Combat Participation

[William F. Owen]

OK, I know this is a touchy subject, but Ken White's post here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=92118&postcount=69), does merit further examination in my opinion.

There have been numerous, quite well researched opinions, data and papers, that not everyone fights, when required to do so.

What we seem to know is

Most men will fight, given good leadership, thus good leaders and NCOs make a huge difference.
In the absence of such leadership, they will simply revert to doing the minimum required by appearances.
3-5% will run or simply play no useful part.

I do not want anyone to start airing dirty laundry, but I think this issue might be usefully discussed.

[Fuchs]

The general morale alters these figures - an especially poor morale could boost the last figure, for example.

The stress level and expectations should also be able to change the structure much.

Finally, it's been written in some sources that the 'cowards' or 'fragile' soldier are usually known in advance. A good roganization should therefore be able to almost eliminate the last fraction median problematic fights.


I recall much German writing on the subject, and it doesn't focus on percentages or such but on what the leaders should do.
The forming of small teams ("Kampfgemeinschaften" - combat collectives) as small as fire team or squad with very strong cohesion is one of the advised courses of action. This goes so far that WIA infantry in WW2 preferred to cure in their company instead of in a hospital, knowing that they would be cared for betterby their comrades.
This is strongly related to "Kameradschaftlichkeit" (conmradeship?).

The other advise is about the vertical relations; leader-troops.
The leaders should immerse into this Kameradschaftlichkeit to be accepted and respected (eating same food, no luxury, lead by example...) while still retaining the ability to be tough (~ sacrific men).

As I said; there's much about how to address the problem in German literature, but very little statistics (if any) about it itself.

[John]

A couple of good books, within the past few years or so, on this subject are "On Killing" and "On Combat" by Dave Grossman. Grossman founded Killology to research these very issues.

[William F. Owen]

A couple of good books, within the past few years or so, on this subject are "On Killing" and "On Combat" by Dave Grossman. Grossman founded Killology to research these very issues.
I know Grossman's work. Personally I think it's just plain wrong.
He has confused two entirely separate issues, that being a desire to kill with an ability to fight, just as SLA Marshall made the same mistake. Fear of harm is not fear of killing. Most of his evidence fails to make that distinction.

Once you subject a lot of his assertions to rigour they just fall apart. His assertion about man shaped targets and computer games is ridiculous.

[Chris jM]

Maj Gen Kippenberger was one of the more accomplished and famed commanders within the NZ Div in WW2, as well as being one of the more intellectually orientated. After Marshall released his 'Men Against Fire' Kippenberger undertook an unofficial review of combat experiences amongst the NZ infantryman. His findings do not sit well with Marshall's assertions with regards to non-participation in combat.

(apologies for the poor formatting, the doc has not copied well from word)


It may be accepted that a man will fight hardest when he has full confidence in himself and in his ability to use effectively the weapon with which he is armed. It is therefore necessary to treat men as individuals when making postings to sections and to allocate them to duties in the battalion which are in character. Thus a man who is a strong individualist may be a better soldier if employed as a sniper than he would be in, say, the anti*tank platoon. On the other hand, an indifferent performer in a rifle section may do well in a less exacting role with a mortar, perhaps because he needs the reassurance of other men working with him in the team, perhaps because he has more confidence in his ability with that weapon.

‘It could be seen from his reactions that he was absolutely terrified of front line action in a rifle section. He was placed in charge of a bren gun and as such took part in the Battle of Takrouna. With his machine-gun trained on to one of the approaches to the pinnacle itself, he stuck to his job during one of the enemy counter-attacks and simply mowed them down until the path was almost blocked with enemy dead. This man was one of the unsung heroes of Takrouna’

21. In general the most determined fighters should be found in the rifle sections, they are the essence of the fighting qualities of the unit and must be drawn from the finest material available.


SECTION 2 – USING THE MAXIMUM WEIGHT OF FIRE
40. The necessity for maximum effective fire against enemy positions in the assault is generally accepted.

‘In the attack on Takrouna, my men knew they were in for a tough job. I consider that though much of their fire found no targets, the volume of thefire carried my men along.’

41. Well trained and well led infantrymen will engage the enemy at every opportunity, especially when the situation is most critical.

‘When we moved over the area (at Bel Hamed) in which the 20th Battalion
was over*run, we remarked that invariably in each hastily dug slit trench
there was a small pile of expended small arms cartridge cases, and this applied also to mortar pits and gun sites.’

42. Nevertheless, there will always be a small proportion of men who will be reluctant to use their weapons, either through fright, or the feeling of drawing enemy attention to themselves, or through mistaken feelings of humanity.

‘On the Senio, a forward platoon phoned battalion headquarters to say that a
German was lying out in front of their position, and they wanted a mortar concentration on the poor unfortunate. No one seemed anxious to fire a Bren, rifle, or SMG. An order from the commanding officer put this right * and the 'German' was found to be nothing more than a steel helmet!’

43. This hesitation will be greatest among unseasoned troops, and especially among those who have not been fully trained to place confidence in their own weapons.

‘During the 1941 Libyan campaign, I witnessed the phenomenon of a few men
carrying out the attack drill faithfully and yet not even bothering to look up at the enemy whenever they took to ground. They seemed to be just lying
there waiting for the next order to charge. I remember ordering these men
to use their rifles. Now and again they did, but I feel certain to no good effect. At the next stop the same thing would happen again.’

‘In the battle of Tanaheran I attacked with two platoons in jungle warfare.
The men were heavily armed * about four grenades each, 100 rounds per rifle
and a full complement of ammunition for Bren and SMG. At the conclusion of
the battle, the platoon that had borne the brunt of the fight were, to a man,
nearly out of ammunition. These men had been painstakingly trained, time and ammunition being no object.’

44. It is important that the proportion of passengers be kept as low as possible, in order that the great fire potential of the infantry battalion may take its full effect on the enemy.

45. This great volume of fire will normally be supplemented by the heaviest fire support that the formation commander can provide from other sources. It is the primary task of artillery and other arms to provide the maximum available fire support in order to help the infantry forward to their objectives, all other tasks are of secondary importance. At the same time, the battalion commander must appreciate the tremendous firepower that is available under his hand in the unit. If heavier support is not available, for any reason, his own resources are normally sufficient to enable him to get forward against anything but strongly fortified opposition.

‘I am convinced that my own unit was tremendously improved by the period
on the Senio when we had no artillery support. Men developed a new confidence and delight in the Bren, sniping became almost common, and most valuable of all, we suddenly found that we could use the PIAT for a great variety of useful purposes. The PIAT was a great infantry weapon, which we only really used to the full effect in the very last campaign.’

46. A commander may anticipate that about one*quarter of his (infantry) weapons will be effective at any one time in the attack, but this will be reduced in conditions of poor visibility. Infantry moving forward close behind an artillery barrage (leaning on the barrage) may have little necessity to fire, other than to demoralise the enemy further. It is unnecessary to emphasise that every worthwhile target should be engaged, even when opposition is light.

[Chris jM]

Grossman founded Killology to research these very issues.

Grossman was taught in one of my university papers as gospel, and at the time I thought very highly of him. After hearing about 'killology' and looking at his website I became a little more suspicious of his scholarship, and on rereading 'On Killing' (this time aware that his 'referencing' of Marshall with all the caveats SLAM invokes) I was more disappointed than anything.

'On Combat' seemed bizarrely orientated towards martial arts and law enforcement than I expected from a book about combat.

Another book that fits into the criteria is Bourke's 'An Intimate History of Killing.' As with Grossman, Bourke's book has many, many issues before one could apply her messages to military training however I would still recommend it as being of interest and educational value. 'An Intimate History' focuses more on the effects of media in the perception of combat than in defining any psych/ science behind killing.

However, without any hesitation I would recommend J Glenn Gray's 'The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle'. The author enlisted in the US Army in 1941 on the same day he was informed that he had achieved a doctorate in philosophy. You won't get any universal lessons or paradox-changing theories from Gray, but it is a well written view of a soldier viewing his experiences and impulses with a logical and philosophical perspective.

[Rifleman]

I think Grossman is valuable in one regard: he documents what happens to many people physiologically when in combat. So experiencing things like tunnel vision, auditory exclusion, and loss of fine motor skills should not come as a surprise.

I think that's about the extent of Grossman's contribution though.

Getting back to Wilf's original post. I suspect that most men really don't want to be there but they don't want to be seen as shirkers either. They see military service as a reluctant duty so they want to be able to say, "I did my part." But most men do not see military service as a calling or even an interest.

That's the biggest reason I don't like the idea of conscription.

[Tukhachevskii]

They see military service as a reluctant duty so they want to be able to say, "I did my part." But most men do not see military service as a calling or even an interest.

That's the biggest reason I don't like the idea of conscription.

Yet,surely, there is also a societal factor to be considered here too. Some states are permissive towards a "militaristic" civil-culture (by which I mean pro-military not pro-war) in which participation is seen to be an important part of what, ahem, turns a subject into a citizen. In Israel the IDF performs numerous ancilliary services; as a homogenising school to meld together recruits from differing backgrounds (spatially speaking, like Ethiopian, Yemeni, Indian jews, etc.) as well as inculcating the central tenents of Zionism and ensuring people learn basic civic responsibility and identification with the State. IMO this was dented after "Grapes of Wrath" (maybe even prior to that). Other countries like Russia where conscription often looked like a forced sojourn in borstal made service in the armed forces something one grittied one's teeth to get through. The strategic culture of states is IMO as important in inculcating a "warrior" mentality upon which to base, expand and deepen professionalism but there will, of course, always be those for whom the military is a plague on their house (like the ultra-orthodox in Israel for instance, though not because they are "scared"). Here (UK) there have been many calls for a return to national service (usually from people who, at the time, said they hated it!). It would be interesting to see if any studies were conducted by the German government in the interwar and war time (WWII) period as well as other countries. I'm sure there's a societal variable we're missing here. Anyway, thats my 2 pence of worth(less) observations from civvie street (and from someone who never got the opportunity to see if I was born to fight or flee:D).

[Kiwigrunt]

Maj Gen Kippenberger was one of the more accomplished and famed commanders within the NZ Div in WW2, as well as being one of the more intellectually orientated. After Marshall released his 'Men Against Fire' Kippenberger undertook an unofficial review of combat experiences amongst the NZ infantryman. His findings do not sit well with Marshall's assertions with regards to non-participation in combat.

(apologies for the poor formatting, the doc has not copied well from word)

Hi Chris, if this doc is available on line, could you give us a link? I'd love to read it.
Some of the remarks you quoted are relevant to a number of other threads here as well.;)

[William F. Owen]

Hi Chris, if this doc is available on line, could you give us a link? I'd love to read it.
Some of the remarks you quoted are relevant to a number of other threads here as well.;)

Concur. This document seems of great value and has managed to stay under my radar!

[davidbfpo]

This Kiwi general has appeared before, with posts by another member EmmetM (who has not been active for a few months) and this maybe helpful - it is not the desired link.

See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1287&page=2

[Bill Moore]

Personally I have not seen any American Soldiers shy away from fighting, but as Ken mentioned in the more elite units such as SF and the Airborne Infantry there is a warrior culture which reduces the likelyhood of that happening. A friend many years ago said there are no better warriors than the Americans, Brits, Aussies and Canadians, there is just something in those cultures that produce men who like to fight. While simplistic, there seems to be degree of truth in that statement. Thoughts?

