Aviation in COIN (merged thread) [Archive]

SWJED

05-07-2006, 06:14 PM

Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0700612408/smallwarsjour-20/103-3213651-7944618?creative=327641&camp=14573&link_code=as1)

by James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson

Reviewed by LTC Lester W. Grau, USA (Retired), Military Review, Nov/Dec 2004

Despite catchy phrases like "surgical strike" and "precision bombing," airpower remains a blunt instrument in unconventional and small wars. Air strikes against guerrillas fail when guerrillas cannot be precisely located. Bombing civilians in retaliation (or error) is ineffective and counterproductive. The pre- World War II aviation concept of "air control," in which aviation occupies and controls a small country by airpower alone, is clearly outmoded and wrong. What then is the role of airpower in small wars?

James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson have a clear vision of this role and have written extensively on air and ground power. Corum is a reserve army officer and a distinguished historian and professor at the U.S. Air Force (USAF) School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Wray R. Johnson is a retired USAF colonel who spent a career in special operations and is now professor at the U.S. Marine Corps University.

Airpower has been a player in small wars and counterinsurgencies since French aviators bombed Moroccan rebels in 1913. Sometimes airpower has been a key player; at other times, it has promised much more than it could deliver. In the case of French Indochina, airpower's failure to deliver as planned at Dien Bien Phu lost the war for the French. Air Power in Small Wars, the first comprehensive history of the subject, analyzes numerous conflicts with guerrillas, bandits, rebels, and terrorists in colonial wars, police actions, counterinsurgencies, and expeditions.

The book's pre-World War II section describes General John J. Pershing's expedition into Mexico; U.S. Marine Corps expeditions into the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua; British Colonial expeditions in Somaliland, Aden, Transjordan, Iraq, and the Northwest Frontier Province of India; Spanish Colonial expeditions in Spanish Morroco; French Colonial expeditions in French Morocco and Syria; and Italian Colonial expeditions in Libya and Eritrea.

The post-World War II section includes the Greek Civil War; the Philippine Anti-Huk campaign; the French Colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria; the British Colonial wars in Malaya, South Arabia, and Oman; the war in South Vietnam; southern African insurgencies in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Rhodesia and Malawi; Latin American insurgencies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Columbia; the Egyptian expedition in Yemen; the Soviet War in Afghanistan; and the Israeli excursion in southern Lebanon. While it is an ambitious undertaking, it succeeds.

Among the book's key findings are that in small wars, the political and economic instruments are often more important than the military instrument. Reconnaissance and transport are usually the most important and effective aviation missions in guerrilla war. Airpower's ground attack role becomes more important as the war turns conventional. Aviation high-tech and low-tech systems might play an important role in small wars. Joint operations are essential for the effective use of airpower. Small wars are long and intelligence-intensive. Training for major wars does not translate into readiness for small wars.

This is an important book and, hopefully, one on which ground power and airpower advocates can agree. Insurgencies, expeditions, and other small wars might occupy the attention of the U.S. Armed Forces in the near term. The time to prepare is now, and getting the air and ground component to work together harmoniously is part of that preparation. This book should be a basic component of that preparation and of that harmony.

Jesse9252

03-07-2007, 08:01 PM

The Air Force wasn’t thrilled about the Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency document, which the service said gave short shrift to airpower’s capabilities, as proved in the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Maj. Gen. Allen G. Peck, commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell AFB, Ala., said he had seen the doctrine penned by Petraeus and Amos, and said that it reflected “a very two-dimensional view of how to fight a counterinsurgency.” If airmen had written it, it would be “different,” Peck observed.

The Air Force provides “maneuver” capabilities by backing up ground troops with kinetic and nonkinetic means, Peck noted.

The Air Force is working on its own COIN doctrine and is proposing to the Pentagon that a joint doctrine be developed. The Air Force version is on a fast track to be finished in August. The service is simultaneously pushing for a joint doctrine.

When that process is under way, “it will be helpful for us to have our Air Force doctrine in hand,” he said.

USAF agrees with Petraeus and Amos that air mobility is a powerful “asymmetric” capability and certainly endorses the view that ISR—air and space-based systems alike—are critical.

However, Peck said he was concerned about the doctrine’s tendency to low-rate the value of force applied from the air. He said FM 3-24 does “probably a bit too much hand-wringing over the potential for collateral damage,” because the Air Force exercises great care in selecting targets and uses the minimum explosive power possible to achieve the desired effect.

Full article can be found here http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2007/0307watch.asp

Just curious what the experts think...

Thanks for any replies.

Old Eagle

03-07-2007, 08:42 PM

There is no doubt that the USAF needs to play in the development of Joint COIN doctrine. We/they still haven't figured out how best to use their firepower capabilities. Dropping 2x2000lb bombs on a farm house that may or may not have had insurgents in it doesn't produce collateral damage, it produces more insurgents. (carefully selected targets -- minimum explosive force)

Stan

03-07-2007, 08:55 PM

Hi Jesse !

I've been Army all my life, so don't take this to heart if you are/were AF :cool:

Going to the Air War College's site can be amusing (for the Army types):
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-lesn.htm

But better yet, Air & Space Power's Spring 06 Journal hits home:

"The Air Force's Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency"

CONSIDERING THAT THE U.S. military has extensive experience
in using airpower against insurgents, and that the United States
will almost certainly be involved in fighting insurgents and terrorists
and will no doubt assist other nations in their own fights
against irregular opponents in the future, the lack of attention in military
colleges and in doctrine regarding this subject is scandalous. The U.S. Air
Force in particular, has tended to ignore and downplay air operations in
small wars in its education system and in its doctrine.”

more here on page 27:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/spr06/spr06.pdf

To a large extent, the Air Force has ignored insurgency as much as possible,
preferring to think of it as little more than a small version of conventional war.

Regards, Stan

Perhaps Old Eagle is right, better late than never !

John T. Fishel

03-07-2007, 09:11 PM

On seeing these posts I recalled discussions in the 1980s with and air force officer whose name I forgot about the use of the RAF in Iraq COIN in the 1920s. A Google search turns up quite a bit of stuff but it doesn't support and optimistic use of airpower as a primary direct action weapon. Even smart bombs do have a tendency to blow up more stuff and people that we desire.

Jesse9252

03-07-2007, 09:48 PM

Stan, no worries as I am a USMC officer candidate heading down to PLC this summer.

Better late than never? The article reads as though the AF brass is suddenly paying attention to COIN because FM 3-24 got all sorts of press, the guy who wrote it is now commander of MNF-I, and when they actually sat down to read it it said horrible things like: "Air strikes are probably too blunt an instrument to be of much value, and ground commanders should think twice before asking for them."

Do the experts here think the AF is going to sit down and produce a thoughtful, nuanced COIN doctrine? Or will they try and protect their turf by overemphasizing the role of airpower and muddy the waters when all the services have to sit down and come up with a joint document?

Maybe their criticisms of FM 3-24 are valid?

The views in FM 3-24 reflect a limited knowledge of airpower’s true role in the current operation and suspicion that airpower can all too easily prove counterproductive.

Loggie

03-07-2007, 09:48 PM

Funny, COIN wasn't a real hot AF topic until FM 3-24 was written...

My fear is that the Air Force counterinsurgency doctrine will be penned by guys who grew up in the ACC (old SAC/TAC) community. While the Air Force is great at delivering ordnance in target, and ISR is a no-fail mission, effective COIN requires so much more than that.

The AF Special Operations community is making great strides in developing a more robust FID capability (teaching the indigenous population to fish today keeps us from buying them a fish later), and their AC/MC-130 platforms provide highly effective support to the trigger-pullers for the type of ground combat we're encountering today (and likely tomorrow); much more so than the fast-burners...(Mobility platforms moving humanitarian supplies play a key role in developing stability as well.)

Air superiority is a wonderful thing, but specialized airpower brings more capability to the ground fight. At least until the insurgents get EuroFighters wry:

Bill Moore

03-08-2007, 03:27 AM

The Air Force provides “maneuver” capabilities by backing up ground troops with kinetic and nonkinetic means, Peck noted.

The Air Force is working on its own COIN doctrine and is proposing to the Pentagon that a joint doctrine be developed. The Air Force version is on a fast track to be finished in August. The service is simultaneously pushing for a joint doctrine.

When that process is under way, “it will be helpful for us to have our Air Force doctrine in hand,” he said.

USAF agrees with Petraeus and Amos that air mobility is a powerful “asymmetric” capability and certainly endorses the view that ISR—air and space-based systems alike—are critical.

However, Peck said he was concerned about the doctrine’s tendency to low-rate the value of force applied from the air. He said FM 3-24 does “probably a bit too much hand-wringing over the potential for collateral damage,” because the Air Force exercises great care in selecting targets and uses the minimum explosive power possible to achieve the desired effect.

Many Air Force General Officers have a tendency to present themselves more as corporate defenders than defenders of their nation. Perhaps the author's intentions are well intentioned, but the tone of this article indicates otherwise. While I agree that the Air Force does play a critical role, and could do more, especially on the non-kinetic side, this article reads like a plea to justify their continued budget on kinetic capabilities (I support that too, but not using COIN to justify it). To accuse a muddy boots officer who was on the front lines as a division commander of ringing his hands over collateral damage clearly marks the words of someone who doesn't understand the principles of COIN, and is clearly attempting to undermine the author of the doctrine.

Hopefully the Young Turks coming up through the Air Force ranks will eventually transform a service that is badly in need of reform. This reminds me of the same mentality that General Motors's management displayed when they ignored the new competition and changes in the market, and they simply tried to discredit the truth until they were ousted.

120mm

03-08-2007, 07:23 AM

Using Air Power against insurgents does more than create collateral damage and more insurgents. Using Air Power delegitimizes our efforts to fight and beat the insurgents. In the minds of the folks who want to defeat us, our use of Air Power means that we are too chicken#### to close with, and defeat them. It leads them to believe that THEY are the morally and tactically superior fighters, who, once it AGAIN appears as if they are "kicking our butts", we turn tail, like the soft, western infidel cowards we are, and call in an airstrike to save our craven butts.

To defeat the insurgents, we must defeat them politically and militarily, in terms that they understand. Failure to do this, makes airpower a recruiting tool for insurgents. Whether Airpower creates "collateral damage" or not, it serves as a recruiting tool and a disincentive to give in to the "cowardly west".

Perhaps if the insurgents valued airpower, it would be useful in a COIN fight. Or their fear of airpower exceeded their motivation for fighting.

I don't think it's necessarily a personal thing, but the best thing the AF could do is to "man up" and just support the fight in the best way they can.

