the Philippines will fade when the Government in Manila finally decides to provide good governance to all of its populace equitably. Similarly in Kabul and Afghanistan.


In the Philippines probably true, though I wouldn't be holding my breath: Manila has neither the capacity nor the will to govern Mindanao effectively. in Afghanistan, I suspect we're discussing good governance when the actual problem is non-governance. To have a good government you have to have a government first, and I'm not sure the assemblage in Kabul qualifies. if it can't govern at all it certainly can't govern well, and our calling it a government doesn't make it one.

If the "government" is perceived as an externally imposed entity that is not likely to outlast external support backed by questionable commitment, it's not likely to attract much support. The key issue is not that governance is good or bad, but of acknowledgment that a legitimate government exists. That's why I suspect that in Afghanistan we're not seeing an insurgency fighting a government but an armed competition to fill a perceived political vacuum.

[Bob's World]

concur. What each populace requires of its governance is unique to that populace. As to your last point that goes to heart: Legitimacy. No government perceived as lacking legitimacy in the eyes of its own populace is likely to prevail when faced with a determined insurgency.

Said another way: If one is going to commit the blood, treasure, and reputation of their nation in the support of the government of another that is facing insurgency, ensure it is perceived as legitimate before the first drop, penny, or promise is spent.

Or said another way: If one backs an illigitimate government against an insurgency, expect that those same insurgents will target you as well. Particularly if they perceive that what legitimacy that government does have comes more from you than from sources that they recognize.

Also that "Official" does not necessarily mean the same as "Legitimate." In the eyes of the afgan people they probably recognize that the Karzai government is "official." Few, however, see it as "legitimate."

[Entropy]

Dayuhan,

All great points. I think one could argue that Afghanistan remains in a state of civil war.

[slapout9]

concur. What each populace requires of its governance is unique to that populace. As to your last point that goes to heart: Legitimacy. No government perceived as lacking legitimacy in the eyes of its own populace is likely to prevail when faced with a determined insurgency.

Said another way: If one is going to commit the blood, treasure, and reputation of their nation in the support of the government of another that is facing insurgency, ensure it is perceived as legitimate before the first drop, penny, or promise is spent.

Or said another way: If one backs an illigitimate government against an insurgency, expect that those same insurgents will target you as well. Particularly if they perceive that what legitimacy that government does have comes more from you than from sources that they recognize.

Also that "Official" does not necessarily mean the same as "Legitimate." In the eyes of the afgan people they probably recognize that the Karzai government is "official." Few, however, see it as "legitimate."



So it all comes down to De Oppresso Liber (to liberate the oppressed). The original purpose that Special Forces were created in the first place.

[marct]

Hi Mike,


juries do it everyday in civil cases by allocating causation and fault. :D

Yes, that is "inter-subjective communications" based on their perceptions. The problem, of course, is that another jury given the same facts could come up with a different allocation. Thus, a problem in predictability.


Totally agree. I remember a while back reading about some experiments looking at perception effects in jury decisions where test juries sat on a case or listened to a transcript being read or just read the transcripts. Apparently, since it was an experiment, the accuracy rate of the juries increased along the same line. Sort of similar to the eye witness testimony problem :wry:.


So, in my book, "Causation" is something of a voodoo science - a mixture of credo and scio. PS: the only reason I use those terms is that my high school Latin teacher drilled them into my skull.

LOL - yeah, I tend to agree although the dolls used are just a tich different ;).


When you put together your model on "Causes" and the "Narrative", please let us know. This sounds interesting, but difficult

I will, if I can ever get it done :(. I've been struggling with it for years now and, while it's gotten better, I'm still not happy with it. Oh well, we'll see....

Cheers,

Marc

[Dayuhan]

concur. What each populace requires of its governance is unique to that populace. As to your last point that goes to heart: Legitimacy. No government perceived as lacking legitimacy in the eyes of its own populace is likely to prevail when faced with a determined insurgency.

Said another way: If one is going to commit the blood, treasure, and reputation of their nation in the support of the government of another that is facing insurgency, ensure it is perceived as legitimate before the first drop, penny, or promise is spent.

Or said another way: If one backs an illigitimate government against an insurgency, expect that those same insurgents will target you as well. Particularly if they perceive that what legitimacy that government does have comes more from you than from sources that they recognize.

Also that "Official" does not necessarily mean the same as "Legitimate." In the eyes of the afgan people they probably recognize that the Karzai government is "official." Few, however, see it as "legitimate."

I agree... but I have to point out, again, that our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were not initiated in order to support a government, legitimate or otherwise, against insurgency. They were initiated to remove governments we found distasteful. Having succeeded in that, we then faced a situation where there was no government at all. That's a very difficult position to be in: a government installed by an occupying power is going to be perceived as illegitimate and not recognized as a government, but if the occupying power leaves without putting together some kind of government the probable result is a takeover by whatever armed force is left after the intervention. If armed force is distributed the likely outcome is civil war, with intervention by all manner of self-interested actors.

Compounding the problem is the tendency of the intervening power in these cases to pursue legitimacy in the eyes of its own constituents in its own country, rather than in the eyes of the occupied populaces. In order to justify intervention and make it appear legitimate the US government promised to pursue transitions to an electoral democracy along American lines, which may have been what the American populace wanted to hear but may not have been a very practical approach to the problem at hand. Of course the American people also wanted an intervention of limited duration, ideally with a fast withdrawal, and nobody seemed willing to tell them that these objectives were mutually exclusive.

If there's any lesson to be learned from all this it is that people who contemplate future regime change efforts need to put a lot more effort into realistic assessments of the challenges implicit in a post regime change environment. It's easy to say we made mistakes, and by any criteria we did, but I'm not convinced that any alternative course of action would have provided a quick magical transition to a functional government that was perceived as legitimate by all of the competing populaces in the picture. The task parameters were just not realistic from the start.

[Bob's World]

I agree... but I have to point out, again, that our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were not initiated in order to support a government, legitimate or otherwise, against insurgency. They were initiated to remove governments we found distasteful. Having succeeded in that, we then faced a situation where there was no government at all. That's a very difficult position to be in: a government installed by an occupying power is going to be perceived as illegitimate and not recognized as a government, but if the occupying power leaves without putting together some kind of government the probable result is a takeover by whatever armed force is left after the intervention. If armed force is distributed the likely outcome is civil war, with intervention by all manner of self-interested actors.

Compounding the problem is the tendency of the intervening power in these cases to pursue legitimacy in the eyes of its own constituents in its own country, rather than in the eyes of the occupied populaces. In order to justify intervention and make it appear legitimate the US government promised to pursue transitions to an electoral democracy along American lines, which may have been what the American populace wanted to hear but may not have been a very practical approach to the problem at hand. Of course the American people also wanted an intervention of limited duration, ideally with a fast withdrawal, and nobody seemed willing to tell them that these objectives were mutually exclusive.