In all fairness, I wonder if it is fair to compare the combat stats from WWII (or the Korean War) where our Soldiers were fighting peer competitors (who had heavy armor, air, artillery and well trained infantry) where the combat intensity and casualty rate was much higher than in the combat we're engaged in today. Suspect that while there are many parallel forms of stress and factors weighing on a man's decision making process, there are also considerable differences that may be worth considering from a leadership perspective.

Shifting gears, is anyone aware of any studies, books, lessons learned that offer "practical" insights on how to inspire the foreign forces we're training in developing nations to develop the same level of fighting spirit that our troops have? I know there are a lot of factors, and in elite units where we can be selective like ISOF and the Afghan Commandos this isn't much of an issue, I'm more concerned about the regular infantry and police we're turning out.

[Firn]

Personally I have not seen any American Soldiers shy away from fighting, but as Ken mentioned in the more elite units such as SF and the Airborne Infantry there is a warrior culture which reduces the likelyhood of that happening. A friend many years ago said there are no better warriors than the Americans, Brits, Aussies and Canadians, there is just something in those cultures that produce men who like to fight. While simplistic, there seems to be degree of truth in that statement. Thoughts

As you said it is pretty simplistic and most likely tied to the personal and rather limited experience of your most likely anglophone friend - it does not seem to be a case that he only has other anglophones in mind.



In all fairness, I wonder if it is fair to compare the combat stats from WWII (or the Korean War) where our Soldiers were fighting peer competitors (who had heavy armor, air, artillery and well trained infantry) where the combat intensity and casualty rate was much higher than in the combat we're engaged in today. Suspect that while there are many parallel forms of stress and factors weighing on a man's decision making process, there are also considerable differences that may be worth considering from a leadership perspective.


As you said it depends an a rather large amount of variables and perceptions play a large part too. The German soldiers and commanders in WWII had a rather low regard for the bravery and fighting ability of the American soldier. This might partly be explained on the simple fact that their enemy could rely so much on their vast superiority in all supporting arms, as well as in numbers and material to dominate the battles. It may also play a role, that quite some members of the German army considered themselves to be man to man the finest soldiers of the war. You see, perceptions and the specific point of view are also to be considered.


Shifting gears, is anyone aware of any studies, books, lessons learned that offer "practical" insights on how to inspire the foreign forces we're training in developing nations to develop the same level of fighting spirit that our troops have? I know there are a lot of factors, and in elite units where we can be selective like ISOF and the Afghan Commandos this isn't much of an issue, I'm more concerned about the regular infantry and police we're turning out.

This is an interesting question and some examples come to my mind. Perhaps I will dig a bit.


Firn

[Ken White]

As you said it is pretty simplistic and most likely tied to the personal and rather limited experience of your most likely anglophone friend - it does not seem to be a case that he only has other anglophones in mind.participating in combat in two major wars (not the post 1989 type) with and against over 12 foreign Armies including those Bill Moore mentioned plus the New Zealanders -- the other eight were not anglophone. My observation was that all nations are willing to fight though techniques do vary and that cultural attitudes fall behind training in importance. I do not totally agree with Bill on airborne / SF warrior culture. There is an attitudinal difference but it's more complex than that and many non-airborne units also possess those same attributes.

Nor is Bills' comment simplistic. While I make no brief for it either way and would in fact say that in the eyes of many, it's a deficiency, not an asset, there's a fair amount of research that shows the Anglosphere does tend to be more violent than the other speech-i-phones.

[Chris jM]

Kiwigrunt, Wilf, - unfortunately the document isn't available online, however I do have access to it as a word doc at work. I'll try and get it uploaded early in the week (the worst case being if I can't upload it to the board, I'll email to those interested). I may have access to some other unrestricted docs on the history/evolution of the RNZIR/2NZEF that could be of interest you, too, Kiwigrunt.

With regards to the elite/ aggressive units, Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon (he was a British subaltern for a significant period of WW2 in the ETO - I imagine his name is already known to most here) made an interesting comment towards the end of his book. While I don't have access to the text, he basically disputed the requirement for soldiers to be aggressive and gung-ho. There was a quote I remember pondering where, from memory, Jary stated that he'd prefer a reflective poet in the frontline over an impulsive brawler. I can't attest to the accuracy of that comment, and if anyone had 18 Platoon close to hand I'd be greatly obliged if they could confirm this quote.

[Kiwigrunt]

Kiwigrunt, Wilf, - unfortunately the document isn't available online, however I do have access to it as a word doc at work. I'll try and get it uploaded early in the week (the worst case being if I can't upload it to the board, I'll email to those interested). I may have access to some other unrestricted docs on the history/evolution of the RNZIR/2NZEF that could be of interest you, too, Kiwigrunt.


Thanks for that Chris, I appreciate that very much.



With regards to the elite/ aggressive units, Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon (he was a British subaltern for a significant period of WW2 in the ETO - I imagine his name is already known to most here) made an interesting comment towards the end of his book. While I don't have access to the text, he basically disputed the requirement for soldiers to be aggressive and gung-ho. There was a quote I remember pondering where, from memory, Jary stated that he'd prefer a reflective poet in the frontline over an impulsive brawler. I can't attest to the accuracy of that comment, and if anyone had 18 Platoon close to hand I'd be greatly obliged if they could confirm this quote.

Yes, his book is on my ‘yet to read’ list.
For as far as your quote is an accurate refection of Sydney’s comments, I tend to agree with him. I have never been very impressed with the macho/gung-ho attitudes that we see a lot in the military. I find it more understandable from the younger ones from a testosterone perspective but to still see it with so many older (more mature?) NCO’s and officers is, uhhhm, a different matter.
This reflective poet does IMO need to be able to generate ‘controlled aggression’ but I don’t think that that requires an aggressive/ gung-ho nature per say.
A counter to this could be that the reflective poet may be less inclined to do what ‘needs’ to be done if he is not morally behind it. That would make it harder for him to generate the required aggression as opposed to utilising a level of aggression that is already there.

[Chris jM]

I have never been very impressed with the macho/gung-ho attitudes that we see a lot in the military. I find it more understandable from the younger ones from a testosterone perspective but to still see it with so many older (more mature?) NCO’s and officers is, uhhhm, a different matter.
This reflective poet does IMO need to be able to generate ‘controlled aggression’ but I don’t think that that requires an aggressive/ gung-ho nature per say.

Having never seen nor led soldiers in combat, I'm reluctant to pass judgement on the need for aggression, and how far that need stretches. I have, however, seen the 'dumb' side of aggression come out in low intensity ops that does more harm than good to both the AO and FF.

I have made a point of avoiding the term 'aggression' or even 'controlled aggression' when it comes to command or tactics. In my mind, 'audacity' is the undefinable quantity we need more than all else. Aggression triumphs action above all else, whereas I see audacity being the corner-stone of thinking, aggressive action coupled with purpose.

[Ken White]

...In my mind, 'audacity' is the undefinable quantity we need more than all else. Aggression triumphs action above all else, whereas I see audacity being the corner-stone of thinking, aggressive action coupled with purpose.You need some aggression -- and thus some aggressive people; currently, some actions would not be won unless you had at least a few who would go through brick wall if told to do so. More importantly, that aggression needs to be focused by a competent leader who will search for and find a window to go through with everyone else while some batter that brick wall.

Even better is the really sharp audacious leader who finds and uses the door before it can be shut. If there were more of those leaders, the macho BS would disappear as no longer required... :cool:

[William F. Owen]

With regards to the elite/ aggressive units, Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon (he was a British subaltern for a significant period of WW2 in the ETO - I imagine his name is already known to most here) made an interesting comment towards the end of his book. While I don't have access to the text, he basically disputed the requirement for soldiers to be aggressive and gung-ho. There was a quote I remember pondering where, from memory, Jary stated that he'd prefer a reflective poet in the frontline over an impulsive brawler.

I think you may be referring to his opinion that infantrymen need endurance and "sufferance."
I interviewed Jary for 4 hours and a lunch in the Officers mess at Sandhurst back in 2004. Two thing stuck with me:

a.) He mentioned that in a fire fight there will be not shortage of volunteers to tend wounded, and haul ammo. This has been consistently confirmed by others, and I even found Marshall references it.
b.) That the most important component of courage was love of and loyalty to others. - this would speak to good NCOs and strong group cohesion.

Bill Moore
A friend many years ago said there are no better warriors than the Americans, Brits, Aussies and Canadians, there is just something in those cultures that produce men who like to fight. While simplistic, there seems to be degree of truth in that statement. Thoughts?
The UK did a study in the early 1980's to test this hypothesis based on loss exchange ratios from combat. The results are classified, but basically what does seem to get mentioned is "Do not f*ck with the Finns."

[Kiwigrunt]

The UK did a study in the early 1980's to test this hypothesis based on loss exchange ratios from combat. The results are classified, but basically what does seem to get mentioned is "Do not f*ck with the Finns."

Wait for JMM99.;):D

Feast your eyes on a bit of Finn action (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XpgPOSg2wBo&feature=related)

[Fuchs]

A friend many years ago said there are no better warriors than the Americans, Brits, Aussies and Canadians, there is just something in those cultures that produce men who like to fight.

That may be an Anglophile prejudice - and even if it was true, the cultures changed a lot even during the past 15 years. Past observations from past wars may be entirely irrelevant in this regard.

Nevertheless, the assumption is quite questionable with a look at the 20th century: Judging by performance / men the English-speaking armies weren't exactly the most efficient during the 20th century. The before mentioned Finns and Germans were much more efficient during the their first three war years (afterwards exhaustion took its toll).
The examples of Crete and Narvik show that this isn't purely attributable to organizational advantages.

Oh yeah, and he forgot the Gurkhas who certainly have a favourable reputation as 'warriors', just as many other nationalities/tribes.


Assertions about quality of soldiers linked to nationality are generally very tricky.
The French built their doctrine till 1914 on a perceived national preference for the offense, in part because it was assumed that the French soldier was (the) best in the tactical offense.
The Germans meanwhile had at the same time the opposite view on French soldiers.

[Bill Moore]

Agree with the jist of the counter arguments, but still wanted to see if there were any studies out there or if this assertion was largely urban legend (which it appears to be).

Further agree with Fuchs that the variables that shape whether or not culture will produce warriors (which I believe it largely based on socio-political factors, since they tend to create the mythologies and social norms, read expectations) vary over time. While the Germans may have been great warriors during WWII, there is little indication that is the case today.

This is an important topic for our efforts to develop effective security forces in partner nations. We can continue to run them our force production processes we have developed and then field equipped security forces with the right technical training (I don't think we do these as well as we could), but they key to success is engraining the fighting spirit. That can't come from us (I don't think), but rather their leadership. It doesn't do any good to field forces that won't take the fight to the enemy. Probably need a social-anthrologist to tell us where we need to connect the dots.

[Chris jM]

I think you may be referring to his opinion that infantrymen need endurance and "sufferance."
I interviewed Jary for 4 hours and a lunch in the Officers mess at Sandhurst back in 2004. Two thing stuck with me:

a.) He mentioned that in a fire fight there will be not shortage of volunteers to tend wounded, and haul ammo. This has been consistently confirmed by others, and I even found Marshall references it.
b.) That the most important component of courage was love of and loyalty to others. - this would speak to good NCOs and strong group cohesion.