120mm

03-08-2007, 12:12 PM

I found this, unattributed, at BCKS COIN forum

Development of sensor packages could aid Pentagon's plans for dedicated COIN air fleet
A shift in Defense Dept. focus and the development of advanced airborne sensor packages just might provide the U.S. military with a platform that has eluded the Pentagon for decades--a dedicated aircraft fleet mix especially designed and deployed for counter-insurgency operations.
Terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and insurgent battles abroad have reawakened Pentagon interest in developing a dedicated counter-insurgency operations (COIN) fleet and capability. Aviation counter-insurgency experts and would-be COIN contractors have been gravitating to the Pentagon to brief officers of the need, capabilities and potential requirements for such aircraft.
The Rand Corp. recently completed an unclassified report, "COIN Aircraft Systems for the USAF and Friendly States Facing Insurgencies," this summer as part of the organization's Project Air Force. Rand notes that there will be a need for such a capability for some time to come. "Insurgencies are likely to be an enduring feature of the international security environment."
Rand also says USAF is using aircraft designed for other needs for COIN missions, but that aircraft specifically geared for such needs would be better.
The Air Force historically has modified high-tech jet fighters or bombers for COIN operations instead of investing in a counter-insurgency fleet, which would consist mostly of transport planes or lower, slower-flying turboprop aircraft for fixed-wing needs. Jets can be used for limited COIN work, while it would be difficult if not impossible to do the reverse.
The Air Force also has been loath to rob its fighter or bomber accounts for what it considers "fringe" work, such as counter-insurgency operations.
Now, some say the anticipated need for COIN fleets is greater.
And growing capability of precision munitions and other sensor packages is making it possible to develop more-effective COIN fleets.
"With sensor packages, that's where we could be able to do it," said Wray Johnson, a former Air Force special forces colonel who helped develop counter-insurgency operations. Johnson teaches at the U.S. Marine Corps College in Quantico, Va.
He also is the co-author of the 2003 book Air Power in Small Wars, Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, which is on the USMC commandant's supplemental reading list, intended for majors and lieutenant colonels deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.
High-flying, fast jets would be at a disadvantage for COIN work, which requires more loiter time, often closer to the ground. Jets are also expensive to operate and maintain, and the Pentagon and Congress are looking for ways to cut costs.
A turbofan light attack-trainer such as Argentina's AT-63 Pampa would have a flyaway cost of about $11 million, the Rand report says; a utility plane, even less. Utility planes could provide more cost-effective transportation than other airlifters such as C-130Js, according to Rand.
"Many in Congress may question the wisdom of future Air Force budgets unless they include investments that clearly contribute to fighting non-state actors," says Christopher Bolkcom, aviation expert for the Congressional Research Service.
To prove they're not simply modifying legacy platforms, the services are jointly developing programs for new aircraft to meet needs they say reflect the growing counter-insurgency requirements. One of these is the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), a tactical airlifter meant for austere environments that can't be accommodated by current fleets.
But some of those programs have failed to get off the ground.
"In the case of the Army, the JCA program will probably falter for lack of money early in its execution, especially given Air Force resistance to buying anything other than C-130s," the Lexington Institute's Loren Thompson says. He notes that other COIN aircraft could meet similar fates.
"In the case of the Special Ops Command, it's hard to understand why an organization already buying the C-130, the V-22 tiltrotor and the next-generation combat search-and-rescue helicopter also needs a twin-engine turboprop. It sounds like special operators are 'overkilling' the short-hop airlift mission while neglecting more pressing needs."
Others disagree, saying the current aircraft don't meet COIN needs.
Johnson says, "What we need is something rugged, reliable, survivable and multi-dimensional."
While the Air Force has often directed its focus and funding on fighters and strike aircraft, COIN operations take on more indirect roles--intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), transportation, air ambulance, psychological operations, communications and providing cover for convoys and other ground operations.
Some COIN-type aircraft and missions include propeller-driven or jet trainers for light attack, helicopters, utility and armed unmanned aerial vehicles, Rand notes.
Aircraft that have proven effective in COIN operations include OV-10s, A-37s, T-37s, AC-47 gunships, UH-60s, C-123 transports and such newer entries as Embraer Tucanos.
EVEN SUCH SMALL planes as turboprop civilian transports, including the Spanish CASA C-212, Pilatus Porter, Cessna 17 or Piper Arrow, have proved useful.
Many of these are analyzed in the Rand report, which also notes conceptual designs, like that of Idaho-based Stavatti Aerospace Machete.
Resembling a black shortened F-15, the Machete will be able to handle strike, ISR and other missions, says Stavatti Aerospace Chairman/CEO Christopher Beskar.
The plan is to build on many of the capabilities of the A-10 or even the old A-1 Skyraiders, Beskar said on Aug. 16. But the aircraft also is incorporating modern sensor packages and construction standards. The plane is made of only about 12% traditional aluminum, while a third of it is titanium, Beskar said. "It's built to have a lot more survivability."
After two years of briefings with Pentagon, Air Force and Rand officials, Beskar has altered the Machete design to better address COIN requirements for more cannon firepower, ISR capability and a more rugged aircraft.
Another indication of what the Air Force may require was the proposal requests issued this spring for an Iraqi counter-insurgency ISR aircraft that can also be tasked for communications work.
WHILE KEEPING an eye on the possible U.S. or American-backed markets, Stavatti has its sights elsewhere.
"[We're] export oriented," Beskar said, noting Colombia, Chile and other Latin American countries, which are looking to replace aging A-37s or OV-10s, are promising.
Latin America, with its history of insurgencies and drug-trafficking battles, provides the perfect backdrop for COIN airframes. The same type of aircraft that's been successful for battling drug traffickers--mobile, quick, persistent--would be effective against insurgents.
Johnson agrees the Latin American market would be a target-rich environment for COIN aircraft. But he argues the only way U.S. allies will buy into COIN fleets is if the Pentagon does first.
Stavatti Aerospace says its Machete concept, which resembles a black shortened F-15, can handle strike, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and other missions important to the COIN initiative.
~~~~~~~~
By Michael Fabey, Washington

slapout9

03-08-2007, 01:51 PM

We already have them or used to anyway. They were originally going to be part pf the Air Cavalry Division as conceived by General Gavin but was finally stripped out. The SLAR side ways looking radar was the father of JSTARS. I think the new AF COIN manual will have a lot of General Gavin's and Billy Mitchell's ideas in it. Here is a link with pics and back round data. http://www.armyav.org/board_ov-1b.htm

Tom Odom

03-08-2007, 03:09 PM

LawVol

03-08-2007, 03:33 PM

However, Peck said he was concerned about the doctrine’s tendency to low-rate the value of force applied from the air. He said FM 3-24 does “probably a bit too much hand-wringing over the potential for collateral damage,” because the Air Force exercises great care in selecting targets and uses the minimum explosive power possible to achieve the desired effect.

I fear this means the "new" AF COIN doctrine will be more of the same. It will likely extoll the virtues of lethal airpower and largely ignore non-lethal roles. Flying small Cessna-type planes just isn't sexy.

This quote alone shows a complete ignorance of what works in a COIN environment.:confused:

Tom Odom

03-08-2007, 03:49 PM

I fear this means the "new" AF COIN doctrine will be more of the same. It will likely extoll the virtues of lethal airpower and largely ignore non-lethal roles. Flying small Cessna-type planes just isn't sexy.

This quote alone shows a complete ignorance of what works in a COIN environment.:confused:

Agreed.....

"Hand-wringing?"

See the SENLIS Report posted here by Marc Tyrell some months ago to get a sense of what "hand-wringing" really means.

Tom

LawVol

03-08-2007, 04:48 PM

Loggie

03-08-2007, 05:17 PM

I'm just getting the overwhelming sense that, with the forthcoming "AF COIN Doctrine," the job of changing the AF mindset will become even more difficult. Hopefully I'm wrong, but I anticipate some form of an air control theory with a new name.

Hence my concern that this "doctrine" will be written by fighter/bomber jocks with advanced degrees in Airpower Studies as opposed to guys who cut their teeth working FID/SOF missions out of Hurlburt Field.

Speaking as an Airman with a Marine Corps background, I'm consistently surprised by the lack of awareness the Air Force possesses, not only of the other services, but of the changing nature of warfare. For those of you out there with boots on the ground, are you more in need of an air superiority fighter, or a C-130? Which will have the most impact on achieving the objectives of the "Long War?" While I am concerned that China is increasing their military spending 18% over the next year, I just can't help but believe that by the time they acquire an air superiority fighter in any appreciable number our F-22s will be obsolete. Our mobility fleet is limping, our special operations fleet should be doubled, and we're buying fighters.

As Charlie Brown used to say: "Good Grief."

Smitten Eagle

03-08-2007, 05:50 PM

Hence my concern that this "doctrine" will be written by fighter/bomber jocks with advanced degrees in Airpower Studies as opposed to guys who cut their teeth working FID/SOF missions out of Hurlburt Field.

Speaking as an Airman with a Marine Corps background, I'm consistently surprised by the lack of awareness the Air Force possesses, not only of the other services, but of the changing nature of warfare. For those of you out there with boots on the ground, are you more in need of an air superiority fighter, or a C-130? Which will have the most impact on achieving the objectives of the "Long War?" While I am concerned that China is increasing their military spending 18% over the next year, I just can't help but believe that by the time they acquire an air superiority fighter in any appreciable number our F-22s will be obsolete. Our mobility fleet is limping, our special operations fleet should be doubled, and we're buying fighters.

As Charlie Brown used to say: "Good Grief."

I deployed with a couple (Marine) Harrier pilots in 2005 to IZ. Good dudes and great guys they are, but even as Marines they lacked the understanding of what a hinderance CAS can be to a long-term COIN campaign. I recall a conversation I witnessed.

Friend of mine: "So, what are you going to do when you deploy?"
Harrier Pilot: "I'm going to pick a fight, that's what!"

The harrier pilot had a warrior's mindset, but probably not the right temperment.

If I need to fight, I'll be honored by an invitation to brawl. But otherwise I doubt the utility of deliberately and bombastically looking for ways of starting said fights. We're fight to end the fight, not begin more.

For more on this, see Chuck Spinney (@ d-n-i.net):
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/successful_mission_lost_war.htm

Spinney's attitude is a bit too caustic, but I think he makes some good points.

Bill Moore

03-08-2007, 06:06 PM

LawVol

03-08-2007, 06:29 PM

Air Force leaders feel airpower can and should be more effectively used in the irregular warfare and counterinsurgency fights in ways other than supporting ground power.

"We need to espouse our views of airpower, to include capabilities to operate in the air, space and cyberspace domains, in this type of fight," General Peck said. "We've proven airpower can effectively support other agencies combating counterinsurgency, but can also operate in a supported component role. It doesn't always have to be about having lots of 'boots on the ground.' Airpower brings asymmetrical advantages to the fight that can be effectively leverage by joint force commanders in counterinsurgencies, support for insurgencies, and other forms of irregular warfare."

If you had any doubt about how the new doctrine will shake out, read this quote from an AFNEWS story. The key phrase is "operate in a supported component role." Air control anyone?

Tom Odom

03-08-2007, 06:45 PM

Ask Tom what an EC-130 could have done to mitigate the genocide in Rwanda. The hate/kill message was propagated primarily from one radio station.

Lift is almost always the biggest shortfall when it comes to AF support for this ground pounder.

For COIN we have sufficient fire support, I would like to hear more ideas on non-lethal fire support that the AF could provide. We won't hear it from their generals, nor will see it on their budget proposals, unless they intend to put it there to get Congressional support, then shift it to bombers and fighters later.

To answer: tremendous effect. I spent hours on the phone in Goma--after the genocide was supposedly over (it was not in the French zone) and aside from beating the drum for water distrubution I raised the IO war repeatedly. And we never got it right--or better said we could never get across just how critical it was.

For me as a boots on the ground guy in Africa--it was airlift. And Special Ops airlift and collection assets were in second place. It was largely the same in the 1960s--although much was made of "COIN" ground attack aircraft (T-28s, T-6s, and A26s) in the Congo in 1964. Those were used as straight interdiction and limited CAS assets--there was no "COIN" as we know it in the Congo then. We--the US, Belgians, mercenaries, and the Congolese--beat the Simbas into submission or extinction. And a key tool was air support.

Even as recently as Somalia--airpower advocates get confused about what is COIN and what is straight interdiction and CAS. AC130s were most definitely needed in Mog; we were not doing "COIN". We were seeking to beat the warlords into submission and we went in like we were doing a simple support operation. TF Ranger was not winning hearts and minds. Even in the support operation we were not trying to win hearts and minds--we were trying to make sure the Somali warlords knew we would seriously hurt them if they tried to disrupt the feeding.

One of the key indicators that the French intent behind Op Turquoise in Rwanda was less "humanitarian" than advertised was their dispatch of Jaguar ground attack aircraft to the AO. How Jaguars were going to stop genocide remains unanswered.

Tom

Jimbo

03-13-2007, 01:53 PM

The real problem is optimizing loiter time with payload capacity with performance. Funny how the best aircraft tend to be turbo prop driven for this. There is a need, but the problem turns into "is it sexy". One of my MC-130 friends told me there are some great designs and such out there, but getting the fighter mafia to buy off on it will be hard. The other problem is gettin past the Armi/Air Force fixed wing friction. If the Army were to buy some Tucano's and arm them to use as an ISR and lisght attack aircraft, the ariforce would go nuts. Conversely, if the Air force were to buy these same aircraft, they probably wouldn't operate them at low altitudes. Maybe the Marines will coem through.

03-13-2007, 04:54 PM

The Army retired Slapout's OV-1 Mohawk, AKA the Widowmaker, over a decade ago. The following details are lifted from
http://www.ov-1mohawk.org

Mohawk Details
The Mohawk was developed by Grumman Aircraft as a photo observation and electronic reconnaissance airplane for the US Marines and the US Army. Due to budgetary constraints, the Marines bowed out early in the development cycle. The first Mohawk (YAO-1) prototype flew on April 14, 1959, and entered production in October 1959. It served the US Army standing watch in Europe, Korea, the Vietnam War, Central and South America, Alaska, and during Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the Middle East. The US Army retired it from service in September 1996. A total of 380 original OV-1 Mohawks were produced. All types were built between 1957 and 1969.

Four basic models of the OV-1 were produced, not counting the prototype or pre-production OF-1, YAO-1, and AO-1:

OV-1A This model was used for photo observation and reconnaissance and employed a forward-looking panoramic camera; 64 were built.
OV-1B This model was used to conduct electronic reconnaissance with a SLAR (side looking airborne radar) pod mounted under the fuselage; 101 were built.
OV-1C This model provided electronic reconnaissance by using an IR (infrared) imaging system; 133 were built.
OV-1D This model provided photo observation and gathered electronic intelligence with SLAR and IR; 37 examples were built.

Following are variations or conversions of the original production models:

JOV-1A This model featured XM-14 .50 calibre gun pods and 7- or 19-round 2.75 inch rocket pods; 27 of these were adapted from OV-1As.

JOV-1C These gunships were the same as the JOV-1A but began as an adapted short wing OV-1C with the IR gear removed.

OV-1 "Super C" These had an "A" fuselage, "B" wings, T53-L15A engines, nose and belly cameras, and IR gear. All "Super Cs" except the American Wings Air Museum's S/N 68-15936 which is pictured in flight on the front page and those lost in accidents or in Vietnam were later converted to "D" models.

OV-1 SEAMORE There were only a few Hawks converted in the SEAMORE project.

RV-1D The ELINT (ELectronic INTelligence) version of the OV-1D had all cameras, SLAR and IR gear removed and newer electronic surveillance equipment installed. OV-1Bs were later converted to "D" models and RV-1Ds.

OV-1E This model was an OV-1D with a "glass" cockpit. It was to be the next generation of Hawk with GPS (global positioning system) integrated flight system, 704 engines at 1800 SHP (shaft horsepower), new SLAR package, updated avionics, storm scope, with a corresponding gross weight increase. Two or three prototypes were flown.

120mm

03-13-2007, 05:16 PM

I like the OV-10 Bronco, better.

Jimbo

03-13-2007, 05:46 PM

I'm with you 120mm, although Piper was making a turbo-propped Mustang in the early 1980's as a COIN aircraft, might be acceptable to the fighter jocks.

Smitten Eagle

03-17-2007, 08:50 PM

In terms of optimizing loiter time vs. payload (both sensor and weapons), I'm starting to think that UAVs and UCAVs are far superior to virtually any TACAIR out there.

Their sensors are just as good as those available on any F-18/16/15/B-1 (take your pick of manned fixed wing CAS), and their loiter time is enormous. I recall working in IZ with an armed predator. I asked the predator pilot (who was probably some AF reservist) the amount of playtime remaining. When he said 8+30, I was sold. He was armed with hellfires, which is as good as pretty much any other PGM for COIN ops (good firepower, not going to level a city block and shatter windows a mile away).

At the same time, I'm still a huge fan of rotary wing aviation for COIN. Cant beat the guns of the H-1s.

BMT

03-17-2007, 11:25 PM

I read many glowing USAF report's about the OV-10 COIN test conducted in Thailand. The minute it got to VN off came the guns and bomb racks, strictly a FAC aircraft.
SOG/CCS had 2 A/C at Quan Loi. They install the guns and replaced the WP rockets with HE. The AF went into a nut roll until someone told them to shut up. We had 6 slicks and 4 guns. Sometime's when we were really strung out we could get a couple of Corba's from the 1st Cav.

BMT

120mm

03-18-2007, 10:50 AM

TWC

03-26-2007, 05:55 PM

imho, the armed UAS like the Predator has all the drawbacks of the Tomahawk, LGB and LGMs do: You're "guessing" that the truck are the bad guys and not a truck full of women and kids.

I'm not a big air support fan in COIN, but there is some utility in a small, manned and armed COIN aircraft. The kind that can slow down to 100 kts and go "eye-ball to eye-ball" with the target.

It also "personalizes" taking out the bad guys to a point the can understand and respect. Which takes away from the image that US soldiers are cowards who hide behind their technology and only win because they cheat. Which takes away one more I/O advantage for the bad guys.

Having said that, the UAS is a great intel "tool", and armed UAS would have a terrific role in taking on high profile threat in a higher intensity environment.

While I think UAS (i.e. Predators) are great for a US military-involved COIN fight, remember that most partner nations do not usually have the ability to operate, support, and employ technically advanced unmanned systems. In a resource constrained environment, would you rather buy a UAS system OR buy a cheaper manned option and, with the left over money, pay your monthly salaries to your military? :)

Operating under the notion that, in the end, the partner nation will either win or lose the fight and the US is just an enabler, pushing UAS on a partner nation may just cause more problems. I think the better answer, and the one being pursued right now in Iraq, is to use manned ISR platforms like a King Air/Cessna 337/Caravan for the host nation...its easier and cheaper to employ over the long term. While UAS do offer amazing persistance, they creat HUGE problems with air space control, maintenance, communication bandwith, etc. Just one Airman's thoughts....

Bill Meara

03-27-2007, 04:56 AM

When I saw the subject line for this thread I naively thought I was going to see a discussion of the venerable O2-B and its use as a platform for launching leaflets and loudspeaker messages (yes, that's right) at insurgents. Perhaps some talk of the C-130 flying broadcast transmitters.

BUT NO!

The entire thread dealt with steel-on-target, Widow-makers, A-37s etc.

Gentlemen, your conventional orientations are showing!

And it has always been this way. When I was involved in PSYOP campaigns in Central America, a crusty old Air Force officer once confessed about the way he remembered the difference between the O2-A and the O2-B (the PSYOP version). "A is for attack, B is for Bull####."

This is why we don't do very well in this kind of conflict. We claim to understand that it is all about hearts and minds, but the organizational DNA is so biased toward "steel-on-target", that that is what we ALWAYS end up doing. Even here in SWJ.

120mm

03-27-2007, 10:27 AM

We already have a thread on what kind of requirements that non-kinetic airpower should bring to the battlefield.

As the first step to fighting an insurgency is breaking up formed counterinsurgent groups and providing basic security, I think there might be a small role for a "kinetic" counterinsurgency aircraft. Light weight, lightly armed and capable of flying 100kt speeds with a good loiter time. An O-2 or something like it "might" do the trick; (I, personally, detest that POS. I've worked on them, and they are nothing but one continuous maintenance problem after another.) but whatever we do have needs to be capable of multirole ops.

Just because kinetics shouldn't be the centerpiece of a coin fight, doesn't mean you don't need to concern yourself with them. And because you aren't looking for a gross overmatch, you MUST put an inordinate amount of brain-power into thinking out the kinetic scenarios so that you are prepared with the minimum force necessary but be capable of big/small fights.

120mm

03-28-2007, 05:50 PM

steel rain

03-30-2007, 06:18 PM

A little off the subject but I have a question on COIN aircraft. I'll grant that from a pure performance perspective a turboprop would be the way to go in a COIN aircraft but wouldn't a piston aircraft have a smaller heat signature and less vulnerable to shoulder fired heat seeker missiles? I would also think it would be easier to mod the exhaust to make the signature even less. Just curious. Thanks

120mm

03-30-2007, 07:09 PM

steel rain

03-30-2007, 08:38 PM

Turboprops give you the benefit of very low maintenance and use of a common fuel. Piston aircraft require much more maintenance and use special fuel.

It's important to remember what a COIN aircraft is supposed to do and be; it is NOT a fighter, and it is NOT there to drop JDAMS. Other folks can do that.

At the altitudes you need to fly to be effective at COIN and the typical state of insurgent resupply, SAMs are not the biggest concern. Your biggest worry should be RPGs, Snipers, lucky riflemen and thrown spears, arrows and rocks....;)

Walter, a Czech company, makes a 600 hp turbine engine capable of propelling just about anything you really need in a COIN aircraft. I really haven't put much thought into the idea sense Burt Rutan floated his ARES concept in front of the US Army and got a bunch of officers and warrants fired for violating the Key West Agreement.

I must admit I'm not familiar with the Key West agreement. I do realize the issues about fuel maintenance etc. On that you are correct. When I was in Iraq we lost a number of helo's including two Apaches to MANPADS. They do put out a lot of heat from the engines. Funny though I saw where one of our Apaches had a windscreen cracked by a rock thrown by a 14 year old kid on the ground. No kidding!!! I tried to get him into college in the states on a baseball scholarship:) I do know the aquisition and operation costs for most COIN aircraft are MUCH less than an Apache and an armed Predator at 4.5 Million dollars.

TWC

03-30-2007, 09:10 PM

I hate to reply to my own post, but I thought it important to point out that "sophisticated 'Uninhabited Aerial Systems" (replaces UAV) are no longer out of reach of even the most primitive countries.

I could build you a live-link UAS for under a grand, and a 500 pound payload UAS for under $10,000, (with a CEP of under 10 m.) ordering materials over the internet. UAS technology is within reach of nearly anyone who cares to acquire it.

While you might be able to build a cheap UAS (not doubting your capabilities), the potential second and third order effects on a partner nation are problematic. As an example, currently the United States is struggling to manage airspace issues in regards to UAS. This same problem is currently being wrestled with in Europe as well. If NATO nations are currently unable to solve this problem, it does not bode well for "more challenged nations" that are under going an insurgency. Besides, if the government was working well then they probably wouldn't have an insurgency in the first place. :D

Therefore, in most cases, it makes more sense to just employ a simple, rugged aircraft instead of unmanned systems. The only thing that UAS give you is endurance. In most COIN scenarios there is enough manpower to bore holes in the sky and you don't have to worry about penetrating distant enemy airspace. While I like UAS, I just hate the thought of a defense contractor selling a high tech platform when low tech will work. Believing in the "big sky, little plane" theory will eventually cause problems.

BTW, I just found out that according to the latest Army doctrine, UAS stands for "unmanned airplane system." Now I don't really know why they changed it (i'm USAF), but I thought I would at least point it out.:wry:

120mm

03-31-2007, 07:48 AM

Close, but no cigar: "UNINHABITED Aerial System. And I am no fan of UAS for COIN outside of the "eye in the sky". I was just pointing out that they were not that "advanced" technology. The tech has existed for 40 years.

I agree with you on airspace deconfliction and the desirability of using cheap, manned aircraft in COIN. I, like my favorite Food Channel personality, dislike "uni-taskers". And you can't haul a sick kid and mother in a UAS.

The Yugoslavs had the UTA 77, the Poles had the Wilga. Both were excellent COIN aircraft. Four seats, high wing, a 150 kt cruise, short, rough landing capabilities and hard points for light weapons seem to be useful characteristics.

