Aviation in COIN (merged thread) [Archive] - Page 2

Jesse9252

09-23-2009, 06:57 PM

There has been some discussion on SWC about the Air Force's move to field low-cost COIN/CAS aircraft for irregular warfare. Folks seem to be generally bullish about the idea, both here and elsewhere, so I thought it interesting to see P.W. Singer take a shot at the program (http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0922_drones_singer.aspx?p=1):

Just like the movie, though, this plan may seem appealing because of the guts and glory of the pilots who would fly these fabulous old planes back into battle (indeed, one of the entrants is even a version of the P-51 Mustang). But it doesn't stand up to much scrutiny. It is somewhat questionable to add 100 new planes (if one can describe 50-year-old designs as "new") at the very same time that the Air Force is seeking to accelerate the retirement of about 250 F-15s, F-16s and A-10s. Unlike these proven multi-role aircraft, light propeller planes could only be used at the low end of war, not against China or even Iran.

Moreover, in its haste to show that it is not focused on the next war, the Air Force may be trying to fight the last war. These planes won't be deployable for use in Iraq or Afghanistan until 2013 at best. The plan thus rests on two huge assumptions: 1) that we'll still be fighting counterinsurgencies there or elsewhere for which we'll need 100 more planes, and 2) while we are going back in time militarily, our enemies won't be going forward. Even within insurgencies, various non-state actors like Hezbollah already field anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles; now we would just be providing them with easier targets.

For operations that need planes to fly low and slow in support of troops on the ground, actually new technologies, like the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned system, have already proved to be far more effective. The old planes rely on the pilot's "Mark II eyeballs"; the drone carries Gorgon Stare, a technology that monitors 12 high-powered cameras at once. Reaper also carries almost double the weapons and can stay on the scene four times as long. Drones are admittedly less fun to fly, but that's not how we are supposed to make serious weapons decisions.

The ultimate kicker is that the very partners the Air Force claims it is buying the planes to train and fight with don't actually want them. The head of the Iraqi air force reportedly wants F-16s instead, while the head of the Afghan National Army Air Corps wants Predators. Perhaps they haven't seen the movie?

I am inclined to disagree with Singer on a number of points. For one, I think it is pretty patronizing to imply that the Air Force is trying to rekindle their scarf-wearing glory days rather than attempting to realistically tackle a legitimate criticism of their force structure. If anything, even if one disagrees with the program, they should be commended for displaying some 'out of the box' thinking that appeared to be woefully lacking of late (e.g., the efforts SecDef Gates had to go through to increase Predator sortie rates).

I am also skeptical of the idea that Predators are the answer. Drones are expensive--they require an extremely sophisticated C2 network and other high-end infrastructure investments--so if you're looking for a low-cost solution they probably wouldn't be the best choice (also why they would be a terrible idea for the Afghan Air Force, amazing Singer is even taking that argument seriously). And there is something to be said for having two pilots in the loop, on station, peering down from a bubble canopy at the fight (not to mention their FLIR pods).

I am more sympathetic to the arguments about survivability, but those cut against Preds and Reapers too. Also the Columbians seem to do well with their Tucanos against a fairly sophisticated and well-armed irregular opponent.

All in all, the op-ed seems like a cheap and ill-informed shot against the Air Force (with some legitimate arguments). Anyone else think Singer may be going a little 'drone-happy' ever since publishing Wired for War?

Schmedlap

09-23-2009, 07:34 PM

I don't get the reference to F-15s and F-16s. I don't know any Soldier who has interacted with one without a JTAC as an intermediary. I mean, maybe it happens, but probably not as the ordinary course of business. For the rest of us, how many JTACs does the AF have available to attach to ground forces down at the platoon level? And even if that were feasible, F-16s brought little more to the fight than a bomb dropped from umpteen thousand feet with a gigantic danger zone and a 30-second delay from the moment that it was requested. It's nice when you need it. But most of the time you just need another set of eyes from a different vantage point and some well-placed fires on a nearby target. Take Kiowas, for example. I communicated in plain English with Kiowa pilots - sometimes with mere hand gestures because they flew so low. And if a Kiowa fired, I didn't need to back up a few hundred meters to avoid being danger close.

Surely there is a happy medium between the firepower and speed of a jet and the responsiveness and precision of a Kiowa. I don't think UAVs are the way to go. They are not responsive. If that problem could be solved, then maybe we would be on to something, but a human in the cockpit is still far more preferable. I also don't think the F-15 or similar jet is the answer. I understand his gripe is that the newly proposed planes won't be useful against China. Yeah, maybe not in the initial HIC. But in the LIC that follows, I suspect it would be. Regardless, aren't we supposed to be focusing on the wars that we're fighting? In that regard, he raises doubt on whether we'll still be fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan by the time these things might be fielded, in 2013. Now there is some wishful thinking.:rolleyes:

Fuchs

09-23-2009, 07:48 PM

It takes a lot of background to understand the whole COIN aircraft (let's think of the OV-10D+ Bronco as an example) discussion.

1) The Korea and Vietnam story of Skyraider vs. jets.
The propeller-driven Skyraider was slow and rugged, its pilot had enough time to find and identify the target (or marking smoke) and to communicate with the FAC or FO.
This is generally used as an example that it takes slow aircraft for safe and effective CAS. That's where much of the A-10's popularity comes from.
The A-10 had its embarrassing sorties about fratricide as well, though (think of AAV's being misunderstood for BMP's in Iraq).

2) The counter-concept to the slow&low school is the "high, fast & technical sensors with zoom" school. Air forces love the latter (if they have enough money) because the platform is much more versatile. You can attach a FLIR pod to a fighter to make a CAS aircraft. Speed is supposedly no problem because the aircraft can circle at a safe altitude.
I'd like to add that supersonic jets can fly slow as well. Maybe the air forces need a new, alternative high authority autopilot software for slow&low CAS (AOA issues may be a challenge, though).

3) Drones (can) have extreme endurance and a good sensor, but most are slow. Especially the original Predator drones are as slow as a WWI biplane. So that's a kind of platform that you want to use on lasting ops, not as a quick reaction asset.

4) Drones also require bandwidth, and as far as I know it's simply impossible to increase the quantity of drones on station by much. Bandwidth is the critical bottleneck afaik.

5) Air support is more than just staring and using guided munitions
* show of force (show yourself, lightshow)
* strafing runs (autocannon, possibly unguided rockets like 68mm SNEB or 70mm Hydra or CRV)

I'd like to add that a 70mm Hydra smoke rocket salvo can at times get infantry out of trouble real quick.

6) New (or re-started) COIN aircraft production takes years. The only quick fix would be to buy and at most refurbish existing aircraft.
Brazil has Tucanos, the USN has T-45's, Broncos sit in the desert, Hawks are available in many places, L-159's are available on the market (even some with almost no flying hours). Such light jets consume only about 1/3 as much fuel as an A-10. They're also two-seaters with superior abilities in communication and sensing (due to shared workload).

7) Normal tactical aircraft cannot easily be operated inside Afghanistan. That takes a lot of ground personnel plus all the fuel and ammo would need to be moved in That would happen either by air (insanely expensive) or on unsafe roads.
The supposed COIN aircraft would be less much thirsty, while the maintenance requirements may be much lower than an A-10's as well.

8) The Taleban don't seem to have effective ManPADS and only occasionally something like 14.5 or 23mm AA weapons. Even WW2 aircraft would be quite survivable (for now - I don't think that the Pakistanis guard their ManPADS systems as well as their nukes).

IntelTrooper

09-23-2009, 07:55 PM

Take Kiowas, for example. I communicated in plain English with Kiowa pilots - sometimes with mere hand gestures because they flew so low. And if a Kiowa fired, I didn't need to back up a few hundred meters to avoid being danger close.

I think Kiowas are a perfect example. Being able to get "low and slow" and communicate directly with troops in contact (maybe the ability to survive some SAF or an RPG) seems like an excellent solution to make the Air Force more relevant in LIC/COIN/SFA operations.

I also agree with your point about what the Iraqis and Afghans want. Is it possible that they don't actually know what would be best for them, and are stating their preferences based on the "gee whiz, cool!" factor rather than the usefulness of such aircraft?

Old Eagle

09-23-2009, 08:35 PM

Everybody wants the best -- shiniest, fastest, etc., etc., etc. One of the military forces I was assisting wanted a fleet of F-16s, as a "gift" from the U.S. As any of you who have run guns for a living know, the expense isn't in procurement, it's in training, O&M, etc. Partner Air Forces need frames that they can afford and can master the maintenance of. Blessedly, our security assistance program sells full packages (training, spare parts, maint. equip., etc.), but even then, with an initial stock of spare parts, vehicles/airframes still become hangar queens through cannibalization.

So quite aside from what the "COIN" aircraft can do for me, please consider what they can do for our partners. Remember, endstate is being able to exit, leaving behind a reasonably self-sustaining partner.

Jesse9252

09-23-2009, 08:45 PM

Everybody wants the best -- shiniest, fastest, etc., etc., etc. One of the military forces I was assisting wanted a fleet of F-16s, as a "gift" from the U.S.
Bingo--which is why Singer is disingenuous (or just ignorant) when he writes, at face value, that the head of the Iraqi air force wants F-16s. Of course he wants F-16s; and they will be about as useful to him as the MiG-29s were to Saddam.

And as far as the Predator going to the Afghan Air Force--what are the odds they will be able to stand up the sort of networked systems necessary to operate them anytime in the next decade? Considering the country's literacy rate, I think I have a better shot of winning the lottery.

On the other hand, could these militaries operate a one or two-engine, two-seat prop plane with some basic avionics and weapons systems, along with the necessary maintenance and training programs? I dunno, but I'd say they had a better shot than with F-16s and Predators.

Ken White

09-23-2009, 08:51 PM

I'm often asked why I'm unreasonably and implacably opposed to 'Think' Tanks and academics who are 'Strategists' or military experts. Theoreticians with considerable book knowledge and little experience are particularly bothersome... :mad:

Then I read ill-informed, rather ignorant and unduly patronizing articles like that from Singer and I recall why that's the case... :wry:

Aside from that pseudo-psychobabble about scarves which demeans the writer, not the aviators, the points made by you and others are all valid. I'll also point out that any turboprops bought won't last long enough due to normal wear and tear to be around if we have a China problem. As for Iran, he apparently is unaware of the moonscape that is Iranian territory... :eek:

No question UAVs have their uses but there are many things they cannot do and he misses the point of in-theater availability. He also should be aware that the F-16 and other fast movers can indeed do CAS -- but Troops and the JTACs on the ground in Afghanistan will opt for the A-10, the AH-64 and a Kiowa in that order given the call. I suspect there's a reason for that. :cool:

Dippy article that contributes little and demonstrates a lot of arrogance, only slight knowledge and not much else.

MattC86

09-23-2009, 09:03 PM

Agreed with all of the above.

Also, I think it's a bit absurd that Singer talks about partners for the Air Force to support, and ignores ground forces. Of course an AF general (no doubt in flight suit during the interview) wants more high-performance fighters. Ground troops of any stripe - coalition or indigenous - I assume would prefer the COIN aircraft to drones or more strike jets.

Then again, it's hard for me to understand the Air Force when I can only (unfairly) think of their role as one of supporting other services. . .

Matt

jcustis

09-24-2009, 04:28 AM

Singer is pretty much out of his depth with that commentary...I would think he knows better.

Oh yeah...and what Ken said too.

Tom Odom

09-24-2009, 07:15 AM

Surely there is a happy medium between the firepower and speed of a jet and the responsiveness and precision of a Kiowa.

Can I get an A-10, Brothers and Sisters? :D

My battle buddy here is widely known as Mr. Excalibur, making him an icon of precision indirect fires in the close fight. He advocates first round precision as the new standard for indirect and has delivered that standard to troops in contact.

Let's face it. Having been in the write for your life game on the USG side, sometimes guys like Singer gotta scribble something and the old rule something needed bad gets delivered bad comes into play.

Tom

William F. Owen

09-24-2009, 08:45 AM

I think the real problem here is that Singer has no idea of the dynamics of CAS. Singer gets it half right in the absence of understanding.

a.) JDAM, AGM-114 and similar does not care what airframe it comes off, so all the Low and slow stuff is pretty moot. "Rolling in on the Smoke," ready to loose 18 x 2.75, is not really relevant to modern operations. - We can do better.

b.) Your sensor does not have to be the shooter - the IDF use UAVs to cue Apache and F-16, but "allegedly" do not wish to arm UAVs - and for normal operations do not. A UAV can cue GMLRs - why differentiate between "Air Support" and Fire Support?

c.) If you want to use 30mm, DAGR (guided 70mm) and similar, Armed helicopters would seem a sensible choice. USAF has none, so human, emotional and organisational bias, get in the way.

Personally, I am against specialist fleets of "COIN bug bashers." unless they bring a lot more to the party, as a true multi-role platform. I'd want OV-10 capabilities as an absolute minimum - eg: Observation, transport, para-dropping, and specialist sensors.

davidbfpo

09-24-2009, 10:28 AM

Wayback when I visted Davis-Monthana airbase, Tucson, Arizona and went on the public tour of the mothballed USAF fleet apart from the size of the stock, more interesting was the commentary that regularly the AF returned to take old planes out of mothballs and into active service. I cannot now recall which planes he cited. The USN and USMC have similar stockpiles.

I would suggest whatever "slow" airframes needed are there, including then dozens of OV-10s; moot point if all the spare parts etc are stockpiled too.

Fascinating place.

davidbfpo

Entropy

09-28-2009, 05:35 AM

Wilf gets it right I think, but tack on two points:

1. Platform is much less relevant than it used to be for delivering good CAS.

2. Each situation is different and METT-TC dependent. There isn't one ideal platform and weapons load that works for every situation - In other words, the air support that one gets is probably going to involve some compromise.

I think I COIN aircraft will be better in a few niche areas but won't bring a dramatic improvement in CAS in most cases. It would seem to make more sense, to me at least, to bring A-10's out of mothballs and upgrade them to the new "C" standard.

Finally, it's kind of funny, to me at least, how stereotypes of pilots are used in arguments about procurement. I'm not sure who to believe - Singer, who thinks pilots pine for the good ol' prop days, or many AF critics who think the AF doesn't want anything that won't go Mach 1+ and pull 9G's.

Fuchs

11-26-2009, 08:00 PM

Quick question: What's wrong with this AF COIN doctrine:

We support allied ground forces on their demand.

?

(KISS)

Coindanasty

11-27-2009, 04:01 AM

BLUF: Air Force senior leaders fail to grasp the fact that if the Air Force wants to contribute to winning COIN, we should be looking to our airmen, not our iron.

Discussion: The problem is that the Air Force views IW and COIN as a means of employing iron instead of people. Yes, COIN requires the disciplined use of Air Force iron IOT execute kinetic strikes and ISR. However, the idea that Big Blue should just sit back and let the ground-pounders execute population-centric COIN while we sit inside the wire is a by-product of years of indoctrination inferrring that any movement back towards the ground will inevitably lead to re-establishment of the Army Air Corps.

Recommendation: Get out of the back seat and into the driver's. Train, equip and deploy airmen tasked with supporting Air Force ground operations ISO unified COIN strategy. IW, and by association, COIN, are population-centric and require people, not planes.

Entropy

11-27-2009, 03:47 PM

Recommendation: Get out of the back seat and into the driver's. Train, equip and deploy airmen tasked with supporting Air Force ground operations ISO unified COIN strategy. IW, and by association, COIN, are population-centric and require people, not planes.

That is happening for personnel with relevant skill-sets: SoF, Rescue, MP, OSI, transportation/logistics, etc. What more should be done?

Coindanasty

11-27-2009, 04:57 PM

I disagree - case in point, just spent some time with an OSI det downrange, as well as their parent leadership. When queried aboit their contribution to COIN, the answer was that it wasn't really up to them. Their perspective was CTO, and if it fit into the localized COIN strategy, then great. It takes nothing away form the outstanding job they do - but one of the much-touted tenets of COIN is unity of command/effort. What does it tell me when the leading edge of the AF ability to contribute to localized intelligence collection receives limmited direction outside find/fix/neutralize targets?

Again, all the specialties you mentioned contribute to COIN as Joint Expeditionary Taskings (JET). However, strategically, those assets are fire-and-forget i.e. the ground pounders want this, we (the AF) give them that.
What we should be doing is taking all elements capable of executing population-centric ops (which in my mind is every specialty), train them and push them outside the wire ISO a unified COIN strategy. You've got thousands of airmen who serve in only a support capacity, folks who have no perspective on the population they are supposedly their to win. Galula addresses exactly this - the idea that force protection and permanence do nothing but isolate the force from the people and lead to the perception of The Invader. And according to the big G, every specialty contributes to the fight. Under his model, an electrician would be focused on supporting first, the needs of the populace and second, that pesky AC unit that keeps going out at the morale tent.

Bob's World

11-27-2009, 07:23 PM

We'll know the AF is truly serious about COIN not when they write doctrine for COIN that shapes the mission to validate the force they have; but when they build a capability to support the mission that the guys on the ground need them to provide.

I had an AF instructor at the War College who challeneged a position I had made in a paper that the AF had provided critical support to the SF teams that were our first boots on the ground in Afghanistan. He was quite serious in his case that it was actually the other way around, that the SF teams on the ground were the ones supporting the AF bombers by providing target locations.

When I see SPADs rolling off the assembly line again instead of UAVs and F-35s/22s, then we will know the AF is serious about supporting COIN operations. Even then it should probably be a relatively small aspect of their capability, with the majority focused on being able to gain and maintain air superiority against a near-peer opponent.

But the AF has bigger challenges, as the technological advantages once measured in and amortized over decades; now are far more fleeting and just can't justify the massive outlays of $$$. They have a new paradigm and there is no easy answer to address it.

Coindanasty

11-27-2009, 07:48 PM

That's funny; sounds like someone needed a lesson in supporting vs. supported...was that at Air War College?

But I still disagree with you (slightly). The smallest portion of a USAF COIN doctrine should be understanding ground support. I still firmly believe it should be rooted in developing organic ground support. The disparate pieces exist; all that is lacking is the will to employ it as such.

Billy Mitchell fought maverick-hard for the separate Air Force; I believe if he were alive today he'd be pretty torqued to see his mantra used to further a digression from relevance. Airpower? More like "Airman-power."

Bob's World

11-27-2009, 08:06 PM

Army War College. When I see such bias in others it mostly serves as a reminder that I too must possess similar biases and to guard against the same as much as possible.