Your right, I was thinking about Jary's concept of sufferance. The quote from page 117 of 18 Platoon is relevant to this discussion:


There is a mathematical formla: aggression increases the further one goes behind the lines. Opposing infantry, with a few exceptions like the SS, are joined by a bond of mutual compassion which but few of the battlefield aristocracy can understand... Had I been asked at any time before August 1944 to list the personal characteristics which go to make a good infantry soldier, my reply would indeed have been wide of the mark.

Like most I would have suggested only masculine ones like aggression, physical stamina, a hunting instinct and a competitive nature. How wrong I would have been. I would now suggest the following. Firstly sufferance, without which one could not survive. Secondly, a quiet mind which enables a soldier to live in harmony with his fellows through all sorts of difficulties and sometimes under dreadful conditions. As in a closed monastic existence, there is no room for the assertive or acrimonious. Thirdly, but no less important, a sense of the ridiculous which helps a soldier surmount the unacceptable. Add to these a reasonable standard of fitness and a dedicated professional competence, and you have a soldier for all seasons. None of the NCOs or soldiers whoc made 18 Platoon what it was resembled the characters portrayed in most books and films about war. All were quiet, sensible and unassuming men and some, by any standard, were heroes.

If I now had to select a team for a dangerous mission and my choice was restricted to stars of the sportsfield or poets, I would unhesitatingly recruit from the latter.

[Chris jM]

You need some aggression -- and thus some aggressive people; currently, some actions would not be won unless you had at least a few who would go through brick wall if told to do so. More importantly, that aggression needs to be focused by a competent leader who will search for and find a window to go through with everyone else while some batter that brick wall.


I completely agree. In an ideal situation the decisions would be smart, logical and demand only minimal courage of those executing. However when the so-called 'fog of war' descends, aggression and the aggressive type would assist in creating action. I like the idea of audacity as it tempers aggression with smart application, however I would always favour aggression over the quiet, non-competitive type alongside me.

And yes, my views on this matter do diverge with that of Sydney Jary. The obvious discalimer is that he's a little more authoritive in this area, given that my CV doesn't include platoon-level command in WW2!

[Infanteer]

I've noticed no hesitation to take part in firefights - everyone wants to get their "TIC", especially the young Privates. After how many of these does the enthusiasm fade? The NCOs, most who have "seen the elephant", seem to enjoy the challenge with that bit of reservation.

Here's a good article by a former CO who fought in Kandahar in 2006.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_1/CAJ_vol10.1_03_e.pdf


Once we had found him, we would attempt to fix the enemy with fires and finish him in close-quarter combat. Neither of these things was easy. It required us to stay within 100-150 meters of the enemy and coordinate fires before physically moving to clear his positions. Doing so was contrary to human nature. The degree of success we had in close quarter combat became personality-dependent. The majority of soldiers, when fired upon for the first time, would seek to disengage back toward the “last safe place” they occupied. After several encounters they repressed this urge but would be very reluctant to advance in contact (especially when separated from their LAVs). Forward movement or sustainment of our presence on the close-quarter battlefield after night-fall depended upon the continued command presence of battalion and company commanders, supported by the “natural fighters” in our ranks. It became evident to me in May that the number of true fighters we had was a small minority. By fighter, I mean those men and women predisposed to keep fighting regardless of violence and danger; those who repressed fear not just because they wanted to remain with their primary group, but because of an overwhelming desire to beat the enemy; those who truly wanted to hunt the enemy and make him the victim. I would estimate that there were only 6 or 7 such individuals in every forty-man platoon. Yet, their stalwartness almost always became the psychological pivot point for the action of a section or a platoon engaged in intensive battle. I believe that the very essence of the western tradition of sections, platoons, companies and battalions (dating as far back as the Marian reforms, which produced Roman maniples, cohorts, and centuries within a legion) was founded on the premise of ensuring a critical number of true fighters were spread throughout fighting forces. I came to rely upon the courage of commanders and this small number of fighters in each platoon and company to override the inherent fear of close-quarter battle and to ensure that we kept the enemy fixed before closing to finish him.

[jcustis]

The majority of soldiers, when fired upon for the first time, would seek to disengage back toward the “last safe place” they occupied. After several encounters they repressed this urge but would be very reluctant to advance in contact (especially when separated from their LAVs).

Very interesting to note, as I'm sure you understand why. I've noticed that for sure in training. Not so much yet in the true fight, but I'll be keeping my eye out for it.

[Ken White]

They tend to offer a 'safe haven' or cocooning effect that requires strong leadership (not always present) to overcome. I realize vehicles are needed for mobility in some terrain and situations but good training is required to break the umbilical to vehicles for dismounts. They also give a false sense of security or lessened vulnerability that is misleading and sometimes causes crews to take undue risks. Tactical handling, parking and dismounting are in my experience not at all well trained. Drivers have to be good at terrain appreciation and distance and height estimation yet few take the time to train them on those topics.

Combat vehicles where the crew remains aboard like tanks and some scout vehicles (real ones, not HMMWVs or Brads -- or LAVs) are a different matter altogether.

The cited 'last safe place' is a very natural reaction but, as noted, disappears for most with a little exposure to fire. So too is the remark on the fighters versus the bulk of a unit, most of whom will do generally well even if they are not 'go-getters.' The cited 6 or7 out of 40 -- 15 or so percent -- may be a bit low, there are usually some very tenacious guys who don't make a big deal of it, it can run as high as 35 to 50 percent, unit dependent, in my observation, norms at about 25% + I think. The greater the net experience the higher the percentage of aggressive folks. I have seen Platoons where there were literally no sluffers -- rare and a couple. Good leaders build that...

[Firn]

This is an important topic for our efforts to develop effective security forces in partner nations. We can continue to run them our force production processes we have developed and then field equipped security forces with the right technical training (I don't think we do these as well as we could), but they key to success is engraining the fighting spirit. That can't come from us (I don't think), but rather their leadership. It doesn't do any good to field forces that won't take the fight to the enemy. Probably need a social-anthrologist to tell us where we need to connect the dots.

This raises an interesting topic. Tradition in the Alps at least had it that the formations were formed by specific regions. The Italian Alpini as well as the German and Austrian mountain divisions were raised that way. This made for formations with usually very considerable tenacity even against the odds. Fuchs already raised the example of Narvik. Of course the same system was also used in a lot of different places and regions.

Given that Afghanistan has very strong regional traits, using it might knit tighter Afghan units with possibly greater combat participation by the individual soldiers. After all you don't want to perform badly in front of your third cousin or your mate from the next village. It is no magic wand and has quite some drawbacks, but it might be a risk worth to be taken.

An now I wonder just how the Afghan army recruits :)


Firn

[baboon6]

Kiwigrunt, Wilf, - unfortunately the document isn't available online, however I do have access to it as a word doc at work. I'll try and get it uploaded early in the week (the worst case being if I can't upload it to the board, I'll email to those interested). I may have access to some other unrestricted docs on the history/evolution of the RNZIR/2NZEF that could be of interest you, too, Kiwigrunt.



Hi Chris

This site is an easy place to upload .pdf and .doc files to:

http://www.scribd.com/

For those of you who haven't read Kippenberger's classic memoir Infantry Brigadier it is available here:

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-KipInfa.html

[Kiwigrunt]

For those of you who haven't read Kippenberger's classic memoir Infantry Brigadier it is available here:

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-KipInfa.html


Thanks for that. I've been looking for this book for years.:)

[Chris jM]

Apologies for the delay gents, however I have now uploaded the word doc 'Infantry in Battle' for general interest. baboon6, thanks for the heads-up - I would have been at a loss had you not id'd that link for me - thanks.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/26351328/050


Abstract: The training note (1) is the product of battle experience in the New Zealand Divisions in World War II. It is based on research conducted by the New Zealand War History Branch under the direction of the Editor-in-Chief, Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO, himself an infantry soldier of wide experience. In 1947, a book (2) was published in the United States, attempting to explain the reaction of the average American to battle experiences. Major General Kippenberger wished to know whether the well-authenticated conclusions reached by the author were of equal application to the New Zealand soldier. Accordingly he addressed a detailed questionnaire, based upon the book, to some fifty officers who had given distinguished service with infantry units of the 2nd or 3rd New Zealand Divisions. Their findings were collated, and are contained in the pages that follow. In order to give point to the opinions stated, many individual examples drawn from all campaigns are quoted in the text. These are set out in italics throughout and are the words of the experienced officers who participated in these events. As the replies to the original questionnaire were not made with a view to publication, personal names have been omitted from all examples.



Kiwigrunt, I've got another few word docs that relate to NZ history. Should you (or anyone else) want to have a look, PM me.

[Eden]

My next-to-last combat job required a lot of driving through Afghanistan, usually in a 'single-vehicle convoy', at most with one other vehicle. I was usually driving with Canadians or Germans in relatively unarmored vehicles, much of the time in urban areas. I did not have to do this every day, or for a year. The reason I bring this up is it made me reflect on the special stress of patrolling in urban areas and how soldiers adapt to it.

Patrolling in an urban area in an environment like Afghanistan presents to the soldier an unending stream of possible threats. Potholes, trash heaps, narrow roads, suspicious looking men in bulky cloaks, single guy driving a trashed sedan a little too close, abandoned acetylene tanks, kid driving crazy on a motorbike - the stimuli are constant. If you are mounted, you may literally be encountering possible danger signals two or three times a minute. Reacting as you have been trained to do is impossible - most times you can't investigate, mark, avoid, survey possible threats if you want to accomplish whatever your larger mission may be.

This seems qualitatively different from patrols in other terrain. Danger signals occur less often, or are less intrusive on your conscious mind, or are easier to avoid. Moreover, when you are humping through the jungle/swamp/hills, the physical challenge soon preoccupies and dulls the mind to danger. You don't have that distraction riding in a vehicle in an urban environment.

It seemed to me that soldiers coped with this constant low-level stress in one of two ways. They either became very aggressive - driving fast, waving their weapons, shouting, wearing their war face - or they adopted a 'Buddah will decide' attitude and basically ignored the danger signals. The best ones remained alert while accepting the tension, like a soldier who stays functional during an extended barrage. But, as I said, I wasn't trapped in that environment day-after-day for months on end.

Any thoughts?

[jmm99]

I've spent the last five days at Aspirus Keweenaw's Laurium Resort - bilateral pneumonia (which I guess can kill you). Being pumped full of oxygen, steroids and antibiotics - along with the inhalation therapy sessions - didn't leave any time for the Net. :D

Anyway, they fixed me without too much damage - after extracting my promise of no more tobacco products for the rest of my life. Seems that sort of deal (threat to withhold medical services absent a promise of future co-operation by the detainee) violates the Geneva Conventions. :D

Well, it was a good run - 50 years of cigarette and cigar smoking - but, the iron lungs are no more. ;) As I write this and pause between sentences, I keep reaching over for the butt that ain't there - phantom limb syndrom. :)

As to the substance of this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=92341&postcount=20), it expresses the sound concept of "Do not f*ck with the Finns." Why that is so, I don't really know. My speculation would be that the Finns figure they are going to be wiped out anyway, if the fight goes to the bitter end. So, why not take as many of the other guys to heaven (Taivaalliselle) as you can in the meantime. Another factor might be the Finnish inclination (at least in my ancestral regions) to engage in fights, not really serious fights (not to the death), but to determine pecking order (or just for the hell of it).

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

More glad that it ended well...