steel rain

04-03-2007, 04:42 PM

I may be over looking something but does anyone know where to find the report "COIN Aircraft Systems for the USAF and Friendly States Facing Insurgencies" Thanks

slapout9

04-09-2007, 02:00 PM

120mm. I found this article in Air Chronicles. It is a story about the bond between Infantry and CAS. I wasn't sure where to put this so if it should be moved to another thread it is ok with me. The link to article is posted below.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/allison.html

Culpeper

04-10-2007, 04:39 AM

Even though this article is geared toward Marine CAS for the most part I do have a little practical experience in this field. Except back in my day it was an Air Force fighter pilot on the ground, with someone like me as his assistant using such tools as a stop watch and a map to direct in a CAS mission. Nevertheless, the Air Force field, TACP, gets little attention in this area. Today, Air Force ETACs are trained to take the place of the grounded fighter pilot. These guys have done a hell of job. During my tenure we were known as ROMADs. They have come a long way and now can be found at every level of the Army, including Special Forces. The FEBA has changed since the end of the Cold War. These Air Force guys are, in effect, virtually calling in CAS for their own preservation as well as for the individual Army personnel they are supporting. It has gotten that close. Just thought I would shine a little light on the Air Force/Army CAS role.

http://www.romad.com/description.htm

jcustis

04-11-2007, 05:49 PM

When I attended the 2003 Emerald Express session in Quantico, there was a very intelligent ETAC who briefed the attendees on his role in supporting CAS. The JTAC program is up and running, but as with all things air-centric, it takes a lot of support to accomplish the training and it is tough to funnel sufficient numbers through.

I'd love to have all of the NCOs around me JTAC qual'd.

120mm

04-16-2007, 07:18 AM

Culpeper

04-17-2007, 03:33 AM

Sorry for taking so long to respond, as I was in Slovakia. This article describes why the USMC should be The Model for Air Force/Army cooperation. As a CAV guy, we really appreciated knowing and working with our "air half". I was in two different units that initially treated the air and ground half of the squadron as separate entities and transitioned into working as a team. The "mutual contempt" issue melted away rather quickly.

The problem I have with our current Air Force brothers, is that their paradigm does not mesh with our paradigm and imho does not contribute to, and probably works against our current COIN model.

I'm sorry to hear that the company language between the Navy/Marine and Air Force/Army hasn't jointly improved as much as I would like to see with CAS. When I was in the Air Force there was no such thing as directing a CAS mission with Navy or Marine pilots and we never trained with Marine FACs. Even if we did I doubt we would have understood each others' lingo. USMC practically wrote the book on CAS and it wouldn't be a bad idea if the Air Force and Army would humble themselves a little more in that direction. Nevertheless, CAS is never an easy mission no matter if the FAC is on the ground, in the air, in the USMC, or the USAF.

Jesse9252

05-08-2007, 06:53 PM

I thought this thread was worth resurrecting with this (http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003479.html) Defense Tech post about the Iraqi Air Force's new COIN aircraft.

The Iraqi air force in two years will be flying a new fleet of single-engine turboprops as counter-insurgency (COIN) aircraft. See the contract solicitation, posted by the US Air Force, here.

The requirement limits the potential bids to companies that have an aircraft that a) is already in wide use and b) is powered by the Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6 engine.

That narrows the bidders to four that Defense Tech can think of: the Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano, the Hawker Beechcraft AT-6 Texan, the Korean Aerospace KO-1 Wong Bee and the Pilatus PC-9M.

Not to play favorites, but Defense Tech humbly suggests this means there are only two serious candidates: the AT-6 and EMB-314 -- with the AT-6 gaining a huge advantage from the "Made in America" sticker stamped on the program's marketing literature.

But don't count out the Brazilians with the Super Tucano. Expect the executives in Sao Jose Dos Campos to propose moving the EMB-314 assembly -- or opening a second production line -- to Florida, if they win the contract.

Keep your eye on this program. This could be the first of many such requirements for a dedicated counter-insurgency aircraft fleet to come down the line, both abroad and in the US.

jcustis

05-08-2007, 08:37 PM

Others disagree, saying the current aircraft don't meet COIN needs.
Johnson says, "What we need is something rugged, reliable, survivable and multi-dimensional."
While the Air Force has often directed its focus and funding on fighters and strike aircraft, COIN operations take on more indirect roles--intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), transportation, air ambulance, psychological operations, communications and providing cover for convoys and other ground operations.

First off, I'm glad a new post hit this thread, b/c I had framed some pro/con arguments on a COIN aircraft but forgot to post them.

I think that with the proper airframe, avionics, and sensor/comm suite, a prop-driven COIN aircraft can be "all that and a bag of chips". Looking at the quote extracted above, it is critical to dig a little deeper and look at just what those indirect roles are, and how a manned platform can supplement (not supplant) UAVs.

As I look back to my favorite historical timeframe (Rhodesia 1965-1980), fixed-wing aircraft played critical roles in the COIN fight there. Granted, the majority of operations were kinetic in nature, but the aircraft were enablers that fit a requirement. Fast-forward to the present, and some of those requirements remain:

ISR - This could run the gamut of pre-strike/raid surveillance, LOC security, counter-fire support, etc. I been in the UAS sensor-to-shooter loop on several occasions, and it can be a painful proposition when the supporting UAV control cell does not have VHF comms to the shooter. In once case, I was coordinating the actions of a ground unit to attempt the capture of personnel previously observed launching rockets from within Fallujah proper. I was on a VHF line to the ground unit, and cardinal directions and distance to the Marines, but only after sifting through tac chat messages, screen captures emailed to the battle captain account, and a live conversation with a UAV cell coordinator several FOBs away. We only caught the bad guys because they went to ground and our guys walked right on top of them. A backseat flight officer could have worked the process directly with the ground unit, even if I had had to deal with a pressing issue like a troops-in-contact situation. That wouldn't have been possible with a UAV.

Psychological Ops - Indeed, the ability to execute PSYOP from a loitering platform would be bigger than we might imagine, but it goes much further than simply dropping leaflets. AC-130s came on station just about every night of Op Al Fajr, and while they were limited to night ops, they also provided fire support that denied portions of the night and battlespace to the enemy. It was also a significant morale boost to hear the low rumble of the engines overhead. Sometimes it's about intangibles.

Communications - Outfitted with the appropriate comm suite, a COIN aircraft could be a big plus in terms of radio relay, whether the crew are monitoring the "battle channel" or have the assets to simply relay the SINCGARs signal automatically. Altitude is the big plus there, and even in the Blue Force Tracker world, instantaneous voice comms are key to reducing friction and misunderstanding.

Support for ground ops - Post incident (e.g. complex ambush), a manned platform may be an asset equal to a UAV, if for no other reason than the fact that the Mk1 mod 1 eyeball remains in play. As another example, on the tail end of OIF, my company was punched out as the QRF to gain contact with a band of thugs terrorizing a town to the NW of Ad Diwaniyah. By the time we got to the town, the BGs had high-tailed it back to their canal-side village. Once we finally detained an old man pointed out by the kids as an Ali Baba (and determined to be the father of 2 of the punks), we reoriented to the east and closed on the village. A section of A-10s had been pushed to us because the original intel estimated the group to be 12-18 men strong, armed with RPGs and up to 82mm mortars. In the end, the A-10 drivers actually spotted a stolen government pickup fleeing away from the village as we approach. Through low-level dry runs and the judicious use of flares, the section fixed the vehicle and allowed us to close the gap and go hands on with all four bad guys. Outside of going kinetic with a hellfire, I don't think a UAV could have had any impact beyond tracking their flight.

Some Rhodesian Lynx (modified Cessna Skymaster 337) drivers were reportedly so good at reading the ground that they could identify the paths worn in the grass by villagers taking food to hiding terrs.

And in this day and age of fratricide and combat ID issues, what better way to identify that group of meandering pickups (let's say in an Afghan SOF scenario) than to hail them on the common "battle channel" or buzz them a bit and see the reaction it provokes?

I think that UAS are great, and they can provide a great degree of support, but it will always be within a niche role. A man in the loop remains a appealing solution to what could actually be simple problems.

Steve Blair

05-08-2007, 09:02 PM

Another good argument for keeping the "man in the loop" is the exploits of scout helicopter pilots and crewchiefs in Vietnam. The little birds played major roles in many incidents, and most likely prevented others. Doctrine varied from unit to unit in many cases, but the ability to go low and slow and actually LOOK at the trail or hut in question is without a doubt a vital element of the equation.

120mm

05-09-2007, 06:35 AM

Carl from Kinhasa and I had an interesting discussion via PM where we discussed the prevalence of TBD/TBF aircraft in Africa. One of the reason they were so common then, and are still being used in various roles, now, is that they made an outstanding COIN aircraft. They could shoot guns, drop bombs, observe troop movements, and you could stuff at least 8 people into the fuselage.

I see no reason why you couldn't develop something like that, using modern materials, that would serve as a COIN aircraft, at a relatively low price.

As an aside, I fought like hell in OIF I to preserve the many crated PT-6s we found at LSA Anaconda as well as other places. The Iraqis used them in their Twin Otters, and they had quite a few factory remans in stock. The Army wanted to bury them with a bulldozer. Hopefully, the requirement that the new COIN aircraft use the P&W PT-6 is the long-term results of my efforts and that "my" engines have survived in storage until now.

jcustis

05-09-2007, 12:57 PM

If I could have it my way, the following would be essential to any aircraft's capabilities.

- All-aspect FLIR camera with display
- All-aspect optical camera(s)
- Hard points for rockets, leaflet pods, and cannon pod(s). I think a cannon around 20mm in size could produce greater anti-material/personnel effects than a gun slinging 14.5mm or less. It comes at a price in weight and ammo capacity, but point detonating 20mm rounds can be very effective
- VHF retrans capability
- UHF capability
- Blue Force Tracker connectivity, with scaleability to incorporate the descendants of BFT
- A jump seat to allow a commander or OpsO to go aloft on that occasion when he needs to see the battlespace with the eyeball

EDITED TO ADD:
- A laser designator/range finder

After doing a little digging around, I found a design proposal to outfit a OV-10 Bronco with a recoilless rifle at one point in time. What a hoot that would have been to let off!

steel rain

05-09-2007, 05:07 PM

Good List JCUSTIS: I didn't think of BFT. When I was last in country I used to lament how I could do a lot of good with just an old C-172 a pair of NODs and a SINCGARS. I'm a small plane pilot myself and I would love to fly the COIN mission. Funny they keep telling me I'm too old to fly in the military. Amazing they didn't seem to care about my age when I was dismounted outside the wire in body armor when it was 110 degrees:D And I get to do it again in a few months. Seriously, I hope big Military can see the need for a dedicated COIN aircraft. Apaches are nice but very expensive.

jcustis

05-09-2007, 05:41 PM

Steelrain,

If you could ever get your hands on a copy of this book, you would likely enjoy it:

http://www.amazon.com/Britains-Rebel-Air-Force-1965-1980/dp/1902304055

Britain's Rebel Air Force: The War from the Air in Rhodesia 1965-1980

120mm

05-10-2007, 05:38 AM

I NEED that book. I'll see if CARL has it.

Edited to say: CARL doesn't have the book, and neither does USAREUR libraries.

Here is a gratuitous 3 view of a REAL COIN aircraft:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/19/Rockwell_OV-10_BRONCO.png

120mm

05-10-2007, 11:45 AM

Based on the COIN Aircraft thread, I've started up some medium-duty research, when I discovered a couple of nice papers on-line by the designer/builder of the most successful military aircraft ever built in a garage out of spare parts, the OV-10 Bronco.

See the link for more information, including a nifty little flying car project the inventor, K.P. Rice, COL(ret) USMC is working on right now.

http://www.volanteaircraft.com/ov-10.htm

The OV-10 Story: Innovation vs. The "System"

W.H.BECKETT ୆ K.P.RICE ୆ M.E.KING

Background

At the end of WWII the era of boom and zoom had arrived for military aviation with mushroom clouds, jet speeds and an independent Air Force. Korea soon showed the continuing necessity for ground troops and old fashioned Close Air Support (CAS), but the Army was impotent against the Air Force's preoccupation with jets, and in the late '50's hadn't developed it's rotary-wing substitute. Naval Aviation was competing with the new Air Force for nuclear roles in order to maintain its very existence. The Marines still advertised CAS, but were following the Air Force lead and justified the transition to jets on the basis of speed, bomb load and nukes (eg: "One A-4 equaled three Corsairs on the basis of 'productivity'").

Here is a link to the original paper about the development of the OV-10 from 1960.

http://www.volanteaircraft.com/l2vma.htm

THE NEED, CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR A VERY LIGHT S.T.O.L. SUPPORT AIRCRAFT 1960

MAJ W.H. BECKETT, MAG-15
MAJ K.P. RICE, AIRFMFPAC

PREFACE

Sixteen years ago the aircraft industry hit the "con trails." The atom was smashed, the sound barrier broken. The era of boom and zoom was launched in the middle of the mushroom clouds. The man in the Buck Rogers suit became the new hero of the new age. Thermonuclear annihilation "push button" style was as real a possibility as the miracle of the dial selector washing machine. But when the dark rain of fallout fell on an awestruck world, both sides of the international political question had grim second thoughts about resolving their differences by leaving a vacant spot in the solar system. The possibility of such a war remains with us. It must assuredly be prepared for!

Meanwhile, back in the foxholes of Korea, the jungles of Indo-China and the sands of Israel and Jordan, war proceeds pretty much as usual. Not the blast of the atom bomb, but the burst of machine gun fire breaks the silence of this "twilight peace" we are enjoying. The rifleman is no anachronism. He is very much with us and in active service. Read the daily newspaper.

The aviation complex, industrial and military, in its rightful pride and zeal, in being the instrument of the future and the vanguard for conquering space, has neglected the exigencies of current warfare and providing the requisite airborne support for same.

Steve Blair

05-10-2007, 12:45 PM

One of the most interesting things about the OV-10 is the way it was used by the AF and the USMC. While the AF wanted to restrict it to a total FAC role, the USMC pushed the plane to its limits operationally (as did the Navy) and got very good operational value out of it.

Tom Odom

05-10-2007, 01:03 PM

I remember reading about the OV-10 in Popular Mechanics as a kid. Fascinating story then and now. The USAF always seemed to punish aviators who would go this route as lesser beings (that is of course a purely impressionistic view but one based on having friends inside the blue machine who fly lesser aircraft).

Thanks, Steve!

Tom

jcustis

05-10-2007, 01:28 PM

I can't remember when they went out of service with the Marine Corps, but I can remember seeing several of them buzzing around New River Air Station in 1992.

It would be interesting to find out what the justification was for the platform's retirement.

Steve Blair

05-10-2007, 02:21 PM

According to globalsecurity.org they were phased out of the USMC inventory in 1995. No real indication there as to why, although it's possible the age of the airframe played a role.

jcustis

05-10-2007, 02:32 PM

Interesting...I've also done a bit more digging, and it seems some Bronco aficianado claims that cutting them allowed the Corps to put more money into fast-movers.

As for the airframe age, the Philippines of all places still has some in the inventory.

I suppose that those who advocate a COIN fixed-wing platform stand to tip over UAS ricebowls. It'll probably come down to a simple matter of not enough funding to justify the acquisition.

jcustis

05-10-2007, 04:16 PM

The Rand Corp. recently completed an unclassified report, "COIN Aircraft Systems for the USAF and Friendly States Facing Insurgencies,"

Anyone know where this might be located? I ran a couple of google strings on it, but came up with nothing.

Blackfoot6

05-10-2007, 05:58 PM

The OV-10 thread is great, but, ultimately we want something with a similar airspeed that is stealthy, can provide ISR, kill a target, and act as an airborne FAC as necessary. That sort of multi-tasking would require a manned platform as well as facilitate airspace de-confliction better than more UAS's.

Steve Blair

05-10-2007, 06:53 PM

Stealth is not an absolute, IMO. It's a "nice to have," but if forced to choose I'd skip it before I'd skip any other function. Adding stealth tacks years and dollars onto any program, and the returns tend to be somewhat theoretical. If you're talking muffled engines and acoustic stealth, that's a slightly different matter for COIN. But radar stealth is a bit of gold plate that could delay or kill a program that is needed.

Tom Odom

05-10-2007, 07:13 PM

Agreed Steve on stealth but agree also Blackfoot on manned platform versus UAS for COIN. By that I am referring to true COIN not select strike ops via Predator or manned platform. I guess I am too stuck in my ways but for COIN and CAS I want a manned platform with a brain and a soul on board.

Best

Tom

Steve Blair

05-10-2007, 07:21 PM

Agree completely on manned platform, Tom. You lose too much capability (and by that I mean all-around capability) by taking the pilot and nav/crewchief/door gunner/what-have-you out of the equation.

carl

05-10-2007, 10:34 PM

The OV-10 thread is great, but, ultimately we want something with a similar airspeed that is stealthy, can provide ISR, kill a target, and act as an airborne FAC as necessary.

Except for the stealth part, an A-1 Skyraider airframe with a big modern turboprop engine would provide everything required; great endurance, very large payload, many many weapons stations, 4 20 mm. cannon and a capacious fuselage with room for whatever you want to put in there.

All for naught though, after the A-10's are gone, the Air Force will make sure there will be no more fixed wing CAS airplanes. The ground soldiers will have to make do with other things.

120mm

05-11-2007, 06:27 AM

carl,

I want something small enough to land on the road next to my CP, so the AD1 is a bit much. But agreed on the uselessness of stealth in a COIN environment.

OV-10s can and have carried small groups of people in internal stores. The basic assumptions of fixed-wing, light, use of infantry munitions and radios are good assumptions. As electronics keep getting smaller, lighter and cheaper, the avionics suite can be quite sophisticated within the initial OV-10 concept, prior to the Air Force attempting to kill it.

Tom Odom

05-11-2007, 12:41 PM

I would say also in this discussion--and I am equally guilty of not doing this--is that we need to distinguish between pure CAS aircraft and COIN aircraft. The two are not really the same--as 120mm indicates above and as Carl reminds us of the most excellent AD. The COIN bird like the OV10 has to do the FAC role--and the CAS on call with perhaps a limited lift capacity in a STOL airframe. The classic CAS bird like the AD, the A10, or even the A26/B26 (depending on variant and time frame) puts steel on target.

Tom

Tom Odom

05-11-2007, 02:04 PM

Funny just watching the news about the fires on Catalina Island off California and there was an OV-10 doing its thing.

Tom

TROUFION

05-11-2007, 02:15 PM

An interesting thing about the OV-10 on the Marine side is that the 2nd seat was reserved for a ground MOS officer. I served with a Company Commander who had done an air-tour as an OV-10 observer. Similiar to having a FAC on the ground, same argument for putting a grunt in the air on a slow moving platform. There is no electronic replacement for context and experience. This company commander was one of the last to fly in OV-10's his assumption for the phase out was battlefield survivability, but then in the early 90's we only looked at former Soviet style enemies.

-T

jcustis

05-11-2007, 02:54 PM

Excellent point on the ground MOS observer. For the unfamiliar, when the Rhodesians (yes, I'm bringing them up again) got hot and heavy into their Fire Force employment techniques, the overall contact commander remained aloft in an Allouette armed with a 20mm cannon or quad .303s. He in turn directed the ballet on the ground.

slapout9

05-11-2007, 03:02 PM

jcustis,keep bringing them up they were a fantastic unit!

120mm

05-13-2007, 06:25 AM

120mm

05-13-2007, 06:39 AM

Funny just watching the news about the fires on Catalina Island off California and there was an OV-10 doing its thing.

Tom

Anyone else remember in the '90s when the conspiracy theorists asserted that these OV-10s were going to be used to assist in the takeover of the US by the "shadow gov't?"

I'm sure that footage is just part of the deception plan. Those OV-10s are probably reconfigured to "mind-reading" duties by ZOG by now:eek:

carl

05-14-2007, 06:19 PM

The COIN bird like the OV10 has to do the FAC role--and the CAS on call with perhaps a limited lift capacity in a STOL airframe. The classic CAS bird like the AD, the A10, or even the A26/B26 (depending on variant and time frame) puts steel on target.

Tom

Those missions could shift depending on the situation. A shootdown would result in the A-1 turning into a Sandy, a combination CAS-FAC and everything else.

At the risk of getting into a this old airplane vs. that old airplane arguement (interesting but sterile), the A-1 wasn't that much bigger than the OV-10; 50 ft by 38 ft vs. 40 ft by 41 ft. If you put some simple high lift devices on the wing and bigger tires on an A-1 you might be able to come close enough to the rough field performance of an OV-10 to make it worthwhile.

My basic point though isn't to advocate on airplane over the other. It is that at this level of aerodynamic performance why go through the trouble of designing a new airframe? An OV-10 or A-1 airframe will get you close enough to where you want to go. Modern engines and avionics (I hesitate to say avionics because people will spend years and billions making those do everything for everybody) will take you the rest of the way.

TROUFION

05-14-2007, 07:26 PM

My basic point though isn't to advocate on airplane over the other. It is that at this level of aerodynamic performance why go through the trouble of designing a new airframe? .

Why, Becuase there is a contractor out there who needs to be paid to reinvent it. :D

carl

05-14-2007, 07:54 PM

Why, Becuase there is a contractor out there who needs to be paid to reinvent it. :D

I forgot about that part; also forgot about the project officer who will get a lot more promotion points for bringing in something new than bringing back something old.

Tom Odom

05-14-2007, 08:25 PM

:wry: We have done this before--big surprise I know :wry:

Look at the A26/B26 transition from medium bomber (A26) in late WWII through Korea to the Congo in 1964 as "COIN" A/C. It was around that time that the Mohawk showed up and the Army did its best to slip it under the Air Force radar screen as an "unarmed" platform, which it ultimately became as a SLAR and IMINT bird.

Then again never forget that the Blackbird (SR71) as an Air Force system was designed as an interceptor (fighter) 1962-1971?. It was the CIA that fielded it as the A12 recce bird in 1962; the SR71 replaced it as an Air Force recce system in 1968.

Gratefully neither the recce nor the interceptor version could be flown slowly enough below their Mach 3.35 speed to allow them to be configured for COIN. That really would have made for interesting CAS. :wry:

Best

Tom

mmx1

06-03-2007, 05:28 PM

Anyone know where this might be located? I ran a couple of google strings on it, but came up with nothing.

The original post reads like a press-release for Stavatti Aerospace. It appears Stavatti is a paper tiger and likely a hoax or fishing for R&D money, and I suspect the cited RAND study is nonexistent. Stavatti's page has a lot of pretty pictures but no indication of any aerospace or defense background.

http://defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=3930
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/000009.html
http://www.defensereview.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=304

JAK

06-03-2007, 10:23 PM

Recent White Paper from HQ AFSOC:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/montgomery-usaf-irwconcept-may07.pdf

Cheers,
jak

pinoyme

07-06-2007, 07:19 AM

Hi:

The Philippines badly needs a squadron of new COIN aircraft for operations against Islamist terrorists mostly and the NPAs from time to time. Its OV10s are badly aging.

During the Huk rebellion the Philippine Air Force made effective use of F-51 Mustangs in its against the Communist-led guerillas.

I do know that there is a twin-engined version of the F-51 that goes by another name.

An upgraded version of this would suit the Philippine armed forces just fine.

It could be used to give hot pursuit to Islamist terrorists riding in pump boats who could use their crafts' speed to seek refuge in Sabah, Malaysia.
lt could also double up for maritime patrol missions from the the Batanes islands near Taiwan to Tawi Tawi near Malaysia.

Tom Odom

07-06-2007, 01:46 PM

That was the F82 Twin Mustang, (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-82.htm) developed originally because it would double the range of the already phenomenol P51. 272 were built commencing in 1945; a handful flew iin Korea and were withdrawn by 1952.

Tom

pinoyme

07-09-2007, 06:34 AM

Hi Tom:

Yup.

Are there still any left in the USAF boneyard?

If not, how much would it cost to revive production lines?

The engines would of course have to be turboprops this time.

But that alone would be enough for the modest but immediate needs of the Philippine Air Force. Together with the Philippine Coast Guard, these planes could also be used to patrol against pirates and smugglers.

Cheers.

Tom Odom

07-09-2007, 01:58 PM

Are there still any left in the USAF boneyard?

If not, how much would it cost to revive production lines?

I would seriously doubt it. The boneyards only keep air frames so long and then they are sold for scrap.

Tom

carl

07-18-2007, 10:33 AM

At the altitudes you need to fly to be effective at COIN and the typical state of insurgent resupply, SAMs are not the biggest concern. Your biggest worry should be RPGs, Snipers, lucky riflemen and thrown spears, arrows and rocks....;)