I recently heard GEN Schwartz speak, and he is convinced as well that the key to the future of the USAF lies in the Airmen who make it up.

Adam L

11-27-2009, 08:49 PM

I'm very tired of the AF acting as if it has been sidelined. I personally think this has a lot to do with Nagl's talk of winning the wars your fighting. The AF primary duties should be maintaining the ability to have air superiority in all conflicts which we might enter. (For example: China or India in 20 years time.) Also, maintaining a sufficient bomber and air lift capability. Personally, I think the AF will be lacking in all of these areas in a few years even if they are not now. This may not be the war right now, but it is the one we must be ready for.

The job of the AF in COIN is to maintain air supremacy (not a problem right now,) provide airlift and whatever air support is necessary (a flyover, an SDB or a MOAB.) After that the AF provides whatever assets/personnel/capabilities it possesses that may be useful to the forces on the ground. (Entropy has already commented that this is occurring.)

Recommendation: Get out of the back seat and into the driver's. Train, equip and deploy airmen tasked with supporting Air Force ground operations ISO unified COIN strategy. IW, and by association, COIN, are population-centric and require people, not planes.

If this is what should be done, then the AF might as well be reintegrated with the Army, latest to some extent. That may not be such a bad idea. We might be able to get beyond this whole argument of Air vs. Ground. It shouldn't matter whether the SF on the ground are supporting the air strike, or the other way around. What matters is that the target got blown up and they both were supporting the mission.

Adam L

Coindanasty

11-27-2009, 08:50 PM

CSAF is a breath of fresh air. Check out his reading list at http://www.af.mil/information/csafreading/index.asp

Exciting to see Galula's tome at the top of the list.

I read an interesting article recently by a STO; will post it if I can find it. It posited that the USAF's tech-heavy approach and failure to cultivate indepent leaders (like Mitchell) currently hamper our ability to shape the the future and stay relevant in the now.

My IW mentors in the AF believe the same re: people vs. planes. Tell the Air Force to do COIN, and we give you the MC-12. Tell us to shape ourselves for the future and we give you the F-35. The paradigm you mention above has been shaped by decades of looking back, and it's leaving us on the hind mammary in the current fight.

Entropy

11-27-2009, 08:56 PM

Coindanasty,

Most of the personnel mentioned are used to fulfill requests by the ground forces. Many others fill PRT billets. Some of the people in my unit have filled these taskings and my previous unit (rescue) directly supported the ground forces. It appears to me the Army would rather have sailors and airmen doing some of the necessary, but perhaps not directly COIN-related, tasks that are within their core competencies to free up Army personnel for direct COIN. As I'm sure you're aware, both the Navy and Air Force have limited capabilities to operate independently on the ground. There are probably some areas where more personnel with appropriate training could embed with the Army, but I don't know what they are.

What we should be doing is taking all elements capable of executing population-centric ops (which in my mind is every specialty), train them and push them outside the wire ISO a unified COIN strategy.

I disagree that every specialty can do pop-centric COIN outside the wire, even if pop-centric COIN is the way to go. For Afghanistan there are real limitations to the number of foreign (ie, American) troops that can conduct such operations, the most important being interpreters. There aren't enough good terps as it is.

I had an AF instructor at the War College who challeneged a position I had made in a paper that the AF had provided critical support to the SF teams that were our first boots on the ground in Afghanistan. He was quite serious in his case that it was actually the other way around, that the SF teams on the ground were the ones supporting the AF bombers by providing target locations.

To me such parochial debates are kind of pointless. It's like a bullet and a rifle arguing about which one of them is "support." The early stages of OEF could not have been accomplished absent either the SF teams or the fire support (and transport and logistics) provided by coalition air forces. It's more accurate to say that both were supporting the joint force commander which is, doctrinally, what we're supposed to be doing anyway.

Coindanasty

11-27-2009, 09:23 PM

Adam L: The AF sidelines itself, not the other way around. Hence CSAF's "all in" approach to the joint fight. I agree with your assessment of priorities, but I do believe that wars of the future will look a lot like the wars of the present (outside of the whole PRK/RUS/PRC debate, which is way outside what I'm talking about here). Hence my belied we need to take ourselves off the sideline.

USAF/Army integration? Heresy! I can tell you I made it work, ad hoc, in '02. Translating tactical success to strategic formulization is the real trick...

Entropy: You're right that when it comes to the JET/supporting world, the Air Force is supporting. However, ask a Rescue guy, especially the ground guys, right now (I just did on my last trip) if they're doing all they can and you might get a different answer. I understand your concern that not all specialties are capable (or desired) for pop-centric ops. Qualified terps - yep, felt that pain in my prior worlds. But, I still think your point reinforces mine: IF we manned/trained/equipped, we COULD do it. Remember that whole IW Wing idea in 2007 that had the traditional airpower folks in such a tiz?

Entropy

11-27-2009, 09:59 PM

Coindanasty,

I spent five years in a rescue unit including an Afghanistan deployment. What PJ's may want to do is not the same thing as what they need to do, which depends on their unit's assigned mission. I know that some PJ's would rather be outside the wire full time than sitting on alert at some FOB waiting for someone to get hurt, but sitting alert and saving lives is a mission that has to be done. Besides, I know my unit saved many Afghan security forces and local nationals, which is pretty "pop-centric" in my book.

Let me ask you this - if more personnel are needed for pop-centric COIN on the ground, why should those forces come from outside one of the ground services? It seems like it would be better to plus up capability in the Army/Marines than try to create some Air Force COIN ground force. The ground forces already have the training, doctrine and mindset for that mission - what "value added" would AF and/or Navy personnel provide beyond the discrete support missions they do currently?

Coindanasty

11-27-2009, 10:10 PM

Entropy,

Point 1 taken; love to debate it further with you at another venue since I could chase the rabbit ways from this thread.

Point 2: Now that's a question worth asking. In order to buy myself time to formulate an educated response, please tell me if I am judging your POV correctly:

You believe that if more ground-centric capability is needed, it should come from the ground-centric branches i.e. USA/USMC. They are the SMEs on all aspects of IW and COIN and are best manned/trained/equipped to do so; gaps can be RFF'd from sister branches as needed but COA 1 is to plus up those existing capabilities.

slapout9

11-27-2009, 10:12 PM

CSAF...does that stand for the Confederate States Air Force:eek:

slapout9

11-27-2009, 10:22 PM

From the Airpower Journal..... COIN and Dynamic Targeting. IMO the AF should continue to ehance these capabilities for their COIN mission.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/win07/brown.html

Entropy

11-27-2009, 10:32 PM

You believe that if more ground-centric capability is needed, it should come from the ground-centric branches i.e. USA/USMC. They are the SMEs on all aspects of IW and COIN and are best manned/trained/equipped to do so; gaps can be RFF'd from sister branches as needed but COA 1 is to plus up those existing capabilities.

Essentially yes. The ground forces are always going to be the lead in any COIN effort, pop-centric or otherwise. What I wouldn't like to see is every service with it's own COIN ground force. There is, obviously, going to be some overlap (which isn't a bad thing), but the Air Force and Navy should concentrate their efforts on supporting and enabling the ground forces, not augmenting them.

slapout9

11-27-2009, 10:44 PM

And Air Occupation from 1997.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/win97/dippold.html

slapout9

11-28-2009, 07:59 AM

And some more stuff from the SBW Target folder, this time by an Army officer on the viability of Air Occupation (1993 paper).

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=1465&CISOBOX=1&REC=12

Coindanasty

12-03-2009, 05:03 AM

I can't believe it. I just spent almost two hours formulating a response and when I tried to post it, it all disappeared and said I wasn't logged in. Luckily when I tried to go back with the browser, it wasn't there either. Damn it all.

:mad:

Entropy

12-03-2009, 05:19 AM

That sucks. If you use Firefox (and you really should), you can get a plugin called Lazarus that saves all your web/form/comment data. It's saved me from the gremlins a number of times.

Coindanasty

12-03-2009, 05:22 AM

Been punting aound the idea of switching over to Linux for a while now, and yes, I really should be using Firefox. I'll try again tomorrow and maybe my response will be that much more mind-blowing (probably not though).

Kiwigrunt

12-03-2009, 05:42 AM

For long posts may I suggest preparing them on a word-doc and then c&p them in here. Then you've got your back-up.

slapout9

12-03-2009, 05:47 AM

slapout9

12-03-2009, 05:50 AM

Newer AF COIN Doctrine.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fiB3vrhPDNs

StreetF16

12-12-2009, 04:08 PM

Reading through the three pages of this thread, it appears to me there is a lot of "talking past each other" going on. Yes, the Air Force needs to wake up and realize that we won the "independent Air Service" fight back in 1947--let's move on, we don't need to refight that merge every year.

That said, why is it that none of the entries so far has even mentioned AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare (published two years ago) ? Work on this document was started before FM 3-24 was published, in recognition that the Air Force needed more doctrine on this type of warfare--COIN is a large part of that document.

The Air Force does not ignore COIN--today MQ-1 Predator pilots are the second largest group of pilots in the Air Force (this is the primary ISR and light attack platform for this fight). The Air Force has spent a lot of time and effort developing munitions that are both smaller and more precise than the older-generation PGMs, making them more useful for those situations in which kinetic attack is called for. We also say in our own doctrine that, in many cases, non-kinetic roles for Airpower such as airlift, ISR, C2, CSAR, etc., are the best ways that air can help win the fight.

There is also a fundamental difference between air and ground forces regarding COIN and other forms of irregular warfare. Most airpower missions differ only in matters of degree and nuance from COIN to higher-end conventional warfare. CAS is still CAS, for example, even though the ROE is very different and even one bomb landing in the wrong area may have strategic consequences. For the infantryman, the difference between TTP for "Clear/Hold/Build" and for major conventional warfare is much greater. So if it appears that the Air Force is making fewer adjustment for the current fight, that's because fewer adjustments are required.

I'm also not saying there aren't things the Air Force could have done better--of course there are. We could have pushed up the pipeline for JTACs sooner, to better provide control for CAS in a small-unit conflict. We've also let the single CAOC per theater concept override the need to have the primary air planners physically co-located with the rest of the joint planning staff, rather than a thousand miles away at the end of a telephone line.

reed11b

12-24-2009, 01:29 AM

today MQ-1 Predator pilots are the second largest group of pilots in the Air Force (this is the primary ISR and light attack platform for this fight).

Does this mean that since I have played "Flight Simulator" I am a Pilot? Sweet.
Reed

jmm99

12-24-2009, 02:43 AM

AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_3.pdf) (2007); and AFDD 2-3.1 Foreign Internal Defense (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_3_1.pdf) (2007).

My dad wore an 8th Air Force patch on his left sleeve and a 30ID patch on the right - obviously before the "War of Divisions". Perhaps, just a little bit of "Back to the Future" would be healthy ?

Merry Christmas

Mike

StreetF16

01-03-2010, 03:27 PM

Mike--thanks for posting links to AFDD 2-3 and 2-3.1; I helped write both of those documents. I think they help to show the air side of COIN and the other air aspects of irregular warfare. I would also direct any interested parties to the "Airpower in COIN" appendix to the Army's FM 3-24--this appendix was largely written by me and my staff at the Air Force doctrine center, thanks to the Army being very joint and sharing the draft for review by all of the services.

I think all of our services today suffer from a slice of senior leadership that still doesn't understand what "joint" is all about. As I stated in my first posting, we (the AF) need to get over the need to prove our independence year after year, and get on with the business of being part of the joint team, with both supported and supporting roles to play.

Reed--I guess playing "Flight Sim" makes you about as much of a pilot as my playing "Ghost Recon" qualifies me for Delta or the SEALs.

Happy New Year

Cavguy

01-03-2010, 04:23 PM

Entropy

01-03-2010, 09:57 PM

Glad to have you here StreetF16. As an Air Force guy myself (ok, Air Guard), this is the best forum around in my opinion. Lots of knowledgable folks here - stick around.

StreetF16

01-05-2010, 03:56 PM

CAVGUY

Thanks for the three links you posted. I'd like to respond with a general comment that many of the posted replies assumed that anything written by RAND Project Air Force comes directly from the office of the Air Force Chief of Staff and represents the latest official position of the junior service. As one who has worked with RAND on several of these and other studies, I can honestly say that is a common, but often false, perception.

Specifically--the "Learning Lessons Large..." study was not researched in the depth required. The study used "current" AF and Army doctrine as an example of how each service did or did not learn lessons during the post-cold war period. In fact, the authors spent little time actually interviewing AF doctrine developers, and did not even read any of the draft doctrine that was in development during the time of the study. Many of the conclusions in this study as examples of lessons not learned were OBE, as the then-draft AF doctrine included exactly the updates the study recommended. I honestly can't speak to the draft Army doctrine side of the study, but the same may hold true for CADD as was the case for AFDC.

Rather than spending time discussing various RAND reports, some of which are very good and some which are not, a better focus for this forum would be to comment on the current joint and service doctrine that addresses COIN. In AFDD 2-3 "Irregular Warfare," for example, one can find the following quotes:

"Often, the effects desired in COIN will directly support ground operations (military and civilian) requiring proper integration and coordination"

"In order to achieve the JFC’s strategic and operational objectives, traditional approaches to warfare must often be reversed, first weighing the impact on the relevant population and then determining the impact of operations on an adversary’s will and capability. There may be times when a conscious decision not to respond to enemy provocation may be more effective toward achieving strategic goals. In COIN, strategic success is defined by successfully discrediting the hostile ideology rather than by achieving military tactical victories."

A detailed look at AFDD 2-3 "Irregular Warfare," which discusses COIN and other forms of IW, clearly shows a balanced approach. Capabilities such as airlift, ISR, C2, HUMINT, logistics support, medivac, C/SAR, and foreign advisory missions are all included along with kinetic attack, which itself is discussed mainly in the form of CAS. I'm not saying the AF is the expert on COIN or IW, but it does both understand IW and take it seriously (not that there aren't individual Airmen out there who don't). In fact, just as within the other services, there is an on-going debate as to whether the AF is moving too far toward improving COIN/IW capabilities at the expense of more high-threat capabilities (similar to the debate over heavy vs. light force mix for the Army).

Turning to a general discussion of service doctrine, I think there is far too much discussion of service doctrine and not nearly enough on joint doctrine. Service doctrine, BY INTENT AND DESIGN, is intended to capture a specific, service-centric perspective. Service doctrine is also not used to guide actual operations--that's what joint doctrine is for. That's one of the main reasons the joint staff recently published JP 3-24, which looks very similar to FM 3-24, BUT IT IS SIGNED BY ALL OF THE SERVICES. As a Colonel teaching and advising prospective USAF component commanders, at least 90% of what I taught was straight out of joint doctrine.

So far I agree with comments about the forum--"fair and balanced" as they say, with a healthy exchange of (mostly) honest opinions.

slapout9

01-05-2010, 04:49 PM

Link to paper on possible AF Doctrine, special section on the Propaganda Triangle.....manpower,money,and media.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA401142&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

LtFuzz

01-29-2010, 08:55 AM

Moderators Note - moved to RFI thread

Hello,

I'm an analyst with a small aviation TF (UHs, CHs, AHs, no OHs) deployed overseas.

Our battlespace owner is very much committed to Counterinsurgency. Our leadership feels -- and I agree -- that if we don't adopt COIN philosophy and doctrine we will be quickly left behind on the modern battlefield and relegated to a role of air logistician.

I've been tasked with putting together a "COIN Academy" for our soldiers and aircrews. I already know the biggest obstacle will be overcoming the "WTF?" reaction from crews who have been trained in kinetic action since the dawn of their profession.

What I am struggling with right now -- after consulting FM 3-24, among other sources -- is finding (or developing, if I must) a template for the exponential use of aviation assets in a COIN environment. FM 3-24 focuses on the application of combat power via air assets, but that really isn't a relevant role for us in our current battlespace.

We know we can be more than air taxis and sling-loaders. We're already having some success by shifting the role of the AHs, to the profound consternation of the crews who don't yet understand that by "failing" in an operational sense, specific to that airframe, they are in fact "winning" the strategic fight.

Do you all have any thoughts on how aviation can evolve to be a relevant actor in a COIN environment?

Xenophon

01-29-2010, 12:36 PM

The bottom line for air support in COIN is to remember that it is air support. You guys are not going to be the main effort on this one, and that's ok. I don't know if your group has ISR capabilities but that's a big money maker. And CAS is still important in COIN, it's just not going to be like firebombing Tokyo anymore.

In fact, I don't think air support in COIN is all that different from air support in any other war. There is just a bigger focus on not blowing up civilians and thus a greater desire for precision (I deal with the same issues as an artilleryman). And really, we should not be in the business of blowing up civilians under any circumstances. A lot of the guidance that gets handed down from on high in the name of "COIN" can be distilled down to "Don't kill innocent people" Well, no kidding. My mom could have told me that, maybe she should write a policy paper. Be a Good Boy, Eat your Green Beans, and Protect the Population: The Application of Nagging in Military Operations Other Than War.

Not sure if this helps you set up your school, but when instructing younger warfighters, I wouldn't focus on the theory of COIN and go into a deep, Powerpoint-assisted lecture on Galula or even FM 3-24. Distill it down to the basics: We're the good guys, act like it, the ends do not always justify means, listen to your mother.

marct

01-29-2010, 01:57 PM

Some good points, Xenophon, and I really, REALLY, want to read your mothers' paper :D.

LtFuzz, do you know Brian Selmeski at the Air Force Culture and Languiage Center at Maxwell AFB? Brian and his colleagues have been doing some very interesting work on the role of air bases as a COIN centre - how to integrate them and use them. You may want to contact him for some ideas; pm me if you want his email address.

Cheers,

Marc

SJPONeill

01-29-2010, 09:33 PM

Doing some work on this as well - do you want to contact me offline and we might be able to share/compare notes? Have just reviewed the RAAF's Friends in High Places - Air Power in Irregular Warfare (http://sjponeill.wordpress.com/2010/01/28/friends-in-high-places-review/) on my blog if you want to have a look...

SJPONeill

01-29-2010, 09:35 PM

Be a Good Boy, Eat your Green Beans, and Protect the Population: The Application of Nagging in Military Operations Other Than War.

Off this topic, or maybe not, but you might argue that this is exactly the IO campaign that is being waged against us by the opposition(s)...?

Cavguy

01-30-2010, 12:15 AM

Agree with the others. Best thing an AV unit can do for support is understand the dynamics of the AO's they're flying over, and endeavor to not fly in such a way that it (intentionally or unintentionally) pisses off the population. Close coordination with battlespace owners is key, which is really just good traditional AGI ...