I can sympathize with the 50 years. Had the same time racked up and had my last Pall Mall bout 18 months ago. :o

This state of having just one vice is not kewel. :mad:

[Bullmoose Bailey]

OK, I know this is a touchy subject, but Ken White's post here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=92118&postcount=69), does merit further examination in my opinion.

There have been numerous, quite well researched opinions, data and papers, that not everyone fights, when required to do so.

What we seem to know is

Most men will fight, given good leadership, thus good leaders and NCOs make a huge difference.
In the absence of such leadership, they will simply revert to doing the minimum required by appearances.
3-5% will run or simply play no useful part.

I do not want anyone to start airing dirty laundry, but I think this issue might be usefully discussed.

William,

In my experiences in first person interaction with American men of the last three Generations (roughly: WWII, Viet-Nam, GWOT, for sake of example), I find that their personal Christian, or other, faith has in the aggregate fallen off since the normalization of Atheism as establised by statute in the US, circa: Sputnik through the removal of prayer from Public School, via Darwinism & Socialism.

Together with these symptoms of lost faith comes a self centeredness that leads to disregard for all cultural sacrifice and leads eventually to sociopathy. Essentially I fear that not only will modern Western men increasingly not die for anything, they will not live for anything.

Predictions; cowardice, self-preservation to the detriment of Nation-State, malinvestment, creditory depletion, corporate greed, poor stewardship, poor planning, wasteage, faithlessness, non-church attendance, marital infidelity & suicide
will continue to increase.

Does that make sense to anyone in regards to combat participation, or the lack thereof?

[Red Leg]

In addition to the other variables that play into aggressiveness and/or duty performance while under fire, e.g. fire and maneuver on the enemy to destroy him in close combat, one needs to examine the conditions upon which soldiers enter and leave the combat theater.

Regardless of the overall national strategic goals, most soldiers will tell you that they want to, in order, 1. survive their time in combat and go home; 2. perform well in front of those they respect, mostly peers, but also superiors and, in the case of leaders, subordinates; and 3. win.

As you compare the conditions upon which a soldier can go home, disregarding medical or disciplinary reasons, look at WWII vs Vietnam vs GWOT. In WWII soldiers went home when the war was won, thus they had a personal stake in victory. In Vietnam, under an individual year long rotation system, and GWOT, under a unit based yearlong (in most cases) rotation system, the personal stake of the individual soldier is survival for a year. Leaders recognize this and, as anyone who has been deployed recently, try to combat both complacency and the reluctance to engage the enemy when terms of victory are ill-defined at best.

[Uboat509]

For the life of me I cannot understand why Grossman is still being seriously discussed. He came to speak to my battalion right before OIF V. At the time what he had to say was interesting but not overly so. He was a pretty good speaker though one of my friends in attendance started referring to him as the Tony Robbins of combat stress lectures. Just the same I decided to read his book "On Combat" for a report I had to write for a Psych 101 class. As was mentioned, his chapters on the physical effects of stress were interesting but hardly profound as most if not all of the information is readily available elsewhere. It goes downhill from there. As was also mentioned, despite being called "On Combat" there is a very clear bias towards Law Enforcement, not that there is anything wrong with that per se but it is not marketed that way. It is marketed as a book about combat stress. Also sprinkled throughout the book are numerous little sales pitches for his other products (lectures mostly). I most certainly would not recommend this book to anyone with a serious interest in its supposed subject matter.

As for which country produces the best soldiers, I can't really say but I imagine that it depends on just what you are talking about. Just like you can find some units that perform certain tasks better than others based on their experience, composition and leadership, I imagine that you will find that whole military forces can vary based on those same factors. I can say this from personal experience, in all the different units I have trained or trained with around the world, I have never yet encountered one that I would consider a top rate force that did not have a strong NCO corps. So if you want to decide who produces the best soldiers then the first thing you have to do is eliminate those countries that do not have a strong NCO corps.

Now I, like Ken, don't buy into the supposed superiority of airborne/air assault units. I have been light infantry and I have been airborne. I never saw that airborne units were more competent than "leg" units though I have noticed that they are far more relentlessly obsessed with uniform regulations and policies. Also from personal experience as OPFOR at the JRTC for 18 months I can tell that my impression was that the 82nd guys tended to be a bit more aggressive, but recklessly so. The 101st apparently believed that their helicopters made them invincible and so tended to air mobile small forces (company size or smaller) deep enemy held terrain where they would be picked apart and destroyed before they could be reinforced. The 10th Mountain, on the other hand always impressed me. They did not train for a MILES fight the way some units did, they trained for war. They were a bit less aggressive than the 82nd units that I saw but ultimately more successful, I believe because they focused less on sexy things like airborne and airmobile ops and more on the basics, after all, it’s what you do on the battlefield that wins wars not how you got there.

[Chris jM]

I can say this from personal experience, in all the different units I have trained or trained with around the world, I have never yet encountered one that I would consider a top rate force that did not have a strong NCO corps. So if you want to decide who produces the best soldiers then the first thing you have to do is eliminate those countries that do not have a strong NCO corps.


This is true from my experiences of ABCA armies, where the NCO corp is required to compensate for the inexperience of the junior officers. Does it hold true, though, in an army that has a different command system - for example the IDF, where the NCO corp directly feeds into the junior officer corp? I also seem to recall that German junior officers spend some time initially as a section commander - someone correct me if I am wrong - so they may hold up as another exception. I'd also be interested in knowing how the Baltic and Scandinavian armies work in this regard, if anyone out there has information on this topic?

I have always been taught (informally!) to quickly assess other armies with the term of 'swimming' nations vs 'non-swimming' nations. If the average population can swim they will make good soldiers - if not, they're rock-fish and will be more or less operationally ineffective. I'm sure there is absolutely no scientific basis to this criteria, but a swimming status does tend to favor the developed world where quality of life, fitness, individual competency etc pushes families to have their children participate in sports and outdoor activities. Causation vs correlation, or complete irrelevance?? :wry:

[Schmedlap]

I think that pondering which country produces the best Soldiers is kind of like pondering who would win in a fight between Captain America and the Punisher or, to use a more common example, whether Soldiers are "more elite" than Marines or vice versa.

[Rifleman]

For the life of me I cannot understand why Grossman is still being seriously discussed.

I agree. He had some worthwhile things to say but he's still way overrated.


As was also mentioned, despite being called "On Combat" there is a very clear bias towards Law Enforcement, not that there is anything wrong with that per se but it is not marketed that way.

Agree again. He's very popular with cops; the whole "warrior" thing and all that. I don't want to hijack this tread and turn it into a discussion about the role of police in society but maybe that mindset is not all bad, since studies and interviews show that most violent gang members think of themselves as "street soldiers."


Also from personal experience as OPFOR at the JRTC for 18 months I can tell that my impression was that the 82nd guys tended to be a bit more aggressive, but recklessly so.

Curious, did you find the 75th Ranger Regiment to be likewise?

[Ken White]

They also have said that the 82d is a pain in the tail due that aggressiveness and because they don't necessarily follow the script. Decapitating the 'leadership' with the God Gun doesn't work to slow 'em down, either... :D

LGOP.

[Seabee]

William,

In my experiences in first person interaction with American men of the last three Generations (roughly: WWII, Viet-Nam, GWOT, for sake of example), I find that their personal Christian, or other, faith has in the aggregate fallen off since the normalization of Atheism as establised by statute in the US, circa: Sputnik through the removal of prayer from Public School, via Darwinism & Socialism.

Together with these symptoms of lost faith comes a self centeredness that leads to disregard for all cultural sacrifice and leads eventually to sociopathy. Essentially I fear that not only will modern Western men increasingly not die for anything, they will not live for anything.

Predictions; cowardice, self-preservation to the detriment of Nation-State, malinvestment, creditory depletion, corporate greed, poor stewardship, poor planning, wasteage, faithlessness, non-church attendance, marital infidelity & suicide
will continue to increase.

Does that make sense to anyone in regards to combat participation, or the lack thereof?

Huh!?!

Having served in a unit where the only religion I ever noticed was a mandatory X-Mas service, and I think I saw a Chaplin visit us twice in 5 years to say hello... I think that is soooooo way of the map I would not know how to answer it...

How would you measure the willingness to fight of the non judeo-Christian japanese or VC troops?

The Waffen SS was also not famous for church going....

I am really, really missing something here.... :confused:

[Olive Oyl]

I know Grossman's work. Personally I think it's just plain wrong. ...


For the life of me I cannot understand why Grossman is still being seriously discussed. ...


Besides 18 Platoon, does anyone have additional recommendations as alternatives to Grossman's work on "killology"?


Also, regarding:

William,

In my experiences in first person interaction with American men of the last three Generations (roughly: WWII, Viet-Nam, GWOT, for sake of example), I find that their personal Christian, or other, faith has in the aggregate fallen off ...

Predictions; cowardice, self-preservation to the detriment of Nation-State, malinvestment, creditory depletion, corporate greed, poor stewardship, poor planning, wasteage, faithlessness, non-church attendance, marital infidelity & suicide
will continue to increase.

Does that make sense to anyone in regards to combat participation, or the lack thereof?


Huh!?!
...

The Waffen SS was also not famous for church going....

I am really, really missing something here.... :confused:


"...faith has fallen off..." Rather than a direct decrease in combat participation, it sounds like Bullmoose might have been referring more specifically to a decrease in moral bases (derived from religion, or "church-going," or, in the Nazis' case, from an ideology) for combat participation. Perhaps alluding to a similar conjecture?:


This reflective poet does IMO need to be able to generate ‘controlled aggression’ but I don’t think that that requires an aggressive/ gung-ho nature per say.
A counter to this could be that the reflective poet may be less inclined to do what ‘needs’ to be done if he is not morally behind it. That would make it harder for him to generate the required aggression as opposed to utilising a level of aggression that is already there.

Emphases added and truncations imposed on quotes.

My own speculation abundant throughout. Please correct any misinterpretations! :o

[William F. Owen]

Besides 18 Platoon, does anyone have additional recommendations as alternatives to Grossman's work on "killology"?


"Not mentioned in Despatches", by Spencer Fitz-Gibbon

[carl]

Agree again. He's very popular with cops; the whole "warrior" thing and all that. I don't want to hijack this tread and turn it into a discussion about the role of police in society but maybe that mindset is not all bad, since studies and interviews show that most violent gang members think of themselves as "street soldiers."

They may think of themselves as "soldiers" but I think most of them act like what they are-street criminals. I read the by-laws of a NM prison gang once and they were scary. If the members had adhered to the by-laws they would have been extremely dangerous to everybody. But they didn't. They acted and re-acted like the hoods they were.

I always preferred officers who, above most everything, were calm in the face of confusion and provocation. The last thing you needed was somebody who was going to make situation worse. Calmness, ability to think under stress and determination to get the thing done, and done the right way, those are the best cop qualities I think.

[slapout9]

I always preferred officers who, above most everything, were calm in the face of confusion and provocation. The last thing you needed was somebody who was going to make situation worse. Calmness, ability to think under stress and determination to get the thing done, and done the right way, those are the best cop qualities I think.

Amen!

[JMA]

For those of you who haven't read Kippenberger's classic memoir Infantry Brigadier it is available here:

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-KipInfa.html

Link is dead (after three attempts over two days). No alternative found on google... anyone have a link to this doc?

[Chieftain]

LEADERSHIP, Leadership, leadership!