I have never flown any but commercial aircraft in peacetime but it seems to me that in order to orient yourself and find your target, you would have to fly at altitudes, say between 1000 and 3000 feet, that would put you in grave danger from small shoulder fired guided missles. When putting something on target then perhaps you would be so low it wouldn't matter.

The following is a list of general comments about this subject that may or may not be pertinent:

A COIN airplane would greatly benefit from having two seats for two sets of eyeballs. Really tough terrain requires full attention to not hitting the ground and having somebody else to look outside would be a big help.

Turboprop engines are great for this mission but you should consider what kind of heat signature the engine produces. The PT-6 has two very hot exhaust stacks exposed all the time. Something like the PW-120 series is more powerful and it might be easier to shield the exhaust.

F-82's are long, long gone. If you could find one, or even the remains of one, it would be worth far more to a collector than any government would be able to pay. Besides the last thing you would want on a low and slow airplane is two radiators exposed at the bottom of the airplane for all the world to shoot at.

I wonder if vertical dive bombing might not be reinvestigated. I read the JU-87, in 1939, could put a bomb with 30 ft of a target, without the benefit of gee-whiz electronics. Combine that capability with the new small diameter bomb, or even a specially fitted 120 mm. mortar shell, it might be a way to put fire support very close to troops without as much expense.

Some kind of cannon, 20 mm. or better, is indispensable. There are many accounts of aircraft like the mighty A-1 Skyraider laying down cannon shells within feet of troops in contact.

One last thing. I recently read an article by an AC-130 aircraft commander lamenting the fact that when he was in Iraq, his airplane was tied to one ground unit all night and it was hell to have it re-assigned. The article also stated that in VN gunships were just flown in a general area till they were needed then away they went. Does anyone know if the AC-130's are still tied down to just one unit in Iraq? It seems that is a waste.

carl

07-18-2007, 10:36 AM

The engines would of course have to be turboprops this time.

Disregard my comment above about radiators being vulnerable. You already addressed that problem.

jcustis

07-18-2007, 02:09 PM

One last thing. I recently read an article by an AC-130 aircraft commander lamenting the fact that when he was in Iraq, his airplane was tied to one ground unit all night and it was hell to have it re-assigned. The article also stated that in VN gunships were just flown in a general area till they were needed then away they went. Does anyone know if the AC-130's are still tied down to just one unit in Iraq? It seems that is a waste.

Do you have a link to the article? If so, I might be able to answer if I could grasp the context of the statements.

jcustis

07-18-2007, 05:05 PM

Carl posted good points about susceptibility to shoulder-launched projectiles. Mogadishu '93 definitely highlighted the danger of an enemy who employs new TTPs against you with a dated weapons system.

On the matter of flight profiles for aircraft, I'll share this interesting moment, even though it occured with Kiowa scout a/c, and not a fixed-wing platform. I recently served as an umpire during Exercise Talisman Saber 07, and the Aussies made excellent use of scout helicopters against light armored recon and tank formations. On more than one occasion, a section of Kiowas would fly nap of the earth and identify our elements on the ground.

On two occasions, once they spotted a cluster of vehicles, they made a direct run overhead and dropped a smoke grenade on the position to mark it for follow-on Cobra or F-18 airstrikes. It's an old Vietnam/Rhodesian tactic, and I have to admit that I had a smile on my face even though I knew I'd be assessing casualties against our side.

What is notable about all this is the fact that the Kiowa aircraft were difficult to pick up and even track due to the single canopy vegetation. We could get a bead on them for only a short window, and typically when they directly overhead. I'm no SAM guy, but I can hazard a guess that it would be very difficult to achieve a lock with such a short exposure window.

I'd have to add to my previous list of required capabilities, and in addition to the leaflet pod, a good COIN aircraft would need a smoke projectile pod to designate targets or the center point of a ground contact. Done right, the pod could be configurable to support both leaflets and smoke devices.

carl

07-19-2007, 07:25 AM

LawVol

07-24-2007, 02:54 PM

http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=20181

US Air Force ( USAF) Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley has told Jane’s he is considering the creation of a new counterinsurgency (COIN) squadron of A-10A Thunderbolt II aircraft for the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).

Ed "Otto" Pernotto

07-28-2007, 05:57 PM

Folks,
I have posted a Concept paper on acquiring the AT-6 for COIN operations at my site here: http://www.excaliburrd.com/projects/

Also, I have also stood up a collaboration and innovation national security thinktank, please take a look at http://excaliburrd.com/cs/

and join or let me know what you think. I love this site and have it linked over at mine,
Thanks
Otto

Tom Odom

07-28-2007, 09:14 PM

Otto,

Interesting A/C. I have to confess that I was wondering why drag out the T6Texan and again try to hang weapons on it. we did that in the Congo in the 60s and there were problems.

Keep posting and welcome. Tell us more about you here. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441)

Tom

Culpeper

07-29-2007, 04:25 PM

Very interesting. The A1 Skyraider was used very well for CAS in Vietnam et al. My dad used to convert the Skyraider at Alameda Naval Air Station for service in Southeast Asia when I was just a kid. I think they went straight to the RVN Air Force.

SWJED

07-29-2007, 04:42 PM

http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/a1skyraider.jpg

The Official A-1 Skyraider Site (http://skyraider.org/)

Ed "Otto" Pernotto

07-29-2007, 05:42 PM

That A-1 was a beast, another similar aircraft was the T-28, initially used by both the Navy and USAF for training and later by the USAF as a close air support weapon. I've attached a link to my friend Brian Shul's Q&A on his background with training foriegn pilots, his deployment and subsequent shootdown in Vietnam, and what he thinks on modern day concept of using a prop driven airplane. If you are interested, please take a look here

http://www.excaliburrd.com/docs/AT-6Project/AT-6BrianShul.pdf

Dominique R. Poirier

07-29-2007, 10:21 PM

Just one question about the Skyraider.

The warbirds association I was member of owned one Skyraider (and two T-6 each of them propelled with 2 blades propellers). It was the biggest and the most powerful one propeller plane of the club; still bigger than the F-4 (though the Antonov AN-2 seemed to be the biggest, but that curious Russian bird was neither a fighter, nor a fast plane, by far).

So, this Skyraider was equipped with one 20mm cannon in each of its two folding wings, whose mechanisms were accessible for maintenance purpose once the wings were folded.

But there is something else about that plane I didn’t find much allusion to on the web, eventually. It consisted of a little door located on the let side below and behind the cockpit. Once you opened that door you could see quite a Spartan seat on which, strangely enough, one should find himself looking at the rear of the plane, that is not at all what a co-pilot or a crew bomber would be supposed to do! Moreover the infortunate guy who was supposed to seat here couldn’t see much of what could happen outside; for, thus "trapped" he had no cockpit and just, if my recollection is correct, one or two tiny round shaped windows: one on this small door, and the second located at the opposite side on the fuselage.

I once asked to someone what this second passenger was supposed to do in that plane, and I was just answered in an humorous and purposeful tone: “oh, that’s where the “monkey” seats down, but I don’t know what he was supposed to do while the plane was flying, actually.” It was certainly awful to be the monkey because this guy couldn't by no means anticipate on what the pilot could do!

My question is, does anyone know something about that, or was this Skyraider a special version?

Culpeper

07-29-2007, 10:48 PM

From what I understand, all the Skyraiders acquired by the USAF and RVN were supplied by the U.S. Navy. The USN was replacing a lot of their Skyraider squardrons with jet aircraft. I do know that over the years there were some counter electronics types with a second seat. Other than that I would assume you are describing one these special types.

Ed "Otto" Pernotto

07-30-2007, 03:16 AM

That’s actually a great question Dominique! I knew there was a door on the left side of the fuselage and never knew what it was for either. On this site:
http://www.boeing.com/history/mdc/skyraider.htm

"Different configurations carried a pilot in an enclosed cockpit, a pilot and another person (either a radar operator or a co-pilot), and a pilot and two other crew. The AD/A-5 could carry a crew of four, plus four passengers or 12 troops, four stretchers, or 2,000 pounds of cargo."

There were versions with 1, 2,3, and 4 seats, talk about designing a versatile aircraft! It's funny to me now, with all of our incredible computers, with modern production designs, all that, back in the "day" we made weapons systems that could be modified into other versions and today our F-22's couldn't cross the International Date Line without their computers tumbling.

SWJED

08-11-2007, 11:18 AM

Air Force Doctrine for Irregular Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/air-force-doctrine-for-irregul/) - The US Air Force recently (1 August) signed off on its latest doctrinal publication - AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare...

carl

08-13-2007, 10:39 PM

Steve Blair

08-14-2007, 01:42 PM

Here is the address of the AC-130 article to which I referred:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i45/19.pdf

Regarding the low altitude flight of the Kiowa: at the begining of the current war I read an article by a VN helicopter pilot in which he expressed surprise at the altitudes the Army helos were flying in Iraq and Afghan. He said that way back when they flew one of two ways; either as absolutely low and fast as they could or above 4000' agl. Low and fast for the reason you state and high to be above .30 cal range.

Kiowa's hard to see, but the OH-6 is harder to see. Quieter, too, on the whole.

I just got a research publication done in 1970 that compiled questionnaires done by scout pilots and observers who'd been in Vietnam. Interesting stuff, and I wonder how much of that actually made it into the training and doctrine? Somehow I doubt that much survived the 1980s....

jcustis

08-14-2007, 04:18 PM

Do you have a link to the article? If so, I might be able to answer if I could grasp the context of the statements.

carl, I finally got through the article, and I think the author forgets that when he references "being tied down to a single unit" he is dealing with brigades and regiments. These gunships aren't tied to single companies or battalions. Take the regimental combat team that is oriented on Fallujah. That RCT owns an area that encompases areas of the peninsula, the next town to the west, east to Abu Ghraib, etc. His portrayal of being tied down to a single unit is a tad misleading.

While I applaud the major's desire to get out and hunt, I don't think any of the ground commanders are willing to have Spectre roaming about on a loose leash, no matter how self-assured the author is about effectively applying C2 to any engagement. Maybe the ground guys need to get their act together better, but so long as we control that ground, air folks need to be patient with the box we put them in.

The Al Hayy vs. Najaf argument is a non-starter, and the statement, "...it was obvious to the crew that the chance of engaging insurgents was slim to none," is a dangerous one that ignores the reality of the ground fight. The enemy's ability to aggregate and conduct attacks is measured in seconds and minutes, and although Al Hayy seemed benign at the time, a commander requested the ASR for a reason. If the author had delved into the nature of the ASR and its justification, he might have a stronger argument.

Cavguy

08-14-2007, 04:32 PM

Cavguy made some very interesting comments about what a CAS aircraft needs in another thread. He mentioned guns and JDAMs (preferably 250 lb).
He also noted the tactical value of having a loud jet buzz the enemy at low altitude, a "show of force."

One misconception I had about air dropped bombs was the damage - the JDAM can be set with a delay fuse that causes an implosion rather than explosion effect. The building collapsed in on itself rather than spewing debris to the neigboring structures. The low explosive weight bombs and GPS guided artillery are to the point where even single rooms/floors can be engaged rather than the building.

Again, I'm not suggesting going willy-nilly with CAS and artillery in COIN - far from it. It should be a rare option. People just need to realize that dropping a GPS guided bomb or artillery round on a target doesn't cause mass collateral damage outside of the target area - most of the negative collateral damage received in the press comes from rounds that hit where they were supposed to - the insurgent was hiding and fighting coalition from within a residential structure.

jcustis

08-18-2007, 07:55 PM

Carl, pinoyme, 120mm, et al.

I'm exploring the issues around a COIN aircraft in greater depth, and I need some help getting my brain around the issue of a turbo prop vs. piston powerplant.

Specifically, what are the differences and why do they matter (in terms of thrust-to-weight, cost, exhaust, etc.). If you could offer links to a "Turbo props for Dummies" page of sorts, it would be helpful.

carl

08-18-2007, 10:26 PM

https://www.chevrontexaco.com/products/prodserv/fuels/bulletin/aviationfuel/pdfs/chapter6.pdf

the above for turbine engines

https://www.chevrontexaco.com/products/prodserv/fuels/bulletin/aviationfuel/pdfs/chapter12.pdf

the above for piston engines

The big difference is a piston engine of 1000 hp will weigh much more than a turboprop engine of 1000 hp, which is why most all prop airplanes that need a lot of horsepower use turboprop engines.

Another disadvantage of aero piston engines is they require avgas which can be very difficult to get in many parts of the world.

Finally, (120 mm would know more about this than I), I think there is only 1 piston engine of around 1000 hp in production in the world. It is made in Poland.

jcustis

08-24-2007, 02:43 AM

ALCON,

I've recently read a 2005 article written for the Air Command and Staff College Air University by Maj A. D. Davis, titled "Back to the Basics - An Aviation Solution to Counterinsurgent Warfare" http://www.excaliburrd.com/docs/AT-6Project/ACSCPaperBackToBasics.pdf. It can be found here http://www.excaliburrd.com/projects/AT6/index.aspx#LINKS which is a page on the Excalibur R&D website.

While I do not believe Maj Davis successfully argued his point about a COIN aircraft via the case studies (e.g. he highlights the A-10's slowness and susceptibility to ground fire as a negative in the Iraq AO, but only makes one supporting statement regarding exhaust IR signature while never really convincing the reader on prop benefits), the article discussed the prospective use of an upgraded T-6 Texan II or similar A/C as a good COIN candidate.

In the aft section of the paper, the discussion of A/C desired capabilities left me with several RFIs that I hope members might be able to help with. I'll space them out for easy copy/pasting:

-The oft-mentioned data-link capability could mean many things. In airpower parlance, what is it most likely to mean? Air-to-ground video capability? Blue Force Tracker satellite connections?

-Maj Davis lists speed and maneuverability at low altitudes as a desirable attribute. Could this actually make an A/C more difficult to fly, and thus train up on if you are an indigenous pilot in the fledgling air force? I know thereare no absolutes, but I've read of many very capable planes that were very difficult to actually get off the ground and land.

-Davis pushes off-the-shelf technology. I can't tell if he means technology that is already in use and militarized, or mostly commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology. If he is means the latter, it has been my experience that COTS gear often increases your logistical burden as sole source suppliers go out of business, components become passe, etc. As supporting the equipment becomes more difficult, that particular line of equipment often requires re-hosting to newer components just to stay operational and effective. Has anyone else had similar experiences?

-Low-cost is a big theme throughout the article, but I sense that stressing cost over capability would leave a COIN A/C proposal trashed by the UCAV proponents every time. I mean, why not spend a little more to incorporate some stealth technologies and get serious about reducing the SAM threat to manageable levels? What say yea?

Thanks in advance for any insight members chose to offer.

P.S. The chevron articles helped out a lot carl, thanks.

carl

08-26-2007, 04:38 AM

-Maj Davis lists speed and maneuverability at low altitudes as a desirable attribute. Could this actually make an A/C more difficult to fly, and thus train up on if you are an indigenous pilot in the fledgling air force? I know thereare no absolutes, but I've read of many very capable planes that were very difficult to actually get off the ground and land.

There is no reason at all that a properly designed high performance airplane should not also be relatively easy to fly. Two good examples of this were the Fokker D-VII and the Zero, both very potent aircraft that were easy to handle.

During the 50's the quest for pure performance led to a fair number of airplanes being fielded that were hard to handle. But that was the result of intentional design compromise. The MiG-17 was designed in the 50's also and I've read it was a very nice handling airplane that gave higher performance airplanes fits in VN.

The modern jets have superb performance and they are much easier to fly than the generation of planes they replaced. In the early 80's some test pilot school students told me they could put me in an F-15, give me a cockpit brief and I could get the plane around the patch without killing myself. They also said that would be impossible in a F-4.

I was very unimpressed by that paper. He got a lot of easily checked details wrong which makes me question the whole thing.

Steve Blair

08-26-2007, 03:28 PM

Davis would push speed because that's an AF mantra. It also flies in the face of most other studies, which concluded that speed is actually a detriment for CAS as it makes conventional bomb accuracy difficult. Granted, with PGMs that's not as much an issue today, but speed also reduces loiter time and the ability to identify targets. You also tend to lose payload for speed, which isn't a good thing for this sort of aircraft, either.

mmx1

08-27-2007, 05:22 PM

Blackwater buys Brazilian Bombers (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20070827.aspx)
Janes - Blackwater seeks to acquire Super Tucano (http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jdw/history/jdw2007/jdw33922.htm@current&Prod_Name=JDW&QueryText=) Possibly Subscription-only

US private security company Blackwater USA is planning to enhance its capabilities with the acquisition of an Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano trainer/light attack aircraft.

Blackwater President Gary Jackson confirmed to Jane's at the Force Protection Equipment Demonstration in Stafford, Virginia, in mid-August that the company is in the process of acquiring the Super Tucano for a new training programme. Transfer of the aircraft to the US is still subject to US government approval and Blackwater would offer no further comment on the transaction or the planned training programme.

...

The company operates a sizeable aircraft wing. In Iraq, it operates a small fleet of helicopters to provide top cover for its security details; two Hughes/MD 500 'Little Bird' helicopters operated by the company were lost to hostile fire earlier this year. The company also advertises CASA 212 twin turboprops for military freefall and static-line parachute operations, as well as cargo operations for US Special Operations Command. The Moyock centre boasts a large airfield.

Prospective acquisition of the Super Tucano by Blackwater comes amid rising interest in counter-insurgency-style aircraft, particularly in the Middle East. Fixed-wing aircraft such as the Super Tucano are seen as a promising option for missions such as surveillance, roadside-bomb detection and close air support. The US Air Force (USAF) 337th Aeronautical Systems Group is currently conducting market research to find potential candidates for a counter-insurgency aircraft for the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF). The COIN aircraft would be a "lightly armoured, two-seat turboprop" that can track, identify and engage a number of targets with electro-optical and infrared sensors as well as with air-to-ground weapons.

Last year, the USAF launched a search for private companies that could provide basic flight training to IQAF candidate pilots.

A defence expert with inside knowledge of counter-insurgency aviation programmes said "several companies" were trying to replicate the mission of the US 6th Special Operations Squadron, which advises foreign militaries in airpower employment and force design. Climbto350.com, a pilot jobs site, recently posted an advertisement seeking fixed-wing tactical instructor pilots for the Middle East. Applicants, the advertisement stated, "should have a military background with experience in special operations aviation" as well as be NVG qualified and have experience in airborne surveillance and tactical parachute operations. The advertiser did not accept calls, but listed a fax number in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The UAE has been studying a range of options for training aircraft, reportedly including the Super Tucano; the M-311 from Alenia Aermacchi of Italy; and the PC-21 from Pilatus of Switzerland. That contest will be decided towards the end of 2007.

In addition to rising international interest, the USAF is also studying its own counter-insurgency aircraft. USAF Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley recently told Jane's he was considering the creation of a new counter-insurgency squadron of A-10A Thunderbolt II aircraft for the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Gen Moseley's interest in a new A-10 squadron followed recent reports of a new AFSOC proposal for an 'irregular warfare' wing. Aircraft reportedly being studied to fill the strike role in the wing have ranged from a modified air-to-ground Beechcraft AT-6B to the Super Tucano.

The US military has also recalled to service fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft such as the OV-1 Mohawk, which was retired from the US Army in 1996. The Department of Defense has contracted with Florida-based Mohawk Technologies of Florida to rent a fleet of six OV-1s. Paul Pefley, the president of Mohawk Technologies, told Jane's the aircraft were currently being used operationally, although he would not say where.

The article does not indicate what role they'll be used in, but it seems like someone is at least acting on this line of thought.

Edit: replaced with link and Janes article.

jonSlack

08-28-2007, 11:31 AM

Danger Room - Blackwater Buying Counter-Insurgency Aircraft (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/08/blackwater-buys.html)

Uh, oh. Blackwater, private security contractor that some people seem to love to hate, is in the market for an attack aircraft, a likely prelude to offering foreign air forces training in counter-insurgency operations. Jane's Defence Weekly reporter Nathan Hodge (and husband of DANGER ROOM contributor) has an exclusive story (sorry, subscription only) on Blackwater's plans to purchase an Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano trainer/light attack aircraft:

Blackwater President Gary Jackson confirmed to Jane's at the Force Protection Equipment Demonstration in Stafford, Virginia, in mid-August that the company is in the process of acquiring the Super Tucano for a new training programme. Transfer of the aircraft to the US is still subject to US government approval and Blackwater would offer no further comment on the transaction or the planned training programme.

If the deal goes through, it will give the company a significant boost in a growing international market for fixed-wing tactical flight instruction, as well as a potential platform for counter-insurgency-style training.

In the actual blog post, Blackwater is first described as a "merc outfit" in strikethrough font. I could not replicate the formatting above so I removed it.

pcmfr

08-28-2007, 02:47 PM

Nice piece on some planes being considered for the Iraqi AF for COIN.

http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=2137

Smitten Eagle

08-28-2007, 05:04 PM

I'm not so critical of the idea of using some sort of training aircraft as a COIN aircraft. The Argentine navy uses Beechcraft T-34 Mentors with guns strapped on as a combat aircraft. Granted, the proud Argentines aren't conducting COIN ops (as far as I know), but it shows that there is a capability inherent in the training aircraft that may be coincident with a combat aircraft.

Not to mention that there are T-6s currently being flown at Vance AFB and NAS Pensacola, and in some years time there should be T-6s flown out of NAS Whiting and Corpus. Bottom line, it is a cheap, supportable aircraft that probably has the ability to kill (bad guys, not student pilots, that is. ;)

jcustis

08-28-2007, 10:22 PM

Anyone in the audience get the impression that these conversations are dominated by one service, as if the USA or USMC can't outline support requirements effectively?

Ed "Otto" Pernotto

08-29-2007, 02:16 AM

It's not so much that these are all training a/c, it's just that they are relatively cheap, two seat propellor driven a/c that can fly at slower speed than jets, and given current (also relatively cheap) modifications such as NVG's, GPS, and GPS guided munitions, they can be very effective. Also, asking air forces that are trying to stand up like the Iraqi and Afghan AF's, these are a/c that can be operated much easier than high end jets.

selil

08-29-2007, 02:57 AM

Anyone in the audience get the impression that these conversations are dominated by one service, as if the USA or USMC can't outline support requirements effectively?

I've gotten that impression for some time... In the Information Technology world we call it the invisible user... Who cares about the people that need this service we can buy cool toys!

jcustis

08-29-2007, 03:09 AM

I've gotten that impression for some time... In the Information Technology world we call it the invisible user... Who cares about the people that need this service we can buy cool toys!

Interesting term. That's sort of how I feel when I am moving along on the Beltway, blinker on, and slowing down to find a gap to make a lane change. Folks seem to think I can't see that they obviously see me, but are just ignoring me in an attempt to box me out!

selil

08-29-2007, 05:00 AM

Interesting term. That's sort of how I feel when I am moving along on the Beltway, blinker on, and slowing down to find a gap to make a lane change. Folks seem to think I can't see that they obviously see me, but are just ignoring me in an attempt to box me out!

Nascar driving.. You're moving along at a clip and you get ready to pass somebody and they speed up so you can't get in. Similar move is to drive alongside a truck and slow down so you can't pass. Even better yet you're waiting for the Q-tip in the Crown Victoria to nudge beyond and the guy in the clapped out Civic with a coffee canister pseudo-muffler go's buy on the shoulder.