If there's any lesson to be learned from all this it is that people who contemplate future regime change efforts need to put a lot more effort into realistic assessments of the challenges implicit in a post regime change environment. It's easy to say we made mistakes, and by any criteria we did, but I'm not convinced that any alternative course of action would have provided a quick magical transition to a functional government that was perceived as legitimate by all of the competing populaces in the picture. The task parameters were just not realistic from the start.


I believe that if there was a better understanding of the concept of Causation for insurgency in the U.S.; then we would have taken very different courses from what we instead embarked upon. I won't second guess the guys who made the decisions; but I think if they had been a bit more informed as to the nature of what they were attempting to manipulate through force of arms; they would have made better choices.

Fact is though, at that time you had Ph.D.'s ranting about Isalmism and the Caliphate; Intel guys looking hard for a state-based threat and pinning the WMD tail on our favorite Donkey Saddam; No one in DC second guessing the validity of our own post-cold war policy and how it might be contributing to the growing violence being directed back at the US; and EVERYONE wanting to exact a healthy dose of American-style revenge on someone; and to return our lives here at home back to normal.

That was then, this is now. The question is, what do we do now?

There are still plenty clinging to concepts and policies that have dug us an 8-year deep hole, be it out of loyalty, stubborness, or just what must be very rose colored lens perspectives. I think a clear order has been given to turn the ship around; I just don't know that we've picked a new heading yet.

[Ken White]

...In order to justify intervention and make it appear legitimate the US government promised to pursue transitions to an electoral democracy along American lines, which may have been what the American populace wanted to hear (Note 1) but may not have been a very practical approach to the problem at hand (Note 2). Of course the American people also wanted an intervention of limited duration (Note 3), ideally with a fast withdrawal, and nobody seemed willing to tell them that these objectives were mutually exclusive (Note 4).Good post. Note 1 - Few did. Note 2 - Inane if not insane. Note 3 - True; as they most always have and will; most of all they want success, preferably quickly. Note 4 - Absolutely and probably the Bush admins greatest failing and certainly the part that spread much egg on the face of everyone in DoD and the Army in particular... :wry:
...The task parameters were just not realistic from the start.True, two valid tasks; retribution for 9/11 (Not necessary for some societies but quite important for the ME / south Asia) and notice to the ME to stop the attacks on US interests around the world. Regrettably, flawed execution blunted both messages. Fortunately, the recipients understood the message in spite of the errors even if most of the European hearth did not. Both operations will most likely (almost certainly, I believe) eventually be successful in achieving those goals but it sure didn't have to be this hard.

Your principal point is the takeaway:
If there's any lesson to be learned from all this it is that people who contemplate future regime change efforts need to put a lot more effort into realistic assessments of the challenges implicit in a post regime change environment.I'd go a step further and say said assessment should result in a determination to not remove such regimes, ever. Just punish those who harm US interests in various ways. We can do that, have done it in the past and we really do that fairly well.

OTOH, we do not do the FID / Stability Operation / 'Nation Building' thing at all well -- mostly for the reasons you cited earlier in another post -- and never have, Small Wars and the Marines in the Caribbean and Central America, the Army in the Philippines included. Not least because we simply do not have the patience for it and are not willing to spend the time for that budding nation to grow.

[Dayuhan]

I believe that if there was a better understanding of the concept of Causation for insurgency in the U.S.; then we would have taken very different courses from what we instead embarked upon. I won't second guess the guys who made the decisions; but I think if they had been a bit more informed as to the nature of what they were attempting to manipulate through force of arms; they would have made better choices.

Possibly so... but at the same time, I can't see how anyone with a half-dozen functioning synapses could have possibly thought that we could remove a government in an environment like Iraq or Afghanistan and simply insert a replacement without releasing a world of trouble in the process. Even without specific awareness of the insurgency causation process, common sense alone should have told us that there would be a whole bunch of people in these places with widely divergent interests and agendas, that there would be substantial competition over the right to fill the governance vacuum that the departure of the previous regime would create, and that the competition would most likely be conducted with armed force.



Fact is though, at that time you had Ph.D.'s ranting about Isalmism and the Caliphate; Intel guys looking hard for a state-based threat and pinning the WMD tail on our favorite Donkey Saddam; No one in DC second guessing the validity of our own post-cold war policy and how it might be contributing to the growing violence being directed back at the US; and EVERYONE wanting to exact a healthy dose of American-style revenge on someone; and to return our lives here at home back to normal.


Well, yes, but thus it always is: it is the job of decision makers to sort through the mass, discard the drivel, and base policy on realistic assessments. That job wasn't done. Instead the administration fell for a load of absolute drivel purveyed by the clique known as the neocons, for which the nation has paid a heavy price. Remember all the talk of "draining the swamp" in the ME? The claims that once we revealed the new Iraq as a shining example of a democratic ME all the despots would fall and be replaced by little America-clones?

I recall quite a bit of talk about how AQ was a response to American transgressions and how AQ was somehow "lashing back", responding rather than initiating. Most of it came from the left, and I never thought the argument held up very well to critical examination. In any event the US could hardly have reversed or negated the past, whether its own cold war policies or the overall decline of Islamic civilization.



That was then, this is now. The question is, what do we do now?


In Iraq, seems to me we've done all we can do and it's time to wind down with all expedient speed. The place is by no means out of the woods, but one way or another the Iraqis are going to have to sort the next steps out themselves. Things could still go downhill, but on balance I have to say Iraq is in a much better state today than I thought it would be: I expected much worse.

In Afghanistan, I haven't a clue what we do now... never wanted us to be in this position in the first place. How do you jump in a meatgrinder and come out without getting chewed up? Obvious answer is that we shouldn't go jumping into meatgrinders, but it's a bit late for that.


I'd go a step further and say said assessment should result in a determination to not remove such regimes, ever. Just punish those who harm US interests in various ways. We can do that, have done it in the past and we really do that fairly well.

OTOH, we do not do the FID / Stability Operation / 'Nation Building' thing at all well -- mostly for the reasons you cited earlier in another post -- and never have, Small Wars and the Marines in the Caribbean and Central America, the Army in the Philippines included. Not least because we simply do not have the patience for it and are not willing to spend the time for that budding nation to grow.


Not sure I'd say "never", but removing regimes isn't something to be done lightly, especially when (as is usually the case) our capacity to control what happens after the removal is limited.

I think part of America's problem in managing intervention has been that we possess simultaneously a powerful drive toward lofty altruism and an equally powerful (often more powerful) drive to serve our own self interest. Sometimes we pretend these are compatible when they are not, sometimes we lose sight of which hat we're wearing, sometimes we flip uncontrollably between them; in each case we can easily end up serving neither.

[Bob's World]

Of course it has never been about either Iraq or Afghanistan either one. Afghanistan was just a convenient place to go after the symptom of AQ and to bring some well earned revenge down on their heads.