It is ALWAYS about leadership. Not just the NCO's, although that is my prejudice as I was a Marine Staff NCO.

But if the leadership above the NCO's is weak or corrupt, so will the organization to varying degree's, down to the man. All large organizations will have some lower ranked "good" leaders, but they alone cannot 'save' or make the unit. The same can be said for the quality of the men too.

A good unit must have superior leadership at the top, and most or the majority of the lower ranked leaders must be very good too. No unit of reasonable size has it all.

Some small SPECOPS units may get there occasionally, but they are usu sally to small for major conflict.

I always enjoyed David H. Hackworths example of the peace time "Perfumed Prince's" in the military. Iraq proved it again. The generals we began the war with, were not capable of winning it. Nothing new here. Lucky that 'W' figured it out fired them, and got the guys he needed. In my opinion it just took him to long.

Give me almost any military group in the world. With quality leaders, that will be a good unit in fairly short period of time. Take some of the best units in the world, and give them crappy leadership, and you may be surprised at how long their reputation will have to carry them.

Quality Leadership, the one value, no organization can afford to lose.

Go figure.

Fred

Semper Fi

[Sparapet]

LEADERSHIP, Leadership, leadership!

It is ALWAYS about leadership.

Agreed completely. It's true of any organization. When an organization needs fixing you look to the officers first. They set the standard and the vision. Then the NCO's, they enforce the standard and promote the vision. Joe is last on the list of responsibility and ability to impact the quality of a unit. Joe falls in line when the NCO's are able to guide them. All in all, in the modern force the line units don't have to recruit or conduct the initial training. That means any Joe that shows up is screened and trained to some basic minimum (what that minimum should be is another conversation). That's when the unit takes over and where the leaders make impact. Otherwise it descends into peer training...e.g. hazing.

Interestingly, the SS (presumably Waffen SS, not their political brothers) have been mentioned several times here as an example of effective units. I am in the camp that walks a fine line between respecting the best of the Waffen SS formations without admiring them. I have seen references in literature on the SS of the regular anti-communist indoctrination those units received to make them believe the communists were the arch evil (and incidentally Jews, but my impression is the communist threat was more potent and regularly tied to Jews). Olive Oyl mentioned the moral basis for their effectiveness. Agreed with that, they were ideologically motivated. Ideology is probably the best motivator if it can be sustained. We see that in some of our post-9/11 Soldiers who got into the services to bring democracy and undo wrongs of the world only to have their world-view shattered once they started raiding Iraqi homes with whole families in them and accidentally killing civilians at check points. That ideology motivated them, but it was never the ideology regularly indoctrinated in the services; this fact becoming clear when the answer to their confusion was "war is dirty".

To a great degree, outside some combat arms units, I do believe the US lacks a martial culture in the services. We are perpetually confused as a group (although many of us are to the death certain of our own roles) about what is appropriate culture for us to enable our purpose. Often times we are even confused by our purpose. Are we to protect the nation? Or are we to protect the nation's interests? Are those synonymous? Is our purpose to spread democracy? etc etc etc. And this "greater purpose" is needed by the leaders as a guide for them to set their own guidance for the NCO's and men. So in that confusion we revert to the cave man answer "what makes the grass grow!?" Which sounds great and motivating until 19 yr old Joe is standing next to a 12 yr old girl he just opened up on with a SAW in the dark. And the only person that can make that alright for him is his leader explaining WHY he should be able to live with that. Too often the answer is "war is dirty" and the leader just resorts to the coercion of regulation to enforce discipline.

Just saying.... :)


Scouts Out

[Fuchs]

There was little if any difference between Waffen SS quality and normal Heer quality once you look at equals in terms of type of formation, supply and age structure of personnel.

In fact, the Waffen SS was rather incompetent early on and way too reckless.

My assertion here is that there's no need to look closely at their attributes because you can learn the same from the fast and light troops of the Wehrmacht (Panzer, Panzergrenadier, Gebirgsjger and early Fallschirmjger formations) without most of the political hazzle.

[gute]

There was little if any difference between Waffen SS quality and normal Heer quality once you look at equals in terms of type of formation, supply and age structure of personnel.

In fact, the Waffen SS was rather incompetent early on and way too reckless.

My assertion here is that there's no need to look closely at their attributes because you can learn the same from the fast and light troops of the Wehrmacht (Panzer, Panzergrenadier, Gebirgsjger and early Fallschirmjger formations) without most of the political hazzle.

No doubt, non-SS units fought quite well during WWII.

[JMA]

There was little if any difference between Waffen SS quality and normal Heer quality once you look at equals in terms of type of formation, supply and age structure of personnel.

In fact, the Waffen SS was rather incompetent early on and way too reckless.

My assertion here is that there's no need to look closely at their attributes because you can learn the same from the fast and light troops of the Wehrmacht (Panzer, Panzergrenadier, Gebirgsjger and early Fallschirmjger formations) without most of the political hazzle.

Martin van Creveld's book Fighting Power (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Fighting-Power-Performance-1939-1945-Contributions/dp/0313091579/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331449502&sr=1-1) is worthy of study.

He speaks of a formula -


Within the limits set by its size, an army's worth as a militray instrument equals the quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by what, ... (is) termed its Fighting Power. The latter rests on mental, intellectual and organisational foundations; its manifestations, in one combination or another, are discipline, cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die. Fighting Power in brief, is defined as the sum of the total of mental qualities that make armies fight.

[Fuchs]

That's a pseudo formula. It multiplies two unknowns.
Show me mathematician who can solve such an equation. :rolleyes:


Besides, his methodology in the book was popular, but also flawed. He compared two very different forces instead of comparing multiple different formations of different performance from the same force. He's voluntarily looking at datasets that are much farther away from ceteris paribus than necessary, which clouds the whole approach - and he used practically no advanced empirical tools as (which would be required for such a multi-input dataset).
It's a pseudo study that purports to deliver scientific results when in fact it's really only about his opinion.

[JMA]

That's a pseudo formula. It multiplies two unknowns.
Show me mathematician who can solve such an equation. :rolleyes:

Besides, his methodology in the book was popular, but also flawed. He compared two very different forces instead of comparing multiple different formations of different performance from the same force. He's voluntarily looking at datasets that are much farther away from ceteris paribus than necessary, which clouds the whole approach - and he used practically no advanced empirical tools as (which would be required for such a multi-input dataset). It's a pseudo study that purports to deliver scientific results when in fact it's really only about his opinion.

Ah... but you missed where I placed the word 'study' in bold.

I am not that concerned with his comparison between the krauts and the yanks just as I will not be distracted by the crude comparison in Jorg Muth's book Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Force, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II (http://www.amazon.com/Command-Culture-Education-1901-1940-Consequences/dp/1574413031/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331470199&sr=1-1) (when I finally get a copy) ... I will search for the little (often invaluable) gems that one uncovers in studying these books.

We all know (and it just leaves it for the last of the diehard yanks to accept the truth) that the raw cannon fodder divisions the yanks fed into Europe after D-Day were being chewed up by the resource stretched but combat experienced German formations. It was a case of the problem that even though they could chew up and spit out one of these divisions comprising inspired amateurs today, tomorrow there would be another, new full equipped one to replace it... and so it went. Any decent book on D-Day - Keegan or Ambrose - will tell you that story.

I try to look for items of relevance applicable for today.

Of interest to me is that the following characteristics (which van Creveld lists as components of Fighting Power) have assumed a lower level of importance than academic expertise (for officers) and technical ability (for all) among soldiers (certainly in the US). I will look into this further out of personal interest as it may well lead to where the US led NATO armies are going/have gone wrong.


(Fighting Power) rests on mental, intellectual and organisational foundations; its manifestations, in one combination or another, are discipline, cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die.

I have mentioned it a number of times before that the role of the infantry is to "close with and kill the enemy".

Look at any video out of Afghanistan and see that the waddling Michelin men of ISAF and see that this is quite impossible. The go out on patrol... draw fire... call in an airstrike... then waddle back to base. Its all a bit of a sick joke.

van Creveld for all his faults helps us return to first principles and rethink why it is possible for the most technically advanced and supported soldiers ever (yanks and Brits) can get their ass' whipped in combat by guys in sandals carrying an AK (and other basic weapons). For those who are able to think it is an interesting journey.

[Fuchs]

I have mentioned it a number of times before that the role of the infantry is to "close with and kill the enemy".

...and I will keep resisting (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/09/role-of-infantry-branch.html) this BS maxim.

[JMA]

...and I will keep resisting (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/09/role-of-infantry-branch.html) this BS maxim.

I'm all ears!

Is this what you believe?


The infantry's tasks are therefore almost all of those (line-of-sight) combat missions which can better be accomplished dismounted than mounted.

So what is it that you don't agree with in the 'standard' definition?

'Closing with'? 'Killing'? Both? Neither?

...but we have been through all this before ( here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10742&page=9) )

You have more you wish to add?

[Fuchs]

Both.

The need to close in with the enemy is relatively rare, and the destruction of the enemy (or even killing) is so, too. That's the 0.x % part of the job in wartime, and it's ridiculous to suppose the other 99.y % were not the role of the infantry.

Almost all defensive combat missions include no "close in with" part until the initial defence failed and a counterattack is being launched.


The destruction / killing of the enemy ain't the role either, it's at most part of a mission. Just remember a classic infantry mission; go snatch a POW for interrogation. Where's the killing here? Ain't that an infantry job?

Moreover, warfare is mostly about reducing the enemy's promising repertoire. Armed forces are mostly about taking the enemy's options off the table, such as "walk forward" (taken off the table by defensive firepower, without actual killing or closing in).

[JMA]

Both.

The need to close in with the enemy is relatively rare, and the destruction of the enemy (or even killing) is so, too. That's the 0.x % part of the job in wartime, and it's ridiculous to suppose the other 99.y % were not the role of the infantry.

Almost all defensive combat missions include no "close in with" part until the initial defence failed and a counterattack is being launched.

The destruction / killing of the enemy ain't the role either, it's at most part of a mission. Just remember a classic infantry mission; go snatch a POW for interrogation. Where's the killing here? Ain't that an infantry job?

Moreover, warfare is mostly about reducing the enemy's promising repertoire. Armed forces are mostly about taking the enemy's options off the table, such as "walk forward" (taken off the table by defensive firepower, without actual killing or closing in).

What warfare is about these days is anyones guess.

There are also a number of tasks - like information gathering (recce) - that are preliminaries to an attack (when your infantry will be required to close with and kill the enemy).

You have said your piece and I mine and I posted the link to our earlier discussion on this matter.

I will try to remember (in future) to state that: the primary role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy.

Other than that I'm with the Brits on this:


INFANTRY

Roles. The Infantry’s mission is: ‘to close with and engage the enemy, in concert with other arms in all operational theatres and environments, in order to bring about his defeat’. The Infantry’s core capability is to conduct aggressive close combat in a combined arms context. All battalions, to a greater or lesser extent, and depending on the available mobility and firepower, are expected to perform the following tasks:

a. Close with and destroy the enemy.
b. Seize, control, and hold ground.
c. Breach and cross obstacles and establish bridgeheads.
d. Operations in built up areas, fighting in woods and forests (FIBUA and FIWAF).
e. Observe and patrol the battlefield especially in conditions of poor visibility and at night.
f. Destroy armoured vehicles.
g. Provide flank protection.
h. Provide integral direct and indirect fire support.
i. Protect vital installations, routes, and communication centres.