The problem with the "invisible user" is solutions have a tendency of not meeting needs. We talk about top down design but it's bottom up requirements gathering. If the user isn't happy the tool/system/application isn't going to work. Only in the case of COIN people are shooting at the user.

120mm

09-05-2007, 06:51 AM

Still, not really COIN aircraft. Light Attack = Just one small piece of the COIN "pie".

120mm

09-05-2007, 06:53 AM

SWJED

09-16-2007, 07:12 PM

Defence of the Realm has a piece up called Cathedral of Ignorance (http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2007/09/cathedral-of-ignorance.html).

In the print edition of The Sunday Telegraph (but not yet on-line) we are offered an extraordinarily ill-informed letter from a Mr Paddy Keenan, who disputes the claim made by Tory MP Ann Winterton last week that the slower, propeller-driven ground attack versions of the Tucano would help reduce "friendly fire" mistakes...

Steve Blair

09-17-2007, 12:13 AM

I've served as S2 in a DIV CAV SQDN, and trust me, the Scout Pilots generally don't give a rat's patootie about SAMs. THEY sweat the small caliber AAA, RPGs and especially guys with scoped rifles.

Much like they did in the old days. Have they gone back to older-style VR or is standoff scouting still the order of the day? Sorry for what may be a foolish question, but this stuff doesn't get much coverage and I'm a bit of an old school H-K tactics fan.

MattC86

09-17-2007, 12:52 AM

mmx1

09-17-2007, 02:07 AM

Steve Blair

09-17-2007, 01:39 PM

Here's my question about this whole concept. What exactly are the capabilities DoD thinks it's going to get out of say, an AT-6 Texan II or whatever, that it can't get out of the ARH (speaking of which, is that program canceled, on hold, or what)?

All of the advantages a slow-moving turboprop has over, say, an A-10 or F-16, a good modern scout helicopter (the Kiowa is an old design) would have over that turboprop, right? Loiter time, versatility, hovering and maneuverability capabilties, etc. And the speed of a turboprop wouldn't be that much more in terms of vulnerability to ground fire, would it?

That is, would that turboprop really be less susceptible to SA-7s or RPGS than the ARH, if the chopper was at full speed?

Maybe I'm misunderstanding capabilities, but to me the whole program smacks of the Air Force trying to say "we're relevant in COIN! Really! Trust us!"

Matt

The RAH did get waxed, to the best of my knowledge.

Fixed-wing has a greater loiter time and payload capacity, as well as a larger body in general where more "stuff" can be added at a later date. It can also sustain more damage than a helicopter and remain flyable. It doesn't have the visual recon capabilities of a helicopter (very little does, honestly, if you get down to the full spectrum to include the eyeball and nostril, mark I), so it's not really a question of "one or the other" but rather what's the most effective pairing for COIN (IMO, anyhow).

I tend to prefer the AH/MH-6 family to the Kiowa, but part of that's the old VN preference coming out again (scout pilots there tended to prefer the Loach to the Kiowa).

jcustis

09-17-2007, 03:08 PM

I tend to prefer the AH/MH-6 family to the Kiowa, but part of that's the old VN preference coming out again (scout pilots there tended to prefer the Loach to the Kiowa).

I've heard a number of Kiowa pilots say that they in fact prefer the Loach. Something about power, speed, etc., IIRC.

Steve Blair

09-17-2007, 03:12 PM

I've heard a number of Kiowa pilots say that they in fact prefer the Loach. Something about power, speed, etc., IIRC.

Yeah...it's got more power, better speed, smaller target...and so on. Problem is that when it came up for re-bid in the late 1960s ('69 I think) Hughes jacked the price. The Army rebid, and ended up with the OH-58.

MattC86

09-18-2007, 02:25 AM

A principal aim of the proposed turboprop platform is that it serves as a vehicle for training partner nations that cannot afford more expensive turbofan or rotary-wing platforms similar to those that we purchase.

A fixed wing platform is inherently more efficient than a rotary winged one, translating into greater range and loiter time for a comparable payload. Fixed wing aircraft also tend to be easier to fly, particularly considering that the models being considered for the IAF are mostly converted trainers.

Ok, both the cost thing for developing-type allies and the payload, range, etc. make sense. Although, in response to Steve, I just looked it up (finally) and apparently the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, based on the Bell 407 design, is currently still being funded. The RAH-66 WAS canceled.

I won't say too much because it's going off topic, but if we're planning on using this turboprop primarily in conjunction with partner nations and indigenous force training, long the realm of Army Special Forces, it just doesn't make sense to me for the Air Force to operate the aircraft. The Army should be operating its close support aircraft just as the Marines do, and that includes the COIN aircraft, should it be procured.

Matt

pcmfr

09-18-2007, 06:41 PM

I won't say too much because it's going off topic, but if we're planning on using this turboprop primarily in conjunction with partner nations and indigenous force training, long the realm of Army Special Forces, it just doesn't make sense to me for the Air Force to operate the aircraft. The Army should be operating its close support aircraft just as the Marines do, and that includes the COIN aircraft, should it be procured.

Better tell that to the 6th SOS. SF doesn't do aviation FID, AFSOC does and has, for many years now.

MattC86

09-18-2007, 08:13 PM

Better tell that to the 6th SOS. SF doesn't do aviation FID, AFSOC does and has, for many years now.

Fair enough, my mouth (fingers?) got ahead of my knowledge. Sorry.

Matt

Jesse9252

10-01-2007, 05:24 AM

If you're still interested, the author of the article on AC-130s is the subject of an interview on the Aviation Week blog. Here are some quotes:

Seifert: I would ask where the insurgents are most likely to be (although I would start figuring it out pretty quickly myself) and I would then fly over those areas as much as possible all the while being on a frequency that all of the ground forces in the triangle knew to call at the first sign of trouble. Sure a lot of insurgents would get away every night but you catch a dozen insurgents every night and you start demoralizing them pretty darn quickly. I've shot dozens of them and they don't even know what's shooting them. AC-130s against insurgents is a total and complete unfair fight. We've made it fair, though, by sitting the gunships in the same spot for hours at a time "defending" whatever ground force happens to be in that location.

My concept is no different than how police forces are used. Do cop cars sit in the same spot and defend a neighborhood? Or do they roam around looking for bad guys all the while being on call to EVERY citizen in their jurisdiction. Cops are the best weapon against bad guys and gunships are the best weapon against insurgents. Another example is F-15 employment. Do F-15s sit in the same spot defending a particular army unit against air attack or do they roam the skies looking for MiGs and waiting for AWACS to push them to the first indication of MiGs? The Air Force has perfected the art of air-to-air and is the reason the Iraqi Air Force wouldn't even take off. Put the same effort and expertise into gunship employment and you'd start seeing insurgents that didn't want to leave their houses.

Q: In your article, you posit that the insurgency's center of gravity is the individual fighter and his attacks. I disagree. I say the center of gravity is ideological and infused in the regional populace. Can you address my assessment in light of your proposal?

Seifert: I know what you're saying but I still say that the insurgent shooting at U.S. troops is the center of gravity. Destroy and demoralize him as quickly and efficiently as possible and the war will start going better. The insurgents keep fighting because we haven't made it painful enough for them to stop fighting. Sure there is the politicial aspect to the war but there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that we need to kill as many insurgents as possible, as fast as possible, as cheaply as possible, as unfairly as possible, etc etc. Killing insurgents with M-16s and F-16s is tough, dangerous, complicated, expensive, etc. Killing insurgents with an ammo-laden transport aircraft that can loiter in the Sunni triangle for 10+ hours every night shooting bullets that cost pennies compared to other means of killing insurgents and now we've got a chance of winning the war without bankrupting our country.

I will also say that the Arab culture respects strength. If the gunships were unleashed, the only defense would be to stop attacking US forces. Again, you'd get away with some attacks but it would only be a matter of time before a gunship or another air asset caught you or a US soldier called quick enough to get the gunship in place. How many hours long battles have you read about in the paper. Why? Other air assets respond but only the gunship has the situational awareness and the ability to shoot a single 40-mm round at a time to efficiently kill insurgents and not cause collateral damage. The gunship is the only air asset I know that shows up on scene and quicly has more situational awareness than the ground forces. Too many times I've told ground forces that personnel were sneaking up on them and that we were 10 seconds away from a round on target the second they gave the command. No other asset compares (in a low threat enironment like Iraq). There are CAS aircraft and then there is the AC-130. How many times have you read about other air assets making low passes and dispensing flares to scare away the enemy after they've attacked our forces. Why are we asking our pilots to fly hundreds of feet from the ground to dispense flares? Our pilots' bravery is unquestioned but there has to be a better way. When you have enemy forces attacking your forces, they need to be killed not scared away. I'll say it again, the Arab respects strength.

I hesitate to criticize someone who has "been there, done that" from the comfort of my college dorm, but Major Seifert strikes me as being rather glib and perhaps out-of-touch with the realities of war from the ground level. I hope he's not one of the authors of the Air Force's COIN manual.

The interview can be found here (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3adfd6ec5b-423b-44e1-811e-1f2496478623)

Steve Blair

10-01-2007, 01:48 PM

This sounds like "more of the same" to me, and it's a shame that they just can't change gears. Can the AC-130 crew really identify insurgents from the air with 100% accuracy? If target recognition was that stellar, we'd have no friendly fire incidents. Firepower is a tool, not an answer.

Cavguy

10-01-2007, 02:27 PM

I love the USAF. An F-15E drop ended a bad firefight I was in that killed one of my soldiers and wounded two. In Najaf 2004 an AC-130 decimated the Mehidi Army outer lines, killing over 50 in less than an hour, and allowing us to move into the city uncontested.

That said, I can't agree. I love the platforms, as Steve said, as a tool. But the USAF finally seems to have found its COIN narrative - that we need to drop more bombs - and if we were just more "aggressive" somehow that the enemy would get "intimidated" and stop planting IED's. MG Dunlap, Dr. Andress, and this guy are all spouting versions of the same thing.

It falls flat on its face to anyone who has been there, but I guess it is seductive like many airpower theories that it promises big results for little risk, and to the uninformed seems like a much better idea.

It really, truly scares me that this is becoming an institutional view of COIN for the USAF.

Cavguy

10-01-2007, 02:33 PM

if we were just more "aggressive" somehow that the enemy would get "intimidated" and stop planting IED's. MG Dunlap, Dr. Andress, and this guy are all spouting versions of the same thing.

As evidence on why airpower won't work as the answer, read Rick Atkinson's Part 2 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/30/AR2007093001675.html?hpid=topnews) of his IED piece from the WAPO this morning about trying to secure 20km of road south of Balad from the air.

slapout9

10-01-2007, 03:45 PM

Don't sell the guy short yet. The whole article is in Joint Forces Quarterly issue 45,2nd quarter 2007. Don't have time to post the link but I have read the article and what he is suggesting is that they be redeployed in a manner based on reported activity by air or ground commanders as opposed to just blindly flying a specific route all night long. Read if you get the chance cause from an LE perspective it makes a lot of sense. This is how air assets are used in LE except for the shooting part. It is Illegal to arm police helicopters at this time anyway:(

carl

10-02-2007, 04:02 PM

Post #38 of this thread has the link to the AC-130 article and post #41 has an analysis of it by JCustis.

slapout9

10-04-2007, 01:16 PM

Part 2 of the interview by the AC-130 pilot has been posted and I just lost the link. I think it was on Danger Room. Point being everybody should read it! If it works out as he would like the Air Force will have a defacto Airborne/Air Cavalry unit to enclude C-130 transport, V-22, and Assault aircraft. Is it a war winning capability? Will it stop IED's? No! but it will be a awsome capability. For Air guys it is not bad thinking for a COIN environment. I said that when the Air Force wrote their new COIN manual you would see a lot of General Gavin's Air Cavalry theory in it. It did not make it into the manual, but their are cetainly Air Force officers doing some heavy thinking along those lines. I didn't realize just how easy and how fast it could be done. Funny thing about Air Force guys is when they start thinking like an Air Army they can come up with some really good stuff IMHO.
So what says the council yes? no? maybe?

tequila

10-04-2007, 02:27 PM

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/10/release-the-g-1.html#more

Q: Would heavier use of gunships result in more civilian casualties?
Seifert: The gunship ONLY shoots when given permission by the ground force commander. It is easy to think that I am proposing that gunships should be allowed to roam the countryside shooting all the bad guys they can find, but nothing is further from the truth. Read again the situation in the article where I saw tracers in my window, got the sensors on the suspicious guys running away and then called the Army to tell them what had happened. The Army [Command and Control] called the unit at the coordinates we gave them and got word that, yes, they had been attacked. Army C2 then cleared us to shoot, BUT we saw the bad guys getting in cars, so we asked for further guidance. C2 said to keep track of them and they formed a QRF which ultimately resulted in 15 captured and us telling the troopers where to start digging to find the box of AK's and RPGs. Army C2 could have said shoot them on the spot and there would have been zero collateral damage. This would have been the case whether they were in open fields (which they were) or in the center of a town.

Most air assets would not have been able to shoot in a town though because they use 500 lb bombs minimum. The gunship, unlike anything else though, can fire a single 2.5-lb HE 40-mm warhead anywhere you want it. This warhead is the rough equivalent of a hand grenade or the 40-mm grenade our soldiers shoot from their rifles. So, you have an air asset that fires an equivalent weapon as a single soldier. The ability to do this is battle-changing. The gunship's two biggest strengths, in my opinion, are the situational awareness and the low-yield weapons. People think the 105-mm is huge, but it has a 32-lb HE warhead, vs 500-lb warheads [on bombs]. Could you use these weapons to kill lots of innocent people? Yes, and it has unfortunately happened -- but only when ground force commanders and/or gunship crews have made significant mistakes.

Q: So if you were in charge, what would you do to improve Air Force COIN capability?
Seifert: If I were King, I'd have several irregular-warfare wings, but I'd break them down between [Close Air Support] and transport wings. I found no synergy from being part of a wing that had transports and CAS aircraft. For example, I'd have an irregular wing of A-10s, AC-130s, an OV-10-type (http://www.noahshachtman.com/archives/001957.html) aircraft -- and I think the small gunship (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/09/air-force-eyes-.html) is an awesome idea. Not necessarily for operating out of small airstrips, but for the ability to buy enough of them so they're not hoarded and so they don't cause the Air Force to only have two dozen like they do the present gunships. A small gunship with one or two 30-mm cannons and a crew of about four would be awesome. I also would put the wings in ACC versus AFSOC, as I found AFSOC deep in their heart only wants to support "special ops" ground forces, whereas I have found ACC wants to kill bad guys for whoever was nice enough to point them out. The transport irregular warfare wing would obviously have some C-130s, CV-22s and a small transport. And both wings though would have a ... squadron for training friendly forces on how to operate the various wing aircraft.

Rob Thornton

10-04-2007, 02:48 PM

Steve - I'll find and read the whole article this weekend - but my gut tells me CAVGUY has the right of it.

However, a couple of quick comments

I will also say that the Arab culture respects strength. If the gunships were unleashed, the only defense would be to stop attacking US forces. Again, you'd get away with some attacks but it would only be a matter of time before a gunship or another air asset caught you or a US soldier called quick enough to get the gunship in place. How many hours long battles have you read about in the paper. Why? Other air assets respond but only the gunship has the situational awareness and the ability to shoot a single 40-mm round at a time to efficiently kill insurgents and not cause collateral damage. The gunship is the only air asset I know that shows up on scene and quickly has more situational awareness than the ground forces. Too many times I've told ground forces that personnel were sneaking up on them and that we were 10 seconds away from a round on target the second they gave the command. No other asset compares (in a low threat environment like Iraq). There are CAS aircraft and then there is the AC-130. How many times have you read about other air assets making low passes and dispensing flares to scare away the enemy after they've attacked our forces. Why are we asking our pilots to fly hundreds of feet from the ground to dispense flares? Our pilots' bravery is unquestioned but there has to be a better way. When you have enemy forces attacking your forces, they need to be killed not scared away. I'll say it again, the Arab respects strength.

There is a distinct difference between SA (Situational Awareness) and SU (Situational Understanding). SA is about seeing as much of the environment as possible that is relevant to you (immediacy is another matter), SU is about understanding how it is relevant to you so you can make good decisions that place friendly forces at an advantage and the enemy at a disadvantage (also a question of immediacy based on who and where you are). While an eye in the sky is a fantastic tool - particularly when manned by thinking humans with a weapons suite that allows for flexibility - there are limitations from a ground perspective. The primary inter-action is on the ground - the consequences are on the ground - the people are also on the ground. Many times we've had aviators, air crews and UAV operators come to the wrong conclusions about what they saw - they have a unique perspective, but it is only one. That is why the leader on the ground who lives with the consequences has to make the call - he delegates that responsibility at the risk of abdicating future opportunities and flexibility.

I've found many things other then just strength that Arab peoples respect - the comment lends itself to the interpretation that the only thing Arab peoples understand and respect is strength - that would tend to reinforce the stereotype brash "air warrior" mentality we often get concerned about on the ground. Are we going to say that about any peoples we find ourselves involved with a Counter-Insurgency? I'll agree that people at war - employing violence to a political end respect strength and develop options as they consider their relative strengths vs. their opponents to decide how to proceed, but I won't agree that any one set of people only respond to brute force and ignorance.

I do want to preserve and enhance our advantage from the air. I'm a fan of technology, but only as it enhances the human warrior - may seem short sighted on my part - but that is my call - and how I prioritize importance. When people get consumed in looking for targets - more things start looking like targets and we get intellectually and morally sloppy - the technology provides the image - but as good as it is, the significance of the image and its interpretation is on us. For all the picture perfect moments portrayed on video and print of our technological competence - "#### happens" remains a bumper sticker - on the ground we have to always keep that in mind when deciding on what level of force to employ - there are always consequences we could not foresee - its the nature of war. I'm all for a good air-ground team - its a effective combination that provides us an advantage, but in a COIN campaign I want the ground team making the call, and the air team in support.

Best Regards, Rob

slapout9

10-04-2007, 03:06 PM

Rob, when you read the article and the whole interview I think you'll see he makes alot of the same points you bring up for the same reason, especially the ground force commander making the call.

Rob Thornton

10-04-2007, 06:29 PM

Cool:cool: - in which case we'll be in violent agreement:D - Have a good weekend - I'm about to hit the beltway to make the drive back to PA:eek:
Best Regards, Rob

slapout9

10-04-2007, 06:36 PM

Rob, there are some points you want agree with and neither do I, but the guy is trying to do better with what he has.

carl

11-22-2007, 04:52 PM

I just had this idea for a small wars CAS airplane today and I want to see what you guys think of it.

The idea revolves around a twin engine turboprop of moderate size and guided bombs. The airplane would be something like an ATR-42-500 and the weapon would be, say, 250 lb. small diameter bomb JDAM's. You would mount the weapons vertically in the fuselage, nose down distributed around the aircraft center of gravity. Each bomb would be in its separate chute, sort of like the arrangement ASW aircraft have for sono-buoys, and each could be released one at a time or in small groups. Figure 20 or so weapons.

The airplane would fly around at around 15,000 feet and wait to be called. 15,000 should be high enough to avoid most shoulder fired missiles or at least give the countermeasures systems a good chance to work. It is also hard to pick out medium sized airplane visually when it is that high especially if it has a good camouflage paint job.

An airplane like that can cruise at about 300 ktas so it should be able to get to any place within 150 nm in about 1/2 hour in no wind. In a Iraq, you could put one over Ramadi, Baghdad, Samarra, Kirkuk and Mosul and you should have fairly short response time in the hot sections of of the country.

The idea is it could do the same thing a B-1 JDAM carrier does at a fraction of the cost and it would have much greater endurance. You would need whatever systems you need to launch JDAM's and minimal additional sensors. Perhaps some kind of video/ir ball that the some of the uav's use, not something good enough to target with but something to give the crew some situational awareness. In addition to JDAM's you could use guided 120 mm mortar shells too.

The aircraft couldn't do a supersonic low level fly by to scare the bejabbers out of the bad guys and it could not put 20 mm cannon shells within feet of engaged troops but it should be able to do most everything else.

Since it wouldn't be a jet and couldn't zoom around doing exciting things, the Air Force might be less inclined to pitch a fit if the Army operated it. The Army already operates many many turboprops.

There, tell me what you think. How far off base am I?

slapout9

11-23-2007, 12:02 AM

Hi carl, I know some of the first Huey gunships had motor rounds mounted vertically just as you mentioned. They were very effective and the Air Force pitched a fit so it was stopped. They want let you (Army) use anything that they consider a bomb.

Point 2. I think the Air Force would complain anyway because they want to fill the sky with armed UAV's which is why there is such a fight going on about who will control them. There is another system close to what you are talking about that involves an electric system firing mechanism. Very advanced and very cool to. They adapted it to make the police officers handgun of the future. If I can find the website agin I will post the link.

slapout9

11-23-2007, 12:52 AM

carl, check this out. this is the system I was talking about...it is made in Australia. Anything from a handgun to aircraft delivered precision munitions.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=iX6YvWxtrxw

selil

11-23-2007, 02:47 AM

Point 2. I think the Air Force would complain anyway because they want to fill the sky with armed UAV's which is why there is such a fight going on about who will control them.

I talked to an Air Force General and asked him point blank if he thought UAV's could serve the roll of CAS and his answer was yes but not likely.

Stan

11-23-2007, 09:24 AM

Hi Carl !
An intriguing idea, but wouldn’t a reduced version of the AC-130H be a better candidate ? Say the C-160 Transall - the platform is both tried and true and would be damn intimidating to the enemy.

I don’t see the immediate benefit in employing GPS-guided gravity bombs. 250 pounders would be devastating though ! We just dug up several Soviet-era 100K FAB-100 bombs here. They are anything but small and even the controlled detonation showered stones and sand more than 300 meters (broke our vehicle’s windshield).

The Army has some fantastic arty folks that can already pin a 105 round on a nat’s butt. Hell, even the airmen on the 130s can accurately employ the M1A1 howitzer.

So, we’ve adequately removed the term 'bomb' and replaced it with 'projectile', and now just need a few aircraft from the Air Force :D

Slap, wicked weapon !

slapout9

11-23-2007, 03:06 PM

Hi selil, Interesting comment by the Air Force. I don't think they want to use UAV's as a CAS weapon at all. I think it is more in line with their theory of Air Occupation similar to their Air Policing ideas from the end of WW1. Your thoughts on this?

carl

11-23-2007, 06:00 PM

Stan:

I spent the last few hours on the internet looking things up, which I should have done in the first place.

The GBU-39 (small diameter bomb) has 50 pounds of explosive in it. The FAB-100 is supposed to have about 85 pounds of explosive so the GBU-39 should be better suited for close in use. From what I have read it was designed not to be "too much bomb" so to speak. It is guided and has a CEP of 5-8 meters, which can be brought down to 3 meters for a surveyed target (I don't know what a "surveyed target" is). The reason I am suggesting this weapon is that from reading various posts people seem to like JDAM's, and this would be a way of giving the Army direct control of a weapon like that as inexpensively as I can think of.

AC type aircraft are great but the current iterations are very complicated systems and they ain't cheap. They also can't fly in the daylight. From what I could gather they fly around 8-10,000 feet, are very easy to see and so are very vulnerable. I am figuring it would be safe enough for an airplane with half the visual density flying at 15,000 feet to operate in the daytime.

The Transall is still a pretty big airplane, but it is out of production and it would still be quite expensive to fit it out like an AC-130.

Slapout:

I didn't know the Army dropped mortar shells from helos in VN. I'll have to look that up.

MetalStorm is quite impressive but wouldn't the first few rounds out of a pistol type one have very different ballistics than the last few?