Take a look at the products in the Knowledge Center at https://coin.army.mil - some generic OPDs you may find useful. Done an ASCOPE analysis of your AO(s) for the pilots? Understand the key civilian infrastructure and terrain?

Enjoy the forum. I've learned a ton.

Starbuck

01-30-2010, 02:03 AM

I say this as an Army Aviator (albeit one committed to the COIN movement...shhhhh...don't tell AAAA), but you need to kind of keep it simple, like Xenophon said. At least at first. Most aviators, particularly warrant officers, will stand up in the middle of a lecture about Galula and say "hey, does anyone have a MANPADS? That's all I care about".

You might be able to build from there. One thing that might be interesting is subtly altering the nature of the mandatory aviation "hooah" video, and replace the shots of missiles blowing things up to shots of IPs and ANA people loading up onto Chinooks and Black Hawks.

Cargo/Lift assets will, of course, be somewhat of a battlefield logistics function, but they can also serve as a means of transportation to seize HVT in a kinetic operation, and serve as CAS as well. Aside from a lot of the tactics and the op-tempo, Army Aviation hasn't had a radical mindshift since 9-11 like the rest of the Army has. They're happy just to keep flying.

Rifleman

01-30-2010, 03:54 AM

Link: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502979&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

I have no idea if this paper will be beneficial for your needs or not. But I thought it was worth directing your attention to on the chance that there might be a nugget or two in it somewhere that fits your situation.

LtFuzz

01-30-2010, 05:45 AM

Thanks for the replies, gentlemen. I'll be looking at all your recommendations and will contribute back here my findings.

SJPOneil, if you could provide me your email address I'd love to compare notes.

Infanteer

01-30-2010, 06:26 AM

1. Ask the real-estate owners what pisses off the locals. Most people I've chatted with in the past get real worked up when aviation starts buzzing them when they're working.

2. Ask the real-estate owners when the enemy likes to screw around - usually the sound and lights of aviation keeps them from digging in for a bit.

William F. Owen

01-30-2010, 07:08 AM

-- that if we don't adopt COIN philosophy and doctrine we will be quickly left behind on the modern battlefield and relegated to a role of air logistician.

What's wrong with logistics? Ammo in, casualties out. Move troops as and when required. Likewise observation tasks.
That's G*d's work in irregular warfare. Look at the Army Air Corps. RAF and FLeet Air Arm, in Northern Ireland as a good template as to what is possible with a bit of imagination.

IMO, provide the support your CoC wants.

LtFuzz

01-30-2010, 08:16 AM

What's wrong with logistics? Ammo in, casualties out. Move troops as and when required. Likewise observation tasks.
That's G*d's work in irregular warfare. Look at the Army Air Corps. RAF and FLeet Air Arm, in Northern Ireland as a good template as to what is possible with a bit of imagination.

IMO, provide the support your CoC wants.

Nothing wrong with it at all, Mr Owen.

The issue here -- however -- is that you're maintaining a force paradigm that has existed, relatively unchanged, throughout all conflicts, conventional and unconventional.

I'm attempting to endeavor a comparison and discussion of how things can be tweaked -- not wholly changed -- to provide even more flexibility to the ground force commander.

In Afghanistan today it cannot be "keep it up" but "how can we make it even better?"

Someone will always have to deliver the mail, but how can we make the AH64s a more effective asset if they are told to hold their fire?

Boots on the ground have had to radically change their posture. I think we're missing something if our aircrews aren't being told to do the same. The UH60 is capable of almost any mission -- how can we make incorporate it onto the battlefield in a more meaningful way than ferrying PAX?

Maybe it's not possible, maybe the trajectory of rotary-wing combat power has reached its pinnacle and I'm reaching for new models that don't exist.

But the British in Malaysia and the Portugese in Angola had two very different interpretations of airpower (thanks for that article, Rifleman) in -- philosophically -- the same environment.

I wonder if we can add to the debate...

William F. Owen

01-30-2010, 10:20 AM

Nothing wrong with it at all, Mr Owen.
Call me Wilf.

In Afghanistan today it cannot be "keep it up" but "how can we make it even better?"
All good, and I agree with asking the customer as the best way to answer the question.

Someone will always have to deliver the mail, but how can we make the AH64s a more effective asset if they are told to hold their fire?
Well the AH-64 can be configured to carry a cargo payload. Cheap and easy to do, but rejected by Army Aviation!
I suggest mothballing the AH-64 if you-cannot find a role for it. UK seems to be using over-time in Helmand, or so it would seem.

The UH60 is capable of almost any mission -- how can we make incorporate it onto the battlefield in a more meaningful way than ferrying PAX?
Why? Why do you want to do more than what history proves to be the most important mission? Personally I can only see roles for basically two types. UH-60/UH-1X and CH-47/CH-53X.

Question: Is every US UH-60 and CH-47 crew deployed to A'Stan cleared to do fly under-slung loads? If not, why not?

LtFuzz

01-30-2010, 11:13 AM

I suggest mothballing the AH-64 if you-cannot find a role for it. UK seems to be using over-time in Helmand, or so it would seem.

There is a role, just as kinetic action has a role in COIN.

Why? Why do you want to do more than what history proves to be the most important mission? Personally I can only see roles for basically two types. UH-60/UH-1X and CH-47/CH-53X.

I'm not saying we need to abandon traditional mission sets -- but how can we expand them?

There are lots of examples I'd like to discuss, but I'm very concerned about OPSEC. If anyone has SIPR/CENTRIX, please PM me and we'll exchange addresses.

Question: Is every US UH-60 and CH-47 crew deployed to A'Stan cleared to do fly under-slung loads? If not, why not?

CHs sling-load regularly. UH60s rarely. (If I am interpreting your question correctly.)

Rifleman

01-30-2010, 11:35 AM

CHs sling-load regularly. UH60s rarely.

Why is this? :confused:

I hooked up several sling loads to UH-60s at various West German training areas in the mid-'80s. It wasn't unusual at that time.

Starbuck

01-30-2010, 01:41 PM

In Afghanistan, the density altitude (high altitudes, high temperatures) make it more difficult to carry large sling-loads with UH-60s, not so much with CH-47s.

Starbuck

01-30-2010, 01:53 PM

You guys would nix the AH and OH? Where else will troops in contact get CAS, route recon, etc? (maybe UAVs in the future, but for now, we have R/W aircraft)

davidbfpo

01-30-2010, 02:12 PM

LtFuzz,

I am sure something can be learnt, or learn to not learn from, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and there is a general thread on this: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9483

Secondly, SWC have repeatedly looked at the Rhodesian experience, notably 'Fire Force' and the on the ground aspects. Underpinning the Rhodesian "lessons" was an exceptionally competent, experimenting Air Force - who had to maximise impact for resources used. There are several Rhodesians threads: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=868, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090 , http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6013,

We have also touched upon extending the concept of the 'Flying Doctor' and elsewhere others have asked why there is such a poor response to civilian road accidents. Unusual roles maybe, but potentially part of working with the locals.

William F. Owen

01-30-2010, 03:14 PM

You guys would nix the AH and OH? Where else will troops in contact get CAS, route recon, etc? (maybe UAVs in the future, but for now, we have R/W aircraft)

Starry mate. For me it comes down the 2 uses rule. Can I use this for regular Warfare and Irregular warfare?

1. Why do you need OH and AH?
2. Can armed UH fulfil 80% of OH and AH tasks? - door gunners with NVGs and LL-LP?
3. Can A-10 do the rest?

A lot of the debate about AH that I see outside the US is a general agreement of the need for armed helicopters, but a general rejection of a machine as large, expensive and complex as AH-64 - whose cost being associated with survivability, seems very much in doubt.

William F. Owen

01-30-2010, 03:24 PM

Secondly, SWC have repeatedly looked at the Rhodesian experience, notably 'Fire Force' and the on the ground aspects. Underpinning the Rhodesian "lessons" was an exceptionally competent, experimenting Air Force - who had to maximise impact for resources used.
Concur about the excellence of the Rhodesian Air Force. Legendary skill and innovation !
However I think we need to be aware that the Fire Forces had almost no ROE, as we would accept them today, and the equipment limitations they coped with are unlikely to be relevant today - well the Americans anyway!

stanleywinthrop

01-30-2010, 04:49 PM

If you find yourself operating over or near urban battlespace as ISR or CAS, aircrews should memorize the GRGs that the ground forces provide. This memorazation should include major landmarks/ buildings and all roads. If the GRG has a building numbering system, while it might not be possible to memorize every building number familiarity with the numbering system is a must.

The less time spent in the cockpit fumbling with maps and GRGs, the more time spent eyes out.

Starbuck

01-31-2010, 12:00 AM

This is a good tip, especially near Baghdad. By the time you think you finally pull the map out of the mission packet, unfold it, and finally find yourself on the map, you've flown through three more sectors.

Fortunately, the Electronic Data Module (basically an electronic kneeboard) helps to reduce the confusion.

Cole

01-31-2010, 05:17 AM

=William F. Owen;92309]Starry mate. For me it comes down the 2 uses rule. Can I use this for regular Warfare and Irregular warfare
Man, just gotta use some imagination. Even an F-22 at supercruise with lots of gun ammo and small diameter bombs could support a COP being attacked with a quick response...at least when they eventually put a Sniper pod on them...and a helmet mounted display...which is why the F-35 is essential.

1. Why do you need OH and AH?Check out what happened at COP Wanat, COP Zeroc, and COP Keating when AH-64Ds came to the rescue and could use 30mm, rockets, and Hellfire close to troops while other more lethal aerial and artillery systems could not. At Wanat, casualties would not have been evacuated as rapidly without Apaches securing the MEDEVAC LZs. UH/CH often need aerial escorts for security. The Brits have used their stronger-engined AH-64D quite effectively in Helmand, too.

Manned-unmanned teaming is the future, and AH and OH fit it perfectly teamed with UAS. UH can get in the act as well carrying a squad QRF cued by UAS. Reconnaissance and security are still critical AH/OH missions in regular warfare or IW as is close combat attack. IED diggers, builders, and financiers don't like AH and OH aircraft or UAS.

2. Can armed UH fulfil 80% of OH and AH tasks? - door gunners with NVGs and LL-LP?Think Direct Action Penetrator UH-60. Personally never understood why UH-60 Hellfire in the GPF would not work, or why an AH and UH version of essentially the same aircraft could not exist. We did a lot of scout-like missions in the Sinai using lowly Hueys, while still doing ash and trash at other times. But UH NVGs are not the equal of the latest Apache, OH, or UAS FLIR. Personally never understood why our MEDEVAC could not be more like USAF CSAR H-60s and be armed and armored for self-defense. Every Soldier is a sensor so that should include UH and CH aviators, as well. Company fusion teams?

3. Can A-10 do the rest?Yeah, A-10s are great as are light attack prop planes with their long endurance. But the value of that endurance somewhat dims when the last of its few bombs are dropped. Then it's slowly back to a distant airfield while AH/OH can visit a much closer FARP at a FOB to arm/refuel, and head back for more. Plus its still hard to see dismounts at 250-350 knots, and diving gun runs at those speeds in mountains can be dangerous.

A lot of the debate about AH that I see outside the US is a general agreement of the need for armed helicopters, but a general rejection of a machine as large, expensive and complex as AH-64 - whose cost being associated with survivability, seems very much in doubt.The US has lost far fewer helicopters in these conflicts than were lost in Viet Nam or by Soviets in Afghanistan, despite flying over 2.5 million rotary wing hours. Lots of countries have purchased AH-64s to include in the Middle East and Europe. They are not overly complex or unaffordable.

Bottom line is the Quadrennial Defense Review correctly identified the value of rotary wing aircraft of all types to all types of conflict. I may personally believe that the AH/OH guys get too much emphasis vs. UH/CH just as combat arms get all the attention in the new Capstone Concept while logistics and COIN are barely addressed. That's just the nature of the Army beast and why infantry, SF, aviation, MP, and sustainers seem to embrace COIN and full spectrum conflict while armor and artillery branches appear to fear it, IMHO.

William F. Owen

01-31-2010, 06:01 AM

Bottom line is the Quadrennial Defense Review correctly identified the value of rotary wing aircraft of all types to all types of conflict. I may personally believe that the AH/OH guys get too much emphasis vs. UH/CH just as combat arms get all the attention in the new Capstone Concept while logistics and COIN are barely addressed.
Cole, I concur.

Yes you need armed helicopters. I am less than convinced that they need to be dedicated Attack types such as the AH-64 - but if you have them, use them.

That's just the nature of the Army beast and why infantry, SF, aviation, MP, and sustainers seem to embrace COIN and full spectrum conflict while armor and artillery branches appear to fear it, IMHO.
Well Armour and artillery have pretty central roles in Irregular Warfare, but basically none once you make all Irregular Warfare into COIN. ....and Armour and Artillery cannot re-role as infantry, you may have the wrong men doing it?

Infanteer

01-31-2010, 07:46 PM

I think whether an airframe can "do" any sort of mission is based on how ####hot the pilots are. I loved the Kiowa Warriors in Afghanistan, simply because they would ride right on my shoulder if needed - those pilots are cowboys! We've pressed our utility choppers (Griffons) into armed escorts with miniguns; the plunging fire is pretty handy. Our pilots are starting to get that important experience and are getting pretty aggressive as well.

A-10s rock. Apaches roam around like hunters, but Wilf may have a point on being a very specialized role between an armed helocopter like the ones mentioned above and an attack plane like the A-10.

Infanteer

01-31-2010, 07:54 PM

Well Armour and artillery have pretty central roles in Irregular Warfare, but basically none once you make all Irregular Warfare into COIN.

Agreed - anything can have a central role in any sort of conflict; just depends on how smart the commander is. I could employ a platoon of cooks to go out and cook for people as an IO message.

Canada has armour (Leopard 2) and artillery (M777) in Afghanistan and it is employed regularly. One should never confine a tool to a preconceived "type" of conflict (if such a thing exists - he's either shooting at you or he's not, IMO).

Anyways, I digress.

Cliff

02-01-2010, 01:42 AM

Man, just gotta use some imagination. Even an F-22 at supercruise with lots of gun ammo and small diameter bombs could support a COP being attacked with a quick response...at least when they eventually put a Sniper pod on them...and a helmet mounted display...which is why the F-35 is essential.

Agreed - F-22 w/ supercruise can cover a much wider area quickly than most fighters.

Manned-unmanned teaming is the future, and AH and OH fit it perfectly teamed with UAS. UH can get in the act as well carrying a squad QRF cued by UAS. Reconnaissance and security are still critical AH/OH missions in regular warfare or IW as is close combat attack. IED diggers, builders, and financiers don't like AH and OH aircraft or UAS.

This is where the real money will be - integrating RPVs/UAS and manned aircraft.

Think Direct Action Penetrator UH-60. Personally never understood why UH-60 Hellfire in the GPF would not work, or why an AH and UH version of essentially the same aircraft could not exist. We did a lot of scout-like missions in the Sinai using lowly Hueys, while still doing ash and trash at other times. But UH NVGs are not the equal of the latest Apache, OH, or UAS FLIR. Personally never understood why our MEDEVAC could not be more like USAF CSAR H-60s and be armed and armored for self-defense. Every Soldier is a sensor so that should include UH and CH aviators, as well. Company fusion teams?

One word - money. FLIR is expensive, and is one of the first systems to be damaged/destroyed in any kind of mishap (happened to plenty of HHs in brownout landings that my folks fixed in my last job). I agree that ideally you'd put some sort of FLIR/imaging/Sniper capability on every plane/helo you can, same with Hellfire/J-series weapons.

Yeah, A-10s are great as are light attack prop planes with their long endurance. But the value of that endurance somewhat dims when the last of its few bombs are dropped. Then it's slowly back to a distant airfield while AH/OH can visit a much closer FARP at a FOB to arm/refuel, and head back for more. Plus its still hard to see dismounts at 250-350 knots, and diving gun runs at those speeds in mountains can be dangerous.

Part of the arguement for the OA-X/AT-6 from the USAF and ACC is that it could be landed and refueled at a FOB... and it can fly at 120 knots to get low and slow. While there is a definite fuel savings, I'll be curious to see what the time difference is between OA-X and A-10... advantage of the A-10 is in a permissive environment I can park the tanker at the top of the CAS stack and just have folks climb up top and refuel when they get low on gas... meaning ordnance becomes your LIMFAC.

I am hoping USAF buys enough OA-X to make it worthwhile. The other interesting thing to see will be whether it ends up in ACC (like Army GPF) or in AFSOC... if it ends up in AFSOC, it will basically mean that COIN will have been walled off in the SPECOPS world. I think that AFSOC would like this, but my personal feeling is it would be good for the USAF to have OA-X be part of ACC.

The US has lost far fewer helicopters in these conflicts than were lost in Viet Nam or by Soviets in Afghanistan, despite flying over 2.5 million rotary wing hours. Lots of countries have purchased AH-64s to include in the Middle East and Europe. They are not overly complex or unaffordable.

Yes... but this environment is much more permissive than Vietnam... I would argue even more permissive than Afghanistan in Soviet times. We don't have China directly supporting the insurgency either, which would make a big difference... so small arms/RPGs are your main AAA threat as opposed to AAA/SAMs/MANPADS. I would also argue that our tactics and improved maintenance help a lot too.

Bottom line is the Quadrennial Defense Review correctly identified the value of rotary wing aircraft of all types to all types of conflict. I may personally believe that the AH/OH guys get too much emphasis vs. UH/CH just as combat arms get all the attention in the new Capstone Concept while logistics and COIN are barely addressed. That's just the nature of the Army beast and why infantry, SF, aviation, MP, and sustainers seem to embrace COIN and full spectrum conflict while armor and artillery branches appear to fear it, IMHO.

Cole and others, I am curious- do you think the AH/OH community has embraced the COIN role?

V/R,

Cliff

Infanteer

02-01-2010, 02:06 AM

Cole and others, I am curious- do you think the AH/OH community has embraced the COIN role?

What is "embracing the COIN role" - especially for a guy in a helicopter? I need an OH to shoot a bad guy or look for assholes digging in booby traps. Does it make a difference if the guy is in a uniform or not? By "embracing COIN", should pilots be getting into shuras?

I'll posit this - the infantry defines the pace of events on the ground against both regular and irregular foes; all else should simply do what they do and provide the support inherent to their capability. That capability does not change in an irregular fight.