[Fuchs]

a. Close with and destroy the enemy.

Hardly primary task, more like the famous exception of the rule.

d. Operations in built up areas, fighting in woods and forests (FIBUA and FIWAF).

Same do armoured forces, recce forces ... nothing special about infantry here other than it's usually better-suited.
Furthermore, note that this is an environment description, while the list began as a task list.

e. Observe and patrol the battlefield especially in conditions of poor visibility and at night.

Especially in conditions of poor visibility!? A MBT is better at that one. Besides, this stuff should be part of (b); control of terrain.

f. Destroy armoured vehicles.

Really? That's more like a self-defence necessity than a real role.

g. Provide flank protection.

...a classic role for faster-than-average troops, and infantry is the slowest branch in combat.

h. Provide integral direct and indirect fire support.

Self-licking ice-cone. That's no task, but part of how to execute a task.

i. Protect vital installations, routes, and communication centres.

There's rarely if ever infantry to spare for this.


I know their manual, and wasn't impressed by ANYTHING in it.
Somebody was tasked to write the thing, wrote it, some general signed it - but no great or especially disciplined mind was involved, for sure.

[gute]

Ah... but you missed where I placed the word 'study' in bold.

I am not that concerned with his comparison between the krauts and the yanks just as I will not be distracted by the crude comparison in Jorg Muth's book Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Force, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II (http://www.amazon.com/Command-Culture-Education-1901-1940-Consequences/dp/1574413031/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331470199&sr=1-1) (when I finally get a copy) ... I will search for the little (often invaluable) gems that one uncovers in studying these books.

We all know (and it just leaves it for the last of the diehard yanks to accept the truth) that the raw cannon fodder divisions the yanks fed into Europe after D-Day were being chewed up by the resource stretched but combat experienced German formations. It was a case of the problem that even though they could chew up and spit out one of these divisions comprising inspired amateurs today, tomorrow there would be another, new full equipped one to replace it... and so it went. Any decent book on D-Day - Keegan or Ambrose - will tell you that story.

I try to look for items of relevance applicable for today.

Of interest to me is that the following characteristics (which van Creveld lists as components of Fighting Power) have assumed a lower level of importance than academic expertise (for officers) and technical ability (for all) among soldiers (certainly in the US). I will look into this further out of personal interest as it may well lead to where the US led NATO armies are going/have gone wrong.



I have mentioned it a number of times before that the role of the infantry is to "close with and kill the enemy".

Look at any video out of Afghanistan and see that the waddling Michelin men of ISAF and see that this is quite impossible. The go out on patrol... draw fire... call in an airstrike... then waddle back to base. Its all a bit of a sick joke.

van Creveld for all his faults helps us return to first principles and rethink why it is possible for the most technically advanced and supported soldiers ever (yanks and Brits) can get their ass' whipped in combat by guys in sandals carrying an AK (and other basic weapons). For those who are able to think it is an interesting journey.

I don't think I would go as far as to say that the U.S. and the Brits are getting their asses whipped.

I like the Michelin man comparison - funny. Our guys definitely wear too much crap.

[Surferbeetle]

What warfare is about these days is anyones guess.

Identification of, and, control of access to resources...same as always. :wry:

Back in the day you guys wore fancy plate armor, carried swords, and struck terror into the serfs as you rode by on your way to jousting tournaments to ceremoniously fight over raw commodities (primarily) agricultural (primarily), industrial (not much), and intellectual (some) bounty. And those damn high tech crossbows were bad form, ya?

Today it's still about fights over raw commodities, agricultural, industrial, and intellectual bounty...we just don't carry swords...:wry:....and the fields of battle are no longer limited to just combatants :mad:

[jmm99]

Which ones were the "raw cannon fodder divisions" that were "chewed up" ?

2nd Armored
3rd Armored
5th Armored
7th Armored
8th Armored
2nd Infantry
8th Infantry
28th Infantry
29th Infantry
30th Infantry
35th Infantry
78th Infantry
79th Infantry
83rd Infantry
84th Infantry
95th Infantry
102nd Infantry
104th Infantry

Show and Tell Facts Time.

Regards

Mike

[ganulv]

We all know (and it just leaves it for the last of the diehard yanks to accept the truth) that the raw cannon fodder divisions the yanks fed into Europe after D-Day were being chewed up by the resource stretched but combat experienced German formations. It was a case of the problem that even though they could chew up and spit out one of these divisions comprising inspired amateurs today, tomorrow there would be another, new full equipped one to replace it... and so it went.
I might be misunderstanding what is implied by your use of ‘full equipped,’ but the Allies had logistics issues of their own on the way to the Rhine.

[JMA]

I might be misunderstanding what is implied by your use of ‘full equipped,’ but the Allies had logistics issues of their own on the way to the Rhine.

Yes you are... compared to what the Germans had to make do with at that time.

[JMA]

Identification of, and, control of access to resources...same as always. :wry:

Back in the day you guys wore fancy plate armor, carried swords, and struck terror into the serfs as you rode by on your way to jousting tournaments to ceremoniously fight over raw commodities (primarily) agricultural (primarily), industrial (not much), and intellectual (some) bounty. And those damn high tech crossbows were bad form, ya?

Today it's still about fights over raw commodities, agricultural, industrial, and intellectual bounty...we just don't carry swords...:wry:....and the fields of battle are no longer limited to just combatants :mad:

...but when we 'rode' into battle back then there was no confusion about who we were and what we were and what our mission was.

[JMA]

a. Close with and destroy the enemy.

Hardly primary task, more like the famous exception of the rule.

d. Operations in built up areas, fighting in woods and forests (FIBUA and FIWAF).

Same do armoured forces, recce forces ... nothing special about infantry here other than it's usually better-suited.
Furthermore, note that this is an environment description, while the list began as a task list.

e. Observe and patrol the battlefield especially in conditions of poor visibility and at night.

Especially in conditions of poor visibility!? A MBT is better at that one. Besides, this stuff should be part of (b); control of terrain.

f. Destroy armoured vehicles.

Really? That's more like a self-defence necessity than a real role.

g. Provide flank protection.

...a classic role for faster-than-average troops, and infantry is the slowest branch in combat.

h. Provide integral direct and indirect fire support.

Self-licking ice-cone. That's no task, but part of how to execute a task.

i. Protect vital installations, routes, and communication centres.

There's rarely if ever infantry to spare for this.


I know their manual, and wasn't impressed by ANYTHING in it.
Somebody was tasked to write the thing, wrote it, some general signed it - but no great or especially disciplined mind was involved, for sure.

I'm sure the Brits will be encouraged to hear this ;)

[ganulv]

Yes you are... compared to what the Germans had to make do with at that time.
I’ll give you that if you’ll give me that zee Germans (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2oK_trZhVdk&feature=youtu.be&t=30s) did have the defensive advantage. The drive to the Rhine was about rooting them out, not facing them in pitched battle.

[Fuchs]

I might be misunderstanding what is implied by your use of ‘full equipped,’ but the Allies had logistics issues of their own on the way to the Rhine.

The insufficient German fuel production was crashed to about 10% of its former output during that period and German truck productions had been smaller than truck losses for three years in a row by mid-'44...


I’ll give you that if you’ll give me that zee Germans (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2oK_trZhVdk&feature=youtu.be&t=30s) did have the defensive advantage. The drive to the Rhine was about rooting them out, not facing them in pitched battle.

You do understand that the fully motorised Western allies took six months in 1944 to reconquer against the numerically inferior shambles of an army what the Germans had conquered in 1940 against a numerically equal opponent in six weeks, having only a 15% motorised force?
This doesn't even take into account the 10:1 versus 1:1 air power ratios and multiplied overall air power effectiveness.

There's little doubt that given the circumstances, the Allied advance through France was slow.

[Surferbeetle]

...but when we 'rode' into battle back then there was no confusion about who we were and what we were and what our mission was.

Soliders *know* how to read a map and what it means with respect to the area and systems they are to work within. That hasn't changed, and i suspect that i don't need to remind you to review a map of current and past operations in order to refresh those hard-won insights. :wry:

Soldiers *are not* swayed by the ephemeral twaddle spewed by chicken-hawk-draft-dodging-patron-seeking or Kantian-dreaming-draft-dodging-patron-seeking politicians of whatever nation.

Sword, deed, and then word...or something like that. :wry:

[ganulv]

The insufficient German fuel production was crashed to about 10% of its former output during that period and German truck productions had been smaller than truck losses for three years in a row by mid-'44...

You do understand that the fully motorised Western allies took six months in 1944 to reconquer against the numerically inferior shambles of an army what the Germans had conquered in 1940 against a numerically equal opponent in six weeks, having only a 15% motorised force?
If the two are compared, is the implication that had the Allies been less heavily motorized they would have proceeded more quickly? But can you really compare the two? Apart from the seasons, the French forces and the BEF evacuated to fight another day. The Germans didn’t have that option. This has to have had a bearing on how long things took to shake out.

My main point is not to argue that the Allies were as skilled and artful as the Germans. I don’t know enough to make or judge a nuanced argument about that, anyway. But I do feel like I know enough to be skeptical about attributing any American success solely to superior resources. If holding the keys to Ali Baba’s cave were a guarantee of victory Man United and the New York Yankees would win the championship every year and the Taliban would be a historical footnote.

[Fuchs]

Dunkirk and Falaise were comparable.

The greater difference is that the Allies did not keep devaluing defensive lines with turning movements because their spearheads did not advance so daringly.
The German army did not allow the French to re-establish an uninterrupted front for weeks, while the Allies did so in 1944. The range till culminating point of attack was surprisingly short for the UK/US forces of 1944.

This is a bit astonishing since the motorised Allies had more than enough fast (technically) forces for the necessary moves and they also had almost inexhaustible air support (flying arty and supply) for their spearheads.

There was a dispute between Rommel and von Rundstedt in early '44 about whether to fight an invasion at the coastline or to do so in manoeuvre warfare. Von Rundstedt believed in the German superiority in the latter, Rommel saw the only chance in an even thicker version of his El Alamein defence.
It appears as if Rundstedt judged the operational warfare qualities correctly, but Rommel judged the relative material strength correctly (both being partially correct appears to be a decent explanation for the disagreement of two largely competent men).


This, btw, is somewhat on topic; it shows that combat participation / motivation / small unit leadership issues were probably not the main issue back in the '44 French campaign. The key failures can be described with operational-level terminology.

[JMA]

This, btw, is somewhat on topic; it shows that combat participation / motivation / small unit leadership issues were probably not the main issue back in the '44 French campaign. The key failures can be described with operational-level terminology.

Expand on this please

[Fuchs]

It's quite simple. The advancing forces were not able to prevent that the defenders re-established an effective defence (defence with little to no further loss of terrain in the short term) shortly after the old defence was broken.

The Germans penetrated at Sedan, broke through tough reserves on some elevated terrain a few kilometres later (Stonne etc) and then didn't allow the French to re-establish a new defensive line until hundreds of kilometres farther west.
It was like a boxer who forces his opponent to stumble backwards for 10, 20 metres, not allowing him to regain his balance and stiffer defensive posture earlier. The German culminating point of attack was quite far.

On the defence in 1944 they merely made a step or two backwards before they regained their balance, all the while their opponent was technically fast enough to run circles around them (keep in mind the German troops did not only lack motorisation and fuel; they were also largely unable to march in daylight due to allied air supremacy!).