slapout9

11-23-2007, 06:11 PM

Hi carl, I don't know enough about the Metal storm System to say if ballistics are effected. The main reason I posted it was for the Aircraft version which shoots the bullets straight down like you were talking about in your first posts.

If you can access anything about the development of the Air Cavalry you should be able to find pictures of early Hueys with the motor dropping capability early 1960's versions.

UH-1M link with info about MAD-Mortar Ariel Delivery system. No Pics just info.
http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avhuey.html

Stan

11-23-2007, 06:27 PM

Hey Carl !

Stan:

I spent the last few hours on the internet looking things up, which I should have done in the first place.

Sorry, pal. Next time I'll send you some jpegs (I have them at the office on the intranet) :o

The GBU-39 (small diameter bomb) has 50 pounds of explosive in it. The FAB-100 is supposed to have about 85 pounds of explosive so the GBU-39 should be better suited for close in use. From what I have read it was designed not to be "too much bomb" so to speak. It is guided and has a CEP of 5-8 meters, which can be brought down to 3 meters for a surveyed target (I don't know what a "surveyed target" is). The reason I am suggesting this weapon is that from reading various posts people seem to like JDAM's, and this would be a way of giving the Army direct control of a weapon like that as inexpensively as I can think of.

I won't go too deep into the FAB-100, but suffices to say her wall thickness is more than 3 inches of scored steel (fragmentation). Our minimum safe distance for 2.0 kilos of explosives is 100 meters :D This presumes a low order detonation ??? So much for that idea. Surveyed target from above could be best described as 'line of sight'.

AC type aircraft are great but the current iterations are very complicated systems and they ain't cheap. They also can't fly in the daylight. From what I could gather they fly around 8-10,000 feet, are very easy to see and so are very vulnerable. I am figuring it would be safe enough for an airplane with half the visual density flying at 15,000 feet to operate in the daytime.

The Transall is still a pretty big airplane, but it is out of production and it would still be quite expensive to fit it out like an AC-130.

I knew they weren't cheap, but they can't fly or operate in daylight ? What happened in Somalia recently ? I naively assumed that all her on-board gizmos and crewmen were intended to work under any conditions.

Slapout:

I didn't know the Army dropped mortar shells from helos in VN. I'll have to look that up.

MetalStorm is quite impressive but wouldn't the first few rounds out of a pistol type one have very different ballistics than the last few?

Yep, we've even acquired GPS-guided mortars...one thing though, don't point the tube downwards :eek:

carl

11-23-2007, 07:46 PM

Stan:

I am not familiar with what happened in Somalia, but from all I've read the Air Force won't let the AC-130's operate in the day. They could, but are judged to be too vulnerable to be worth risking. We only have a very few of these airplanes.

Maybe an AC-130 guy could comment. My saying "I've read that..." doesn't really cut it.

I think a GPS guided 120 mm mortar shell dropped, rather than fired, from an airplane 3 miles up would be kind of cool.

FLZOOMIE

11-28-2007, 10:52 AM

[QUOTE=carl;32437]Stan:

I am not familiar with what happened in Somalia, but from all I've read the Air Force won't let the AC-130's operate in the day. They could, but are judged to be too vulnerable to be worth risking. We only have a very few of these airplanes.

Maybe an AC-130 guy could comment. My saying "I've read that..." doesn't really cut it.

Hello all,

I'm a former AC-130 pilot and the author of "Gunships Unleashed" which you discussed previously in this blog. I just joined the website so please be patient as I figure out the ROE's, technology, etc here. Anyway, AC-130's can and have operated in the daytime but the potential reward must warrant the potential risk. It is in no way black and white, as with most things, and I am unaware as to present ops and couldn't discuss here even if I was. A great article was written following the first major battle in Fallujah which specifically discussed the issue. 300
Hopefully I've attached it here. I'll try again if not and you can probably find it by googling "AC-130 daytime ops". Anyway, it's a controversial topic. If you've read my article, you'll see that I did not feel gunships were being used as effectively as possible in the time that they were operating. So, my goal was to help fix that before even considering the daytime ops question. In closing, I know there were some differing opinions as to my article so please send your thoughts my way.

slapout9

11-28-2007, 11:06 AM

Welcome Zoomie, great to have a writer of an actual article of discussion here to explain their views.

jcustis

11-28-2007, 12:09 PM

Welcome Zoomie, great to have a writer of an actual article of discussion here to explain their views.

Indeed...We appreciate you taking the time to come here and discuss this critical (at least to me and a few others) topic.

Stan

11-28-2007, 12:33 PM

Welcome aboard, FLZoomie !

Hello all,

I'm a former AC-130 pilot and the author of "Gunships Unleashed" which you discussed previously in this blog. I just joined the website so please be patient as I figure out the ROE's, technology, etc here. Anyway, AC-130's can and have operated in the daytime but the potential reward must warrant the potential risk. It is in no way black and white, as with most things, and I am unaware as to present ops and couldn't discuss here even if I was. A great article was written following the first major battle in Fallujah which specifically discussed the issue.
Hopefully I've attached it here. I'll try again if not and you can probably find it by googling "AC-130 daytime ops". Anyway, it's a controversial topic. If you've read my article, you'll see that I did not feel gunships were being used as effectively as possible in the time that they were operating. So, my goal was to help fix that before even considering the daytime ops question. In closing, I know there were some differing opinions as to my article so please send your thoughts my way.

The Somalia story (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/08/world/main2335451.shtml) was reportedly a daylight operation. Granted, it doesn't appear that the targets were assessed as a potential risk to the gunship. Most of my experience with 130 drivers was in Sub-Sahara with the 7th SOS. My observations then are echoed in the attachment you sent.

Air and ground officers alike tend to blame commanders, rather than AC-130 pilots or crews, for the decision to withhold these assets during the daytime fight in Fallujah. Some AC-130 pilots agree the threat from MANPADs in Iraq is fairly low, given the altitudes at which the gunships typically fly, officials say.
“It’s not the captains and the majors flying these missions. They’re the bravest of the brave,” says retired Army Col. David Hunt, a former Green Beret and airborne Ranger. “The generals are making a statement: ‘We’ll tell you how best to use our airplanes.’”

I look forward to more of your posts.
As time permits you, please take a few minutes here and introduce yourself (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=37).

Regards, Stan

luckyroll

05-28-2009, 12:49 PM

Hi, new here. Just reading this post and thought I'd make an opinionated reply to some of what you guys had to say. I probablt don't have the knowledge you guys have, but, I might be able to make a point.
It seems alot of people are basing alot of what was said off of what the Military does. The guy that trained me tought me "outside the box" thinking. It also seems that the Military gets it wrong as much as they do right.
Your usually better running a set-up that you feel confident in and in a perfectly good aircraft you feel confident flying. Heck, you could take an old DC-3 and dodge SAMs all day long and arm it to the nines with small arms... It'll get the job done if you feel good about it. But, on the other hand, you'd better have some rotor for back up against heavy jet power and a damn good rotor wing pilot. I would feel most confident in a light, fast piston fighter like a Sea Fury MK11, seeing as how it can go low and slow and can out manuver jet power. Now, I'm basing this off of the fact that no one has all the rice in China or tea in England to be spending on equipment. Another thing that might be considered about the Tucanis and AT-6 Hawkwer is that they both have really good acrobatic capabilities against jets with the right pilot. A small consideration untill your getting pounced on by a jet.

luckyroll

05-28-2009, 02:20 PM

I was reading some of what you guys were talking about with regards to the OH-6 series of rotorwing craft. I thought I might tell you what I know about it. I'm not sure if this is 100% correct, but, its just of my understanding.
The OH-6 system is still in use by the Army and I think the Marines today. Hughes did jack up the cost, but, the Army threatened to cancel contract and halted for a few months untill Hughes sold the contract and plans to MD Rotor, a division of McDonnell Douglas. The modern Army version is called the MD-530eg/Defender 2. The new Defender-530 boasts 650 SHP over the older OH-6's 450 and a few other modern advances. The Marine Corps is said to be using the MD-530an, that has the new NOTAR tail rotor system. It actually doesn't have a tail rotor, but, more a harmonic balancer like on a car engine with a fan on the end(to put it in laymans terms, my idiocy knows no bounds). The Corps had plans on running it in conjunction with the UH-1y Venom 2, with the Quick Fix sigthing system, kinda like the old Army Pink Teams, but I guess plans have changed to coupling it with the new Cobra's, whenever that may be...
It has been said that the Defender 2 is the fastest, most long range capable rotor craft in the Militaries modern arsenal with the exemption of any X- craft. This is just what I understand and please feel free to correct me. After all, I am mostly on this forum to learn from you guys.

William F. Owen

05-28-2009, 02:38 PM

This is just what I understand and please feel free to correct me. After all, I am mostly on this forum to learn from you guys.

While not wishing to neccessarily correct you, this (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=aerospacedaily&id=news/ARH010809.xml&headline=Boeing%20Offers%20Army%20Two%20ARH%20Alte rnatives) might help.

Personally, I think NOTAR is a box of frogs. It's got poor authority compared to a proper tail rotor, and it weather cocks into into wind, when you are trying to hover cross-wind. - so for an armed platform it's not good!

luckyroll

05-30-2009, 12:47 PM

No, I have to admit, when MD first put that NOTAR sys out there I thought and still think it a bit quirky. Not only that but, they have already made great improvements to the Defender 2's tail rotor and it seems to be perfect. Why give them an oversized RPG target? That NOTAR tail can't swing as quickly as the standard tail can and I thought that to be some of it's great attributes... The fact that it's tail was so small and moved so quick(intern causing the entaire craft to be able to manuever quickly).
Anyway... I agree. Why fix what aint broke?.. Gues its good for commercial market, if you want to land in a residential area without the worry of banging it up on a nicely manacured oak tree.

Bob's World

05-30-2009, 01:23 PM

Just to help nudge people toward greater clarity: You are discussing "FID" aircraft, not COIN aircraft (COIN is something one does in their own country with their own populace).

Or in the current lingo, "IW" aircraft. AFSOC is working closely with the "big blue" to help them develop a capability and capacity to support these types of operations in order to avoid the otherwise inevitable alternative: If only AFSOC develops the capacity to support these types of missions the Air Force will think of IW as being synonomous with SOF. It isn't.

Basically it just looking around and seeing what we really need for the world we live in today, and buying that. Fortunately what we really need today is a lot cheaper than what the fighter jock community has been pushing for.

William F. Owen

05-30-2009, 01:35 PM

reed11b

05-30-2009, 02:07 PM

Good points. Personally I can't see the point in having airframes that are unique to COIN operations. Buying little turbo-props to shoot rockets is a pretty silly idea, if it's justified on their application in Counter-insurgency!

Operational costs..ability to reduce colateral damage...better equiped to provide CAS, due to loiter time and situational awarness...ability to have forces that operate aircraft our allies are likely to be able to afford and can therefore teach there use???
Reed

luckyroll

05-31-2009, 12:51 PM

Well, I'm not sure about the turbo-prop thing... I kind of wonder if those were a little too fancy for Blackwater, or, if they really needed something that expensive even. I try to think of all the SOF's out there(how small in force those guys are) that have the oldest of the old "junkers" or little "horse flies" that can do their job just fine. But, I guess you spend the money you have and get the best you can afford. And, those planes are good aircraft for the money. I would outfit and sub-con my 337 sky rocket out any day, its a good one and I trust it's capabilities.
By the way, I'm using SOF's only as a refference.
I always lean towards the "less means more" way of thinking and I do have to agree with Bob.

Entropy

05-31-2009, 02:07 PM

BW,

What more do you think is needed for FID besides the UAV's, transports and other aircraft we have now?

William F. Owen

05-31-2009, 02:39 PM

Operational costs..ability to reduce colateral damage...better equiped to provide CAS, due to loiter time and situational awarness...ability to have forces that operate aircraft our allies are likely to be able to afford and can therefore teach there use???
Reed

Not saying you are wrong, or those are not good points, but you might as well adapt an airframe you already have, rather than dive head long into purchasing a new one.
Got Apaches, use Apaches. Too expensive? - OK so how do I do the same thing cheaper and not make my Apache a "big war only Toy".
Can you adapt a training aircraft, you already have?
What's the cheapest to run aircraft in the inventory?
Will procuring a new airframe save more money that adapting something in service which has higher running costs?

etc etc etc....

luckyroll

06-01-2009, 01:38 PM

Well, since we are on the same page, I think... Lets look at the 0-2 skymaster and NOT using it because it isn't in inventory. Even though they are extremely cheap, other militaries still use them because of cost, effectiveness, ruggedness, reliability, list goes on and on. They are not in inventory ( maybe re-adoption should be in play). We will go with the next best, or, best thing yet... AU-24 Super Stallion. The new ones are fast, have a few already, can land in a variety, if not any environment, easy to learn to fly(have been used as trainers, tough and cheap. Adaptable to every small arms system including, but not limited to TOW, HYDRA and GAU-4/M-195-7. Do you think? I think so! 40 years and the orders keep rolling in. That has to say something about any perfectly good aircraft, right? I personally love'em! Am I completely wrong?
Then, lets run it in cunjunction with the new AT-6 Hawker that are in inventory(Well t-6 2's, but they can convert to AT-6 COINs). Maybe I'm not thinking correctly, but, I still think it makes sense. And, I don't think we are going to be outfitting U-21's with wepons systems(although maybe not a horrible idea).

William F. Owen

06-01-2009, 02:05 PM

... Lets look at the 0-2 skymaster
Really? I know a few Covey pilots from way back and not a well liked aeroplane. Underpowered, overloaded and can't do much well. Plus silly little reciprocating petrol engine!

AU-24 Super Stallion. The new ones are fast, have a few already, can land in a variety, if not any environment, easy to learn to fly(have been used as trainers, tough and cheap.
Turbo Couriers are good. Good passenger/cargo payload and pretty multi-role. Good aircraft for a small air force.

....but we still come back to this "rolling hot, call FAC in sight" Bush War fantasy plane image, which is not really realistic.

The US Forces do not operate forward bases. They operate huge bases, so all the FOB-STOL stuff is a waste of effort. The Army is focussed on rotary wing, so I can't see why they would welcome fixed wing back.

If you want support airframes, use King Air B200's and if you want weapons use A-10s and AH-64s - seems the US Forces pretty much have what they need.

luckyroll

06-01-2009, 02:54 PM

Well, I was reffering to 0-2s in the sense that we would be converting. My 337 is a Super Skyrocket and there are other uptdated military type conversions such as the Super Lynx. Not a silly aircraft at all. The Originals had as much power as a VW Bug, but, other than that, they are a joy to fly in terms of manuverability and tough take offs/short landings and tough as nails. I was also assuming we are using the cheapest meens possible.
Look, I'm just tossing thoughts at this point for both sides of the argument. No heated debates from me.
I may be completely wrong in saying this, but, it's the minimalist that I am...
Combat is a level playing field because we are all carrying guns. The only disadvantage is to the person who doesn't know, doesn't seek out, and doesn't know how to use every advantage they have in war. How many times do modern militaries have to be beaten by primitiveness before they learn?
Use the utmost basics first, then use technology as need apply or a fail-safe.
I guess if everything worked well, or, even at all, we wouldn't have anything left to discuss. It seems like everything that has to do with combat is based on an opinion. Usually from an over-zelouse mouth like my own.

Umar Al-Mokhtār

06-02-2009, 12:10 AM

William F. Owen

06-02-2009, 04:35 AM

AVGAS. No longer a commodity in the US logistics inventory. If one were to go the route of adapting an exisitng airframe then the AU-23A Peacemaker would be a good choioce. Basically it's the armed version of the Pilatus (http://www.pilatus-aircraft.com/html/en/products/index_2712.asp?NavL1ID=31&NavL2ID=48&NavL3ID=2711&NavL4ID=0&NavL5ID=0&NavL6ID=0&L=3)PC-6/C Turbo-Porter. Stall speed is 52kts with the laundry hung out! :eek:

And it uses JP.
Thus my point about reciprocating engines.

The AU-23(B/C) would make a good choice.
It can be used as a gun ship, with 12.7mm gatling and combined with modern RCWS and FCS, that would be potent, in a low threat air defence environment. There is enough room in the back for some good sensor and comms packages, and you can parachute and air drop from them.

...but, the US don't do STOL anymore so no advantage to a STOL Airframe.
PC-6 is SLOW... so time to OA, time back and time to go A-B is an issue, and it can't keep up with a CH-47 or 53 - they are faster!

So bearing that in mind, if STOL is not required it does nothing better, than a B200 - which the USA has in service, and let's be honest budget is not really an issue for the US. The supposed savings of a low performance fleet will be negligible as a percentage of that used in theatre.

The IDF has junked all it's STOL AC. I can show you piles of DO-27/28's and ARAVAs - breaks my hearts, as someone who enjoys flying, but they have a very number of B200s.

I love little dirty Bush War AC, but warfare evolves and they are less and less relevant given modern technology, weapons and sensors.

reed11b

06-02-2009, 05:36 AM

Thus my point about reciprocating engines.

The AU-23(B/C) would make a good choice.
It can be used as a gun ship, with 12.7mm gatling and combined with modern RCWS and FCS, that would be potent, in a low threat air defence environment. There is enough room in the back for some good sensor and comms packages, and you can parachute and air drop from them.

...but, the US don't do STOL anymore so no advantage to a STOL Airframe.
PC-6 is SLOW... so time to OA, time back and time to go A-B is an issue, and it can't keep up with a CH-47 or 53 - they are faster!

So bearing that in mind, if STOL is not required it does nothing better, than a B200 - which the USA has in service, and let's be honest budget is not really an issue for the US. The supposed savings of a low performance fleet will be negligible as a percentage of that used in theatre.

The IDF has junked all it's STOL AC. I can show you piles of DO-27/28's and ARAVAs - breaks my hearts, as someone who enjoys flying, but they have a very number of B200s.

I love little dirty Bush War AC, but warfare evolves and they are less and less relevant given modern technology, weapons and sensors.

I was working w/ a guy for awhile that was working on a project that was essentially a scaled down version of these utility aircraft in UAV form, with a strong emphsis on range and loiter over STOL. Simalier benifits and some good cost savings, I'll see if he will let me release some of the materials I have.
Reed

luckyroll

06-02-2009, 02:17 PM

Now back to the Blackwater thing. All of the Aircraft we have listed would have of better cost to quality ratio. Right? Atleast for what they need in thier so called support ( COIN ops). Why would a company with that many problems want to get involved in COIN operations anyway? OK.... I won't go there 'cause I like Blackwater and when your on top I guess everyone tries to knock you down. Not to mention the "other types of militaries" that mess up as well, we can only be fair and not criticize.
Anyway, I think that for support our forementioned aircraft would be fine for what they need and cost savings. They already have numerouse rotorcraft and there are alot of professional soldiers that have been in small, poorer countries and have established themselves with those governments. Sure there planes might be old birds, but they are established. I'm just curiouse.

Really I'm wondering why they would want a larger SOF company and how all this works. It seems the days of the small time SOFer are coming to an end. Are the days of the AVG gone?

120mm

06-03-2009, 02:53 AM

Heck, you could take an old DC-3 and dodge SAMs all day long and arm it to the nines with small arms... It'll get the job done if you feel good about it.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v311/120mm/P2240589-1.jpg

You rang???

Passenger/freight carrier, ISR platform and fire support, all in one dependable, loiter time rich and cheap airframe.

And currently in use in parts of the long war by the good guys....

carl

06-03-2009, 04:48 AM

I would not want to take any DC-3 variant into a place where there might be manpads lurking, not unless it had a missile warning system and flare package equal to or better than that carried by C-17s. A 3 couldn't dodge a bottle rocket. Nothing much short of a fighter can dodge manpads anyway.

Don't use a B200, A200 or any King Air for anything that requires the crew to look outside. You cruise along serenely in those things untroubled by the sight of the ground. The wings and engine nacelles you can see pretty good.

Dreaming about what airplane we should get is always great fun even if nothing at all will change. No matter what platform was purchased the powers that be would ruin it millions of dollars worth of electronic systems. Nothing really exists unless it can be seen on the video screen in the TOC after all.

Still there must be a better way of supporting infantry patrols than using a B-1 based in Diego Garcia and the tankers that go with it.

Umar Al-Mokhtār

06-03-2009, 02:53 PM

Spent an early part of a career long time passed on the Marine Corps' C-117D (previously designated R4D-8) which was in essence an upgraded C-47. We were self annointed the Short Haul Inter-island Transport Squadron. Even flew that crusty curmudgeon Dale Dye around theater when he was a CWO.

120mm

06-04-2009, 03:32 AM

DC-3s also have a very light wing loading, which gives them really decent STOL characteristics, but make for a very bumpy ride in turbulence.

To me, it satisfy the real multirole mode and economy of a true COIN aircraft.

carl

06-04-2009, 03:48 AM

I used to watch a turbo-3 take off from Kisangani and it didn't look very STOL to me. The captain seemed reluctant to take it into a place the Caravan could go. But you'd have to look at the book figures to really know.

Besides, where are you going to get tailwheel pilots to fly the thing? Say, 120mm, don't you fly Super-Cubs?

If you want to use aircraft about that size, ATR-42s or Dash-8s would be a much better bet. They are considerable faster, fly higher and an ATR at least can land really short. I don't know much about the airfield performance of Dash-8s but I do know Dash-8 100s are cheap. You can part the thing out for more than it cost to buy a flyable airplane; or at least you could 4 years ago.

William F. Owen

06-04-2009, 03:49 AM

To me, it satisfy the real multirole mode and economy of a true COIN aircraft.

I would agree. As they are no longer made, and have a fair few other problems, I'd moot the CN-235 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CASA_CN-235) or 295 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EADS_CASA_C-295) as being indicative of the requirement.

luckyroll

06-04-2009, 01:45 PM

I don't know about it all. The gentleman that tought me to fly in the civilian sector flew RU-21h's along time ago. He said anything that went low and slow made it easy to dodge SAMs. He told me something about a trick to pick them up using a Cobra hand held, (can't remember the details). You just turn up the volume real loud on it and pay attention to any little change in squelch static. Not sure exactly how it works. Other than that keep a close eye. He said he watched many a telephone pole fly past his canopy. He mentioned that at that time the louder planes like A-1s couldn't use it because of the load motors. Of course this was all 40 years ago and I'm sure some things change.
I don't know alot about this stuff. I don't think there is any elimination of risk no matter the equipment. I was infantry and did not learn to fly untill recently. So far it seems like a gritty job and lots of fun. I'd like to get into "the buisiness" someday, but my flying skills and knowledge are lacking. For now I'm soaking it all up and trying to figure out a way to practice combat flying.
I know we have been talking about what everyone should be using and doing. But, I wonder alot more every day about things getting worse just south of my local and the role antiquated COIN aircraft and COIN for hire might play in the not so distant future. It worries me... Makes my teeth itch thinking about it, but at the same time something that pushes me for knowledge about what I need, or, may be needed to do if in an event that this type of work should pop up. So, this is all knowlege for that and anything else that I might fall into.

120mm

06-05-2009, 04:03 AM

A bit too late to suggest different airframes: The US Department of State is currently using DC-3s as COIN aircraft in Afghanistan, as we speak.

I "get" that there may be some more optimal airframes out there, but the old Gooney bird is getting the job done, regardless of theory. I just rode in one three weeks ago.

The unitasker does not an ideal COIN aircraft make. The idea being that the air situation requires flexibility, not optimization of platforms. And the DC-3 is STOL "enough" and is a good enough ISR platform, and is a good enough fire support platform. And it's relatively cheap to operate. And evidently some were available and affordable.

You could apply these requirements for just about any fixed wing aircraft with "good enough" characteristics.

The problem comes when you get a wonk who insists on "idealizing" the airframe for a certain task. Or becoming risk averse.

luckyroll

06-05-2009, 03:17 PM

120 thats too cool. So, I wasn't too far off base I guess in saying what I said. It seems no matter what you might think is going on in the military today with thier equipment, things you think had passed seem to pop up as ressurected. Why, because they work!!
For example, just found out that Boeing is re-vamping the OV-10 to a new STOL, COIN platform for the Corps called the au-110 Lightning 2. Same plane, more (bigger) guns, more ammo, better sights and alot faster... and slower. The original 1,040 SHP's will be replaced with the more compact, lighter, P&W pt6a-68 1,250 SHP engines.