Ken White

02-01-2010, 04:13 AM

...the infantry defines the pace of events on the ground against both regular and irregular foes; all else should simply do what they do and provide the support inherent to their capability. That capability does not change in an irregular fight.Nor will it change in future MCO due to the comparative expense of other combat elements. Infantry will always have the numbers to achieve economies of scale denied others... :D :cool:

Cliff

02-01-2010, 07:37 AM

Cole

02-02-2010, 01:37 AM

do the aviation folks take the time to understand the ground scheme of maneuver, and are they taking appropriate consideration for how their ops impact that? IE, are they making sure they don't buzz friendly villages/livestock, are they appropriately restraining use of force, etc.

Infanteer, I agree with you - most of what aviation is doing will not change. Nevertheless, I think there are benefits to the flyers understanding the ground fight. The same holds true even if it is an MRC, IMHO. Even for air-to-air guys, it sure helps you protect something/someone when you understand the bigger mission.

There may be times where even the infantry is in support of other folks as well, be they the HN forces or OGAs... which is why I think everyone needs to understand their part in the bigger plan.

Can't speak for aviators but do believe they get it and know the ramifications and ROE.

Lt Fuzz, suggest using the ASCOPE table out of FM 3-24.2, Tactics for Counterinsurgency as a start point for an expanded Civil Considerations class and discuss how aviation might influence items in the chart in conjunction with ground forces. Aerial insertions of OPs and patrols on high terrain. Ask infantry units to attach a squad to the TF for an aerial QRF and for sling load hook up. Insert and pickup leaders at shuras to avoid ambushes afterwards while bringing goodies to villagers. Cover routes and known chokepoints using all types of aircraft. Look for illegal checkpoints and take pictures of culvert and bridge areas to look for changes. Cover those areas and if you are an MI analyst or S-2, then have all pilots, including the utility and CH pilots, provide written or oral debriefs after each mission to a TF fusion cell. Give all pilots, or crew chiefs/flight engineers digital and video cameras to take pictures/FMV of items of interest provided to the fusion cell after the mission.

One of my more lamebrain ideas would be using National Guard water buckets for forest fires to bring water from a river or lake to drought area village animals. Chinooks could also bring in large village metal pool or engineers could construct shallow concrete pools at locations villagers agreed upon. Perhaps land near farmer's fields with UH (without causing rotorwash damage) and drop off fertilizer bags and animal feed for farmers growing good crops. Get ANA Soldiers to be seen dropping off the bags as they dismount to patrol an area.

LtFuzz and others, I'm sure you guys can think of similar but better ideas.:o

NOMAN

02-02-2010, 05:07 AM

StreetF16

02-02-2010, 10:23 AM

Lt Fuzz--recommend you look up AFDD 2-3 "Irregular Warfare." Although it is AF doctrine, not Army, you'll find a lot of applicable material on both the combat and non-combat use of airpower in COIN and other irregular applications. You might also find some useful material in AFDD 2-3.1 "FID" and 2-7 "Special Operations." Here's a link to the LeMay Center's public site at Maxwell AFB:

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/?txtSearchWord=AFDD&rdoFormPub=rdoPub&btnSearch.x=27&btnSearch.y=14

Also--you mentioned that you've looked in FM 3-24 already. In case you missed it, there is an appendix on "Airpower in COIN" in that document as well.

Hope this helps!

LtFuzz

02-02-2010, 12:18 PM

I appreciate the continued discussion, gentlemen.

I'm currently assembling a small syllabus for my task force and in a few weeks we'll begin some classes.

Rex Brynen

02-24-2010, 06:11 PM

Of course, I'm not sure Luttwak has yet met a problem that he couldn't bomb :D

In Praise of Aerial Bombing: Why terror from the skies still works (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/in_praise_of_aerial_bombing).

Foreign Policy Magazine
BY EDWARD LUTTWAK | MARCH/APRIL 2010

Ever since the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey cast doubt on the efficacy of aerial bombardment in World War II, and particularly after its failure to bring victory in the Vietnam War, air power has acquired a bad reputation. Nowadays, killing enemies from the skies is widely considered useless, while its polar opposite, counterinsurgency by nation-building, is the U.S. government's official policy. But it's not yet time to junk our planes. Air power still has a lot to offer, even in a world of scattered insurgencies.

...

Most unfortunately, having so often greatly overestimated air power in the past, the United States is now disregarding its strategic potential, using it only tactically to hunt down individuals with remotely operated drones and to support ground operations, mostly with helicopters, which are the only aircraft the Taliban can shoot down. Commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal, understandably concerned about the political blowback from errant bombings widely condemned both inside and outside Afghanistan, has put out the word that air power should be used solely as a last resort. He intends to defeat the Taliban by protecting Afghan civilians, providing essential services, stimulating economic development, and ensuring good government, as the now-sacrosanct Field Manual 3-24 prescribes. Given the characteristics of Afghanistan and its rulers, this worthy endeavor might require a century or two. In the meantime, the FM 3-24 way of war is far from cheap: President Barack Obama is now just about doubling the number of U.S. troops by sending another 30,000, at an average cost of $1 million per soldier per year, to defeat perhaps 25,000 full-time Taliban.

William F. Owen

02-24-2010, 06:51 PM

Actually I can't see much in that I disagree with.

Nothing works well when done stupidly or badly. Anything works well when done by folk skilled enough to deliver and they merely have to be good, not perfect.

SWJED

03-27-2010, 11:28 PM

Moderators Note: This was a separate RFI thread and merged 2nd April 2010.

Got this via e-mail from an Army aviator:

Ladies and Gentlemen:

My brigade is attempting to assemble a briefing on counterinsurgency for dumm...erm, aviators in preparation for a deployment to Afghanistan. I know we all feel strongly about teaching troops about the fundamentals of counterinsurgency--protecting the population, isolating the insurgents, providing security and civil services, etc.

Yet, we aviators are kind of a special case--we typically don't participate in tribal engagements. Aviators have minimal interaction with the population, and we aren't rebuilding infrastructure. Start teaching pilots about Galula or economic inequality and their eyes will inevitably glaze over. Eventually, some joker will raise his hand and say, "I just want to know if they have surface-to-air missiles". (Aviation units do have ground elements attached to them for logistical purposes and aircraft security, however, they generally won't be taking part in leader engagements and the like. Although anything can happen.)

Still, shooting up the countryside like cowboys works against our counterinsurgency efforts. Based on your experience, what advice would you have for aviators preparing to go to Afghanistan? What impact might they have on the local population? How do air crews better interact with ground troops? Do you have any information on how aviation contributes to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan? What are the best COIN lessons for an aviator about to deploy to Afghanistan?

I greatly appreciate any help you can give me in this matter. Any lessons you can give me would help immeasurably.

Thank you for your time

Captain xxxx
Fort Drum, NY

davidbfpo

03-28-2010, 11:08 AM

Have a look at the 'COIN Academy' for Aviators, a RFI thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9605 and maybe contact its author LtFuzz (Who I have tried to make contact with).

slapout9

03-28-2010, 01:44 PM

Yet, we aviators are kind of a special case--we typically don't participate in tribal engagements. Aviators have minimal interaction with the population, and we aren't rebuilding infrastructure. Start teaching pilots about Galula or economic inequality and their eyes will inevitably glaze over. Eventually, some joker will raise his hand and say, "I just want to know if they have surface-to-air missiles". (Aviation units do have ground elements attached to them for logistical purposes and aircraft security, however, they generally won't be taking part in leader engagements and the like. Although anything can happen.)

I would say there is your problem and your solution. You should (the pilots)be doing tribal engagement......you should go on the ground and on patrol to see the AO in intimate detail before you go flying if possible. That is how the original concept of "Air Policing " was done. They did the most detailed studies of Tribal leaders before and after any Air Strikes to see what effect they were having.....positve or negative.

davidbfpo

04-01-2010, 10:51 PM

hat tip to Abu M:
One of the resident aviators at CNAS, "Herbal" Carmen, weighs in with the following advice.

Complete with a nine point list.

Link: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/04/coin-aviators.html

JMA

04-02-2010, 06:36 AM

Concur about the excellence of the Rhodesian Air Force. Legendary skill and innovation !
However I think we need to be aware that the Fire Forces had almost no ROE, as we would accept them today, and the equipment limitations they coped with are unlikely to be relevant today - well the Americans anyway!

Wouldn't it be wonderful to have the opportunity to take a bunch of enthusiastic aviators not yet mentally conditioned into the straight jacket of the conventional mindset and see how a "Fire Force" operation adopted to cater for local enemy and terrain could work. It would be a blast. Maybe the Marines would be up for it?

JMA

04-02-2010, 07:36 AM

Off the top of my head, check out Fire Force by Chris Cocks. The Fire Force used both air assault and airborne insertion skills to seal an enemy. They had lift birds and C& C birds and K cars (side firing helo gunships). They brought in fixed wing when needed. The Fire Force is base upon the 1/9 Air Cav from Viet Nam. Look up Bremman's War and its two companion books about the 1/9 Air Cav and how they worked. Then look up Checker Boarding and Jitter Bugging two Air Cav tactics.

Chris Cock's book is a "troopers eye" view of the Fire Force concept in action. A book worth the read though.

The key to the the effectiveness of the air effort used in Fire Force (after the initial fixed wing strike if there was one) was that close air support was close.

How close is close in Afghanistan?

In Rhodesia 50m was possible because the Lynx (Cessna 337 Skymaster) had 'small weapons' such as 38mm SNEB rockets and a 16 gal Frantan (Napalm). The gunship could fire closer as at 800 ft the gunner could be deadly accurate. The closest troops were just told to keep their heads down. It must be said that these air crews did the vast majority of their flying on Fire Force and became very experienced.

Sylvan

04-02-2010, 06:05 PM

1. Know the ETTs and PMTs and make sure they know you.
The ANP are going to be in more TICs than anybody. If your local PMT calls and asks you to help out, try your best to do so.
2. Don't use flechettes in orchards. That where kids hide during firefights. PID PID PID PID PID PID.
3. 30mm sucks in soft dirt. Just an FYI.
4. Before laying scunion, try to ensure a ground manuever element will be able to conduct BDA on that site. Everytime you engage, mark the 10 digit grid and relay via BFT or FM to the ground manuever element.
5. Not everybody carries a compass anymore (their fault, not yours). When relaying directions to ground elements, try to orient based on their positions. "To your 3 O'Clock"
Instead of "To the Southeast"
6. Educate the people using your support. Let them know how long it takes to get a crew up and how long they can loiter in support.
7. Get some soccer balls and kick them out over kids. Make sure they are inflated, haji don't have needles.
8. Use "Wait Out" when talking with your aviation bosses on the other net or on the ground net. I would get frustrated when I couldn't talk to air because I forgot they also have more than one net to monitor.
9. I can not express to you the frustration felt when as senior ground commander I PID'd a target and relayed and the apaches didn't fire. Fire/don't fire is made by the man on scene. Your TOC rats better understand that or there will be harsh words.
10. PID again. If you are unsure, let the guy walk and let the ground manuever element deal with it.
11. Make sure you have every possible frequency for every ground element out there. Make sure that your primary command freq is known by every ground element so they can make initial contact. This was never a problem with rotary, but we sometimes couldn't establish contact with fixed.
12. In a big TIC, you will go winchester or bingo before teh fight is over. Push out the initial QRF and start prepping the next one.
13. Out of my league, but door gunners are pretty good CAS. There was a lot of hesitancy to use slicks for CAS, but blackhawks are better than nothing. The eyes in the sky at least help.
14. I honestly never had an issue with MEDEVAC. ON time and on target. Big brass ones.

Ken White

04-02-2010, 08:44 PM

5. Not everybody carries a compass anymore (their fault, not yours). When relaying directions to ground elements, try to orient based on their positions. "To your 3 O'Clock"
Instead of "To the Southeast".Totally understand the problem and where you're coming from but the far better solution is for the troops on the ground to have better situational awareness and a sense of direction. That means looking at their GPS, carrying the dumb compass, noting where the sun is (in the Stan, it'll always be south of you, comes up in the east, moves 15 degrees an hour and goes down in the west. At 1200 local standard time will be directly overhead). Stars are available at night, ridge lines are oriented in some direction. Streambeds, even if intermittent or even if the creeks are dry, are on the Map more to show you where low ground is than they are to show you water. Plenty of ways to get there. There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard...:cool:

I do know the difficulties but it's a training issue that can be easily solved. Use of "Your 3 o'clock" is better than nothing but can be disastrous if a guy is facing 180 degrees away from what looks like or should be his orientation -- or the guy hearing and reacting is not the guy you're talking to. :eek:

In this case, it's better for the Aviation support to force the cardinal directions on the ground guys. As you say, it's the ground pounders fault, not the airplane drivers...

JMA

04-02-2010, 09:49 PM

Totally understand the problem and where you're coming from but the far better solution is for the troops on the ground to have better situational awareness and a sense of direction. That means looking at their GPS, carrying the dumb compass, noting where the sun is (in the Stan, it'll always be south of you, comes up in the east, moves 15 degrees an hour and goes down in the west. At 1200 local standard time will be directly overhead). Stars are available at night, ridge lines are oriented in some direction. Streambeds, even if intermittent or even if the creeks are dry, are on the Map more to show you where low ground is than they are to show you water. Plenty of ways to get there. There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard...:cool:

I do know the difficulties but it's a training issue that can be easily solved. Use of "Your 3 o'clock" is better than nothing but can be disastrous if a guy is facing 180 degrees away from what looks like or should be his orientation -- or the guy hearing and reacting is not the guy you're talking to. :eek:

In this case, it's better for the Aviation support to force the cardinal directions on the ground guys. As you say, it's the ground pounders fault, not the airplane drivers...

May I suggest that where the air support is integral to the ground force unit/formation and working with the troops everyday simple left/right and clock face directions would be fine. If the support from people you have not worked with before then standard FAC (forward air controller) procedures need to be followed if only to ensure he doesn't put his load on your head.

Ken White

04-03-2010, 12:51 AM

...where the air support is integral to the ground force unit/formation and working with the troops everyday simple left/right and clock face directions would be fine.If it were, I'd agree. Our problem is that other than the Marines who do have integral air to an extent -- but only to an extent and even they may often get support from the Dutch, the French, The British, or an unfamiliar US Army or Air Force element. Our rotation and centralized control / pooling system mean that the likelihood of dedicated or familiar support for most units most of the time is very slim.
If the support from people you have not worked with before then standard FAC (forward air controller) procedures need to be followed if only to ensure he doesn't put his load on your head.True. However, the issue to me is not air support, it is one of training quality (and ours is poor... :mad: ). As I said "There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard." I'll add that "everyone" includes IMO Joe the rifleman with less than a year of service. People will say that's asking too much. No, it is not. And you don't ask for it, you demand it -- the vast majority of the kids are more than capable of doing it.

It's simply a matter of competence for worst case situations. Best case stuff is good but you cannot rely on it in most combat and you positively cannot in major combat operations or mobile armored or mechanized warfare.

Bob's World

04-03-2010, 01:47 AM

From my recent experience the two biggest causes of innocent casualties on the battlefield are:

1. "Warning Shots/escalation of force" gone bad by soldiers manning a guardpost or rear of a convoy; and

2. Aviators cursing the roads looking for IED emplacers at night.

For the first one we really need non-lethal weapons. Knock that rider of his motorcycle with a beanbag from your 203 rather than a 3-round burst of 5.56. I don't blame these guys for these events, they have to make a snap decision that affects the lives of them and their mates, they just don't have the right tool for the job. These events happen ALL THE TIME.

For the aviators, some battle space owner or nearby ODA gets a call on the radio from the pilot that they have PID on 3 men emplacing IEDs on a road some 8 KM away from their position, can they have permission to engage. Too often that man on the ground says "yes, and thanks." Until he goes out the following morning to conduct BDA and finds an angry village and 3 dead kids. The guy on the ground gets hammered for mistake.

Changing the strategy from "defeat the insurgent" to "protect the populace" didn't make the battlefield less dangerous, but is requiring a change of mindset that slowly catching up as to what a change that significant really means. Aviation in COIN will save your life; but without proper controls is apt to create strategic setbacks that are virtually impossible to recover from. Making pilots more responsible for the results of their engagements may help; getting rid of "PID" as a green light to fire (It can mean so many things that it is more confusing than helpful), would help. Personally I like "Reasonable Suspicion" (check it out, bring assets in, etc) and "Probable Cause" (man on ground can engage; but if he wants to employ air to ground or perhaps indirect fire he needs a finding of probable cause from a commander at some pre-determined level. Just like a Cop can stop, arrest, or search based on certain assessments; but must go to the DA and a Judge if the situation requires a warrant).

There’s no easy answer. Casualties in Afghanistan currently are higher per capita of troops on the ground than they were at the peak in Iraq, and fighting season isn't here yet.

JMA

04-03-2010, 06:25 AM

JMA

04-03-2010, 06:47 AM

If it were, I'd agree. Our problem is that other than the Marines who do have integral air to an extent -- but only to an extent and even they may often get support from the Dutch, the French, The British, or an unfamiliar US Army or Air Force element. Our rotation and centralized control / pooling system mean that the likelihood of dedicated or familiar support for most units most of the time is very slim.

Good for the Marines. How do they do it and does it work?

How often do units in the field require or call for air support? If you can get a chopper overhead can he not talk the fixed wing on to the targets?

True. However, the issue to me is not air support, it is one of training quality (and ours is poor... :mad: ). As I said "There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard." I'll add that "everyone" includes IMO Joe the rifleman with less than a year of service. People will say that's asking too much. No, it is not. And you don't ask for it, you demand it -- the vast majority of the kids are more than capable of doing it.

It's simply a matter of competence for worst case situations. Best case stuff is good but you cannot rely on it in most combat and you positively cannot in major combat operations or mobile armored or mechanized warfare.

I suppose the sheer scale of troop deployments into Afghanistan make it near impossible to have coordinated pre deployment training in the US and/or orientation training in Afghanistan before going operational.

Then perhaps the other issue may be that rotation is by whole squadron being relieved by a fresh (completely raw) replacement squadron from the US thus ensuring there is no continuity and no means to pass on experience gained to newcomers.

Like a rotation of a battalion would be out with the one that is just starting to get the idea and in with a brand new inexperienced one with absolutely no understanding of local conditions. Now what if fate hands out a card which places a brand new company in a situation where a brand new squadron (probably from another NATO country) comes overhead to support. That is a truly worrisome situation for all concerned.

I can begin to understand why the Marines want to keep it all in the family in Helmand so to speak. It makes perfect sense.