Small unit performance was certainly an enabler, but the real fault laid on the operational level, the grand tactics about the employment of divisions and battlegroups / combat teams. The British were way too timid and the Americans didn't exactly exploit the full potential of their internal combustion engines either.

[ganulv]

This is a bit astonishing since the motorised Allies had more than enough fast (technically) forces for the necessary moves and they also had almost inexhaustible air support (flying arty and supply) for their spearheads.
My limited knowledge of WW2 military history leads me to understand that the Allied commanders in Europe were pretty squirrely about utilizing CAS. Is that a correct understanding on my part?

[Steve Blair]

My limited knowledge of WW2 military history leads me to understand that the Allied commanders in Europe were pretty squirrely about utilizing CAS. Is that a correct understanding on my part?

Some of them were, while others weren't. In some cases it came down to technological issues (air-ground coordination wasn't always that spiffy), in others it came down to issues identifying targets. In many cases what's viewed as CAS was really defined by the Air Corps as battlefield interdiction and thus might not come under the direct control of the ground commander. Often it came down to individual personalities. Patton, for example, had a good relationship with his Air Corps people (Weyland in particular, who used techniques developed by Quesada for First Army).

[Fuchs]

Dunno what "squirrely" means, but they for sure used their bombers and fighter-bombers well for interdiction.

The availability of CAS (in air power per division) exceeded what the Heer enjoyed in 99.9% of its campaigning. The only comparable massing of CAS happened in May 1940 at Sedan on one day; a pre-planned attack sequence.

Armoured spearheads detach from supply lanes (which wouldn't be secure anyway) by design. They need to do so in order to be quick.
This in turn means their ammunition is rather scarce and they are extremely grateful for 'flying artillery' (CAS) in cases when they need to break (instead of circumvent) some stiff resistance deep in hostile territory.
The Luftwaffe was never really good at this and had only sporadic moments of success in it (which get exaggerated a lot). The Allies had at least the tools for it in excess; range, payload, numbers, radio tech.


Some of the Allied divisions had fighter-bombers on patrol overhead during their advance in autumn. The best a German division had on station in their offensive campaigns was a spotter plane. Te attack aircraft took off, cruised, searched, spotted, attacked, returned, landed - rinse, repeat, rinse, repeat. No time (or fuel) for CAS patrols.

[Steve Blair]

The Luftwaffe was never really good at this and had only sporadic moments of success in it (which get exaggerated a lot). The Allies had at least the tools for it in excess; range, payload, numbers, radio tech.


Some of the Allied divisions had fighter-bombers on patrol overhead during their advance in autumn. The best a German division had on station in their offensive campaigns was a spotter plane. Te attack aircraft took off, cruised, searched, spotted, attacked, returned, landed - rinse, repeat, rinse, repeat. No time (or fuel) for CAS patrols.

The Luftwaffe at least had some doctrine to deal with CAS and a history of it going back to World War I. The AAC was making a great deal of theirs up on the fly (so to speak) and had to deal with a level of institutional hostility to the entire concept. Where US CAS was good it could be very good, but it was not so much a matter of accepted and applied doctrine. Interdiction was better simply because it was closer to what many within the AAC thought they should be doing anyway: bombing behind the lines to stop production and break will. That made it easier to support and (within the internal political AAC situation) justify. CAS was much more developed, IMO, in the Pacific. But that was an entirely different situation.

[Fuchs]

The Luftwaffe had a doctrine for CAS? That eluded me so far.

They had miniscule numbers of Hs 123 for CAS, near-useless Hs 126 spotter planes (later Fi 156) and the Ju 87 B (later D).

The Ju 87 was used for interdiction. It smashed the rail network, trains, march columns - very rarely did they intervene in actual battles. Ground troops had no compatible radios. There was no ground spotter system in place, arty spotters had no clue about air power.
I didn't even find any indication that Luftwaffe field divisions were any better in air/ground cooperation than army divisions!

The Luftwaffe CAS doctrine was basically to lay out some flags on the ground to tell the Ju 87's to bomb someone else.


CAS only really began with Fw 190Fs in 1943 and the small number of Hs 129 when attack air power (and the fast divisions) turned into firefighters against crisis situations on the Eastern Front and away from facilitating grand operational moves.

[Steve Blair]

If you look at Luftwaffe doctrine from 1936, they certainly had some. They also had a very detailed system developed as early as 1917. Doesn't mean it was always used, and they did make some very poor aircraft design decisions, but the thought process was certainly there prior to 1940.

And they certainly had more extant than the AAC did.

[Fuchs]

If you look at Luftwaffe doctrine from 1936, they certainly had some. They also had a very detailed system developed as early as 1917. Doesn't mean it was always used, and they did make some very poor aircraft design decisions, but the thought process was certainly there prior to 1940.

And they certainly had more extant than the AAC did.

1936? Prior to the Spanish Civil War? Why do you take that seriously?

Doesn't matter, I will look it up sometime. They surely did not pay much attention to CAS, though.

[Steve Blair]

1936? Prior to the Spanish Civil War? Why do you take that seriously?

Doesn't matter, I will look it up sometime. They surely did not pay much attention to CAS, though.

Because that's when they developed the doctrine (although it was a process that began after World War I). I take it seriously because it was there. They also had effective measures in place as early as 1917. Deciding to ignore it (as some Luftwaffe commanders certainly did) doesn't mean they didn't have the doctrine. And because AAC efforts worked in some places and cases doesn't mean they actually had good doctrine, no matter what the postwar spin might claim.

If you look at the AAC, they had a vested interest in making interdiction and strategic bombardment work, because that was part of their cornerstone for an independent air force. CAS...not so much. But to get back to Ganluv's question, there were a number of reasons why Allied ground commanders appeared 'squirrely' about using CAS. Coordination wasn't always idea, communications weren't always great, and sometimes the aircraft just weren't made available. When it worked, it tended to work OK (with some exceptions). The sad thing is that little of that was actually preserved in the postwar period and had to be relearned.

[Fuchs]

You know, the invasion in Normandy and reconquering of France was not an all-U.S. effort... the empire's air power over France '44 was greater than what the Luftwaffe had on disposal at its best times, too.

Montgomery's forces were still known to be rather slow during their advance.

[Steve Blair]

You know, the invasion in Normandy and reconquering of France was not an all-U.S. effort... the empire's air power over France '44 was greater than what the Luftwaffe had on disposal at its best times, too.

Montgomery's forces were still known to be rather slow during their advance.

I never said that it was an all-US effort. I was speaking to Ganluv's question, and my experience lies more with the AAC (hence my focus on its response and doctrinal/ideological preferences). If you've got some relevant research/experience with the RAF and its CAS doctrine, please feel free to add to my comments on the AAC. The more, the merrier!

[Ulenspiegel]

Besides, his methodology in the book was popular, but also flawed. He compared two very different forces instead of comparing multiple different formations of different performance from the same force. He's voluntarily looking at datasets that are much farther away from ceteris paribus than necessary, which clouds the whole approach - and he used practically no advanced empirical tools as (which would be required for such a multi-input dataset).
It's a pseudo study that purports to deliver scientific results when in fact it's really only about his opinion.

Here one can disagree:

1) MvC used data sets which were provided by Dupuy, who listed and analysed battles in Italy 1943 and found a higher effectiveness of German forces, independent of type. Have you better data, that refute Dupuy's?
(In hard science I provide better data or shut up :-))

2) The overall approach is valid on base of Dupuy's data. I agree that your approach would give additional insight, but this does not change the valid basic concept and would be IMHO a different project.

3) McC's comparisonon of US forces of 1943/44 and German structures of 1941/42 is flawed, he should have analysed the 1943 units in Italy. Especially the depleted officer/NCO corps.

4) Some of his conclusions are wrong.

5) However, many of the tables and comparisons (secondary data) presented by MvC are still very valuable even when I disagree with some conclusions he draw from them.

[Fuchs]

He may be correct or wrong; his approach is a poor one and was likely based with the reception among anglophone readers in mind.*

As a general principle you should use datasets that have as few as possible secondary influence factors. He basically took totally noisy samples instead of using much less noisy samples as would have been available if he had used exclusively U.S.Army-related or exclusively German army-related sources.

I do not remember any of the advanced empirical tools from his books, nothing as complicated as the statistical suff used in econometrics on comparably noisy datasets, for example. Nowadays you wouldn't get a diploma in economics if you made an econometric diploma dissertation with a noisy dataset and as simple statistical analysis. It would be considered as a no-show job.

In short, he wrote at best an inspiring popular science book. His other works weren't more advanced either.

*: A criqitue of the methodology does not require a counter-argument or -analysis concerning the facts.

[Ulenspiegel]

He may be correct or wrong; his approach is a poor one and was likely based with the reception among anglophone readers in mind.*

As a general principle you should use datasets that have as few as possible secondary influence factors. He basically took totally noisy samples instead of using much less noisy samples as would have been available if he had used exclusively U.S.Army-related or exclusively German army-related sources.

I do not remember any of the advanced empirical tools from his books, nothing as complicated as the statistical suff used in econometrics on comparably noisy datasets, for example. Nowadays you wouldn't get a diploma in economics if you made an econometric diploma dissertation with a noisy dataset and as simple statistical analysis. It would be considered as a no-show job.

In short, he wrote at best an inspiring popular science book. His other works weren't more advanced either.

*: A criqitue of the methodology does not require a counter-argument or -analysis concerning the facts.


Sorry, I think you miss the point:

MvC did not use own data, but ones provided by Dupuy, so he lives or dies with the quality of Dupuys data. Do you assume or have evidence that Dupuys data are fawlty?

Frankly, why should Dupuy use only US or German data, that would be poor methodology. You use reliable US data for the US side and German for the German side.

[Fuchs]

You miss the point about noise and why only one side should be used to extract the desired insight.

I explained that already and it's pointless to repeat that, though.

[Firn]

Anyway how would one describe the Stuka attack on the Metaxa line (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3fyqvfL6rA)? It was of course a relative special case of CAS against a modern bunker systems in very difficult terrain in support of mountain troops with rather limited bunker-busting firepower at their disposal.

[Fuchs]

The doctrine behind such actions is not CAS, but Schwerpunkt; the scharfes Zusammenfassen (difficult to translate; 'decisive resolute concentrating' maybe). The German military did a lot f unusual things (including the air attack orchestra at Sedan) when it betted on success in one small area for an operational purpose. Air power can move its focus by hundreds of kilometres in a matter of hours or a day, and consequently the Luftwaffe has been called upon even for purposes it did not usually meet.


By the way; a bit more related to the official topic:

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2012/03/video-about-morale-kinda.html

I guess we could fill pages discussing the phenomena visible in this short clip...

[ganulv]

The doctrine behind such actions is not CAS, but Schwerpunkt; the scharfes Zusammenfassen (difficult to translate; 'decisive resolute concentrating' maybe).
Something like what the Greeks did at Gaugamela?

http://www.ancient.eu.com/uploads/images/151.gif

[Fuchs]

Alexander followed rather the U.S. idea of a CoG; he went for the critical vulnerability without truly massing his forces at a point (other than companion cavalry).

The original Schwerpunkt is more like Epaminondas' oblique order at Leuctra (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leuctra) even though it occasionally did hit a strong point, which is not required for the German post-1871 interpretation of a Schwerpunkt.

[Morgan]

I'd like to take this back to the original issue of combat particpation. The initial issue deals with soldiers in actual combat....whether or not they fight. I've not noticed any reference to those who avoid getting into the fight at all despite years of training for "the fight".

I bring this up because I've seen many, both officers and NCOs, who've avoided deploying to Iraq or A'stan. In some cases, these have been infantry officers (active duty) with all of the cool-guy badges, schools, and assignments. I have yet to figure out what motivates them to avoid combat participation despite all of their preparation.

Thoughts?

[Fuchs]

Reason and knowledge.

[Ken White]

Reason and knowledge.Lack of principle. Or ethical lapse. Either is also appropriate.

[Fuchs]

Neither of those apply if reason tells them that these wars serve no purpose for the nation (a not really far-fetched conclusion).

Especially those who joined pre-2001 with the idea of actually serving and defending their country - instead of the constant nonsense bullying and meddling of the last ten year - may be prone to rejecting deployments, having seen too much of the reality.

[ganulv]

Neither of those apply if reason tells them that these wars serve no purpose for the nation (a not really far-fetched conclusion).

Especially those who joined pre-2001 with the idea of actually serving and defending their country - instead of the constant nonsense bullying and meddling of the last ten year - may be prone to rejecting deployments, having seen too much of the reality.
Según me dicen, one’s relationships with those in his/her unit tend to be the single most important motivating factor for those in combat situations. If that is indeed the case it should hold true in spite of and possibly even more strongly because of one’s own assessment of the grander design.

[jmm99]

I'm not competent to speak personally to this topic.

I offer the following as one path an officer might consider even though he has reached the firm conclusion that the war is lost. The Marine was Bill Corson (CAP's Formative Years (http://capmarine.com/cap/colcors1.htm)) (emphasis added):


It (this decision ) can be used to prove that our use of the CAP concept, beginning in 1966, was doomed to ultimate failure because it was at least two years too late. [B]I knew that before I went to Vietnam, but I agreed to take on the job because, as I mentioned above, my purpose was to save Marine and Vietnamese lives. Lives, in my opinion, that would have otherwise been lost in the pursuit of a futile military and political strategy.

The context of the reference (why he went) occurs earlier in the speech:


The search for a measurement of success for the CAP program is elusive. Remember, the United States lost the war. Did the CAPs make a difference? The answer is an unhesitating YES! On the quantative side there are many thousands of Vietnamese alive today who would have either not survived the war or been able to procreate if not for the CAPs. On the qualitative side, the young men who exceeded my greatest hopes, and those of Lew [Walt] and the Brute [Krulak], were forever changed for the better by their experience in "their" hamlets. One cannot attend a CUVA reunion without a sense of pride in knowing men such as those kids. In recent years some wives and children have attended our reunions. My conversations with those folks are treasured memories.

Food for thought on the positive side.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

Neither of those apply if reason tells them that these wars serve no purpose for the nation (a not really far-fetched conclusion).First, neither you nor they nor I are really in a position to determine what serves the nation's purpose. We can have an opinion but that's all it will be, an opinion. That, to me, is not adequate to make a decision to abrogate an oath no one made you take...

More importantly and pertinent, service is voluntary. No one has to take the oath but if you take an oath, you either live with it or do not, period.
Especially those who joined pre-2001 with the idea of actually serving and defending their country - instead of the constant nonsense bullying and meddling of the last ten year - may be prone to rejecting deployments, having seen too much of the reality.Nonsense it may be but that's not the call of those who elected to serve. If one is not willing to play by the rules (when they are easily available for all to see and know...), one should seek another game.

Just like marriage, you don't have to say "I do" but once you do that you either work it out honorably or you do not -- and that is NOT advocating blind obedience; I was disobedient a bunch of times -- but I did not fail to do what I said I would even opr go where competently ordered when I disagreed with what was required. On two occasions I was told to do things I thought were very wrong, I refused and that was the end of that.

Reason -- and logic -- are important. Honor is an intangible. All are needed for humans. Knowledge is also important -- it can also be deceptive. It's been my observation that a number of very intelligent, erudite people are about half as smart as they seem to think they are. Those are the folks that tend to think the rules or norms do not apply to them.

Shows they really aren't all that smart; the norms always apply... ;)

ganulv has it right. Voluntarily assumed responsibility should trump both logic and reason

[82redleg]

I'd like to take this back to the original issue of combat particpation. The initial issue deals with soldiers in actual combat....whether or not they fight. I've not noticed any reference to those who avoid getting into the fight at all despite years of training for "the fight".

I bring this up because I've seen many, both officers and NCOs, who've avoided deploying to Iraq or A'stan. In some cases, these have been infantry officers (active duty) with all of the cool-guy badges, schools, and assignments. I have yet to figure out what motivates them to avoid combat participation despite all of their preparation.

Thoughts?

I'd be interested on where you found these. I haven't seen them. The deployment avoiders I've seen over the last 10 years have generally been CSS junior enlisted with external issues, often those that joined AFTER the war started.

[JMA]

I'd be interested on where you found these. I haven't seen them. The deployment avoiders I've seen over the last 10 years have generally been CSS junior enlisted with external issues, often those that joined AFTER the war started.

Interesting comment.

I would be interested to hear why some who join during 'wartime' seek to avoid combat service.

I would have thought it would have been that some of those who joined a peace time army (for all the wrong reasons) may wish to avoid a combat tour.

[JMA]

Segn me dicen, ones relationships with those in his/her unit tend to be the single most important motivating factor for those in combat situations. If that is indeed the case it should hold true in spite of and possibly even more strongly because of ones own assessment of the grander design.

You are correct in that the tightest personal bonding is in groups of four - where they 'do it for their mates'. The better units have strong unit cohesion where they 'do it for the regiment'.

There are always those who keep apart and do not bond with others to the extent that they will not place themselves at risk for another. These people are always looking out for No 1 and to hell with the rest. Easy for these people to decide that combat exposure is not for them and they will be able to produce all manner of excuses as to why they are not prepared to expose themselves to the danger of combat. Lack of belief in the 'cause' is the usual one... but never is there an admission that there is a lack of courage.

Now before I hear that soldier X, with a prior record of courageous combat exposure, is one who is now attempting to avoid a combat tour let me remind all of Lord Moran's findings (in his 'must read' book The Anatomy of Courage (http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Anatomy-Courage-Lord-Moran/dp/1845294866/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1331783619&sr=1-1)) that, in summary, courage is drawn from a well that is never replenished.

The best advice to the heroes who find their 'well' of courage used up is to get out of the service rather than stay and be exposed for the real reason they need to avoid combat exposure. Nothing is simple.

... oh yes and in addition. This 'problem' can spread like a cancer from individuals to groups as with the US experience of combat avoidance/refusal in Vietnam. Kill it before it spreads.

[Fuchs]

My mother told me when I was young not to jump from a skyscraper just because others did so.
I for one would never feel that it would be against my honour or friendship not to jump.


Look at it this way; some armies have fought campaigns with great displays of courage, others not so. It's not necessarily the honour of the soldiers, their volunteering before the war etc that makes the difference. Sometimes it's simply their judgement that taking such risks would be stupid. In fact, it might even be stupid from the society's perspective, for a 25 y.o. has hardly paid back all the upbringing and education he got from the society already.
To die in a stupid conflict that serves no purpose means he'll never repay his debt to society (for his sacrifice would be of no use*).


Finally, there's more than survival motives that can keep one away from accepting deployment. They may have bonded more with their family than with expeditionary warfare, or they may expect to do useless harm to foreigners if deployed. You know, some people actually anticipate that #### happens in war and don't want to risk becoming a bad guy for a cause that's not worth the risk.


*: This appears to be a wide-spread difference to world war-time attitudes.

[Morgan]

I'd be interested on where you found these. I haven't seen them. The deployment avoiders I've seen over the last 10 years have generally been CSS junior enlisted with external issues, often those that joined AFTER the war started.
82d redleg,


I first saw these types in I Corps HQ in '05. I am now serving with some of these types in Saudi Arabia. I'm told that many of these types can be found in the halls of the Pentagon though I cannot confirm that since I've never been in there.

[Steve Blair]

Lack of principle. Or ethical lapse. Either is also appropriate.

Concur. This is a volunteer force. If officers in particular have ethical issues, they should resign. Otherwise they're just welfare mothers wearing a pretty uniform instead of a mu-mu.

[Sparapet]

Every instance of actual fear on mission I have seen, whether in my self, my men, or other units, has been tied to a lack of leader-reinforced purpose and leader-reinforced explanation of what is happening (I mean this in the most basic sense as in "we have to kill those guys over there because they are the enemy). Nothing seems to galvanize men more quickly than the belief that what they are about to do matters. Getting them to believe that is part of the "art of leadership".

So much so that physical danger became preoccupying when a sense of purpose was lost. Yet it was amazing to see how much the men, and my self would accept as a matter of risk when there was a conviction that the risk had to be accepted for mission success. This implies believing that mission success is important. And it seems this is the point where "for my battle-buddy" motivation plays a strong role.

I would also venture to say that this sense of leader-driven purpose becomes more important when professionalism is weak, as it is in the junior enlisted and in those junior officers and nco's who got into the warmaking business for the "wrong reasons" (e.g. college tuition, avenge 9/11, spread democracy, etc). This speaks to my earlier post on ideology in this thread.

Men have always fought hard when their convictions match their belief that force is necessary. The challenge comes in shaping those convictions so they can withstand time and experience. VC, Jihadi, or Nazi fanatic prove the case over and over again. The difference is that VC and Jihadi tended to rely on motivation as enough, thereby being persistent but persistently losing engagements against conventional, barely professional forces. The Nazi/fatherland fanatic, when matched with the operational skill of the Wermacht (in the best Wermacht formations as well as in the I and II SS Panzer Corps mid-43 to late 44) made for a persistent and dangerous conventional force.

Greater point to me is that men fight hardest when their leaders make them believe in why they are fighting and/or when they feel someone they care about is in danger (squad-mate). The former makes them take on dangerous missions, the latter makes them fight hard but only to the point of the end of the danger. I think this also speaks to the FOB mentality on 2003-2006 as all sense of purpose was lost in the leadership and "get my men home safely" became a noble goal.

Scouts out...

[Ken White]

My mother told me when I was young not to jump from a skyscraper just because others did so.... You know, some people actually anticipate that #### happens in war and don't want to risk becoming a bad guy for a cause that's not worth the risk.However, none of that changes the basic fact the no thinking individual should fail to know what he or she is volunteering for and if their calculations mirror yours, then they should simply should have sought another line of work in the first place. One should not choose a line of work that demands one make some sacrifices of logic, reason, comfort, safety and excessive concern for human rights and welfare unless one is prepared to do that. There are plenty of other jobs out there.

Conversely, if one freely elects to take the pay and accept the promotions and perquisites then one has a responsibility to perform per the contract -- or one can take the money then elect to be schmuck. One always has choices... :wry:

[slapout9]

Every instance of actual fear on mission I have seen, whether in my self, my men, or other units, has been tied to a lack of leader-reinforced purpose and leader-reinforced explanation of what is happening (I mean this in the most basic sense as in "we have to kill those guys over there because they are the enemy). Nothing seems to galvanize men more quickly than the belief that what they are about to do matters. Getting them to believe that is part of the "art of leadership".


Your whole post is fantastic but this is SWC quote of the year stuff. If we still do quotes around here? if not it is till excellant! or as we say down souuth Ya dun good!:)