William F. Owen

06-05-2009, 03:39 PM

For example, just found out that Boeing is re-vamping the OV-10 to a new STOL, COIN platform for the Corps called the au-110 Lightning 2. Same plane, more (bigger) guns, more ammo, better sights and alot faster... and slower. The original 1,040 SHP's will be replaced with the more compact, lighter, P&W pt6a-68 1,250 SHP engines.

Well that's been a long time coming. There was lots of talk about this when I was Project managing some stuff for the Philipinnes Air Force and what could be done replace/enhance their OV-10s.

Calling the OV-10 "COIN" aircraft is selling it short. It was FAC/MEDEVAC/Transport/CAS true multi-role air frame. Today it's a good choice for small Air Forces, and more useful than the Super Tucanos for example. The AH-6 is going back into production for the same reason.

luckyroll

06-05-2009, 07:36 PM

I'm sure it's still considered a multi roll and will serve all those porposes. This is more likely a diplomatic thing calling it an attack aircraft. Sounds better come time to get funding. And making it seem like a modernized version of the p-38(which it is) sounds somewhat comemorative and patriotic and that is always a good selling point to congress.

Cliff

06-06-2009, 01:52 AM

Big pow-wow of AF generals this week (Corona).

http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/05/airforce_irregular_warfare_053109w/

They'll likely make a decision on the irregular warfare wing. This won't necessarily mean the aircraft they will buy will be set, but they will at least lay out the requirements. Should be interesting to see the results.

V/R,

Cliff

William F. Owen

06-06-2009, 07:35 AM

Big pow-wow of AF generals this week (Corona).

http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/05/airforce_irregular_warfare_053109w/

They'll likely make a decision on the irregular warfare wing.

And...

Making up the wing would be 20 “light strike” attack planes; four C-130 Hercules to ferry troops, small transports and helicopters;

errr.... A-10 anyone? It can do the job now, and needs a couple of modification to be just about perfect. Some aircraft converted into the two-seat A-10B can do all the weapons, sensors and FAC roles far better than any prop-driven bug-basher.

Last time I checked the C-130, AC-130, and A-10 were all operational in the inventory.

luckyroll

06-06-2009, 01:08 PM

I'm guessing you like the Thunderbolt 2. The problem with the T-bolt 2 is that it has no turning radius= very poor manuverability compared to prop craft and can only hold a slow pattern for a few seconds before you have to dip back into the engines and give the stick a little tug. Atleast this is what my sisters boyfriend tells me. He flies Hornets in the Corps, but was a Hog (t-bolt 2) pilot before that.
He also said that at those low speeds it was insanely rough and that hard jolting would sometimes cause the 30mm to jam. He said the feel is similar to flying a commercial jet at very low speeds and altitudes. But, he said it almost impossible to tear it apart with heavy fire, or, anything else for that matter( thanks to carbon fibre covered ceramic spawl plates). He said he's seen many of them get hit with SAM's in the stubs and still land. He said he has even belly landed one and it was back up and flying a few days later... didn't hurt it at all. That says ALOT for any jet powered craft. In that aspect that plane lives up to it's namesake.
I like'em alot! Probably my favorite jet pack, but the not turning thing would make me sick. But, it is a flying tank and is designed to do exactly what it does, included in that is the fact that it has little manuverability. That is so you don't overshoot or, have to dip to keep your point of aim on a target when your coming in on top of it. This is what I'm told about that aircraft and it seems to make sense. He even said that turboprop "bug bashers" are better for serving alot of the roles that the A-10 serves and more. I called and asked him just to see what he said, but, this is only one opinion of one pilot. But, aside from the fact that you can't hardly take an A-10 down, I think a turboprop is just as good in it's own right.
But the idea of recip engine "horse fly" planes was a little silly now that I think about it in terms of the US armed forces. Where in the hell would they get AvGas and why would they want to deal with that?! Although to me it still makes sense for the private sec.

Entropy

06-06-2009, 03:21 PM

The A-10 can fly slow enough to employ weapons effectively, which is all that matters. The days of slowly loitering low over the battlefield employing the Mk 1 eyeball as the primary sensor are pretty much gone. Sensor pods provide much better SA, work at night, can defeat some types of CCD, provide much better targeting info (if needed) and can be transmitted in real-time to whoever is on the ground, etc.. In that case there's no need to fly very low most of the time (in fact, the view from medium altitudes is often better), nor is there a need to turn tighter than the A-10 can currently turn.

I really like the idea of bringing back the 2-seat A-10. It allows a pilot to concentrate on not getting shot down or flying into terrain (which is very challenging in Afghanistan, for example), while the back-seater can concentrate on the sensors, coordination with the ground element, comms, etc. I would consider adding some conformal fuel tanks for more loiter time as well.

The A-10 has a lot of other advantages too. It can self-deploy, it's faster, it can operate in higher-threat environments, can carry more ordnance and more precise weapons, etc. Oh, and it also has a big gun ;) I can't think of any reason to downgrade to what's been suggested in this thread so far, except possibly for operating cost, which isn't really compelling considering the trade offs.

luckyroll

06-06-2009, 04:41 PM

Joining this forum, fun.... Talking of aircraft, great... My two cents......... Worthless. I swear someday they will find a cure for my diarhea of the mouth and brain.
I still think that the new Bronco/lightning set-up will be something to behold( if it ever hits the tarmac).
I'm just wondering if I'm going to have to spend the rest of my days buzzing in circles, listening to Marshall Tucker, wasting fuel. Maybe I should join CAP... LOL!!!!:wry:
I don't know what to do with myself....

Cliff

06-07-2009, 03:23 AM

except maybe Republic (well, now Boeing owns the contracts).

It's the Warthog, or just Hog.

I'm guessing you like the Thunderbolt 2. The problem with the T-bolt 2 is that it has no turning radius= very poor manuverability compared to prop craft and can only hold a slow pattern for a few seconds before you have to dip back into the engines and give the stick a little tug. Atleast this is what my sisters boyfriend tells me. He flies Hornets in the Corps, but was a Hog (t-bolt 2) pilot before that.

The A-10 has a better turn radius than the Hornet.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/a-10.htm

Turn radius is a function of speed vs. G. The Hog can pull 7.33 gs max. It's turn radius down low ranges from just over 1000' with flaps to 2000' without. A turboprop could turn tighter, but only by flying slower... which doesn't do you too much good. A-10s fly at 200-300 knots, which isn't too much faster than most turboprops.

He also said that at those low speeds it was insanely rough and that hard jolting would sometimes cause the 30mm to jam. He said the feel is similar to flying a commercial jet at very low speeds and altitudes.

Any aircraft at low altitude is going to have a bumpier ride. The lower the wing loading, the harder the ride. The A-10 doesn't have a ridiculously low wing loading. An F-15C at low altitude is much worse.

But, he said it almost impossible to tear it apart with heavy fire, or, anything else for that matter( thanks to carbon fibre covered ceramic spawl plates).

The Hog is one of the most survivable aircraft ever. It also has a lot of foam inside it to reduce spalling from hits.

But, it is a flying tank and is designed to do exactly what it does, included in that is the fact that it has little manuverability. That is so you don't overshoot or, have to dip to keep your point of aim on a target when your coming in on top of it. This is what I'm told about that aircraft and it seems to make sense. He even said that turboprop "bug bashers" are better for serving alot of the roles that the A-10 serves and more. I called and asked him just to see what he said, but, this is only one opinion of one pilot. But, aside from the fact that you can't hardly take an A-10 down, I think a turboprop is just as good in it's own right.
But the idea of recip engine "horse fly" planes was a little silly now that I think about it in terms of the US armed forces. Where in the hell would they get AvGas and why would they want to deal with that?! Although to me it still makes sense for the private sec.

I respectfully have to disagree. The A-10 was designed to destroy Soviet armor in the face of intense AAA, MANPADs, and SAMs. It does that exceptionally well. As for CAS for COIN efforts, the A-10C with targeting pods and GPS weapons is excellent for CAS.

The reason why the USAF is looking at AT-6s or Tucanos for the COIN mission is because it is not only cheap, uses a little less gas, but also because you could easily train indigenous forces on the AT-6 and then sell them their own aircraft.

The irregular warfare wing would not just support our own forces (the A-10 is probably a better platform for that as several folks have pointed out) but also work the training and by/through/with portion of the COIN fight. After all, the ultimate goal in COIN is for the indigenous forces to be able to stand on their own as part of a legitimate government.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff

06-07-2009, 03:41 AM

I agree with Entropy. For just CAS, the A-10 is perfect, for all the reasons listed... if you're going to buy a decent CAS platform, the speed to cover a wide area is good - otherwise you need to buy more assets to cover the same area.

Good words my friend!

Joining this forum, fun.... Talking of aircraft, great... My two cents......... Worthless. I swear someday they will find a cure for my diarhea of the mouth and brain. I still think that the new Bronco/lightning set-up will be something to behold( if it ever hits the tarmac). I'm just wondering if I'm going to have to spend the rest of my days buzzing in circles, listening to Marshall Tucker, wasting fuel. Maybe I should join CAP... LOL!!!!:wry: I don't know what to do with myself....

Luckroll, where/what are you flying? I can't seem to find an intro from you...

You can introduce yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441).

V/R,

Cliff

luckyroll

06-07-2009, 01:23 PM

Ok, introduced myself for what little it's worth... Ahh, I feel so exposed:D Sorry for that Cliff.
Most of what I am saying is just poking at you gentlemen to get responses from one opinion to the other. I'm trying to stay dynamic, as I usually do, in the what and why. So far, I think I'm loaded on info, atleast for now.

Cliff

06-16-2009, 05:27 AM

Looks like the competition for COIN turboprops is heating up:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124508942994615891.html

Air Tractors are tough planes, but it seems like they would be pretty vulnerable due to being so slow.

Very manouverable though... anyone that's seen one working a field understands why.

I am curious to see how far the re-alignment in defense aerospace swings toward the small wars...

V/R,

Cliff

William F. Owen

06-16-2009, 05:46 AM

I am curious to see how far the re-alignment in defense aerospace swings toward the small wars...

So am I, because the lack of insight so far is quite worrying. Things that fly are utterly irrelevant except for the sensors and the weapons. A Hellfire type weapon does not care if it comes off an MQ-9, C-130, or an A-10.

With over 100 A-10s in service If the US goes out and buys cheap "COIN aircraft" it will be because it wants to, not because it needs to.

slapout9

06-18-2009, 08:15 PM

Counterinsurgency
Is “Air Control” the Answer?
by Major Angelina M. Maguinness, Small Wars Journal

Counterinsurgency: Is “Air Control” the Answer? (Full PDF Article)

Within the last few years, many airpower theorists advocated for the creation of a more air-centric approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. They point to modern airpower successes as the central component in military strategies, such as the successes in Bosnia in 1995, in Kosovo in 1998, and in the air policing operations conducted over Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Other airpower proponents decry the lack of “air-mindedness” and the short attention given to airpower in the 2007 United States (US) Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency. They call for a truly joint COIN doctrine that recognizes and leverages airpower’s combat capabilities instead of relegating its use solely to support for ground forces.

Many of these arguments are reminiscent of the early airpower zealots who believed airpower’s emerging technical capabilities promised less costs in money, lives, and resources with equal or better results than the use of large armies. Airpower, however, is not a cure-all in COIN, as demonstrated by Britain’s foray into colonial policing from 1919 to 1939. These lessons are applicable today, as military leaders continue to explore alternatives and supplements to existing American COIN strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. While there is no doubt airpower plays a prominent role within COIN strategy, airpower’s most prudent use should not be as a primarily offensive weapon but as a component within a restrained combined arms approach.

A far better report with a lot of detailed research is linked below. Including actual messages sent to the population as part of the information campaign. Use of 5 pound bombs to limit damage and Bombing to interrupt as opposed to bombing to damage. Written by a real Air Force Officer not an Intelligence Officer.

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/saas_Theses/SAASS_Out/Longoria/longoria.pdf

Steve Blair

06-18-2009, 08:21 PM

A far better report with a lot of detailed research is linked below. Including actual messages sent to the population as part of the information campaign. Use of 5 pound bombs to limit damage and Bombing to interrupt as opposed to bombing to damage. Written by a real Air Force Officer not an Intelligence Officer.

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/saas_Theses/SAASS_Out/Longoria/longoria.pdf

As opposed to a Real JAG Officer?:D

I actually found Maj Maguinness's article interesting, especially when paired with our own LawVol's offering from a few months back. Perfect? No, but it's refreshing to see someone looking at things other than "bombs on target" and "airpower will win the war." She did a good job of touching on things that do get a longer look in the paper you linked (which is possible when you're working with 72 or so pages as opposed to 10 or so).

Entropy

06-18-2009, 09:30 PM

I plan on reading this tonight but in the meantime could you please explain what a "real" Air Force officer is?

Steve Blair

06-18-2009, 09:36 PM

I plan on reading this tonight but in the meantime could you please explain what a "real" Air Force officer is?

I wondered about that, too. I'm guessing it's a pilot or similar aviator-type.

Not baggin' on ya, slap...just seemed an odd word choice.

Ken White

06-18-2009, 09:37 PM

my day, the CCT Squirrels were accused of being far and away too Army - oriented by the rest of the AF ...:wry:

LawVol

06-19-2009, 01:32 AM

Air policing is a form of law enforcement and it naturally requires some kind of legal authority. Additionally, law enforcement and air policing must proceed on the basis of some form of civil order and on some degree of environmental order. If the policeman is to police there must be an adequate degree of calm in his operational medium. Airpower differentiated itself from ground power because it literally rose above immediate threats on the ground. This allowed it to be used in its most effective manner.

While Longoria is quite correct that legitimate authority is a required precursor to any action, air policing or otherwise, he misses the point of law enforcement. He seeks to use the coerciveness of airpower to effectuate change. This isn't law enforcement. Sure cops bust down doors and get the bad guys, but surely there is much more to it than that (Slap, you're the expert here). Community policing principles teach that interaction of the cop on the beat with the locals creates a bond of trust that helps control crime. This dovetails nicely into traditional COIN principles.

I fail to see how coercive airpower can accomplish this. The author discusses that there are 3 possible coercive mechanisms that airpower can provide: damage, morale and interference. The goal being to disrupt daily life. However, with the inevitable mixture of combatants and civilians, can you really limit the coercion solely to the combatants? In other words, are you cutting off your nose to spite your face? If one believes that COIN means winning over the populace, this isn't the way. As you would expect, I think a softer form of airpower is the answer.

I would also point out that the use of air policing in this fashion would encounter problems from an international law perspective. Obviously, there are situations when steel on target is necessary regardless of the fallout. But as Maguinness indicates, coercive airpower isn't always the answer.

slapout9

06-19-2009, 01:51 AM

I plan on reading this tonight but in the meantime could you please explain what a "real" Air Force officer is?

naturally Ken got it;)
He was a CCT officer,Master Parachutist:),with a combat jump :)obviously a real Air Force Officer.:) of superior intellect and Strategic Thinking ability.

slapout9

06-19-2009, 02:05 AM

While Longoria is quite correct that legitimate authority is a required precursor to any action, air policing or otherwise, he misses the point of law enforcement. He seeks to use the coerciveness of airpower to effectuate change. This isn't law enforcement. Sure cops bust down doors and get the bad guys, but surely there is much more to it than that (Slap, you're the expert here). Community policing principles teach that interaction of the cop on the beat with the locals creates a bond of trust that helps control crime. This dovetails nicely into traditional COIN principles.

I fail to see how coercive airpower can accomplish this. The author discusses that there are 3 possible coercive mechanisms that airpower can provide: damage, morale and interference. The goal being to disrupt daily life. However, with the inevitable mixture of combatants and civilians, can you really limit the coercion solely to the combatants? In other words, are you cutting off your nose to spite your face? If one believes that COIN means winning over the populace, this isn't the way. As you would expect, I think a softer form of airpower is the answer.

I would also point out that the use of air policing in this fashion would encounter problems from an international law perspective. Obviously, there are situations when steel on target is necessary regardless of the fallout. But as Maguinness indicates, coercive airpower isn't always the answer.

Hi John, he also talks about the 3 situations

1-no law and order(small War)
2- some law and order
3- support to existing civil authority

That shaped how Air "Force" would be used. He also points out that there was a political Officer representing the official Government that was in constant contact with the tribal chiefs explaining the benefits and punishments of not following lawful commands.

But the most important part of the paper I thought was the Strategic Catechism at the end. The questions you should ask to determine IF Air Policing is even feasible! The answer is....all depends on the situation. My Opinion... in Iraq no, In Afghanistan it may be a viable option. But we need some better Intelligence to determine the answer.

Ken White

06-19-2009, 02:22 AM

.... My Opinion... in Iraq no, In Afghanistan it may be a viable option. But we need some better Intelligence to determine the answer.use air power for 'policing' is unlikely. The Afghans are pretty wily and more than willing to shop each other.

Add to that the lack of infrastructure to target, the dispersion factor (by five categories -- individual, family, clan, tribe, race -- and geographically, that's a big country, about 1.5 times the size of Iraq), the essential rural nature and location of most of the populace and the terrain and I'm doubtful it could be made to work.

Why do you think it might?

slapout9

06-19-2009, 03:25 AM

use air power for 'policing' is unlikely. The Afghans are pretty wily and more than willing to shop each other.

Add to that the lack of infrastructure to target, the dispersion factor (by five categories -- individual, family, clan, tribe, race -- and geographically, that's a big country, about 1.5 times the size of Iraq), the essential rural nature and location of most of the populace and the terrain and I'm doubtful it could be made to work.

Why do you think it might?

It might not work but I was thinking Kinda of like an invasion remix. Use SF/or whatever teams to engage the Tribes gain their support. Air power to handle any group that becomes big enough to target or threatens the engeagement teams. Also provide resupply and IRS.

But we need to get rid of the Political Objective of turning them into a Democracy. Don't think that will happen in my lifetime unless they choose that for themselves. But that is the first question that needs to be answered what is the Political Objective.

Influencing the Tribes is the key IMO. Air power may be able to pull that off.

jmm99

06-19-2009, 04:06 AM

appears to be this, based on GEN McChrystal's Guidance (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=74720&postcount=22):

Success will be defined by the Afghan people's freedom to choose their future--freedom from coercion, extremists, malign foreign influence, or abusive government actions.

The course of action appears to be:

The ongoing insurgency must be met with a counterinsurgency campaign adapted to the unique conditions in each area that:

- Protects the Afghan people--allowing them to choose a future they can be proud of

- Provides a secure environment allowing good government and economic development to undercut the causes and advocates of insurgency

-----------------------
PS: The Longoria article reminded me of The Lost Patrol (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Lost_Patrol_(1934_film)) (yup, I'm a John Ford - Victor McLaglan fan), where RAF Air Control did not fare too well.

William F. Owen

06-19-2009, 04:48 AM

Actually, I thought this officer did a god job of telling the truth about the RAF's contribution to inter-war small wars, as being practically zero.

Problem is, that the RAF flat outs lies about history when it suits them. Having less than a 100 years of it, (of which only 3 are serious fighting) it gets spotted pretty quickly, compared to the Army or Navy!

slapout9

06-19-2009, 06:15 AM

Wilf, what would the dead German Guy do in Afghanistan?

William F. Owen

06-19-2009, 01:14 PM

Wilf, what would the dead German Guy do in Afghanistan?

Well he's a dead Prussian, so not quite the same sort of chap as the current Germans... That aside....

I think, he would say.

The war has to be won before anything else happens - and it is a war.
That the policy (what ever that is) can only succeed once the Taliban(s) are defeated.
All national resources should be harnessed to something that is of national importance.

.... so if winning in A'Stan is so important, how come the US is using about 1/8th of the resources it put towards WW2 or Vietnam?

LawVol

06-19-2009, 01:21 PM

I don't know that "air policing" as he defines it would ever truly work. Maybe I'm misreading, but it seems that his examples are more "air substitution." Restoring or maintaining civil order requires much more than a heavy hand. I found it interesting that he used the hammer-nail analogy with respect to land power when his examples imply the opposite.

Using an air sustitution policy, however, could work in some instances since it is essentially punitive operations. To me the key difference in determining whether air substitution is appropriate is your desired end state. If you simply want to give the equivalent of a spanking in an attempt to dissuade future conduct, it may be appropriate. However, if you want to change or improve an existing government (as in both Afghanistan and Iraq) then it is not feasible.

Basically, it is Iraq pre and post invasion. Operations Northern and Southern Watch were air substitution operations aimed at containing Saddam's military. After the invasion, the goal became something quite different and while airpower certainly has a role, it isn't as police IMO. Its like the old saying: you catch more flies with honey. Longoria only discusses using airpower as vinegar, but I want to spread a little honey around. :)

Steve Blair

06-19-2009, 02:14 PM

naturally Ken got it
He was a CCT officer,Master Parachutist:),with a combat jump :)obviously a real Air Force Officer.:) of superior intellect and Strategic Thinking ability.

But he has no air-to-air kills....so he's clearly NOT a REAL Air Force officer....;)

Steve Blair

06-19-2009, 02:18 PM

Basically, it is Iraq pre and post invasion. Operations Northern and Southern Watch were air substitution operations aimed at containing Saddam's military. After the invasion, the goal became something quite different and while airpower certainly has a role, it isn't as police IMO. Its like the old saying: you catch more flies with honey. Longoria only discusses using airpower as vinegar, but I want to spread a little honey around. :)

Quite so, and that was one of the reasons I really liked your article. The AF needs to remember the Berlin Airlift, and not just as a "feel good" lead-in to their role as an independent service. It's odd that of all the services it's the Navy that seems to have best grasped the humanitarian aid component of military service.

Entropy

06-19-2009, 02:35 PM

Liked the Longoria paper, the Maguinness was just ok. This line is particularly shallow:

Many of these arguments are reminiscent of the early airpower zealots who believed airpower’s emerging technical capabilities promised less costs in money, lives, and resources with equal or better results than the use of large armies.

Perhaps reminiscent in the author's mind, but not everyone's.

Personally, I don't like the term "air policing." It conjures up the wrong sort of images. One crticisim of the Longoria paper is that I think he defines "policing" much too broadly. By his definition, one could argue the entire Korean war was a policing effort and not a major war. I'm not convinced that OSW/ONW were "policing" operations.

IMO, true "policing" cannot be accomplished by air power.

Bob's World

06-19-2009, 02:52 PM

I plan on reading this tonight but in the meantime could you please explain what a "real" Air Force officer is?

you run the risk of bumping into all kinds of oxymorons when you start mixing terms like "military" and "Intelligence" or "Airforce" and "Officer"...Slap should know better...

(But just as I would remind my good buddies at PACFLEET when they would come up with their latest scheme to resolve populace based conflicts through naval power: "Insurgency doesn't happen at sea." I would just add here, "it doesn't happen in the air either.")

It happens among the populace, and one has to operate among the populace to resolve it.

slapout9

06-19-2009, 03:20 PM

you run the risk of bumping into all kinds of oxymorons when you start mixing terms like "military" and "Intelligence" or "Airforce" and "Officer"...Slap should know better...

Spilled my coffee over that one:D:D

LawVol

06-19-2009, 05:31 PM

Quite so, and that was one of the reasons I really liked your article. The AF needs to remember the Berlin Airlift, and not just as a "feel good" lead-in to their role as an independent service. It's odd that of all the services it's the Navy that seems to have best grasped the humanitarian aid component of military service.