Ken White

04-03-2010, 06:24 PM

...Now what if fate hands out a card which places a brand new company in a situation where a brand new squadron (probably from another NATO country) comes overhead to support. That is a truly worrisome situation for all concerned.Not terribly worrisome but it is a constant and it does have some minor adverse impacts.
I can begin to understand why the Marines want to keep it all in the family in Helmand so to speak. It makes perfect sense.Yep, makes sense. Also more effective. Unfortunately, it's costly and not terribly 'efficient.' We're bigger on efficiency than we are on effectiveness. :rolleyes:

The Marines are able to pull it off by dint of being fairly small but mostly by having a strong support group in the US Congress; the other services also have them but the Marines assiduously cultivate theirs and it has awesome power, enough to fight off those of the other forces...

I digress. Why we value efficiency over effectiveness I've never really understood. :o

My wife says it's about money -- but then she for some odd objects to my proposal to buy a certain additional weapon, not from any pressing current requirement but because it works really well and just in case I might need it... :wry:

Razorback0505

04-09-2010, 01:06 PM

Many Air Force General Officers have a tendency to present themselves more as corporate defenders than defenders of their nation. Perhaps the author's intentions are well intentioned, but the tone of this article indicates otherwise. While I agree that the Air Force does play a critical role, and could do more, especially on the non-kinetic side, this article reads like a plea to justify their continued budget on kinetic capabilities (I support that too, but not using COIN to justify it). To accuse a muddy boots officer who was on the front lines as a division commander of ringing his hands over collateral damage clearly marks the words of someone who doesn't understand the principles of COIN, and is clearly attempting to undermine the author of the doctrine.

Hopefully the Young Turks coming up through the Air Force ranks will eventually transform a service that is badly in need of reform. This reminds me of the same mentality that General Motors's management displayed when they ignored the new competition and changes in the market, and they simply tried to discredit the truth until they were ousted.

Any concept or doctrine that does not celebrate the primacy of kinetic airpower gets this treatment. Regrettably, the USAF is run by fighter pilots. More regretable is that the true USAF heroes of OEF/OIF, the ISR bubbas, the C-130, c-17, tanker sticks, and PJs will likely never get their due because the majority of their officers are still drinking the EBO kool-aid that is the same tired Lemay-style airpower argument. The corporation sees their dreams of even more obscene budgets blowing away with the winds of national strategic and/or operational utility. The corporate air force are the ones who are wringing their hands, not General Petraeus.

Razorback0505

04-12-2010, 07:42 AM

Couldn't agree more LawVol. Can anyone tell me where the USAF has "proven they can operate in a supported component role"? This is more of the same corporate spin to keep the money for fighters program going. I wish the AF was half as worried about doing the job that supported commands required as they are about protecting and expanding their own service rice bowl.

Cliff

10-18-2010, 08:37 PM

Looks like the Light Attack/Armed Reconnissance program is moving along- see the Air Force News article here (http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123226358).

The Air National Guard / Air Force Reserve Test Center (AATC) is working testing right now. I'll be curious to see what happens... for a while it sounded like LAAR was going to be procured for the SOF/building partner capacity role and for organic light attack use as well. This article pushes that aspect a bit, but I've heard that it will only be bought for use with partners.

V/R,

Cliff

SethB

02-18-2011, 01:27 AM

"Updating Close Air Support (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/11/5009090)," by LT. COL PAUL DARLING AND LT. JUSTIN LAWLOR.

When Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal took command of Afghanistan, one of his first orders severely restricted the use of fixed-wing strike assets in support of combat operations. The newly appointed commander of the International Security Assistance Force, Gen. David Petraeus, has been reluctant to change the order.

The order received much criticism, with many complaining that restricting strike assets posed too great a danger to soldiers on the ground. The order, however, reflected an unspoken reality, namely that the doctrine, structure and airframes currently used for close-air support (CAS) are fundamentally flawed and are an expensive and ineffective framework for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Our current CAS structure is hampering our mission in Afghanistan and reflects a reversal of lessons learned not only by U.S. forces in Vietnam but also by countries around the world engaged in COIN for the past 40 years.

How did we get to the point where the one area where we have unquestioned dominance is deliberately neutered to the point of irrelevance? It wasn’t easy, but fixing it can be. We can not only dominate the air, but effectively use it to our advantage as long as the military acknowledges our current failures, uses an analysis of our successful past and encourages an effort by all service branches to adjust to a post-Cold War environment. We can fight better, cheaper and more effectively only when we understand where we are and from where we came.

"Reality Check (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/02/5278489)," by MAJ. AARON W. CLARK AND LT. COL. J. BRAD REEVES.

Misperceptions about close-air support (CAS) continue to plague the relationship between ground and air forces. CAS is a mission area where myth and reality often coexist.

The article by Lt. Col. Paul Darling and Lt. Justin Lawlor is a striking example of this mix. The authors claim that CAS doctrine and operational practices have not evolved sufficiently to meet today’s needs, especially in Afghanistan. Their assertion is unsupportable, and the mischaracterizations in the article do a disservice to the coalition forces putting their lives on the line every day using these highly evolved procedures. Contrary to points made in the article, joint CAS doctrine has changed dramatically since the Cold War, and especially since the first operations in Afghanistan in 2001. Command and control structures, tactics and systems have all undergone major adaptations that were either misrepresented or missed entirely in the article, leading to flawed prescriptions. We intend to set the record straight.

The "counterpoint" is hopeless, but I thought that it served as a useful illustration of the points that LTC Darling and Lt. Lawlor made.

Cliff

02-18-2011, 05:45 AM

"Updating Close Air Support (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/11/5009090)," by LT. COL PAUL DARLING AND LT. JUSTIN LAWLOR.

"Reality Check (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/02/5278489)," by MAJ. AARON W. CLARK AND LT. COL. J. BRAD REEVES.

The "counterpoint" is hopeless, but I thought that it served as a useful illustration of the points that LTC Darling and Lt. Lawlor made.

OK, so why is the counterpoint hopeless? Can you offer some of your arguments or rationale?

The counterpoint points out several factual errors in the first article- especially the fact that CAS doctrine hasn't changed since the Cold War.

For instance, I find it ironic that LtCol Darling and Lt Lawlor's article uses kill boxes as an example of "cold war doctrine", since it dates to well after the Cold War. Ironically kill boxes are actually one of the most flexible ways of conducting CAS or AI that exist - even in a COIN environment.

One of the other major problems with the "Updating CAS" article is that it confuses platforms with effects. The authors assert that USAF fighters cannot communicate with them, and that they are unable to sufficiently identify targets on the ground and sort insurgents from civilians. They claim that an OV-10 aircraft would be better able to do this. They fail to consider that it is the effects that matter and not the platform... in fact, most single seat fighters now carry the Sniper pod which is ROVER compatible and can offer the ISR that the authors desire. They also can accomplish the FAC-A mission - the limitation here is not the aircraft, but the training for the aircrew, as regardless of the platform the crew must accomplish the extensive FAC-A training (it is one of the most intensive upgrades aircrew can undergo). As for precise effects, all USAF and USN fighters carry an internal gun, which is just as accurate as a minigun pod. (The authors argue that a 20mm minigun is ideal - the M61A1 20MM cannon is precisely the weapon carried by the fighters they scoff). Most could carry rockets as well as desired by the authors- they don't simply because rockets are actually relatively inaccurate and are less reliable than PGMs. The Small Diameter Bomb gives single seat fighters a low-CD weapon that is relatively accurate. The author's last requirement is for "availability", which they define as "There must be enough of them to provide support to multiple engagements simultaneously and remain overhead for several hours without allowing a break in aerial coverage or support." Unfortunately, even if the USAF were to buy AT-6s or OV-10s we would not be able to buy enough of them to give every platoon in the Army their own CAS 24-7. The advantage of single seat fighters is that they have the speed to get to the fight quickly and support the troops. The authors fail to consider that in a country like Afghanistan, where there are limited places to base even rough-field capable aircraft, the faster aircraft are important in giving them the availability they desire. In short, they are centered on the platform that supports them and not the effects they want.

Another big problem with the "Updating CAS" article is that it implies a JTAC is required for weapons release. While doctrinally a JTAC is highly desired, according to joint doctrine "The authority and responsibility for the expenditure of any ordnance on the battlefield rests with the supported commander." (JP3-09.3, 8 Jul 09, pg V-18). In other words, the ground commander can decide to call for ordnance even if a FAC is not present. As the counterpoint highlights, the USAF and Army are attempting to make this unnecessary by providing Joint Fires Observers (JFOs) to aid in terminal guidance operations (TGO) during Type 2 or 3 CAS (IE where a JTAC cannot see the aircraft and target). Yet the authors of "Updating CAS" fail to consider this important doctrinal update. I also am not sure how they think a slower aircraft will make a difference in telling friend (or non-combatant) from foe during CAS in a COIN environment - that will always be up to the ground commander to decide.

I find the Army stereotypes of CAS, and especially USAF CAS to be amusing. I personally have been asked questions like "why is CAS not important to the USAF", or my personal favorite "why does the USAF hate the A-10 and want to get rid of it?" These views (in my experience) usually seem to stem from a bad experience with CAS, or from stereotypes that date back to Vietnam and have been perpetuated by the outright hatred many in the Army seem to feel towards the USAF. Many times folks don't realize that if their CAS was taken away it wasn't by the USAF but by their own higher echelon ground commanders.

The days when we could value service parochialism over jointness are gone. Our country's current financial situation will not allow us to buy every system we feel we need for every situation regardless of cost. We are going to have to learn to use a few systems over a large range of operations, and do so jointly to maximize our strengths and minimize weaknesses. We will not be able to afford to have a different aircraft for every single mission - sad but true. Even with the cheaper cost the of a LAAR type aircraft the fact that they are only useful in a COIN environment means that they will likely be limited in number due to austerity- the benefits don't outweigh the costs. I won't even get into the fact that our country's political will to do a large COIN operation is pretty much 0, meaning that the planned limited number of LAAR aircraft for USAF Special Operations Command will probably be adequate. With proper training, current US fighters can do a pretty good job of providing the accurate and proportional firepower the authors want.

The services have all placed a high priority on supporting the current fight. Numerous USAF units have spent a lot of time training to provide CAS to the ground components, at the expense of their other missions. The USAF has upgraded the A-10 and re-winged them, prioritizing this effort over several other fighter upgrades. It also has worked with the Army to try and be more responsive with both ISR and CAS, to include signficantly expanding the number of JTACs, ALOs, and RPAs by cutting fighter aircraft to free up bodies. That doesn't sound like a service that is still focused on the Cold War or doesn't care about CAS.

Allright, I know that my arguments will likely not be well received, but I've made them just the same. I look forward to hearing your support for the "hopelessness" of the "Reality Check" article.

V/R,

Cliff

Ken White

02-18-2011, 04:48 PM

and agree that the Darling-Lawlor article is quite parochial and has some flaws while the Clark-Reeves article is not "hopeless" IMO (and I'm unsure why it was so tagged...). I further agree the Army can get rather dumb on the subject of CAS. However, in defense of that Army attitude you note, I would submit three points for your consideration.

- The strong USAF push for centralized control of ALL air in a theater. Yes, that's a Viet Nam legacy and Momyer didn't do the AF any favors but Horner also tried to do it Desert Shield / Desert Storm and Dave Deptula has his ideas (and not just on UAV control or ownership). While the underlying logic is understood and accepted, it is but one approach and needs can vary by theater and war. While the single manager idea is efficient, it may not always be the most effective employment and the very significant downside is that a message of an excessive control fetish is sent...

- The USAF has -- deserved or not -- a reputation as an organization (with acknowledgement that there are individuals and units that do not subscribe to the organizational models) for being excessively safety conscious, avoiding extreme low level CAS (pods not withstanding; the issue is attitude, not altitude... :wry:) and generally not favoring CAS as important to the service. This translates into a perception that it is as a mission not given adequate priority. Clark and Reeves address that issue and acknowledge the USAF could do more to eliminate that perception. Their comment about AGOS (I thought it was now JAGOG :confused:) is noted but that does not affect the vast majority of Army people who do not go to Nellis or the clones at Ramstein and Sill.

Part of the problem is shown here:
Air Force Doctrine: Air Force Manual 1-1, Mar 92, Volume 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, outlines the Air Force's framework for understanding how to apply CAS. Understanding the Air Force doctrine will greatly enhance our CAS operations. This doctrine states: "Close air support is the application of aerospace forces in support of the land component commander's objectives.... Close air support produces the most focused and briefest effects of any force application mission; consequently, close air support rarely creates campaign-level effects. Although close air support is the least efficient application of aerospace forces, at times, it may be the most critical by ensuring the success and survival of surface forces. " (emphasis added /kw)My emphasis is to illustrate that, as we know, people tend to take away from the written word exactly what they wish to take away. The psychological impact of those words is beyond this non-psychologist but I bet it does little good for USAF internal 'support' of CAS...

- This attitude of distrust of the USAF by the Army is a result of the two foregoing items and is further evinced by the fact that the USAF did over several years for various reasons related to AF funding priorities attempt to get rid of the A-10. That bird was designed and optimized for CAS, it does it better than any other (with the possible exception of the SU-25) and it has the GAU-8 which makes the M61 truly look like the minigun you erroneously called it ( ;) -- sorry 'bout that, too good to pass up... ). Recent improvements to make A-10Cs a bird to be reckoned with but it is a fact that many fighter jocks originally (and allegedly still) vociferously objected to flying the 'mud mover' and that had Desert Storm not come along, the USAF probably would have gotten rid of all of them. Though the 95+ % OR rate did look good to Congress. :D

The issue is that the USAF had a dedicated CAS bird, that the service wanted to discard it and the perception thus arose that they wished to second rate the mission. To say that an F-16 can do the job of an A-10 'as well or better' simply does not pass the basic credibility test and the USAF lost cred in the process over the years.

None of this intended as AF bashing -- I'm a Grunt who supports and has a vague understanding of air dominance (or air superiority...) and appreciation for the fact that in several wars, I got strafed and bombed only very seldom and a long time ago. Rather it is intended to illustrate that much the nominal "outright hatred many in the Army seem to feel towards the USAF" has a basis in demonstrated or perceived USAF attitudes and parochiality as well as in Army parochiality and stupidity [NOTE to Army persons: I use the word "stupidity" advisedly because parochiality is stupid; unwillingness to use the skills and knowledges of others to enhance ones own capability is stupid and the US Army is king of the 'not invented by me' syndrome].

Ignorance plays a strong role on both sides...

SethB

02-18-2011, 06:03 PM

One of the other major problems with the "Updating CAS" article is that it confuses platforms with effects. The authors assert that USAF fighters cannot communicate with them, and that they are unable to sufficiently identify targets on the ground and sort insurgents from civilians.

I keep hearing the USAF tell me how great their ISR capabilities are, but in practice, the one time that I tried it, the pilot couldn't locate anything that I could on the ground, before he had to leave for lack of fuel.

They claim that an OV-10 aircraft would be better able to do this. They fail to consider that it is the effects that matter and not the platform... in fact, most single seat fighters now carry the Sniper pod which is ROVER compatible and can offer the ISR that the authors desire.

That isn't a 100% solution, and you'll find that not every maneuver element is equipped with ROVER. And ROVER is great, by the way.

As for precise effects, all USAF and USN fighters carry an internal gun, which is just as accurate as a minigun pod. (The authors argue that a 20mm minigun is ideal - the M61A1 20MM cannon is precisely the weapon carried by the fighters they scoff). Most could carry rockets as well as desired by the authors- they don't simply because rockets are actually relatively inaccurate and are less reliable than PGMs.

Unfortunately I haven't posted for you the original 6,000 word article. Darling and Lawlor actually favor a rifle caliber minigun.

The Small Diameter Bomb gives single seat fighters a low-CD weapon that is relatively accurate. The author's last requirement is for "availability", which they define as "There must be enough of them to provide support to multiple engagements simultaneously and remain overhead for several hours without allowing a break in aerial coverage or support."

An SDB was designed for standoff engagement and can take quite a while to arrive on target.

Unfortunately, even if the USAF were to buy AT-6s or OV-10s we would not be able to buy enough of them to give every platoon in the Army their own CAS 24-7. The advantage of single seat fighters is that they have the speed to get to the fight quickly and support the troops. The authors fail to consider that in a country like Afghanistan, where there are limited places to base even rough-field capable aircraft, the faster aircraft are important in giving them the availability they desire. In short, they are centered on the platform that supports them and not the effects they want.

Because they believe that the platform is part of the problem. Darling found the B1 to provide the best CAS but he got the most out of CCA from Apaches. They worked with him, rather well, in fact.

Another big problem with the "Updating CAS" article is that it implies a JTAC is required for weapons release. While doctrinally a JTAC is highly desired, according to joint doctrine "The authority and responsibility for the expenditure of any ordnance on the battlefield rests with the supported commander." (JP3-09.3, 8 Jul 09, pg V-18). In other words, the ground commander can decide to call for ordnance even if a FAC is not present. As the counterpoint highlights, the USAF and Army are attempting to make this unnecessary by providing Joint Fires Observers (JFOs) to aid in terminal guidance operations (TGO) during Type 2 or 3 CAS (IE where a JTAC cannot see the aircraft and target). Yet the authors of "Updating CAS" fail to consider this important doctrinal update.

It isn't that important. The are only 2,000 JFOs at this point, and with requirements for continual certification... The most important phrase that I've learned, with regards to airpower, is "I am not a JTAC."

So while you can call for air support, you may or may not get it.

The days when we could value service parochialism over jointness are gone. Our country's current financial situation will not allow us to buy every system we feel we need for every situation regardless of cost. We are going to have to learn to use a few systems over a large range of operations, and do so jointly to maximize our strengths and minimize weaknesses. We will not be able to afford to have a different aircraft for every single mission - sad but true. Even with the cheaper cost the of a LAAR type aircraft the fact that they are only useful in a COIN environment means that they will likely be limited in number due to austerity- the benefits don't outweigh the costs. I won't even get into the fact that our country's political will to do a large COIN operation is pretty much 0, meaning that the planned limited number of LAAR aircraft for USAF Special Operations Command will probably be adequate. With proper training, current US fighters can do a pretty good job of providing the accurate and proportional firepower the authors want.

I've been told that LAAR was cancelled, and there is a quote floating around from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force about how LAAR was only for training missions with other militaries. I also fail to see how it could be cheaper to operate B1s and other expensive aircraft (including tanker support) than it is to buy cheap, essentially disposable aircraft t use for the next few years.

A Super Tucano is several times cheaper than an Apache, for instance.

The services have all placed a high priority on supporting the current fight. Numerous USAF units have spent a lot of time training to provide CAS to the ground components, at the expense of their other missions. The USAF has upgraded the A-10 and re-winged them, prioritizing this effort over several other fighter upgrades. It also has worked with the Army to try and be more responsive with both ISR and CAS, to include signficantly expanding the number of JTACs, ALOs, and RPAs by cutting fighter aircraft to free up bodies. That doesn't sound like a service that is still focused on the Cold War or doesn't care about CAS.

Forgive us, but most of the Soldiers I talk to feel that the Air Force is trying to win the budget war, rather than the Afghan war.

Allright, I know that my arguments will likely not be well received, but I've made them just the same. I look forward to hearing your support for the "hopelessness" of the "Reality Check" article.

What I didn't like about it was that it essentially said that Darling and Lawlor are incapable of understanding how great CAS is, then it provided a number of points that were, frankly, irrelevant.

I can work with CCA quite easily. If I was in combat with Apaches overhead I could talk to the pilot and we could come up with something quickly. An IZLID and the radio in my HMMWV is all I would need.

In order to effectively use CAS I'd need a JTAC at BN and a JFO at a lower unit. Then I'd have to hope that someone could talk the pilot onto the target.

Which doesn't mean CAS for every PLT. We haven't reached the point where every PLT can use CAS, let alone have it.

Which is why Darling quit using fixed wing during his tour in Afghanistan.

El Cid

02-22-2011, 08:39 PM

A friend of mine pointed me to this thread of comments with respect to CAS in Afghanistan. I have read and re-read this group of comments, and decided, probably unwisely, to add my own. I flew close air support for most of my 25+ years in the AF, and no one knows better than my Hog brothers and I that this was not THE AF mission. Having said that, the AF has come along way in the last several years. I would sumbit that the AF has moved towards the Army more than the Army has moved towards the AF.

With respect to the threads, I agree that the Darling article was trying to point out issues with CAS, and suggest the LAAR as a solution. However, many of the facts in the article are clearly wrong. Calling a rebuttal of the incorrect facts "hopeless", is something that I would expect to see at the UN with the Iranian President speaking, and not here on a blog where we hopefully deal in facts not emotion. CAS doctrine, TTP, manning, communications, weapons, and equippment have all changed since drastically since the cold war--for the better! The lack of change was the premiss for the Darling article. If the LAAR is a solution, then supporting it with the correct facts is the way to get it.

I value LtCol Darling's opinion, however, I suspect he was not a MVR Cdr, or he would have had a TACP available at least down to BN level. If he was part of a PRT or other non maneuver unit, then he would not have had a TACP. This is the wide area security issue the Army is struggling with right now. Right or wrong, the AF agreed to functionally align TACPs and JTACs with the units the Army asked them to--the manuever units. The Joint Force is making an effort to make more Joint Fires available to Army units at lower echelons, but this remains an issue, especially for units that do not technically own AOs as per Army doctrine. Since 2005 the intent has been to train JFOs to pick up the slack for the units that do not have TACPs.

The idea that 2000 JFOs is not that important when there were zero JFOs six years ago, may be part of the problem. A collective effort by the insitutional Army and Air Force created this new joint capability from scratch. Unfortunately JFO usage has been inconsistant across the force as this new capability hit the theater. If the deployed Army believes the JFOs are not important, then they will not be employed.

As for the LAAR, it has the potential to be part of the solution, just like JFO, TACP-CASS, Rover, Predator, Reaper, PSS-SOF, and training more Army youngsters in CAS without a Qualified JTAC.

I will be the first to say the AF needs to conitinue to focus on supporting the Army, particularly in AFG. Having flown A-10s in combat, including operation Anaconda, I have also seen first hand how these journal wars distort what happens in the AO. I have yet to meet a soldier who was on the floor of the Sha-E-Kot who has a negative thing to say about the A-10 performance during Anaconda (to my face), yet in the post event journal wars the AF was risk averse, would not go below 10K, etc. If the AF guys have thin skin about incorrect facts in journals, it is not without precidence.

I read Ken White's post with interest. Ken has obvisouly been around the block and I agreed with most of what he said. He was correct when he pointed out that cold war CAS doctrine stated that CAS was the least efficient use of airpower. In a target rich environment with thousands of enemy tanks, it made sense to presume that CAS would slow down the targetting process used in the classic AirLand Battle Doctrine because each flight would have to get a nine-line and clearance. When compared to an interdiction mission focused on massed enemy forces, CAS was probably less efficient.

Personally, I never liked the way that sounded because it gave the impression that it was a math problem and not a mission to save soldiers on the ground. In any case, when the fixed piece battles of the Cold War went away AF doctrine changed. Since 2003 AIr Force Doctrine Document (AFDD (1)) says this.

"CAS can provide a tremendous tactical advantage when supporting
ground forces. Although in isolation it rarely achieves campaign-level
objectives, at times it may be the more critical mission due to its contribution
to campaign objectives. CAS should be planned to prepare the conditions
for success or reinforce successful attacks of surface forces. CAS can
halt attacks, help create breakthroughs, cover retreats, and guard flanks.
To be most effective, however, CAS should be used at decisive points in a
battle and should normally be massed to apply concentrated combat power
and saturate defenses." (AFDD 1, 17 Nov 2003, p 45)

If the AF Doctrine of 1992 is still driving the Army perception of the service, then the AF does not have a CAS problem, but a PR issue.

I suspect that my thoughts will not change the negative opinion's of those who have made up their minds about the AF, CAS, and the percieved lack of support to the Army. For those who are undecided, know that there are thousands of airmen who train hard every day with the sole purpose of supporting our brothers in the Army.

Ken White

02-22-2011, 09:48 PM

Good to know the change in wording occurred. As you say, at the time the item I quoted was written, it made sense. While logically agreeing with its premise, my fear was that it, like a lot of 'doctrine,' could be misinterpreted or misused.

FWIW, One of my sons just finished his recent fourth tour in his second war as a leader of Grunts and he has nothing but high praise for the AF, JTACs and JFOs -- and he is particularly in love with the Hog, says it is hands down the bird most appreciated and is tied with or ahead of the Apache in the eyes of most. He puts the British Harriers way up there as well but goes to great lengths to say they all do good work. :cool:

I like to remind people that both Iraq and Afghanistan are relatively benign combat environments, that air superiority is really, really, nice -- but is emphatically not guaranteed. In a major war against a near peer opponent folks are likely to notice different things and have a quite different attitude. :wry:

Great catch this:
I value LtCol Darling's opinion, however, I suspect he was not a MVR Cdr, or he would have had a TACP available at least down to BN level. I missed that -- but then, I'm old. I did read the blurb on the AFJ Article:""Lt. Col Paul Darling is an infantry officer serving with the Alaska Army National Guard. He recently served as the provincial lead mentor with the Afghan National Police in Zabul, Afghanistan"" but had forgotten it when I read of the lack of FAC prob... :D

I think you're probably correct that the bulk of the USAF has moved closer to the Army while the far larger Army has not reciprocated too well; part of that problem is, IMO, unrealistic expectations (and lack of knowledge...) about what air can and cannot do. That is IMO the Army's fault. Sometimes being the biggest kid on the block means you tend to ignore all the other kids. That's usually not smart. :rolleyes:

The aforementioned Son, BTW has called in and successfully employed USAF/USN CAS without a FAC, JTAC or JFO. As have I. What is written is not what is war...

SethB

02-23-2011, 02:06 AM

A friend of mine pointed me to this thread of comments with respect to CAS in Afghanistan. I have read and re-read this group of comments, and decided, probably unwisely, to add my own. I flew close air support for most of my 25+ years in the AF, and no one knows better than my Hog brothers and I that this was not THE AF mission. Having said that, the AF has come along way in the last several years. I would sumbit that the AF has moved towards the Army more than the Army has moved towards the AF.

I appreciate your comments.

I value LtCol Darling's opinion, however, I suspect he was not a MVR Cdr, or he would have had a TACP available at least down to BN level. If he was part of a PRT or other non maneuver unit, then he would not have had a TACP. This is the wide area security issue the Army is struggling with right now. Right or wrong, the AF agreed to functionally align TACPs and JTACs with the units the Army asked them to--the manuever units. The Joint Force is making an effort to make more Joint Fires available to Army units at lower echelons, but this remains an issue, especially for units that do not technically own AOs as per Army doctrine. Since 2005 the intent has been to train JFOs to pick up the slack for the units that do not have TACPs.

You are correct, he was an advisor. Saying that that wasn't a maneuver unit is incorrect, though. They were a maneuver unit, just not an American one. The USAF cannot produce enough JTACs to insert them into American units, let alone indigenous units. And unless I am mistaken (or, more accurately, was misinformed by the JFO cadre) a JTAC is a key part of the CAS process.

The idea that 2000 JFOs is not that important when there were zero JFOs six years ago, may be part of the problem. A collective effort by the insitutional Army and Air Force created this new joint capability from scratch. Unfortunately JFO usage has been inconsistant across the force as this new capability hit the theater. If the deployed Army believes the JFOs are not important, then they will not be employed.

JFOs are important, but I don't think a JFO knows anything that a 13F from 30 years ago didn't. Somewhere along the line, calling in CAS was taken from the 13Fs and given to the JTACs. JFO is a matter of reinserting that knowledge.

Also, I've been told that there have been issues with getting the Air Force on the same page, both with the creation of JTACs and JFOs.

As for the LAAR, it has the potential to be part of the solution, just like JFO, TACP-CASS, Rover, Predator, Reaper, PSS-SOF, and training more Army youngsters in CAS without a Qualified JTAC.

All great things, especially PSS-SOF and Rover! Rover makes target talk ons easy, and PSS-SOF enables GMLRS strikes.

I read Ken White's post with interest. Ken has obvisouly been around the block and I agreed with most of what he said. He was correct when he pointed out that cold war CAS doctrine stated that CAS was the least efficient use of airpower. In a target rich environment with thousands of enemy tanks, it made sense to presume that CAS would slow down the targetting process used in the classic AirLand Battle Doctrine because each flight would have to get a nine-line and clearance. When compared to an interdiction mission focused on massed enemy forces, CAS was probably less efficient.

That's not just it. When you had DIVARTY and MLRS to kill a grid square at a time you didn't need CAS. But what LTC Darling isn't talking about is killing the enemy. Not necessarily.

He wants equipment and doctrine that forces the enemy to choose between moving and being killed by air power, and staying still and being killed by infantry. He can find and finish, but he can't fix.

He doesn't need a B1 to do that, he needs a 30MM cannon that can loiter for a few hours.

For those who are undecided, know that there are thousands of airmen who train hard every day with the sole purpose of supporting our brothers in the Army.

I appreciate that.

I was raised to love the Air Force, and nearly gave my grandad a heart attack when I joined the Army!

Entropy

02-23-2011, 05:31 PM

A couple of interesting, if predictable articles. Some thoughts:

Risk aversion. Ken is right, the AF has it in spades. So does the Army IMO, though the AF is probably worse (I was also in the Navy and the AF is worse than the Navy in that regard). It's part of the mentality of mid-grade and senior officers and it's the same mentality that causes some commanders to micromanage platoon leaders in the field. Ken should, at this point, link back to one of his many cogent arguments about the inadequacies of personnel systems across the DoD.

Platoon-level support. This is partly related to the above. Although the intent is for the AF to provide enough JTAC's to have them at the company level, raising numbers is proving difficult. JTACs have a high attrition rate and there isn't, as of yet, a big enough training pipeline to create a lot of them quickly. Then there's the problem of the aforementioned personnel system as well as the AVF which makes it more difficult to force people into certain jobs. The Army always has the option of creating it's own JTACs but opted not to because it's already short of personnel, which is completely understandable. Even with the structural issues, I think the AF isn't doing enough to get more JTAC's trained.

Additionally, in my experience with ISR, the Army likes to keep control of CAS and UAV's at the battalion or brigade level. I've seen first-hand the frustration from units when their ISR support is pulled for someone else but such decisions are not made at the CAOC or by those flying the aircraft. Most often such decisions are made at the brigade level. That's not a problem that Air Force doctrine can solve.

"COIN" Aircraft: The Super Tucano and similar aircraft are certainly impressive. But advocates for them seem compelled to exaggerate their perceived advantages. Just as one example, the article states the Tucano's endurance is 6 hours with internal fuel, yet the manufacturer's own literature states 3.4 hours with internal fuel. Once you add in weapons load-outs, extra weight for all the gizmo's required by the US Military, the high-hot operating environment of Afghanistan, transit times, etc. that ideal number goes down even further. It's still likely to be 2-3 times the 30-45minutes typically seen with something like an F-16, but six hours is simply not a credible figure.

Secondly there is cost. These aircraft are supposedly "cheap" and even "disposable." My economics is a bit rusty, but I'm not sure how buying new a aircraft is inherently cheaper than using aircraft that are already bought and paid for. I know, for example, that I could trade in my paid-for minivan for a new sedan, and I recognize that buying a new sedan is cheaper than buying a new minivan, but I am certainly not "saving money" by buying a smaller, less-capable vehicle to replace what I already own.

I do agree that the operating costs for a Tucano are likely to be less, even after factoring in the extra logistics tail to operate these aircraft at many dispersed locations in Afghanistan, but those savings will take some amount of time before they begin to offset all the up-front costs associated with procurement, training, personnel, parts, etc. I'd like to see an analysis of that, but so far I haven't found one.

Regardless, Tucano's would probably end up costing about $10-15 million an airframe which is close to what an Apache costs and hardly makes the aircraft "disposable" (The version Columbia purchased was about $9 million an aircraft). By contrast, the A-10C upgrade was about $12 million per airframe including re-winging the aircraft. Personally, I would rather see more A-10's than a Tucano because I think the A-10 is clearly the superior aircraft and there are clearly advantages to getting more of an aircraft you've already got than getting something new. One option that should be examined is refurbishing additional A-10's.

Still, given 20/20 hindsight, I do think that purchase of some Tucano-type aircraft back in the early ought's would have been worth it. I think they would fill a real capabilities gap between RW CAS and most FW CAS provided by today's platforms, specifically more precise guns. I am, however, skeptical that purchasing them today would be worth it. Even with an accelerated procurement (something like the MC-12 Liberty) we wouldn't see significant numbers for a couple of years - about the time when our mission in Afghanistan will start to wind down.

Radios. Tactical radios seem like a no-brainer. I don't know why they haven't been installed on many aircraft.

To conclude, there are legitimate arguments that the Air Force is currently not supporting CAS adequately and that Air Force (and joint) doctrine and training are likewise inadequate. There is also a legitimate argument that today's fleet of AF (and Navy, and Marine, and Coalition) platforms are not optimized to support the kinds of wars we are currently fighting. Of course, that isn't a unique problem - much of the Army's equipment isn't optimized for a distributed COIN campaign in a land-locked central Asian country (and then there's the Navy...). Given all the legitimate room for criticism of the Air Force in particular, it's perplexing to me why critics, as seen with the Darling/Lawlor article and many like it, continue to make exaggerated and easily falsifiable assertions in their arguments. It's not like Cold-War CAS doctrine or the endurance of a particular aircraft are difficult research problems. At best such mistakes are simply sloppy, but they end up undercutting arguments rather than supporting them.

Ken White

02-23-2011, 07:47 PM

Platoon-level support... Although the intent is for the AF to provide enough JTAC's to have them at the company level, raising numbers is proving difficult...The Army always has the option of creating it's own JTACs but opted not to because it's already short of personnel...IMO the Army is not short of personnel, it just woefully misuses those it has. I'd also suggest that any competent Infantry Squad Leader should be able to call in Air -- it was so with Marines in Korea and in at least some Army units in Viet Nam (in fairness, that get the job done attitude gets replaced in the following period of peace with the bureaucratic parochial and risk averse "Safety uber alles" rulings...). With all respect to those who do the job, it is not rocket science -- I'd also note that few who elect to join the USAF do so with a goal and desire to serve in the mud with the Army. If the Army wants support, it should do its share. It does not and that's due to both Army and AF parochialism... :mad:
Additionally, in my experience with ISR, the Army likes to keep control of CAS and UAV's at the battalion or brigade level... such decisions are not made at the CAOC or by those flying the aircraft. Most often such decisions are made at the brigade level. That's not a problem that Air Force doctrine can solve.My observation has been that the diversion or denial of CAS is a mixed bag as far as who makes the decision. That applies to both who makes the decision and whether that decision was justified or not. I'm not sure there is much that can be done to remedy that, it's a human foible thing all too often...:eek:
"COIN" Aircraft: The Super Tucano and similar aircraft are certainly impressive... but six hours is simply not a credible figure.Having actually been supported by Mohawks (illegally armed..,), A-37s, AT-28s, F-5s --plus O-1, O-2, OV-10 and A1 birds -- as well as sundry prop jobs, everything from F4U / F-51 up through F-4 / B-57 / B-52, I am not a fan of or advocate for so-called COIN aircreft. They have no stamina or staying power, they can't carry much and IMO are waste of time and money. Plus they're too easily shot down (my attitude may be colored by crawling through too much jungle to try fruitlessly to get dead bodies out of crashed airplanes -- to include Army Helicopters...:mad:). When you get to the A-1 / A-4 and A-7 level you're talking more sensibly and you aren't wasting money on one trick ponies. There is a place for a multi use a/c like the OV-10 but one does not need many of them and the CAS function is not their strong point.
One option that should be examined is refurbishing additional A-10's.Yes!
...
I do think that purchase of some Tucano-type aircraft back in the early ought's would have been worth it... I am, however, skeptical that purchasing them today would be worth it.No and yes. Er, no and no. Uh-uh...Umm - never, not then not now...;)
Given all the legitimate room for criticism of the Air Force in particular, it's perplexing to me why critics, as seen with the Darling/Lawlor article and many like it, continue to make exaggerated and easily falsifiable assertions in their arguments. It's not like Cold-War CAS doctrine or the endurance of a particular aircraft are difficult research problems. At best such mistakes are simply sloppy, but they end up undercutting arguments rather than supporting them.Exactly. It's okay to be ignorant -- we all have gaps -- but it isn't terribly wise to expose undue ignorance that can be largely attributed to relatively unthinking bias or putting excessive faith in writing one has apparently not even attempted to verify...

jcustis

09-28-2011, 03:13 AM

While not directly related to our DoD pursuit of a "COIN" a/c capability, this fella looked interesting: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204010604576594510143821174.html

Two South African companies are attempting to elbow their way into the global defense market with an unusual new aircraft developed on home soil.

Paramount Group and Aerosud Holdings Ltd. on Tuesday will unveil the Ahrlac, a compact plane that they say merges the capabilities of a drone, an attack helicopter and surveillance aircraft.

"There's nothing like it in the marketplace," says Paul Potgieter, managing director of closely held Aerosud.

The Ahrlac—short for Advanced High Performance Reconnaissance Light Aircraft—aims to fill a niche left by less-versatile and more-expensive rivals. Most countries on the continent rely on modified cargo planes or turboprop fighters for surveillance work, but the Ahrlac is a multipurpose alternative that's marketed for perform military and civilian reconnaissance. It will cater to African governments involved in combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian work, he says.

http://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/MK-BP316A_SAPLA_G_20110926174210.jpg

More at the link.

Marc

09-28-2011, 06:00 PM

While not directly related to our DoD pursuit of a "COIN" a/c capability, this fella looked interesting: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204010604576594510143821174.html

http://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/MK-BP316A_SAPLA_G_20110926174210.jpg

More at the link.

No way, the airforce lobby will kill any aircraft program that jeopardizes their longing for slik, sexy, dollar-burning fighter jets. And if you ask why, they will cram you with their latest Warden-Deptula five-ring theory that supposedly offers an answer to all warfighting problems.

LtFuzz

01-03-2012, 05:56 PM

Gentlemen,

I just found this thread again after a very successful and unique deployment to Afghanistan with my AVN TF that ended in NOV 2010.

I will spend a few days gathering my thoughts and post them here -- suffice it to say we definitely did find a way to more effectively participate in COIN ops in OEF.

And our method was promptly dismissed by the unit that took over from us. :cool:

davidbfpo

01-03-2012, 06:07 PM

LtFuzz,

It will be good to read some feedback and within reason what your pre-deployment syllabus was too.

As for your successors it happens in virtually every profession.

Badmash

01-04-2012, 12:06 PM

Given that the US DoD is currently undergoing death by a thousand cuts and also given that the USAF has just announced a $355 million contract for the Afghan Air force Light Strike aircraft to the Super Tucano, (http://www.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4695) what are the chances that the USAF would cancel said contract if ISAF (NATO++++) passed around the hat to fund another aircraft of the same gendre, with adequate supply chain and training support? Let’s face it, this will probably blow out to 0.5billion, which is not an insubstantial amount in the current climate? I note also that Hawker-Beechcraft is challenging this contract as it's AT6 lost out, will that stall the procurement in anyway? ( http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/hawker-beechcraft-protests-over-usaf-decision-to-dismiss-at-6-bid-365163/ )

Compost

02-06-2012, 11:21 PM

Latest issue of Armed Forces Journal has an interesting article on CAS and logistics by COL Michael Pietrucha. [ http://armedforcesjournal.com/2012/02/8792325 ]

goprisko

07-01-2012, 05:49 PM

The Stavatti proposal got my thinking cap going and I propose the aircraft The structure is graphite/kevlar/spectra composite. The armour is a spectra compressed UHMW/carbide composite rated for 50 cal at 200 m

The gun and 70mm rockets are laser targeted. Brimstone is fire and forget. Pars 3 LR can target both tanks and helos. Maverick is for targeting fortified positions, bridges and other targets requiring the larger warhead.

The regimen is to attack ground targets from 1500-5000 m, which is beyond the range of most ground fire.

The plane's cockpit, electrical and piping conduits, and engine are armoured. Fuel tanks are self sealing.

The plane uses the APS-30 recoil operated gun. Mags are in the fuselage, guns in the wing root fairings.

Engine drives a contra rotating prop 10 ft dia.

Wings have slats and two component fowler flaps. Airfoil is a NASA natural laminar flow airfoil as developed by Hitachi for their business jet offering. This combo develops a lift coefficient of 4 at 20 degrees angle of attack.

Plane is designed to take off at 60 knots at Max Gross and land at 40 knots, light.

Plane is meant to use 30X113 gun ammo, 70 mm rockets, as commonly used by helos, with the addition of Brimstone, Pars, and Maverick, to
permit use as a Front Line aircraft attached at brigade level, operating just behind the artillery positions.

shown in the attached Jpegs.

The stats are as follows (lb):

___________________Take Off__________Landing
Fuel------------------------------3,854.4____________771
Engine---PW 127G------------1150____________1150
Airframe_____________2000 ___________2000
Armour___________ ___2000 ____________2000
2 - ASP-30 suto cannon____228.80___________229
30mm 600 rds __________590.75___________ _59.
38 - 70mm AIPKWS _____1330______________ 0
6 - Brimstone missile______642______________0
2 - AIM 9X______________376 _____________0
6 - Pars 3 LR____________660______________0
2 - AGM 65 Maverick_____1090____________0
Pilot _________________ 200_____________200
Ejection Seat ___________120 _____________120
_____________________14,242__________ 6,526

PW 127G TurboProp HP 2920 MTOW 14250

INDY

Tukhachevskii

07-04-2012, 11:34 AM

So am I, because the lack of insight so far is quite worrying. Things that fly are utterly irrelevant except for the sensors and the weapons. A Hellfire type weapon does not care if it comes off an MQ-9, C-130, or an A-10.

Surely the sustainability, endurance and survivability of a given platform are important to the Hellfire missile (on its happy way to suicide) given that a hellfire only has a range of 8km (12km in the brimstone variant). It therefore needs a means of conveyance that can get it within at least its maximum effective range given enemy air defences. No?

goprisko

07-04-2012, 02:33 PM

Brimstone, very similar in size to Hellfire, has two seekers, and proved itself
exceptionally useful in Libya. It is cheaper, and can be fired from the Tornado, ie fixed wing aircraft.

The AIPKWS 70mm laser guided rocket has a CEP of a meter or so.

Today, LASER targeting is used on the MP-230 chain gun on the Apache Helo, for setting the fuze and directing fire. LASER targeting of 30mm cannon on a fixed wing aircraft should permit attacks beyond the effective range of 50 cal machine guns, ( a common platoon weapon ).

In my proposal above, the AGP-30 recoil operated 30mm cannon firing the 30X113 DEFA round ( same as the Apache ) was specified because that loading offers more projectiles, including a proximity fuzed HE round (effective against troop concentrations & trucks)., and a shaped charge AP round effective aginst up to 50mm of armour. This cannon has no spool up time and 750 Lbs of recoil vs 3000 Lbs for the M230 chain gun and 8000 Lbs for the GAU-8 This cannon's 1 second burst is 8-9 rounds.

My proposed aircraft has two cannons, one in each wing root fairing, fed from magazines in the fuselage. My proposal has the magazines at CG, which means no change in trim or pitching moment during or after firing.

My proposed aircraft mounts the rest of the armament load on under wind pylons at the CG, which also means no change in trim or pitching moment during or after firing.

My proposal mounts 2 - 19 tube 70mm AIPKWs launchers with 3 Kg warheads each, totaling 38 rockets.

It mounts 2 AIM-9X sidewinders for use against hostile fixed wing aircraft.

It mounts brimstones on pylons, 3 missiles / pylon for use against everything up to and including tanks.

It mounts the Pars-3L dual purpose missile on pylons, 3 missiles / pylon for use against hostile helos, or ground targets up to and including tanks.

It mounts the Maverick missile, one each on 2 fuselage pylons, for use against hardened targets requiring the 300 Lb warhead.

The missiles have ranges on the order of 6-12 km, which is within effective visual range, with sufficient standoff to permit attacks from beyond the effective range of most ManPads and company level AAA.

Regardless, the plane is armoured against 50 cal at 200m, with the cockpit, fuel lines, electrical lines, and engine armoured. Fuel tanks are self-sealing. The armour system consists of 6mm Titanium 25mm extreme high Mol Wt Polypropylene/silicon carbide matrix and 10mm of Titanium.

The airfoil chosen is a NASA natural laminar flow as modified for the business jet offered by Hitachi, with slats and 2 segment fowler flaps to generate a lift coefficient of 4 at an angle of attack of 23 degrees. The wing planform is that of the P-51, chosen for the same reason, it's straightforward to build.

The gear legs are long to provide ample prop clearance when landing at 15 degrees nose up attitude, and to permit rotation at take off.

The aircraft can take off at full gross at 60 knots and land empty at 40 knots. With a 5lb/ hp ratio, acceleration is quick, rate of climb is > 5000 ft / min. Large tires and moderate gross mean the aircraft can operate from grass or unimproved strips as short as 400 ft.

The combination of weapons and STOL abiity means this aircraft can operate from strips at battalion level, generally within 25 miles of the front, or from firebases, ala Vietnam.

This aircraft is not designed for, or meant to battle hostile jet fighters to gain air superiority. It is expected that a CAP of such aircraft will operate from Division or Corps level, and this aircraft will function under the protection they afford.

This aircraft is designed for maneuverability and attacks against ground targets in the speed range of 100-300 knots at 500 ft AGL, with a max speed of 450 knots at 20,000 ft, and a VNE of 480 knots.

This aircraft at gross has fuel for 6 hours and can be refueled in mid- air.

This means this aircraft can loiter much longer than helos, striking targets as designated by controllers at the platoon level. Using laser target designation, this aircraft can fire against targets illuminated by itself or by FACs in the air, or on the ground.

A few notes on the configuration:

The "T" tail was chosen to provide full access to the engine compartment, which is a major problem with the SM-27. The canard is retained to
give the aircraft a tight turning radius, and a high degree of maneuverability.

The rudder is large to eliminate any tendency to flat spin, via provision of excellent lateral control.

The wing has dihedral to make the plane stable, simplifying the control system, and reducing pilot work load.

The pilot sits upright with a good view of his surroundings which improves his ability to find targets.

There is ample space beneath the pilot for an electronics suite, so this aircraft can have a high degree of automation, reducing pilot workload, additionally
this location is within the armour belt. Shown in the drawing is a nose mounted targeting radar and targeting laser, with associated electronics.

I'm thinking a fly away price of $10 million

Given directions, I will gladly upload a larger image, to facilitate study.

INDY

carl

07-05-2012, 01:47 AM

goprisko

07-06-2012, 01:27 AM

Goprisko:

I have a few questions.

Will the pusher propeller really work out? I can't think of a single aircraft design with a single pusher propeller that was truly successful except some sport designs. I read that an insurmountable disadvantage is that the prop has to operate in constantly disturbed air. Are the advantages of that configuration really worth it?

Will a laminar flow airfoil be work if the aircraft is going to be operating at low levels? In North America in the summer the leading edge will be fouled, horribly fouled, by smashed bugs, sometimes in just a few minutes.

Why just one seat, why not two? Perhaps an aircraft like this would be used for simply scouting out areas as much as anything else. Two pairs of eyes are a lot better for that.

All that being said, it would great from just an intellectual point of view to see something like this built. I get tired of reading about the latest delay in the F-35.

To improve airflow into the propellor please note that only the rudder lies ahead of it, the stabilizer is above it, and the wing is well ahead of it. Ever hear
of the B-36? Had 6 pusher propellors. Was the largest aircraft fully operational, the largest was the Spruce Goose.

The prop proposed is a contra-rotating one 10 ft in diameter with a 6 blade prop ahead of a 5 blade one, to minimize vibration.

Pusher propellors are actually more efficient than tractor propellors, and this one is operating behind a fuselage that is extremely fair and has minimal cross section.

The NASA natural laminar flow airfoil proposed was thoroughly investigated by Hitachi at speeds from 80-600 knots and at reynolds numbers from 3 million up. so yes it will operate effectively at low altitudes and at speeds between 40-500 knots.

Please also note that unlike the Stavatti Proposal, MTOW is held to no more than 5 X HP or 12,900 lbs. This provides the sort of performance inherent in the Thunder Mustang, with an engine that does not suffer from performance losses with altitude, the PW127G

One seat vs two, to keep MTOW low, with the pilot using a heads up display, in a fully automated airplane. Remember, that this cockpit is armoured against 50 cal so this pilot adds nearly 1500 lbs to MTOW when armour, ejection seat, oxygen system, and pilot are included.

Composite construction provides an extremely smooth, low drag skin, contributing greatly to performance.

The intended use of this aircraft is attack and destruction of ground targets found by the pilot, identified by a CAS observer elsewhere, or identified by ground forces. To do this job, this aircraft must have direct radio communication with friendly forces below, direct communication with whoever is supplying CAS, whether a L-19 bird dog, an officer attached to ground forces, or another aircraft, and direct communication with G-2(intelligence) at battalion or regimental level, (whomever this plane is attached to.

To minimize friendly fire incidents, this aircraft uses a combination of high definition RADAR and laser target designation, virtually identical to that used by attack helos.

However, the maintenance effort necessary to keep this aircraft operating is a fraction of that needed to maintain a helo,

Please also note that low level operations, in helos are no longer performed due to the prohibitive amount of maintenance necessary to repair ground fire, and airframe damage, from evasive maneuvering.

To fulfill it's role, this aircraft is not part of the airforce. If a Marine Aircraft, it is attached to an expeditionary force commander, if an Army Aircraft, it is attached to Brigade or a Batallion Commander, and those commanders organize logistics for it, prepare bases for it, and provide ground personnel to service and arm it.

The airforce provides air supremacy via aircraft such as the F-16/F15 at altitudes above 10,000 ft..

The airforce conducts strategic bombing campaigns against infrastructure, behind enemy lines, it no longer conducts bombing runs at the tactical level.

This change will incorporate the lessons learned from the WWII performance of the RAF in France following the Normandy Invasion.

Like the USAF, the RAF focused development on air superiority aircraft, and refused to support the design and implementation of a purpose built ground attack aircraft.

In counterpoint, the US Army Aircorps produced several competing ground attack designs, the most successful of which was the P-47 Thunderbolt, and it was the US Army which broke out first from the Normandy Beach head, despite inferior tanks, and less field experience fighting the Germans.

INDY

goprisko

07-06-2012, 02:54 PM

There have been several successful aircraft using pusher propellors powered
by engines of the size advocated in the COIN proposal above.

The Beechcraft Starship is one.
The most relevant is the SAAB 21, which
had a 1450 hp engine and was a fighter and was considered successful.

AND

The Douglas XB-42 MixMaster, which has virtually the exact same layout
as my proposal, equivalent horse power (2650 vs 2920), but was 3 X heavier.

The XB-42, due to clean design, was faster than the DeHavilland Mosquito. It did have handling problems, which were correctible, but lack of interest due to the end of the war called a halt to the program. With today's experience in Canard pusher design, and jet aircraft design, the handling issues should be readily solvable, given the only difference between jet design and prop pusher design, is the source of the thrust, and in both cases, the engine is aft, so the CG issues are similar.

INDY

goprisko

07-06-2012, 03:12 PM

Please compare the Douglas XP-42 to the proposal. Note several important
differences, as follows:

1. The proposal's propellor circle lies above the bottom of the fuselage, while that of the XP-42 extends 20% below the bottom of the fuselage.

2. The propellor of the proposal is much closer to the trailing edge of the
wing than that in the XP-42/

3. The distance between the aft landing gear and the propellor is much shorter in the proposal than in the XP-42.

4. The departure angle from the main gear to the prop is much greater in the proposal than in either the Stavatti SM-27 or the XP*42, 20 degrees in
fact, to permit landings at high angles of attack

5. The ventral rudder is fixed, for yaw stability only, and is there to protect the prop in the event of high angle of incidence landings.

INDY

Bob's World

07-06-2012, 03:29 PM

Police and Coast Guard helicopters; fire retardant aircraft, etc. all these are good examples of "COIN" aircraft, as the best COIN is prophylactic and the day to day equitable provision of necessary services by a government perceived as drawing its legitimacy from the populace that it serves.

We need to stop seeing our FID efforts to support the high end COIN efforts of the failing governments we create or sustain through our own military efforts as "COIN" if we are ever to get back to healthy understanding of that particular type of operation.

What we are discussing here are more accurately "Irregular warfare" aircraft, and this is indeed a major effort that our air services should take every bit as seriously as they do their drone, strategic and air superiority programs.

We need a robust fleet of relatively small, durable platforms that can haul 12-15 men and their equipment from one unimproved airfield to the next without a visual signature that stands out much from the other private and commercial activity in the area. We need platforms that can linger on station providing all manner of ISR and fires (tailored to the likely target set) that have a pilot working to support the leader on the ground below him, rather than a drone working to support some far senior commander watching the whole drama on a video feed in his CP miles away.

There simply isn't much appetite among those who work in the air to commit to such aircraft as desired by those who work on the ground. Instead we get CV-22s and F-35s; or in SOF we continue to invest in MC130s, though these aircraft and crews are typically far too busy practicing for a mission they'll likely never conduct to actually be out supporting the very forces they exist to support. A proverbial "self-licking ice cream cone" in many regards. And really not the platform we need for a major infiltration or day to day low vis, low intensity operations either one.

As we continue to pursue the promise of "JOINT" operations, healing the breach between the air and the ground is one area still in need of major work. Getting to the platforms we all really need, rather than the platforms that an elite few really want.

Ken White

07-06-2012, 03:34 PM

What he said...

carl

07-07-2012, 04:03 AM

We need a robust fleet of relatively small, durable platforms that can haul 12-15 men and their equipment from one unimproved airfield to the next without a visual signature that stands out much from the other private and commercial activity in the area. We need platforms that can linger on station providing all manner of ISR and fires (tailored to the likely target set) that have a pilot working to support the leader on the ground below him, rather than a drone working to support some far senior commander watching the whole drama on a video feed in his CP miles away.

An AN-28 or a Twin Otter should do the trick. Twin Otters are going back into production and I think the AN-28 is still produced in Poland as the M-28 Skytruck. Both would do about what you want and you could hang sensors and weapons on the outside and have enough room on the inside for operators and equipment.

You are right though that the Skygods in the various services, even the Army, wouldn't go for it. Not sexy enough. I can't understand that attitude. The type of missions you seem to want these aircraft to fly would be a blast for the pilot, stick and rudder, using your eyeballs, skill, wits and being closely involved with the action on the ground. The kind of thing the Raven FACS and Air America guys did. But I suppose guys who like that don't make rank in any of the services. Besides, that kind of flying stresses the skill of the man, not the sophistication of the machines. We don't seem to go for that anymore.

carl

07-07-2012, 04:17 AM

Goprisko:

I can understand why only 1 pilot. 1,500 pounds is a lot of weight.

You know far more about aerodynamics and configurations than I. I only know very general stuff. I still question whether the pusher configuration is really worth it though for a single engine airplane.. If it was there would have been more aircraft with it in the history of aviation. The Saab 21 did fly and see service for a while but I don't think it was all that successful. The Swedes bought P-51s as soon as they could. The XB-42 was a remarkable airplane but only a one or two of.

Laminar flow airfoils are great but will it work in a low level buggy environment?

goprisko

07-10-2012, 01:14 AM

Further enquiry into the aerodynamics of fighter aircraft brings up significant changes needed.

1. the Ogive nose shown, can and should be shortened, as it is a supersonic nose, and this aircraft will not exceed 0.7 Mach.

2. Work at Northrop on the F-20 program showed that the nose should be
elliptical with the major(long), axis being horizontal. to improve directional stability and reduce the size of vertical stabilizer needed.

3. The SAAB Viggen showed that the canard eliminated down forces from the horizontal stabilizer, improving lift at all speeds by 10%, so the proposal should have the rear stab deleted to minimize drag.

4. Work on various projects has shown that roll control can be effected by using the rudder and canard in concert, provided the Canard is "flying" that is fully rotatable, and provided the two sides can be rotated together in the same direction, or in opposite directions, as directed by the flight comnputer. This means the ailerons can be dispensed with, infavor of spoilers, and the entire leading edge of the wing given over to a slot, and the entire trailing edge given over to fowler two component flaps. This would greatly improve short field performance.

5. The gun placement shown, is a vast improvement over that on the A-10, given a much simpler mechanism, a rate of fire nearly equal that of the M230 chain gun, due to no spin up time, and mounting of two cannon means 1 second bursts of 16 rounds, vs the A-10's 30. Gun placement so the magazine is on the centerline, above the wing, means improved protection from ground fire, no CG changes consequential to gun use, and simplified reloading.

6. The dorsal inlet for the PW 126 G eliminates FOD and was proved on the UK test aircraft nearly 50 years ago.

7. A nearly 6' long landing gear leg on all gear provides improved ground clearance to enable rough field operations, and the wider stance of the revised main gear placement, provides great cross wind handling during landings. This coupled with a low landing speed of 40 knots empty, means cross runway landings, similar to those routinely performed by twin otters, will be the norm, and thus cross wind landings are un-necessary.

8. Carriage of rockets,missiles, and bombs externally, means simplified armouring, simplified launching of ordinance.

9. Location of external stores hardpoints so as to eliminate CG changes during release of weapons, simplifies design of the rudder and canard, eliminates yaw due to firing, and reduces pilot workload.

10. I am seriously looking into changing the rudder into two rudders canted 40 degrees, to reduce RADAR signature, improve roll control using the rudder, and reduce drag, via elimination of the aft norizontal stabilizer.

INDY

INDY

socal1200r

07-10-2012, 07:32 PM

I work as a contractor in International Affairs, and one of the things we keep our eyes on is the Light Attack Armed Recon platform for Afghanistan. Lots of good suggestions in here regarding a good COIN platform, how it should be multi-role, simple to fly and maintain, be pretty much off the shelf so it can be rapidly fielded, etc.

With all that being said, at least from an AF perspective, it would seem that the Embraer Super Tocano would be the ideal solution. It's already being flown in armed variations for COIN and counter-drug missions, can be outfitted for multi-role missions, is much simpler to fly and maintain than a comparable UAS, and can probably be used to bring partner nation air forces online faster in a COIN or CT capacity.

Just like the USAF, I doubt there's a "one size fits all" when it comes to a platform that can do both COIN and light mobility. A twin-engine Otter, C-27, etc. could probably be outfitted in a gunship version for COIN operations, and still have light mobility capabilities, so that might be something worth pursuing. But then the pilots would have to be multi engine-rated, and with the countries that are most in need of COIN air assets like these, the simplest solutions would probably be best.

goprisko

07-10-2012, 08:24 PM

Turns out that armouring attack aircraft is most advanced in helos.

Helos must operate at altitudes subject to ground fire, and operate at speeds varying from stationary to 170 knots.

Helos get lots of AAA, MANPADS, and even RPG-7 attacks.

Helos also have severe gross weight limitations, so lots of effort has gone into light weight armour systems to defeat 50 cal and 30 cal machine gun AP rounds, which are the most common threat. A much smaller effort has gone into defeating 20 mm cannon rounds, mostly because these require heavier armour which generally is beyond the capabilities of a helo.

The proposal allocates 120 lbs for the armoured seat, and BAE systems, as it turns out, has a seat of this mass that can defeat 30 cal which is in use on the CH-47 Chinook Helo.

Given the 2000 lbs allocated for armour, this leaves 1880 lbs for everything else.

Armouring the canopy is necessary, and Diesenroth Engineering offers AMAP-T which is a transparent ceramic armour with the following properties:
"AMAP-T offers excellent transparency and, due to the extreme strength of the material, ensures excellent protection – in meeting the STANAG requirements of Level 1 to 4. The system is also unaffected by temperature changes, produces only minor surface reflections, allows the use of night-vision goggles and can be equipped with a system to shield it from detection by radar. ?

One of the advantages of ceramic armour vs metallic armour, is reduced RADAR signature, which greatly reduces threats from AAMs fired by hostile aircraft or SAMs fired from the ground. Turboprops, of course, emit much less heat, and the exhaust is run through the propellor, which promptly mixes it with ambient air, further reducing the signature.

The proposal includes provision of the AN/ALR-67(V)3 radar receiver, as part of an advanced digital countermeasures radar warning system including the ALE 50 decoy system integrated into the AN/ALQ-184(V9) self-protection jamming pod designed to defeat radar guided surface-to-air and air-to-air threats, weighing 638 lbs.

An ECM / anti missile system like the ALE-47 counter measures dispenser and the AN/AAR-47 missile approach warning system is also provided. The AN/AAR-47 threat receiver, weighing 50 lbs, provides passive warning against infrared and laser guided missiles fired at its host platform. In addition to providing warning to the aircrew, it cues the ALE-47 onboard expendables dispenser weighing 32 lbs, to eject expendable infrared countermeasures in order to defeat incoming missiles. The system includes four sensor units providing 360-degree protection.

Total mass of these systems is 710 lbs.

Provision of the above takes the proposal far beyond the capabilities of the AT-6B and the A-26B Super Tucano. The proposal grosses only 3,000 Lbs more than the Super Tucano, has nearly twice the horse power, has a HP:MTOW ratio of 1:5 vs the Tucano's 1:7.5, has a rate of climb > 5000 Fpm, and carries 7400 Lbs of ordinance vs the A-26b's 3000 Lbs and the A6's 1500 lbs.

All this in a package with a stall speed at MTOW of 75 mph, taking off in < 250m and clearing a 16m obstacle within 300m, while operating from unimproved strips.

INDY

socal1200r

07-11-2012, 02:42 PM

Goprisko - simple question: is your proposed platform currently available for immediate COIN operations? You list a bunch of techno-babble and aeronautical big bang buzz words, but it's all moot if such an aircraft is only on paper.

I think what would be the best of both worlds, for most of the COIN/CT environments these platforms are anticipated to be used in, is some sort of twin-engine light mobility aircraft, armed as a gunship, with some upgraded sensors and targeting systems, that still has cargo-carrying or troop-carrying capabilities, like a twin-engine Otter, C-27, etc.

It can be designed with limited self-defense capabilities like armor and chaff/flares, but let's be realistic. In these types of COIN/CT environments, I don't think these platforms really need to have robust air-to-air capabilities. They're main mission will be offensive air-to-ground, insertion/extraction, and resupply. Another key component is the country that gets these platforms has to be capable of acquiring, flying, and maintaining them over the long-term, so they can't be overly sophisticated.

Could some be lost to the occasional and highly lucky RPG or small arms fire, perhaps. Would I factor in MANPADs or maybe even SAMs into the equation? Maybe, but again, keeping in mind the anticipated COIN/CT environments these platforms would be operating in, I'd have to put those at the low risk end of the spectrum.

carl

07-11-2012, 10:36 PM

I think what would be the best of both worlds, for most of the COIN/CT environments these platforms are anticipated to be used in, is some sort of twin-engine light mobility aircraft, armed as a gunship, with some upgraded sensors and targeting systems, that still has cargo-carrying or troop-carrying capabilities, like a twin-engine Otter, C-27, etc.

When you say "armed as a gunship" do you mean with side firing guns like and AC-130 or armed with something like GPS guided 120mm mortar shells and small missiles like Hellfire or a combination of all of the above?

Allow me to put in a plug for the AN-28/M-28. It loads from an openable (sic) back and has the best forward visibility of any airplane I ever sat in. And since the Russians built it, it is built stout.

socal1200r

07-12-2012, 03:52 PM

I'm thinking more forward-firing armaments, like gun pods, missile launchers, etc., which will be easier to train the pilots to use effectively, in more of a CAS and strafing role. There's another thread on here about the Rhodesian Light Infantry, and they had a pic of one of their helos outfitted with four .303 Browning machine guns, which replaced a 20mm gun. They said the Brownings were much more effective, since the 20mm rounds had a tendency to explode at tree-top level. So I'm thinking maybe .50 cal gun pods on hardpoints under the wings, or possibly on the fuselage, would be pretty decent for a COIN/CT platform like this. Maybe add a side-firing weapon on each side for self-defense purposes, like another .50 cal or 7.62 chain gun, and that should do it. So something like this should be able to come in to a hot LZ, provide suppressive fire while orbiting, offload some troops and cargo with engines running, then do a combat takeoff and make it home.

carl

07-12-2012, 05:05 PM

Small twins like the Twin Otter and AN-28/M-28 are small compared to a C-130 or Dakota and agile compared to those airplanes. But they are huge and clumsy compared to one of those Rhodesian helos. And they are dead slow compared to one of the old strafers like the B-26. Making a strafing run, which means getting fairly close I think, at 100 knots in a Twotter might not be such a good idea.

That is why I asked about fixed side firing armament like all the AC airplanes. You could stay further away from the ground while still providing good fire support with the guns and whatever else you wanted to hang on the thing.

That might require more skilled pilots but I would rather keep the systems simple and put the money into pilot training. To do a good job with whatever you have you must have skilled pilots, so I would rather have that known and concentrated on from the start.

Do you mean the same individual airplane would do the fire support and the cargo and people carrying? If you do, I don't think that is such a good idea. Guns, ammo, bombs and rockets weigh a lot and would not leave much weight and room available for cargo and people. I think it would be a much better idea to have some of the M-28s set up as armed airplanes and others set up as cargo and people carriers, like the Huey gunships and Huey slicks from Vietnam. The pilots wouldn't have to divide their attention and training between different missions either.

socal1200r

07-12-2012, 07:22 PM

Carl - understood, but a good take away is the same platform, configured a little differently, could do just about everything. Something like the Otter, C-27, or one of the Russian planes you mentioned, is already available. I'd think they could be configured as the minimally armed troop transport/resupply aircraft, along with the separate gunship version, and have the same general procurement, operation, and maintenance costs/requirements.

What I'm getting at is, there's something available RIGHT NOW, that with minimal work, can be configured to do the COIN/CT mission for 99 percent of the projected operational environments they're expected to work in, without bankrupting those partner nations in the process. As they say, don't let perfect stand in the way of good enough...

carl

07-13-2012, 03:51 AM

We are agreed then. It makes perfect sense. Bob Jones' idea was a very good one. But I think we both know it will never happen. There is no cool tech. No trons to dazzle nerds with. No complex project that would need project officers whose careers could be made by seeing something complicated halfway through. And it would depend mainly on the men in cockpits and turning the wrenches. All it would have going for it is effectiveness, simplicity, sensibleness, flexibility and lack of big expense. Sigh. It would be a cool project though.

socal1200r

07-13-2012, 03:17 PM

"...All it would have going for it is effectiveness, simplicity, sensibleness, flexibility and lack of big expense..."

Yup...unfortunately, that's WAY too much common sense, and not sexy or Gucci enough for the residents in the Puzzle Palace...

SWJ Blog

08-08-2012, 10:01 AM

Bull in a China Shop? Attack Aviation and the COIN Battlefield (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/bull-in-a-china-shop-attack-aviation-and-the-coin-battlefield)

Entry Excerpt:

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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/bull-in-a-china-shop-attack-aviation-and-the-coin-battlefield) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

goprisko

08-18-2012, 11:04 AM

Experience during the Normandy, Ardennes Campaigns, and likely in Vietnam, showed strafing to be the most hazardous ground attack activity.

Advances in missile and gun targeting via LASER designation, now permit targeting of ground targets at ranges up to 5 km, depending upon atmospheric conditions. Should all weather be necessary, LIDAR or similar RADAR technologies need be used, with the disadvantage of emissions which call attention to the aircraft.

The pusher design was chosen to open the nose of the aircraft for targeting electronics, both LASER and RADAR, and for mid-air refueling to increase
loiter time.

A single engine, armoured was chosen to minimize drag, and to simplify handling. Earlier twin engine COIN designs suffered massively when one engine went out, to the point of an uncontrolled barrel roll leading to a flat spin. Further, the engine is aft and shielded by the wing from ground fire during low level attacks.

I admit that this specific design does not exist. This is a concept based upon sound aeronautical design, to show what is immediately feasible, given current technologies.

Note that the wing and tailplane is much simplified compared to the Stavatti Machete, the entire aircraft is much cleaner too.

Note that spoilers and the air brake are specified, this permits control of dive speed to permit longer target acquisition, and facilitates short field landings at empty weight(s).

INDY

goprisko

08-18-2012, 11:10 AM

The Twin Otter, the DHC-3, as offered by Dehavilland, is a fine bush plane.

However, it will lose much of it's payload once armoured, and fitted with a gun and targeting system. Since, it is an aluminum airplane, and twin engine, it's empty weight is much heaver than my concept aircraft, and it's skin friction is far higher, too.

Also, it's stall speed is above 70 knots, and the concept specifies a landing speed, empty of 40 knots. This crucial difference equates into much longer landing and takeoff runs, necessating larger clearings, which may not be practical. It also has a much longer wing than the proposal, and the wing is not laminar, thus higher drag.

INDY

goprisko

08-21-2012, 04:10 PM

I don't believe a COIN aircraft should be a multi-purpose vehicle. Specifically, my proposal is a ground attack aircraft, capable of defeating AAMs and SAMs using EW, including decoys and jammers. The proposed EW capability includes 360 degree scanning for incoming threats.

My proposal is a fully automated aircraft, to lessen pilot workload, and improve defensive response.

For troop insertion, my two favored methods are twin engine transports and helos. Both aircraft are available in STOL configurations, would operate under the umbrella of my proposal and current Air Supremacy assets, and
have payloads many times that of my proposal. For instance a twin turboprop transport will operate at gross weights of 10 X hp. Given two 3000 hp engines this transport would operate at MTOW of 60,000 lbs, could carry a company of men, or a platoon complete with vehicles, ammo, and provisions.

INDY

goprisko

08-30-2012, 09:02 PM

I'm guessing you like the Thunderbolt 2. The problem with the T-bolt 2 is that it has no turning radius= very poor manuverability compared to prop craft and can only hold a slow pattern for a few seconds before you have to dip back into the engines and give the stick a little tug. Atleast this is what my sisters boyfriend tells me. He flies Hornets in the Corps, but was a Hog (t-bolt 2) pilot before that.
He also said that at those low speeds it was insanely rough and that hard jolting would sometimes cause the 30mm to jam. He said the feel is similar to flying a commercial jet at very low speeds and altitudes. But, he said it almost impossible to tear it apart with heavy fire, or, anything else for that matter( thanks to carbon fibre covered ceramic spawl plates). He said he's seen many of them get hit with SAM's in the stubs and still land. He said he has even belly landed one and it was back up and flying a few days later... didn't hurt it at all. That says ALOT for any jet powered craft. In that aspect that plane lives up to it's namesake.
I like'em alot! Probably my favorite jet pack, but the not turning thing would make me sick. But, it is a flying tank and is designed to do exactly what it does, included in that is the fact that it has little manuverability. That is so you don't overshoot or, have to dip to keep your point of aim on a target when your coming in on top of it. This is what I'm told about that aircraft and it seems to make sense. He even said that turboprop "bug bashers" are better for serving alot of the roles that the A-10 serves and more. I called and asked him just to see what he said, but, this is only one opinion of one pilot. But, aside from the fact that you can't hardly take an A-10 down, I think a turboprop is just as good in it's own right.
But the idea of recip engine "horse fly" planes was a little silly now that I think about it in terms of the US armed forces. Where in the hell would they get AvGas and why would they want to deal with that?! Although to me it still makes sense for the private sec.

Cliff and others seem married to the above aircraft. I'm not. I think that modern computerized flight characterization programs can assist the design of a STOL, turbo-prop COIN aircraft with flight characteristics superior to the A-10. My submission is one such aircraft.

A modern ground attack aircraft would take advantage of improvements in lightweight armour. Would simplify the gun system as I proposed. Would keep the hp to MTOW ratio at 5 or less to improve climb, shorten takeoff run, improve dash, and keep cruise in the 300-400 knot range.

A modern ground attack aircraft would use slats and compound full span fowler flaps to reduce landing speed (empty) to 40 knots, and takeoff speed to 60 knots at MTOW. Roll control would be via the canard, spoilers, and the elevator. Both a canard and elevator would be present to maximize maneuverability, including a very tight turning radius at combat speeds, which are expected to be 100-200 knots.

A bubble canopy with the pilot seated erect and high, so he can maintain situational awareness, which is armoured, is specified.

The engine and prop are aft to open the nose for refueling probe, LASER target designator, and RADAR target designator.

The gun is relocated from the chin to the wing root where the magazine is better protected from ground fire, and close to the CG so using ordinance does not change trim. Two recoil operated guns are specified to simplify maintenance, improve reliability, and maintain acceptable firing rate. Further the gun is no longer expected to KO tanks, the brimstone and Pars missiles deal with MBTs, while the gun deals with APCs, trucks, troop concentrations, and helos. 75mm Guided Rockets are in the inventory to deal with Light Tanks, pill boxes, and other suitable targets.

The emphasis is on precision targeting using LASER and RADAR for all weather capability.

The key components of the airframe and cockpit are armoured to improve survivability.

MTOW is kept at 15,000 # max at 3000 Hp.

Landing Gear legs are long to provide ground clearance essential for fast re-arming between missions, and at a forward base.

30X113 ammo is specified for the gun because that ammo is used by other batallion level aircraft, (helos), and because recoil is much less.

In short, the A-10 has proved itself a very useful aircraft, as did the AD1 Skyraider, the P-47 thunderbolt, and the F6F Wildcat. But time moves on, advances in technologies have been made, and it is time to field a successor.

INDY