Iraq was just the retarded kid playing in middle of the street that got run over. A tragic case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

No, what it is about is securing the United States and developing new Ways and Means to promote and preserve our national interests in a manner that is far less controlling (Cold War era), arrogant ( Clinton era) or aggressively violent (Bush era). In a manner that backs down to no one, but at the same time does not excessively press anyone without just cause either. To stand for concepts of liberty and self-determination; to apply the great natural and human resources of this great nation to overcome our current fiscal and security challenges and to emerge stronger, more vibrant, and more of a leader by our very example: and not by the promise of force or the threat of withholding favors.

This is the nation we see ourselves as, and this is the nation we can once again become. I am confident of that. After all, unlike any other nation in the world, the U.S. has the perfect ideology of popular empowerment to excel in the world emerging around us.

[Dayuhan]

what it is about is securing the United States and developing new Ways and Means to promote and preserve our national interests in a manner that is far less controlling (Cold War era), arrogant ( Clinton era) or aggressively violent (Bush era). In a manner that backs down to no one, but at the same time does not excessively press anyone without just cause either. To stand for concepts of liberty and self-determination; to apply the great natural and human resources of this great nation to overcome our current fiscal and security challenges and to emerge stronger, more vibrant, and more of a leader by our very example: and not by the promise of force or the threat of withholding favors.

This is the nation we see ourselves as, and this is the nation we can once again become. I am confident of that. After all, unlike any other nation in the world, the U.S. has the perfect ideology of popular empowerment to excel in the world emerging around us.

Excellent principles. Of course moving from principles to policy in the complicated and challenging environments presented by Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Iran, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Mindanao, Colombia, etc is a difficult and uncertain effort, and moving from policy to successful implementation is much harder.

[Bob's World]

Excellent principles. Of course moving from principles to policy in the complicated and challenging environments presented by Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Iran, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Mindanao, Colombia, etc is a difficult and uncertain effort, and moving from policy to successful implementation is much harder.

America is an excellent example of what a nation rooted in "excellent principles" can achieve.

When we were clawing our way up from the obscurity of being a break-away penal colony of Great Britain we held to our principles and did not go about trying to impose them on others. There is great wisdom in the words of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Lincoln, Roosevelt (1 and 2), and Wilson to name a few that is as relevant today as it was in their respective times.

Once we emerged from the pack at the end of WWII and we fell into the roll of implementing control-based policies to Contain the Soviets; all that slowly began to change. We first became comfortable with mandating moral and governmental judgments on others, then came to see it as our right. We were growing up and becoming our parents.

I think those Presidents who served this nation prior to the Cold War would be very surprised at how we've come to see our role in the world today. The good news, though, is that we still possess that strong foundation. We just need to take a hard look at recent interpretations shaped by the Cold War experience and recalibrate them for the world that exists today.

[Ken White]

I really hate to tell you this -- or perhaps remind you of things you know but would rather forget -- but both Roosevelts were as imperialistic and meddlesome in the affairs of others as anyone who came after them.

Teddy and his dispatching Taft to Asia in 1905 arguably created many problems in the Pacific for the US that you tend to ascribe to the Cold War. A lot of them are still with us. That and the Great White Fleet were Empire building at its finest...

As for FDR, all the illegal crap he did to get the US into WW II and his deliberate actions to bankrupt the United Kingdom and France to get both out of the Colony business so US commerce could get into those former colonies make him a major troublemaker by your lights.

You often make some good points but your desire to sugar coat US history undercuts your efforts all too often.

[Dayuhan]

When we were clawing our way up from the obscurity of being a break-away penal colony of Great Britain we held to our principles and did not go about trying to impose them on others. There is great wisdom in the words of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Lincoln, Roosevelt (1 and 2), and Wilson to name a few that is as relevant today as it was in their respective times.


Native Americans might disagree, as might Filipinos, and a few people in Latin America who saw the Monroe Doctrine from a side US history books don't generally portray. The Japanese might want to mention Commodore Perry sailing into Edo with warships and a few demands. That's off the top of my head, I suppose there are a few other examples around.

There is nothing wrong with an excellent principle, and one can have no better starting point. It pays, though, to be alert to the ease with which a bit of sophistry can twist the most admirable principles into justification for the most barbaric of acts.

[Bob's World]

Ken and Dayuhan,

No sugar applied. Building empires is what "big countries" did back then, and we wanted to be a big country in a big way.

We do not have clean hands, and as the doddering Spanish empire dangled before us, we could not resist the temptation of claiming what parts of it we wanted as our own. To control the seas required deep water ports and coaling stations, to find out where these facilities existed then, look for odd places where one often finds US flags to this day. The best deep water ports across the Pacific were Pearl Habor in Hawaii; Apra Harbor in Guam, Manila Bay in the Philippines, and Pago Pago Bay in American Samoa.

We took a strategy and tactics used to defeat native Americans and applied it to the people of the Philippines. I get it. I have studied my history too.

Both Wilson and FDR called for an end to colonialism and for the right of self-determination for all. Both were vetoed by their Eurpean counterparts in those initiatives who had far too much to lose to such a radical scheme.

Somewhere over the past 60 years "self-determination" became replaced by "democratization." Some may find that nuance insignificant.

Alway driven by commerce, as we grew more powerful we too began to manipulate governance in order to lend certainty and security to critical points of commerce and key terrain for lines of communication.

When the British held sway in the Middle East, we undercut them on the contract to develop Saudi oil by not making the same moral demands (end slavery) that the Briitish were making, and by also offering them a much fairer price for their product. We said we had no right to make such moral demands of another sovereign.

Today we not only see making such moral demands as our right, but also as our duty. To bring to rule of law and democracy to others.

In the law, they call this the "slippery slope." The problem is that we picked up a great deal of speed, and of late are encountering a great deal of friction as well. Yes, we quite willingly started down that slope. But that is no reason to ride it out to the bitter end like those empires who have gone before us. We can learn from their mistakes, and take steps to reduce the friction. Right now we are just slapping at the smoke and flames.

So yeah, I do think that prior to the end of WWII American leaders saw our rights and duties in the lands of other differently than they do today. Those were different times.
There was a time to expand the US across the North American continent. There was a time to dabble in colonialism and estabish a global footprint, there was a time to exert controls to contain the Soviets. The burning question is, what time is it now?

[Dayuhan]

Both Wilson and FDR called for an end to colonialism and for the right of self-determination for all. Both were vetoed by their Eurpean counterparts in those initiatives who had far too much to lose to such a radical scheme.

Somewhere over the past 60 years "self-determination" became replaced by "democratization." Some may find that nuance insignificant.


Were we really pushing for self-determination in those days, or was that a noble-sounding way of saying we wanted to break up the colonial system so we could trade into markets that the system locked us out of? Once Latin America was de-colonised we lost much of our interest in self-determination; I've no reason to believe it would have been any different elsewhere.



Alway driven by commerce, as we grew more powerful we too began to manipulate governance in order to lend certainty and security to critical points of commerce and key terrain for lines of communication.


Did that happen as we grew more powerful, or as the old colonial powers that once performed that function became less powerful and gave it up... or a bit of both?



When the British held sway in the Middle East, we undercut them on the contract to develop Saudi oil by not making the same moral demands (end slavery) that the Briitish were making, and by also offering them a much fairer price for their product. We said we had no right to make such moral demands of another sovereign.


Again, I think not making moral demands had nothing to do with principle and everything to do with business: we wanted the contract. The Brits manipulated the US a bit as well, most notably in Iran.



In the law, they call this the "slippery slope." The problem is that we picked up a great deal of speed, and of late are encountering a great deal of friction as well. Yes, we quite willingly started down that slope. But that is no reason to ride it out to the bitter end like those empires who have gone before us. We can learn from their mistakes, and take steps to reduce the friction. Right now we are just slapping at the smoke and flames.

So yeah, I do think that prior to the end of WWII American leaders saw our rights and duties in the lands of other differently than they do today. Those were different times.
There was a time to expand the US across the North American continent. There was a time to dabble in colonialism and establish a global footprint, there was a time to exert controls to contain the Soviets. The burning question is, what time is it now?


Post cold war foreign policy management has been a mixed bag. We've not done all that badly in Latin America, where we've scaled back on direct intervention and learned to live with a broad political spectrum without completely losing influence or compromising national interests. We've not done all that badly in East Asia. There's a rough crescent running from Pakistan through the ME and parts of Africa that remains a total mess... but that's not altogether our doing by any means.

[Ken White]

The burning question is, what time is it now?Dayuhan said it better than I could, particularly on Monroe's and Roosevelt's quite commercial versus even mildly altruistic approach -- even though both were shrewd enough to publicly couch it as the latter instead of the former. As for Wilson, a classic case (like Carter) of idealism gone amok. You might want to think about that.

I'll just reiterate that I believe your vision of what you think we should do seems unduly colored by your version of what you think we did. That version of events before your birth does not square with my recollection in many cases or with actual history in a great many more. :wry:

As I've said before, a good idea predicated on a flawed perception can go awry. You also still seem to ignore the venality of Politicians in your prescriptions...

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan said it better than I could, particularly on Monroe's and Roosevelt's quite commercial versus even mildly altruistic approach -- even though both were shrewd enough to publicly couch it as the latter instead of the former. As for Wilson, a classic case (like Carter) of idealism gone amok. You might want to think about that.

I'll just reiterate that I believe your vision of what you think we should do seems unduly colored by your version of what you think we did. That version of events before your birth does not square with my recollection in many cases or with actual history in a great many more. :wry:

As I've said before, a good idea predicated on a flawed perception can go awry. You also still seem to ignore the venality of Politicians in your prescriptions...

Ken the way I look at it I should not have to tone down what I think needs to be done to move forward simply becuase it suggests actions required of elected officials that they historically prove themselves unlikely to take on. I'll set the bar where it needs to be, not where I think they can clear it.

It is incumbent upon an informed populace to demand more of its governance when it falls short. Consider this my demand.

Was Wilson an idealist? certainly. Were his French and British counterparts realists? No, they were bitter, angry, visionless men and by trumping Wilson they forced terms on Germany that made WWII inevitable.

I'm comfortable with my knowledge and interpretations of history. I'm not a memorizer, so don't ask me to regurgitate dates, names, etc. I am more what I would call an "understander." I think about things and relate them to other things, challenge book solutions, and look for deeper meanings. Sure, I get it wrong at times, and I certainly probably sometimes see things that aren't really there. I'm comfortable with my track record.

I put these ideas out for others to consider in their own quests for understanding. Party lines and status quo answers are sold elsewhere. I'll be the first one to admit that America has stepped on a lot of toes over the years. Sometimes intentionally, sometimes just being a bit clumsy. I'm simply saying that we might want to step back a few inches and be a bit more tolerant of others a bit less intrusive in the governance and morality of the world.

[marct]

Ken the way I look at it I should not have to tone down what I think needs to be done to move forward simply becuase it suggests actions required of elected officials that they historically prove themselves unlikely to take on. I'll set the bar where it needs to be, not where I think they can clear it.

Good for you. I took that line years ago when I was heavily involved in politics; didn't work then and probably won't work now, but I can at least live with myself.


It is incumbent upon an informed populace to demand more of its governance when it falls short. Consider this my demand.

Sure, it's an axiomatic assumption if a democracy of any form is actually going to work as more than a mobocracy. Unfortunately, most of our (Western) democracies are dominated by political parties rather than any real grass roots type of democratic organizations, and one of the unfortunate truisms about political parties is that they are all focused on either maintaining or getting into power. In addition, there are some very strong institutions operating that do not want the populace to be informed except as that term is used by propagandists.

[slapout9]

Is BW really Billy Jack????

Scene from Billy Jack goes to Washington.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqBynKxAiiI

[Bob's World]

Sadly, the "net-nazis" won't let me view youtube from here...

I'll sit down with a glass of the Irish and watch it when I get home.

[slapout9]

Sadly, the "net-nazis" won't let me view youtube from here...
I'll sit down with a glass of the Irish and watch it when I get home.

All the more reason to watch it;)

[Ken White]

...the way I look at it I should not have to tone down what I think needs to be done to move forward simply becuase it suggests actions required of elected officials that they historically prove themselves unlikely to take on. I'll set the bar where it needs to be, not where I think they can clear it.Good for you -- I'm merely an old cynical guy pointing out that you're likely doomed to be disappointed. I'm also pointing out that while what you want is desirable IMO I believe you'd be better off or more likely to achieve success with a flanking movement or infiltration rather than a frontal assault... :wry:

I also suggest that while you don't have regurgitate stuff verbatim and that it's great to be an "understander," that those who oppose your ideas will latch on to any apparent egregious errors to discredit your positions. That's not an accusation, it's a cautionary... ;)
I'm simply saying that we might want to step back a few inches and be a bit more tolerant of others a bit less intrusive in the governance and morality of the world.As you know, I agree. We simply differ on the tactics... :cool:

[Pete]

In the final analysis I think it was a good thing that FDR steered us in the direction of becoming involved in World War II. A great grandfather of mine who served six months in a California National Guard cavalry unit at Camp Lewis during the Spanish-American War was a outspoken believer in the "Yellow Peril." During the 1930s he used to listen on the radio to Father Coughlin, the Rush Limbaugh of his day. Although the "Yellow Peril" sounds unacceptably racist to us now, the hindsight of the war with Japan and later wars in Korea and Vietnam makes me wonder whether old granddad was on to something. My grandma said her father would drive her mother nuts when he'd fiddle around with his Army-issue Colt .45 revolver when he was working his way through a bottle of whisky.

[jmm99]

there is a difference.

I see "rule of law" as something that arises from the People (and yes, I agree with Dayuhan that "village factions" exist); but, if a rule of law develops, it results from a sythesis of the theses and anti-theses of those factions. As such, it (the rule of law) is a valid expression of "self-determination" - something that could be called "legal" ("hey, Mr Lawyer, is this legal ?") or "legitimate".

Much of the world (and too often us - USAians) translates our self-determinate "rule of law" as "rule by law". The latter could be called "positive law" imposed from above - that is, by whatever elites happen to be be ruling the roost. The dichotomy between "rule by law" and "rule of law" is illustrated in Manchu law, where the imperial codes represented "rule by law" and village traditional law (preferred by the villagers) came closer to our "rule of law".

The bottom line is that in most of the world (and often in the US), I will have to do a lot of explaining to get across what I mean by "rule of law". And, after all that, the listener may still think that I am speaking about "rule by law".

Another case where closely-sounding terms mean very different things.

Mike

[Entropy]

there is a difference.

I see "rule of law" as something that arises from the People (and yes, I agree with Dayuhan that "village factions" exist); but, if a rule of law develops, it results from a sythesis of the theses and anti-theses of those factions. As such, it (the rule of law) is a valid expression of "self-determination" - something that could be called "legal" ("hey, Mr Lawyer, is this legal ?") or "legitimate".


That's excellent and relates to something I've been reading out this week - the Troubles in Northern Ireland in the mid-late 1960's. The increase in repressive policies toward Catholics was coming to a head and the response was initially a series of protests by nationalists calling for change. So far, so good. This passage from "The Dirty War (http://www.amazon.com/Dirty-War-Strategies-Political-Conflicts/)" really caught my eye and was an aspect of this time I didn't know about:


Undoubtedly there was a rise in anti-Catholic militancy in response to nationalist demands for change, but there was another factor which is rarely mentioned and is conveniently forgotten by Unionists who were prominent in politics at that time. Within Unionism itself there was a moderating influence led by Captain Terence O'Neill, the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, who was regarded by many people on both sides as liberal. O'Neill was prepared to give ground slowly to the clamour for change, but he did not take account of the fact that there were those within the Unionist establishment who were prepared to plot against him and overthrow him if he was seen to be capitulating to nationalists....During his period in office he witnessed the coming together of the dangerous elements which would set the society alight. What he did not know was that three prominent Unionists who reckoned that he was not hard enough on the issues re-formed the Ulster Volunteer Force, a paramilitary organization which was involved in the killing of Catholics in the 1920's Troubles. Those three men, who for legal reasons cannot be named here, introduced the one ingredient which the IRA was not prepared to provide in the mid-sixties: violence.

The passage goes on to explain the history of the first UVF attacks, the forced movement of Catholic families and the deployment of British troops, initially done to defend Catholic areas.

What's interesting here is the "rule of law," already written by the dominant group to repress the minority, was not sufficient for some who resorted to violence. The government was too moderate for the unionists and too repressive for the nationalists, but it was the dominant group that began using violent extra-legal means. It sounds kind of crazy to say it, but couldn't they be considered the first "insurgents" in that conflict? Eventually, of course, the Unionists closed ranks and the IRA more clearly became "insurgents."

I'd be interested in Col. Jones take on this, specifically in regard to motivation/causation and his theory on governance and insurgency.

[davidbfpo]

Entropy,

Maybe not the best place to re-open how 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland started in 1969. That aside.

I always remember the first RUC police officer to be killed in 'The Troubles' was a constable shot dead by a 'Loyalist' mob protesting at the 'Young Report' publication on a Friday afternoon that the RUC be disarmed (amongst other changes). The RUC in 1969 was very different from "mainland" policing and was truly para-military.

Afterwards government reports were not published on a Friday afternoon I.e. allowing for a drunken reaction and the RUC underwent some changes. It never was totally disarmed, the para-military aspect did change and evolved in different ways.

[Bob's World]

there is a difference.

I see "rule of law" as something that arises from the People (and yes, I agree with Dayuhan that "village factions" exist); but, if a rule of law develops, it results from a sythesis of the theses and anti-theses of those factions. As such, it (the rule of law) is a valid expression of "self-determination" - something that could be called "legal" ("hey, Mr Lawyer, is this legal ?") or "legitimate".

Much of the world (and too often us - USAians) translates our self-determinate "rule of law" as "rule by law". The latter could be called "positive law" imposed from above - that is, by whatever elites happen to be be ruling the roost. The dichotomy between "rule by law" and "rule of law" is illustrated in Manchu law, where the imperial codes represented "rule by law" and village traditional law (preferred by the villagers) came closer to our "rule of law".

The bottom line is that in most of the world (and often in the US), I will have to do a lot of explaining to get across what I mean by "rule of law". And, after all that, the listener may still think that I am speaking about "rule by law".

Another case where closely-sounding terms mean very different things.

Mike

Mike,

I'll probably have steal this, as it nests in well with my line of thinking regrading these types of well intended, but slightly off azimuth, concepts/programs.

The problem is that we say "enforce the rule of law; whereas to expand your remarks as I understand them, we would more accurately say enable the rule of law. One would enforce the rule by law.


This is critcal as it links directly back to:

1. One of my key causal factors of perceptions of Justice/Injustice; and

2. One of the West's current "easy button" cures for insurgency "enforce the rule of law."

My take is that when one has a populace in subversion due in part to perceptions of injustice; and the government comes in to resolve the problem by enforcing the rule of law, they more often than not push a larger setment of the populace into the movement, and the movement deeper into insurgency.

But, if they came in, recoginzing both the perceptions of the populace in regards to injustice (note to all Americans, our own civil rights based insurgency with the African American popualce is in no ways "over", it is merely "contained," and there are strong perceptions of injustice toward that segment of our society that we would do well not to ignore) and also then set out to "enable the rule of law" instead, they could move problem down and to the left on the chart I provided earlier.



I confess, most people just look at you and say "whatever" when you attempt to explain such critical subtleties as:

Effective Governance vs Good Governance

Rule of Law vs Rule by law

Legitimacy of governance vs officialness of government.


But I firmly believe, that it is in the understanding of these subtle differences and the design of words and deeds that are sensitive to those differences that mark the difference between a long, drawn out, effort with to suppress an insurgent vs a much shorter, and more enduring effort to address an insurgency.

[jmm99]

and some day, we might meet (over your Bud Lite and my Bud Regular) and determine who has the larger ego. I'd like that. :)

To be consistent (and swallowing a bit of ego), I have to admit sloppiness in using the term "rule of law". Typically, I've used "rule of law" to refer to civilian law (domestic or international), as opposed to the "laws of war" (LOAC, or a term I think is terrible: "international humanitarian law"), or to the UCMJ (consider whether that is "rule of law" or "rule by law" - how much of it bubbles up from the military, and how much is imposed on it ?).

Let's leave aside that confusion (which might be better expressed by the terms "Civilian Law" and "Military Law" - would that be better, Polarbear ?).

The contrast between "rule of law" and "rule by law" (as used in my prior post) continues through the entire process of development, acceptance and enforcement of the rule. Enforcement does not suddenly change the "rule of law" into "rule by law".

I could illustrate that by reference to Manchu law, contrasting the imperial codes ("rule by law") to the traditional village law (more akin to "rule of law"). But, that would entail more writing than I want to do and what you want to read. So, let's take something that we've already discussed: Mao's doctrine of "from the people, to the people" (a positive feedback loop) in development and implemention of the "Narrative Cause". That process also sums up the "rule of law" process, including enforcement.

Interestingly (but not surprisingly) enough, Mao did not use the "from the people, to the people" process in developing the Chinese Criminal Code, which was (when I studied it: and probably still is) much more "rule by law" than anything we would recognize as "rule of law". The imperial codes still live.

Now, "rule by law" can be accepted by the people (or at least a substantial majority of them); if so, it is "legal", "legitimate"; and the government has "legitimacy" (at least in that area of acceptance).

Also, what may be called the "rule of law" may not be accepted by the people (or at least a substantial majority of them) where the development or implementation process is via a representative democracy with a republican form of government - and there is a disconnect between the "law makers" and the people. Perhaps, the by-elections in VA, NJ and MA were evidence of that disconnect. We shall see.

As to this (and what follows):


from BW

This is critcal as it links directly back to:

1. One of my key causal factors of perceptions of Justice/Injustice; and

2. One of the West's current "easy button" cures for insurgency "enforce the rule of law." ......

one of our (US) problems is not understanding "rule of law" ourselves, or by using sloppy language about it (my mea culpa is above). Their (much of the world, especially where "insurgencies" exist) "problem" is that the "rule of law" is totally foreign to them - and they enforce "rule by law", as their autocratic governments have done for thousands of years.

As a practical matter, we (US) would be better served by recognizing their "rule by law" - and by suggesting changes in those rules to make them acceptable to the people. But, as Dayuhan will say, the Powers That Be are not likely to gore their own oxen by doing that - and may in fact act outside of their "rule by law".

In that case, we have "Blazing Saddles" where the populace's logical response is bringing in "foreign fighters", "mobilizing the masses", "accepting allies" (except for the Irish ! :D) and "setting IEDs". All in the script.

Agreed to this:


I confess, most people just look at you and say "whatever" when you attempt to explain such critical subtleties as:

Effective Governance vs Good Governance

Rule of Law vs Rule by law

Legitimacy of governance vs officialness of government.

But I firmly believe, that it is in the understanding of these subtle differences and the design of words and deeds that are sensitive to those differences that mark the difference between a long, drawn out, effort with to suppress an insurgent vs a much shorter, and more enduring effort to address an insurgency.

but these are difficult terms in their understanding; and even more difficult in reducing them to practice.

Now, a truly interesting meeting would be Bill Moore, Ken White, you and me, to engage in a discussion of "good governance", which still needs a bit of work. :)

As to this:


from BW
I'll probably have to steal this, as it nests in well with my line of thinking regrading these types of well intended, but slightly off azimuth, concepts/programs.

feel free to dog rob with reckless abandon. The work you are doing is far more important than my "proprietary rights" (which you as a lawyer, know don't exist in this stuff; but thank you for asking first).

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I see "rule of law" as something that arises from the People (and yes, I agree with Dayuhan that "village factions" exist); but, if a rule of law develops, it results from a sythesis of the theses and anti-theses of those factions. As such, it (the rule of law) is a valid expression of "self-determination" - something that could be called "legal" ("hey, Mr Lawyer, is this legal ?") or "legitimate".


I agree... however, we need to remember that the process by whicyh a rule of law or a synthesis of various factions, develops is often a rocky one and sometimes conflict is part of it. That process may not necessarily suit our interests in any given place at any given time. Our reflexive view of insurgency as something to be countered can make it difficult for us to see that sometimes insurgency is part of that developmental faction. When a ruling elite refuses evolution, they find themselves facing revolution.

When an outside force, even one with altruistic motives, steps into this developmental process and tries to influence or direct or "help" it, distortions are created that don't always work out as intended.


I'll be the first one to admit that America has stepped on a lot of toes over the years. Sometimes intentionally, sometimes just being a bit clumsy. I'm simply saying that we might want to step back a few inches and be a bit more tolerant of others a bit less intrusive in the governance and morality of the world.

In many ways we've been doing this, in many parts of the world. In some places it's worked out fairly well, as I mentioned earlier, in others it hasn't. Not everything that happens, even when it involves us, is a response to our actions and our positions; there are many other forces in play as well. Certainly we need to be aware of our influence, but not to the extent where we start thinking we're the only influence.

[M-A Lagrange]

Hello everybody,


I confess, most people just look at you and say "whatever" when you attempt to explain such critical subtleties as:

Effective Governance vs Good Governance

Rule of Law vs Rule by law

Legitimacy of governance vs officialness of government.


But I firmly believe, that it is in the understanding of these subtle differences and the design of words and deeds that are sensitive to those differences that mark the difference between a long, drawn out, effort with to suppress an insurgent vs a much shorter, and more enduring effort to address an insurgency.

Rule of Law has to be understood as it is: a politic philosophy and not another tool from the State Building box.

In my opinion, what most of the people implementing Rule of Law do not get is that Rule of Law does not replace the social contract that fond a society.
The twist may come that in the US Rule of Law is the Social Contract: the US constitution. When rule of law is exported, either you have a social contract meeting the pre requirement of rule of law and it's a success. Or you just have a social contract that support socio-economical division of political power and you end up with Rule by Law. Rule of Law cannot be exported without being supported by the people.

And yes you have village factions, as we have conservators and liberals. (If I can add). Why do we always see the others not as complex as us? Most of the time, they are even more complex than us because less united and more fractioned.

Sorry to introduce an additional subtle difference.

M-A

[jmm99]

or at least more succinctly:


from MA

Rule of Law has to be understood as it is: a politic philosophy and not another tool from the State Building box.

In my opinion, what most of the people implementing Rule of Law do not get is that Rule of Law does not replace the social contract that fond a society.

The twist may come that in the US Rule of Law is the Social Contract: the US constitution.

When rule of law is exported, either you have a social contract meeting the pre requirement of rule of law and it's a success.

Or you just have a social contract that support socio-economical division of political power and you end up with Rule by Law.

Rule of Law cannot be exported without being supported by the people.

QED (Quod est demonstratum).

That having been said, the term "rule of law" is very much in the "toolkit". E.g., the 2009 Rule of Law Handbook (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/rule-of-law_2009.pdf) (available at CLAMO website), A Practitioner's Guide for Judge Advocates, which deals in practice with the domestic, civilian law of host nations - as well as with some I Law and Military Law issues.

So far as defining "rule of law", the doctrine provided is (pp. 24-25):


Rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights principles.

That principle can be broken down into seven effects:

• The state monopolizes the use of force in the resolution of disputes

• Individuals are secure in their persons and property

• The state is itself bound by law and does not act arbitrarily

• The law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow individuals to plan their affairs

• Individuals have meaningful access to an effective and impartial legal system

• The state protects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms

• Individuals rely on the existence of justice institutions and the content of law in the conduct of their daily lives

The Chinese legal scholars of the Manchu period (and before, and perhaps now) would call that fa-chie (rule by law) effectively implemented. Absent the bullet points of "and which are consistent with international human rights principles" and "The state protects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms", which did not enter the picture.

What is interesting is that the Chinese people avoided the hsien (district) courts like the plague (for good reasons), in favor of the traditional clan, village and guild methods of dispute resolution.

Regards

Mike

[Entropy]

Entropy,

Maybe not the best place to re-open how 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland started in 1969. That aside.


Agreed and I see that I made my point poorly. I'm only using it as a possible example of a case where "governance" was not the root problem. When you have two factions, or factions within factions, that have completely incompatible goals, are willing to use violence and unwilling to compromise, then I question whether there is any kind of governance that can contain that. BW's theory is that insurgency is caused by a lack of "good governance" but governance comes from people and sometimes people want violence.

M-A Lagrange brings up the social contract (or lack of), which related, IMO. When one group views another group in terms of the "other" as more than a mere enemy, then there is no social contract and therefore no basis for "good governance." At least that is something I've been thinking about lately.

[M-A Lagrange]

Entropy,


When one group views another group in terms of the "other" as more than a mere enemy, then there is no social contract and therefore no basis for "good governance." At least that is something I've been thinking about lately.

Can you make your point much clearer?
Excluding a group of people from the society or from the protection of the society (as slaves in antiquity) can be part of the social contract.
As I understand it, it is ennemies who are not part of the social contract as they want to destroy/change it.

[Dayuhan]

Entropy,



Can you make your point much clearer?
Excluding a group of people from the society or from the protection of the society (as slaves in antiquity) can be part of the social contract.
As I understand it, it is ennemies who are not part of the social contract as they want to destroy/change it.

I think the point was that it can be difficult or impossible to establish a social contract in an arbitrarily delineated "nation" that includes traditional enemies within its borders. An example might be the former Yugoslavia.

[Entropy]

I think the point was that it can be difficult or impossible to establish a social contract in an arbitrarily delineated "nation" that includes traditional enemies within its borders. An example might be the former Yugoslavia.

That's basically it yes.

[marct]

I think the point was that it can be difficult or impossible to establish a social contract in an arbitrarily delineated "nation" that includes traditional enemies within its borders. An example might be the former Yugoslavia.


That's basically it yes.

One of the rather odd things I've picked up over the years is a slightly different view of the concept of a social contract. The fact that X and Y are traditional enemies means that they have a specific, defined and accepted relationship already, which is part of a contract. This has some interesting implications since, I would argue, every nation state (barring possibly Andorra, Monaco and few others) are arbitrarily delineated "nations" that only bear a passing resemblance to an ethnoi.

As to whether or not such a contract can be established, sure it can and has been in a number of places: Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland all spring to mind as classic examples. The question, IMHO, should be more in line with how did such a multi-ethnoi social contract come into existence and why and how has it been maintained?

Cheers,

Marc

[Dayuhan]

One of the rather odd things I've picked up over the years is a slightly different view of the concept of a social contract. The fact that X and Y are traditional enemies means that they have a specific, defined and accepted relationship already, which is part of a contract. This has some interesting implications since, I would argue, every nation state (barring possibly Andorra, Monaco and few others) are arbitrarily delineated "nations" that only bear a passing resemblance to an ethnoi.


I suppose two groups agreeing to kill as many of one another as possible at every available opportunity could be said to constitute a social contract of sorts. Whether that contract would be a viable basis for nationhood is another question.



As to whether or not such a contract can be established, sure it can and has been in a number of places: Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland all spring to mind as classic examples. The question, IMHO, should be more in line with how did such a multi-ethnoi social contract come into existence and why and how has it been maintained?


It might be more accurate to say that these contracts evolved, rather than speaking of establishment. The process of evolution varies widely from case to case; sometimes it's peaceful, sometimes it's not, sometimes the groups involved end up separating and establishing different nations. I don't think it's something something that can be effectively imposed on a deus ex machina basis.

[Beelzebubalicious]

I'd like to throw in a little wrinkle on the social contract discussion that's evolving here as it's a term that's come up a lot for me recently in the international development business (when I'm not winning no bid contracts and fleecing american taxpayers...).

International Review of Administrative Sciences 75(4), "Decentralized local governance in fragile states: learning from Iraq" by Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson, the authors use the word "covenant" in this sense:


The good governance agenda assumes a form of state—society relations that results from a covenant between citizens and their government, yet historically most states arose through conquest. Page 5.

I though the use of word "covenant" curious since it seems such a religiously and racially charged term - a bit heavy-handed for what seems to be a kind of social contract or partnership.

The first time I saw the term used was in the USAID report titled, “Democratic Decentralization Strategic Assessment: Indonesia Final Report (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ231.pdf)". In this report, the term is used in this context:


An innovative concept emerging from this assessment is that a feasible approach for future local governance programming in the near term may be the introduction of a more efficient approach to the accountability challenge that works through multi-party relationships (accountability covenants) that bind a large number of actors together in support of shared aims. Local politicians and CSOs in Indonesia might organize a participatory planning process that first yields a shared vision then leads to formulation of an action plan. By assigning specific tasks to multiple actors, a dense network of mutual accountability is created. p. 28

Social contract theory (Putnam) has driven a lot of development programming, most explicitly the World Bank's Community Driven Development approach applied broadly (over 30,000 villages and $1 billion distributed) in Indonesia. For a good overview of that, see a paper (http://www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/papers/Crises.pdf) by Scott Guggenheim.

Donors, especially USAID, have consistently focused on supporting civil society and building the social contract (largely in the absence of a strong or even functional government) and I've been wondering if the use of "covenant" is an attempt to strengthen and expand the concept/approach. I find the concept and approach appealing, but it does have a lot of issues when it comes to international development.

[marct]

I suppose two groups agreeing to kill as many of one another as possible at every available opportunity could be said to constitute a social contract of sorts. Whether that contract would be a viable basis for nationhood is another question.

What is fascinating about it is, really, the structures negotiated to contain conflict to specific times, places, styles and forms. "Nationhood", like the concept of nation state, is, IMO, quite tricky and a very recent invention. Honestly, as far as establishing a model of social contracting between either different ethnoi or sub-groups of the same ethnoi, nation states are pretty irrelevant except as a special case.

Where it does become relevant is when we start examining how multi-ethnoi, multi-group polities can function. Again, the nation state is a special, and quite recent, case, so it can't serve as the basis for a general theory.


It might be more accurate to say that these contracts evolved, rather than speaking of establishment. The process of evolution varies widely from case to case; sometimes it's peaceful, sometimes it's not, sometimes the groups involved end up separating and establishing different nations. I don't think it's something something that can be effectively imposed on a deus ex machina basis.

It's a very interesting question - evolution vs. contract ex machina. In most cases, I suspect that initial contract conditions are imposed and, from that imposition, evolve over time; that was certainly the case in Canada.


I'd like to throw in a little wrinkle on the social contract discussion that's evolving here as it's a term that's come up a lot for me recently in the international development business (when I'm not winning no bid contracts and fleecing american taxpayers...).

International Review of Administrative Sciences 75(4), "Decentralized local governance in fragile states: learning from Iraq" by Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson, the authors use the word "covenant"....

Donors, especially USAID, have consistently focused on supporting civil society and building the social contract (largely in the absence of a strong or even functional government) and I've been wondering if the use of "covenant" is an attempt to strengthen and expand the concept/approach. I find the concept and approach appealing, but it does have a lot of issues when it comes to international development.

It's an interesting term, especially since they are using it in the 19th century sense. Technically, using "covenant" as a "coming together" it is correct, although you're right that it now carries religious connotations. How do you see it as being useful for development work?

[Entropy]

I think state formation is an important element and is a primary factor in a lot of the problems we see today with "failed states." That's one reason I keep bringing up the issue of borders because, in many cases, borders were imposed and are a continuing source of conflict. There wasn't a natural evolution that developed into a social contract and nationhood - instead a bunch of different peoples were conglomerated and given a name. I'm not sure there is much that additional outside interference (ie. "Development") can do to create or improve a social contract in that case. It might make problems worse.

There's also the question of institutions and I think they are some of the stickiest glue that enables a "social contract" that keeps peoples together in a big tent. For example, in Pakistan there is the Army. What is there in Afghanistan? Somalia? Yemen? Nothing except Islam which brings up another set of issues. Can outsiders develop such institutions? It seems to me the track record on that isn't very good.

[Bob's World]

From my current perch in the middle of things here in Southern Afghanistan, I get a chance weigh these theories against the facts I deal with daily, and the various programs that higher develops.

One area drawing a lot of focus is that of Reconciliation and Reintegration (or "forgive and forget" as I think of it.) Personally, I think we are worrying too much about this, and that to over formalize or overly shape this from our outsider perspective would be as likely to be harmful as helpful, but that is not what I wanted to address.

In reviewing some R & R documents, it struck me that we are really dealing with two distinct types of insurgency with the Taliban, and it divides on hierarchical lines.

For the Taliban senior leadership, I believe it is primarily a "Revolutionary Insurgency” (In BW, there are three broad categories of Insurgency: Revolutionary, Separatist, and Resistance). For revolutionary insurgency Causation and Motivation are more distinct than for a resistance insurgency. I believe that the key to R & R with the Taliban leadership must address the Causal factor of the illegitimacy of the Karzai government; that there must be some place for their ideological concerns in the new government; and that lastly, the presence of the foreigners must be reduced.

For the rank and file, I believe it is primarily a resistance insurgency. 50-80% fight simply because we are here, or because we are here and they can draw an honest wage as well to attack that foreign presence. I think they don't spend much time thinking about the government in Kabul, or its legitimacy. I think they don't much think about the TB ideology. For them the key factors that must be addressed are virtually the inverse of those for the senior leadership. BL, is that I don't believe we need to really worry about the majority of the populace to address the causal factors for the insurgency writ large, and that the COIN / R & R effort must focus on addressing the issues of the leadership.

This throws a wrench in the POP COIN machine to a degree. Yes, we must treat the populace with respect, no, we can't kill our way out of this (merely killing senior leaders drives the Pez effect. New ones keep popping up). We must enable a legitimate process that includes the leadership of this large, disenfranchised segment of the populace. In so doing, we will be able to bring them into the system and bring legitimacy to the system at the same time. This stands leadership down. Then we can reduce our presence. This stands the rank and file down.

But you must address the leadership first.

[Beelzebubalicious]

It's an interesting term, especially since they are using it in the 19th century sense. Technically, using "covenant" as a "coming together" it is correct, although you're right that it now carries religious connotations. How do you see it as being useful for development work?

Well, USAID is using it in terms of "accountability covenants" between civil society and government, the key definition being binding relationships where each side holds the other accountable. This starts with both sides understanding each others role and responsibility in a democratic society, something which takes years to develop. In many countries I've worked in, there's a huge level of distrust on both sides, a sense of entitlement on the citizen side (high expectations and frustration) and on the government side, the perspective that citizens don't know best, should not be involved and that government should make decisions themselves.

I think USAID wants to take the whole idea of social contract a step further and to make it almost a sacred trust, a stronger bond. Unfortunately, citizens holding government accountable often means taking the "watch dog" role and it is inherently antagonistic, which further deteriorates the relationship and bond. On the other side, civil society working closely with government can also mean co-option and lack of objectivity.

This kind of approach often fails to take account of or approach the issues of power and political economy. So, coming around to answer your question, I'm not sure it has much validity, or at least I think I need a lot more convincing. The World Bank has claimed success in using this kind of a method in Indonesia on the Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach at the village level and CDD has been adopted by USAID and now the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in other places. The WB has done a lot of impact evaluation and they have some compelling arguments that it works.

[marct]

Hi Beelzebubalicious,


Well, USAID is using it in terms of "accountability covenants" between civil society and government, the key definition being binding relationships where each side holds the other accountable. This starts with both sides understanding each others role and responsibility in a democratic society, something which takes years to develop. In many countries I've worked in, there's a huge level of distrust on both sides, a sense of entitlement on the citizen side (high expectations and frustration) and on the government side, the perspective that citizens don't know best, should not be involved and that government should make decisions themselves.

I suspect that a largish part of the problem lies in the concept of "democratic society" :wry:. It was certainly part of the mythography of the 20th and early 21st centuries, but has been too much of a failure in too many parts of the world to be appealing. Federal Republican versions of it usually flop when the people running it realize how much they can skim, while parliamentary types flop without a long held crown as a counterpoise. I suspect many of the countries in, say, Africa, would do better with a canton-esque confederate system a la 18th cenrtury Switzerland.


I think USAID wants to take the whole idea of social contract a step further and to make it almost a sacred trust, a stronger bond. Unfortunately, citizens holding government accountable often means taking the "watch dog" role and it is inherently antagonistic, which further deteriorates the relationship and bond. On the other side, civil society working closely with government can also mean co-option and lack of objectivity.

Typical, unfortunately. At a cultural level, it would be analogous to the Commonwealth stepping into US politics and saying "Nice try, guys, but we've decided you need some stability, so we are re-establishing the monarchy". There are other alternatives to that watchdog, antagonistic role - you might want to glance at the preface to the 2nd edition of Durkheim's The Division of Labor in Society (http://www.amazon.com/Division-Labor-Society-Emile-Durkheim/dp/0684836386/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1265217458&sr=8-5) where he talks about "intermediate systems" in a large society. People are, as a general rule, more likely to trust people they actually know.


This kind of approach often fails to take account of or approach the issues of power and political economy. So, coming around to answer your question, I'm not sure it has much validity, or at least I think I need a lot more convincing. The World Bank has claimed success in using this kind of a method in Indonesia on the Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach at the village level and CDD has been adopted by USAID and now the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in other places. The WB has done a lot of impact evaluation and they have some compelling arguments that it works.

Hmmmm, yeah, I can see that. Covenants that aren't enforceable in this world or the next tends to be not worth the paper they are written on :wry:.

Cheers,

Marc