Admiral Stavridis, recently of Southern Command, has proposed a Humanitarian Service Group which is essentially configured like a carrier group but for humanitarian missions. It could be used in some COIN situations.

The story is here. (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/page/2/) It's the fourth one down.

Entropy

06-19-2009, 05:42 PM

Steve Blair

06-19-2009, 05:53 PM

Humanitarian work is all well and good, but it is, and should be, a secondary mission for a military force. Therefore, if the US wants to create and fund a dedicated "humanitarian" capability, it should not do so under the DoD.

And I can imagine the screaming when DoD's budget is reduced to fund such an agency.

Not arguing with you, but pointing out that funds for such an activity have to come from somewhere...and DoD is the most likely candidate (as it should be if a secondary activity is being removed and refocused with a different agency). We should be facing some hard choices like this, but I strongly suspect that we won't, and the military will continue to be tasked with aid missions. Stavridis's proposal is, I suspect, tacit recognition of this reality and an attempt to tailor a force package for it.

jmm99

06-19-2009, 06:54 PM

.... so if winning in A'Stan is so important, how come the US is using about 1/8th of the resources it put towards WW2 or Vietnam?

I expect the dead German guy would deliver a little lecture on the reality of allies delivering lesser input than when they are the principal targets. In terms of national interests, the relative importance to NATO countries is far different from the "national" interests of the Karzai government.

I expect that this is a general rule in insurgencies (as well as in allied coalitions in the more conventional arena). The HN has a vital interest (survival interest to the incumbant government); whereas the assisting nation does not have as vital an interest. The insurgency often has a survival interest. Lots of different trinities - the little magnets are far from being the same.

Thoughts ?

Entropy

06-19-2009, 07:41 PM

Steve Blair

06-19-2009, 08:08 PM

Steve,

The military will always be a go-to player when necessary, but there's a big difference between preparing to do humanitarian missions on an ad hoc basis with capabilities primarily designed for military roles and creating a dedicated humanitarian capability within the military.

I understand that, but as the need or policy need for humanitarian ops increases, there will be hard choices to be made. That was my point. The military may have to give up a bit of the resource pie to make room for a new organization.

Fuchs

06-19-2009, 09:31 PM

Well he's a dead Prussian, so not quite the same sort of chap as the current Germans... That aside....

I think, he would say.

The war has to be won before anything else happens - and it is a war.
That the policy (what ever that is) can only succeed once the Taliban(s) are defeated.
All national resources should be harnessed to something that is of national importance.

.... so if winning in A'Stan is so important, how come the US is using about 1/8th of the resources it put towards WW2 or Vietnam?

Actually, Total War theory isn't as old as the Prussian guy - it appeared with Luddendorff. I don't recall that the Prussian had paid much attention to the mobilization of civilian resources.
A Chinese had some remarks about this, though. He emphasized that states must not exhaust themselves or else they would make themselves vulnerable to other foes.

The Prussian guy would probably have said that the AFG scenario is something that he still had to add to his book (because he didn't think much about insurgencies as the Spanish one when writing his book draft before that stupid epidemic interrupted him).

Besides, he might have pointed out that it's not very fruitful to fight against the friend of an enemy even though this friend is far away and no threat in himself.

Ken White

06-19-2009, 09:56 PM

I think, he would say.

The war has to be won before anything else happens - and it is a war.
That the policy (what ever that is) can only succeed once the Taliban(s) are defeated.
All national resources should be harnessed to something that is of national importance.

.... so if winning in A'Stan is so important, how come the US is using about 1/8th of the resources it put towards WW2 or Vietnam?

Agree.
Don't think they can be 'defeated.' Rendered virtually impotent? Probably.
I'd paraphrase that; "National resources should be devoted to to something in proportion to their gross importance."
... I think that's being done and I'd guess the Afghanistan and Iraq efforts through 2015 at about 30-33% of the WW II dollar cost (for the US, estimated at about 40%+ of GDP annually for over ~$6.1T total IIRC. Other Nations had it far rougher). No sense even trying to compare human totals and costs.

Compared to Viet Nam where we spent almost 9% of GDP average for the build up period, we're spending less than 5% annually today. In dollar terms, VN cost ~$518.B (in then dollars, ~$2.5T today) and Afghanistan and Iraq will come in at slightly less than that, I expect. Again, no comparison on personnel and casualty numbers. While Afghanistan is more complex than was Viet Nam, it's importance to the US is about the same and we're applying resources in proportion.

Carl would not approve -- I don't approve -- but we have little other choice in our response to things from South Asia or the ME due to pathetically poor planning on our part, said poor planning induced by an electoral system that moves the deck chairs every 2 years to at least some extent. ;)

That and a culture that tries to ignore things (and places. And methods...) it does not like in hopes they will go away... :D

Eet's hokay -- we cobble while hobbled well. Be nice if we didn't have to do that but... :(

(Yes, that's inefficient guvmint but we like it. Usually. :cool: )

Ken White

06-19-2009, 10:00 PM

Besides, he might have pointed out that it's not very fruitful to fight against the friend of an enemy even though this friend is far away and no threat in himself.fruitfulness is not one of our important tenets... :D

Payback is one.

And yes, that means we get trapped in messy situations. :wry:

Uboat509

06-19-2009, 11:24 PM

Humanitarian work is all well and good, but it is, and should be, a secondary mission for a military force. Therefore, if the US wants to create and fund a dedicated "humanitarian" capability, it should not do so under the DoD.

This isn't going to happen, not in today's political climate. If it was even proposed by President Obama the right would be begin to howl that he was creating another bloated government agency and the left would howl that we are done fighting "wars of aggression" and that we therefore don't need an organization designed to deal with the aftermath of those wars.

SFC W

jmm99

06-20-2009, 12:43 AM

the old German-Prussian had quite a bit to say about "the mobilization of civilian resources" - Chapter XXVI, Arming the Nation (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK6ch26.html).

A PEOPLE'S war in civilised Europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. It has its advocates and its opponents: the latter either considering it in a political sense as a revolutionary means, a state of anarchy declared lawful, which is as dangerous as a foreign enemy to social order at home; or on military grounds, conceiving that the result is not commensurate with the expenditure of the nation's strength. The first point does not concern us here, for we look upon a people's war merely as a means of fighting, therefore, in its connection with the enemy; but with regard to the latter point, we must observe that a people's war in general is to be regarded as a consequence of the outburst which the military element in our day has made through its old formal limits; as an expansion and strengthening of the whole fermentation-process which we call war. The requisition system, the immense increase in the size of armies by means of that system, and the general liability to military service, the utilizing militia, are all things which lie in the same direction, if we make the limited military system of former days our starting point; and the levée en masse, or arming of the people, now lies also in the same direction. If the first named of these new aids to war are the natural and necessary consequences of barriers thrown down; and if they have so enormously increased the power of those who first used them, that the enemy has been carried along in the current, and obliged to adopt them likewise, this will be the case also with people-wars. In the generality of cases, the people who make judicious use of this means, will gain a proportionate superiority over those who despise its use. If this be so, then the only question is whether this modern intensification of the military element is, upon the whole, salutary for the interests of humanity or otherwise,—a question which it would be about as easy to answer as the question of war itself—we leave both to philosophers. But the opinion may be advanced, that the resources swallowed up in people's wars might be more profitably employed, if used in providing other military means; no very deep investigation, however, is necessary to be convinced that these resources are for the most part not disposable, and cannot be utilized in an arbitrary manner at pleasure. One essential part that is the moral element, is not called into existence until this kind of employment for it arises. ... [goes on for more paragraphs]

CvC in Book 8 (the key to the whole) emphasized that the switch of the Allies toward mass mobilization was a key factor in defeating Napoleon. That process began in Prussia with military reform (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_von_Clausewitz) under:

General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the future first chief of staff of the new Prussian Army (appointed 1809). Clausewitz, along with Hermann von Boyen (1771–1848) and Karl von Grolman (1777–1843), were Scharnhorst's primary allies in his efforts to reform the Prussian army, between 1807 and 1814.

The Landwehr (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landwehr) was one aspect of Scharnhorst's modernization.

--------------------------

"total war (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war)" - 1936 publication of General Ludendorff’s World War I memoir Der Totale Krieg.

Fuchs

06-20-2009, 01:10 AM

@Jmm99:
That was pretty much about manpower mobilization, not really about other kinds of resources. The concern was numbers on campaign, not resources.
Keep in mind that Wellington's artillery at Waterloo was equivalent to a single Man-o-war's artillery. The only really expensive needs of armies were pay and hay.

Both WW (and Wilf used a WW2 reference) were coined by a transformation of peacetime economy to a wartime economy; military hardware and consumables became a huge portion of national economic output.

There was no such thing before 1915. In fact, the share of survival-related production (food, clothes, housing) was too large to allow for any major economy conversion prior to the late industrial revolution.

Btw; wow, the English translation is a horrible lecture.

Compared to Viet Nam where we spent almost 9% of GDP average for the build up period, we're spending less than 5% annually today.

Forget about the 4.x % figure, it's a myth.
The U.S. has much more military expenditures than the basic DoD's budget.
One of many additions that point this out: http://preview.tinyurl.com/lnx7rc
The real military expenditures are close to a trillion USD annually.

The real percentage in 2010 will be about 7% (if the economy stagnates) - plus supplemental expenses.
The 'defense' spending is incredibly inefficient in the USA.

jmm99

06-20-2009, 01:25 AM

from Fuchs
Keep in mind that Wellington's artillery at Waterloo was equivalent to a single Man-o-war's artillery. The only really expensive needs of armies were pay and hay.

Both WW (and Wilf used a WW2 reference) were coined by a transformation of peacetime economy to a wartime economy; military hardware and consumables became a huge portion of national economic output.

There was no such thing before 1915. In fact, the share of survival-related production (food, clothes, housing) was too large to allow for any major economy conversion prior to the late industrial revolution.

for the above ?

Ken White

06-20-2009, 01:57 AM

Forget about the 4.x % figure, it's a myth.
The U.S. has much more military expenditures than the basic DoD's budget.
One of many additions that point this out: http://preview.tinyurl.com/lnx7rc The real military expenditures are close to a trillion USD annually.

The real percentage in 2010 will be about 7% (if the economy stagnates) - plus supplemental expenses.
The 'defense' spending is incredibly inefficient in the USA.In reverse order, yes, our defense spending is terribly inefficient, no question. :mad:

However your "close to a trillion USD" is possible only if you count the Veteran's Administration, the Department of Energy and a half dozen other things as part of Defense. You may do that if you wish but it will skew your perceptions even more. :eek:

Lastly, the suggestion: IMO, Winslow Wheeler has far less credibility than Sacha Baron Cohen. He's a hack. If you read him a lot and believe what you read, you'll really get a distorted view. You should probably not put too much faith in his writing even if he does say things many like to hear. :wry:

Fuchs

06-20-2009, 03:20 AM

His sum was just one of several examples.

-> PM (offtopic)

William F. Owen

06-20-2009, 07:35 AM

The Prussian guy would probably have said that the AFG scenario is something that he still had to add to his book (because he didn't think much about insurgencies as the Spanish one when writing his book draft before that stupid epidemic interrupted him).

... and that raises an interesting point. A lot of folks go "CvC never mentioned insurgencies." True but that makes no difference. He covers all the issues that pertain to fighting insurgencies, because insurgencies are wars. War is War. There are only differing forms of warfare. That highlights a number of issues that go to how the US understands or talks about insurgencies.
FM3-24 alludes to this being the case, but that begs more questions than the book can answer, because it starts from the wrong place, answering the wrong question. You get into problems once you start down the "armed social work" and "competition for the soul of the people" malarky.

CvC would look at any insurgency and say "so what?" or "Dumkopf! Das ist Krieg!" :)
An insurgent is a military opponent. He needs to be fought by the ways and means appropriate to his nature, but he must be fought!
So, you do not use means that defeat or undermine the nature of your policy, but nearly all conflicts see political restrictions in the use of force. Why the US did not use Nukes in Vietnam or Korea? = Politics. No politics, no war.

NATO will never commit the neccessary level of resources to A'Stan, because,

The US experts keeps telling them it's not a military problem ("the solution is only 15% military") - so no need to provide more troops.
There is no domestic or international political imperative to win. NATO could be defeated and no one in Europe would care. The US would not be less safe than it already is, etc etc..

Sorry to ramble, but basically CvC is right again....

William F. Owen

06-20-2009, 07:40 AM

Don't think they can be 'defeated.' Rendered virtually impotent? Probably.
I'd paraphrase that; "National resources should be devoted to to something in proportion to their gross importance."

Carl would not approve --
Well impotence would equal their defeat, via exhaustion, or irrelevance, so I'd be happy with that end state.
I'd very much agree on the national resources side. - see my other post.
...and Carl would not approve, but he would understand.

slapout9

06-21-2009, 02:39 PM

The New Army/Air Police:).......Bring The Rain.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5KwiC-JiS8&feature=rec-HM-fresh+div

Entropy

06-21-2009, 11:29 PM

The New Army/Air Police:).......Bring The Rain.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5KwiC-JiS8&feature=rec-HM-fresh+div

Ah, that movie was beautiful propaganda for the Air Force. The next one is rumored to be even bigger.

PINT

06-22-2009, 04:56 PM

I am pleased to see comment and discussion spurred by my paper written and published under duress. I appreciate the substantive comments, both positive and negative. Intent was to spur discussion...

Entropy - interested in your comment regarding my assertion that the arguments from those who advocate moving to an air centric approach to COIN is similar to those pushed early on in airpower's history (often stating that airpower would negate the need for armies and navies). I see some modern theorists advocating a purely airpower approach to COIN (like Phillip Meilinger) in similar language and for similar reasons (current public opinion does not have the patience or stomach for long-term boots on the ground). What are your thoughts on this?

Again, thanks for the discussion and comments.

"Fake" USAF officer out. :cool:

PINT

06-22-2009, 05:01 PM

Humanitarian work is all well and good, but it is, and should be, a secondary mission for a military force. Therefore, if the US wants to create and fund a dedicated "humanitarian" capability, it should not do so under the DoD.

Agreed - should be a secondary effort. Unfortunately, the DOD tends to have the preponderance of the assets, capabilities, personnel and money to accomplish HA/DR. I agree that ideally HA/DR opeations should be handled by "someone else"...however, until this someone else emerges, DOD will likely be the go to support to USAID and other entities for these efforts.

PINT

06-22-2009, 05:02 PM

Steve Blair

06-22-2009, 05:04 PM

Agreed - should be a secondary effort. Unfortunately, the DOD tends to have the preponderance of the assets, capabilities, personnel and money to accomplish HA/DR. I agree that ideally HA/DR opeations should be handled by "someone else"...however, until this someone else emerges, DOD will likely be the go to support to USAID and other entities for these efforts.

And I seriously doubt that DoD will be willing to give up the money needed to fund that "someone else." There's only so much to go around, and if HA/DR does become a major foreign policy factor, then it's almost inevitable that DoD will either need to spin up a structure to deal with it or give up resources to a new (or modified/enhanced existing) organization. That's a condensed version to be sure, but it seems to be the road ahead.

Entropy

06-22-2009, 06:45 PM

...and defending your work. It's always nice to get the author's perspective directly.

Entropy - interested in your comment regarding my assertion that the arguments from those who advocate moving to an air centric approach to COIN is similar to those pushed early on in airpower's history (often stating that airpower would negate the need for armies and navies). I see some modern theorists advocating a purely airpower approach to COIN (like Phillip Meilinger) in similar language and for similar reasons (current public opinion does not have the patience or stomach for long-term boots on the ground). What are your thoughts on this?

How many modern theorists are actually advocating a pure air power approach to COIN besides Phillip Meilinger? Even General Dunlap does not go that far. Those are the two names I consistently hear about. Who, besides these two, are you talking about when you mention the "many" theorists/proponents in the opening paragraphs of your article?

In my view most air power "proponents" are instead making arguments about the relative emphasis and value of air power in the combined-arms team, which is far different from modern-day Douhet-ism. And early air power advocates were not always wrong - just look at Billy Mitchell's fight with the US Navy over air power and the capital ship in the 1920's.

Many of these arguments are reminiscent of the early airpower zealots who believed airpower’s emerging technical capabilities promised less costs in money, lives, and resources with equal or better results than the use of large armies.

I'm not sure why that belief is so controversial because it's true. It's why we fight wars with combined arms and not masses of infantry. Artillery, armor, air power, etc. actually do reduce costs, particularly lives. If they weren't better in terms of costs, we wouldn't be using them. This is borne-out by experience war. In Afghanistan, for example, there were a few instances that I'm aware of where coalition forces would have been overrun were it not for the intervention of air power and/or artillery. In Afghanistan it's primarily air power that prevents the enemy from massing against us.

Entropy

06-22-2009, 06:49 PM

And I seriously doubt that DoD will be willing to give up the money needed to fund that "someone else." There's only so much to go around, and if HA/DR does become a major foreign policy factor, then it's almost inevitable that DoD will either need to spin up a structure to deal with it or give up resources to a new (or modified/enhanced existing) organization. That's a condensed version to be sure, but it seems to be the road ahead.

It's not a question of the DoD giving up money. The reality is that the American people are not interested in funding such a capability no matter what department the money comes from. For the same reasons, we won't be seeing a dedicated HA/DR capability within the military anytime soon.

PINT

06-22-2009, 10:03 PM

I'm not sure why that belief is so controversial because it's true. It's why we fight wars with combined arms and not masses of infantry. Artillery, armor, air power, etc. actually do reduce costs, particularly lives. If they weren't better in terms of costs, we wouldn't be using them. This is borne-out by experience war. In Afghanistan, for example, there were a few instances that I'm aware of where coalition forces would have been overrun were it not for the intervention of air power and/or artillery. In Afghanistan it's primarily air power that prevents the enemy from massing against us.

You will get no disagreement from me with this. However, my point was airpower cannot be used as the ONLY weapon - it must be a joint fight. I still have pilot peers of mine who believe we would do better to have an all out airpower strategy than continuing to support ground operations. That somehow airpower in support of and as a force multiplier of ground operations is not true airpower.

Good comments and definitely some things to think on and consider as I continue to learn and reframe.

slapout9

06-23-2009, 12:09 AM

I am pleased to see comment and discussion spurred by my paper written and published under duress. I appreciate the substantive comments, both positive and negative. Intent was to spur discussion...

Again, thanks for the discussion and comments.

"Fake" USAF officer out. :cool:

Hi Pint, welcome to the council. As part of your reframing I hope you can watch the listed show below on Wednesday 24 Jun 09 on the National Geographic Channel. The title is CIA Confidential The Hunt for Bin Laden, but you could easily call it Airpower and Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict. Link is below.

Entropy you should watch this to!

http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/series/cia-confidential/4199/Overview

As for the paper.... the only Air Police are the Sky Marshals that catch hi-jackers.:D
I thought The paper was significant due to the targeting concept they used as in they targeted tibal leadership for a Political Effect!!! as opposed to just bombing targets.

Again, welcome to the council.....you are not to far from Montgomery, if you are ever near this area stop by for some Strategic Education and Dang good Bar-B-Que:wry:

PINT

06-23-2009, 12:32 AM

Hi Pint, welcome to the council. As part of your reframing I hope you can watch the listed show below on Wednesday 24 Jun 09 on the National Geographic Channel. The title is CIA Confidential The Hunt for Bin Laden, but you could easily call it Airpower and Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict. Link is below.

Entropy you should watch this to!

http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/series/cia-confidential/4199/Overview

As for the paper.... the only Air Police are the Sky Marshals that catch hi-jackers.:D
I thought The paper was significant due to the targeting concept they used as in they targeted tibal leadership for a Political Effect!!! as opposed to just bombing targets.

Again, welcome to the council.....you are not to far from Montgomery, if you are ever near this area stop by for some Strategic Education and Dang good Bar-B-Que:wry:

Thanks for the tip...I live with the man who actually did that in real life...heard all the stories from him and I get plenty of opportunities to hear how this book and that GO got the story all wrong from his perspective. It will certainly be a good thing to watch with him, as I'm sure I'll get to hear how accurate the portrayal is... ;)

As far as coming to Montgomery, thanks for the invite. While I have enjoyed previous experiences there, I am hoping for a change in venue for my next academic experience...maybe I can write another paper, but this time piss off the other three services...and throw the USCG in as well for good measure. :D

Cheers,
PINT

Entropy

06-23-2009, 01:11 AM

Slap, thanks for the link - I'll be sure to watch or, more likely, DVR and watch later.

PINT,

Thanks for the comments. Stick around, we can use more intel and AF types around here.

William F. Owen

06-23-2009, 05:09 AM

I still have pilot peers of mine who believe we would do better to have an all out airpower strategy than continuing to support ground operations. That somehow airpower in support of and as a force multiplier of ground operations is not true airpower.

As you probably know, that is a problem with pilots. It's Air Support, not Air Power. Air Superiority is merely a means by which Air Support is enabled. Air Support, like artillery support or naval support is vastly important. You must have it to win, but it's still support, not power.

I have asserted that fact several times to UK military audiences and the only negative reaction is from RAF Pilots. RAF officers in general can live with this fact, but Pilots have some level of emotional buy-in that makes it very hard for them to live with.

slapout9

06-23-2009, 12:38 PM

Thanks for the tip...I live with the man who actually did that in real life...heard all the stories from him and I get plenty of opportunities to hear how this book and that GO got the story all wrong from his perspective. It will certainly be a good thing to watch with him, as I'm sure I'll get to hear how accurate the portrayal is... ;)

Cheers,
PINT

If he watches the program I hope we will get an After Action Review for it's accuracy.....not that the CIA would lie or anything:D

PINT

06-23-2009, 08:11 PM

As you probably know, that is a problem with pilots. It's Air Support, not Air Power. Air Superiority is merely a means by which Air Support is enabled. Air Support, like artillery support or naval support is vastly important. You must have it to win, but it's still support, not power.

I have asserted that fact several times to UK military audiences and the only negative reaction is from RAF Pilots. RAF officers in general can live with this fact, but Pilots have some level of emotional buy-in that makes it very hard for them to live with.

Hmmm, maybe I am misunderstanding your point but...as an Airman, I believe Airpower is comprised of many components - some kinetic and some non-kinetic. Air superiority missions are a component of Airpower as are CAS, ISR, and airlift missions. There is just a difference in the degree of "sexiness" of those Airpower missions for some Airmen (read: some fighter pilots). BL: Airpower is about delivering effects from the air (kinetic and non-kinetic).

I think one of the problems we have in the USAF is being tied to the machine versus the ideal...what I mean is, some Airmen are more in love with the flying part over the Airpower effects part. While I believe you can't have one without the other, there are some that might sacrifice optimal Airpower effects for the ability to continue flying their aircraft of choice. I could go on about this (and will if I am not clearly articulating my point satisfactorily), but will spare you.

My humble opinion...:wry: