Afghanistan indicators

[Rex Brynen]

(with apologies if someone already posted this)

Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera, and Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 (http://www.brookings.edu/%7E/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf) Afghanistan, Brookings Institution, 21 January 2010.

No analysis, just numbers/graphs/charts/etc... useful raw material (if used cautiously), updated weekly here (http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx).

[Rex Brynen]

Security in Afghanistan Is Deteriorating, Aid Groups Say (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?ref=global-home)

Adam Ferguson for The New York Times

By ROD NORDLAND
New York Times
Published: September 11, 2010


KABUL, Afghanistan — Even as more American troops flow into the country, Afghanistan is more dangerous than it has ever been during this war, with security deteriorating in recent months, according to international organizations and humanitarian groups.

Large parts of the country that were once completely safe, like most of the northern provinces, now have a substantial Taliban presence — even in areas where there are few Pashtuns, who previously were the Taliban’s only supporters. As NATO forces poured in and shifted to the south to battle the Taliban in their stronghold, the Taliban responded with a surge of their own, greatly increasing their activities in the north and parts of the east.

The worsening security comes as the Obama administration is under increasing pressure to show results to maintain public support for the war, and raises serious concerns about whether the country can hold legitimate nationwide elections for Parliament next Saturday.

Unarmed government employees can no longer travel safely in 30 percent of the country’s 368 districts, according to published United Nations estimates, and there are districts deemed too dangerous to visit in all but one of the country’s 34 provinces.

The number of insurgent attacks has increased significantly; in August 2009, insurgents carried out 630 attacks. This August, they initiated at least 1,353, according to the Afghan N.G.O. Safety Office, an independent organization financed by Western governments and agencies to monitor safety for aid workers....

[Bob's World]

Kabul, Afghanistan (CNN) -- The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus, told CNN Saturday the Taliban's momentum in Afghanistan has "broadly been arrested" in some locations.
As another fighting season comes to a close, and the rank and file fighters return to their villages and mid-level leaders return to Pakistan, this assessment:

Petraeus: Progress being made in Afghanistan From Barbara Starr, CNN October 31, 2010

"My assessment is that the momentum the Taliban enjoyed until probably late summer has broadly been arrested in the country," Petraeus said. "It doesn't mean it's been arrested in every location in the country, but it means by and large that is the case, and moreover, more importantly, the ISAF and Afghan forces have achieved momentum in some very important areas."


In related news, as Winter draws near, scientists see signs of progress on Global Warming...


(I actually had an Army 1-star in a very critical position in Afghanistan proclaim that he did not "believe in the fighting season," as clearly the weather was not prohibitive to fighting in the winter in Southern Afghanistan. Now that he has been there a full year his assessment may have changed; or perhaps he is the one who used this natural reduction of OPTEMPO to brief GEN Peraeus on the progress made for his end of tour OER...)

[Infanteer]

Having sat through the end and beginning of a fighting season and having soldiers with previous tours through the fighting season, I can catagorically state that there is a fighting season in Afghanistan.

Most Kandaharis I spolke to said that, at least for the greenzones in the south, it was much a factor about the available cover to fight from as it was to the temperature. Afghan insurgents are extremely exposed from the air in the winter, in the summer traditional shoot-and-scoot tactics become easy. The mountains to the east probably feature a bit of a different dynamic.

Here are photos to illustrate the difference between December and May.

[Bob's World]

MG Nick Carter recently changed command after a great year commanding RC-south. A good man and a great man both, and that is rare. His comments at his change of command are worth the read, and he gave full import to calulating the fighting season effect into any assessments of progress:

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/RecentCommanderInSouthernAfghanistanReportsOnProgr ess.htm

To "General Nick", sir, it was an honor and a pleasure to serve with you.

[Infanteer]

To "General Nick", sir, it was an honor and a pleasure to serve with you.

+1 to that. Although there was a bit of a gulf between Platoon and Division Commander, I enjoyed the few times I met MGen Carter; he was my guest for an afternoon once. He certainly had a way of getting to the point and certainly felt there was some good direction coming from RC(S); it was nice to see that it wasn't a mailbox as was the case previously.

[Bob's World]

Shared here is a slide from a presentation I am preparing promote a proposal for a more effective way ahead in Afghanistan. Many are cheering the successes of the past year, while calmer heads, notably GEN Petraeus and MG Nick Carter, are taking an optimistic "wait and see what next fighting season brings" approach.

My position is that this insurgency is best seen in two distinct tiers. The upper tier being a revolutionary insurgency driven by the Quetta Shura primarily, with largely political issues of causation. The rank and file that the brunt of the COIN surge is directed against, are what I call the lower tier, and are in essence a resistance insurgency. This is an effort to depict how increased foreign presence and effort affects a resistance insurgency.

The 66% increase in violent attacks is clear. What will happen next year is less clear, and I submit will be impacted far more by how we engage the high-level political drivers between Karzai and the Quetta Shura than by any nation building or security efforts in the rural areas.

[Ken White]

Be interesting to show the changing percentages of local vs. foreign forces initiations of contact. I do not disagree with final your point but a higher percentage of ISAF intiations is quite likely to affect the real meaning of your depiction of data.

[JMA]

Shared here is a slide from a presentation I am preparing promote a proposal for a more effective way ahead in Afghanistan. Many are cheering the successes of the past year, while calmer heads, notably GEN Petraeus and MG Nick Carter, are taking an optimistic "wait and see what next fighting season brings" approach.

My position is that this insurgency is best seen in two distinct tiers. The upper tier being a revolutionary insurgency driven by the Quetta Shura primarily, with largely political issues of causation. The rank and file that the brunt of the COIN surge is directed against, are what I call the lower tier, and are in essence a resistance insurgency. This is an effort to depict how increased foreign presence and effort affects a resistance insurgency.

The 66% increase in violent attacks is clear. What will happen next year is less clear, and I submit will be impacted far more by how we engage the high-level political drivers between Karzai and the Quetta Shura than by any nation building or security efforts in the rural areas.

Lets not dress the Taliban up in clothes that are not theirs. They are primarily a mercenary force being paid (partially out of the proceeds of the drug trade) and using nationalism and a bunch of other reasons to cover this in a shroud of patriotism. The first step would be to put the word out (and to scale up for it) that there will be no poppy crop next year come hell or high water. The failure to address the poppy and drug issues in Afghanistan will go down as the single most insane US political decision of this war. Still waiting to see how far the corruption has spread in this regard.

[Bob's World]

This isn't Sierra Leone, which I would not classify as an insurgency at all, but rather just a power/money grab. There is a difference. Mexico is not insurgency either for similar reasons.

There is a very real resistance insurgency in Afghanistan. Do many participate in the resistance for a paycheck? Absolutely. They are Pashtun, and to fight an invader is far more honorable than to essentially be a reservation indian back in the village cleaning out irrigation canals for coalition "cash for work" program.

As to the poppy, I was always taught "never make a rule you are either unable or unwilling to enforce." I assure you, GIORA has no desire to kill this multi-Billion dollar industry, and EVERYONE in power (formal or informal) profits from this; and the Coalition would literally be waist deep in muddy fields of IEDs and sniper fire for little gain. The opening days of the Marjah campaign were like that, and it was ugly.

No, my assessment is accurate. The way to pull the plug on this is not by eradicating poppy, but rather by focusing on the top tier revolutionary aspect of the insurgency. The key there is reconciliation. Sooner than later this will be what we do. It's not a copout, its just the smart way to solve this type of problem.

[Dayuhan]

What will happen next year is less clear, and I submit will be impacted far more by how we engage the high-level political drivers between Karzai and the Quetta Shura than by any nation building or security efforts in the rural areas.


The way to pull the plug on this is not by eradicating poppy, but rather by focusing on the top tier revolutionary aspect of the insurgency. The key there is reconciliation. Sooner than later this will be what we do. It's not a copout, its just the smart way to solve this type of problem.

Do you believe that either Karzai or the Quetta Shura has any desire for reconciliation, as anything but a transient step toward full control?

The "high level political driver" between Karzai and the Quetta Shura seems pretty clear. They both want power, all of it. They both can't have it. They will fight until someone wins and the winner will take all. That's how they do it. That may change, likely over a few generations, but we aren't going to change it. I'd really like to believe that the QS are a bunch of reasonable people who would happily settle for representation in government and a share of the power, but I doubt that's the case.

It takes two to reconcile, and I'm not sure we even have one that's willing. For sure people will be willing to talk about it, and even to make a show of pursuing it, if they see an opportunity to advance their desire for complete power. That doesn't mean there's any real interest.

[William F. Owen]

This isn't Sierra Leone, which I would not classify as an insurgency at all, but rather just a power/money grab. There is a difference. Mexico is not insurgency either for similar reasons.
Since when were insurgencies not an attempt to seize power?

The COIN crowd never want to look at Sierra-Leone and Mexico, because it tramples the model, so they dismiss it as relevant to what they want to study, and talk about. War is War.

[Graycap]

Since when were insurgencies not an attempt to seize power?

The COIN crowd never want to look at Sierra-Leone and Mexico, because it tramples the model, so they dismiss it as relevant to what they want to study, and talk about. War is War.

This time I'm with Wilf in the eternal, and ever interesting, Bob-Wilf debate.

I'm italian and I'm viewing Mexico like an example of what could have happened in Italy some years ago when our mafia began a "war" with the government with a string of terrorist bombing.

We followed a completely different strategy: we send in thousands of soldiers in Sicily to help our police in low level actions and we opened the way to covert deals to fracture "cosa nostra".

The military wing of the mafia, once isolated, was soon arrested and the "business like" wing abandoned terrorism but has become somewhat collateral to the institutions,generating a possible secession with the northern part of the country (an unarmed insurgency??) that is no more willing to accept the burden of the southern economic "black hole".

Do we obtained a clausewitzian unuseful victory?

[Bob's World]

Since when were insurgencies not an attempt to seize power?

The COIN crowd never want to look at Sierra-Leone and Mexico, because it tramples the model, so they dismiss it as relevant to what they want to study, and talk about. War is War.

Identification of what something is is best done by understanding how it came to be, rather than what it looks like as it sits before one in some mature state.

This is how science identifies and classifies all plants, animals and minerals. It avoids all kinds of confused conclusions that can come from looking at some specific stage of something in isolation.

Yet insurgency is just one "stage" of the lifecycle of the dynamics between a populace and its government. It does not define that dynamic, one must go to its birth point to understand it most clearly.

Granted, historically military theorists, historians, political scientists and politicians have dumped all manner of informal conflicts into various buckets with little regard for such scientific approaches.

As an example, Colombia was a nationalists insurgency that got into the drug business. Mexico is a drug business that is beginning to challenge government. Two very different forms of genesis at work, and therefore two very different problems requiring very different solutions to resolve. Yet people go: "Violence? Check. Drugs? Check. Government on the ropes? Check. Ok toss these in the narco-terrorist insurgency bucket. Next!"

Insurgency is a unique form of illegal political challenge to government. The "war is war" crowd is uncomfortable with that idea, as it requires them to have more tools than a hammer and to be a bit more sophisticated than "two up and one back."

Certainly a change of power is common to all. If the insurgent opts to employ violent tactics, then violence is common as well in that stage. We need to look past the commonalities and focus on the differences at the point of inception. Otherwise one is apt to pick the wrong solution for the problem.

If I am just dealing with some cartel that wants to seize the diamond mines and control their profits; or expand the profit margin of his illegal drug enterprise by reducing governmental obstacles; that is not insurgency.

But for the COINdinistas, I would offer that going in and building nations while committing oneself to preserving the current government in power is not COIN either; and is highly unlikely to produce any better results than the "war is war" approach as neither addresses the root causes of the problem. One focuses on the symptoms of popular dissatisfaction, and one focus on the symptom of the illegal violent challengers that feed on that dissatisfaction.

I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.

For a power grab for profit? Very different. Crush the power grabber and one has likely solved the problem.

[Dayuhan]

I'm not at all convinced that the situation in Mexico can reasonably be described as "insurgency", or that the cartels want State power, which in many ways would be awkward for them. They are probably best off with what they've got: a government that is sovereign, limiting opportunities for foreign action against them, but ineffectual, limiting opportunities for domestic action against them. They seem less concerned with seizing state power than with limiting the ability of the state to constrain their business, and with suppressing competing cartels.

I'm also not at all convinced that the insurgency in Afghanistan is anything other than an attempted power grab. I doubt there's any real concern on either side for quality of governance, both sides simply want to govern, alone and for their own benefit. Seems less a backlash against bad governance (bad governance in Afghanistan is expected), but a simple fight over who gets to impose their own particular brand of self-serving bad governance.

[Steve the Planner]

I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.

Bob:

I, for one, really found Clolin Powell's doctrine of "You break it, you buy it," to be an bizarre bureaucratic concept not at all consistent with history.

What would have happened if we just broke something and left it for those folks to clean up? Hasn't that strategy been viable and applied many times throughout history without this British/Empirical Model of "Clear, Hold, Build" until the empire has bled itself to death.

Massive retaliation/intervention with no holding purpose was, after all, used to some effect along the Durand for centuries without too much detriment. Once the climate changes a century ago and the Silk Road broke down, these areas have been marginal/challenging. Shall we fix that little climate stuff, too?

Is there a field manual for Smash, Grab, Run, then Threaten from a Distance.

Dahuyan's point is well said: Not every actor has the same traditional power structure focus that some do. Most just want to keep their riches flowing and could care less about "the people" or anything else. To assume they share our visions is a mistake.

[Infanteer]

Lets not dress the Taliban up in clothes that are not theirs. They are primarily a mercenary force being paid (partially out of the proceeds of the drug trade) and using nationalism and a bunch of other reasons to cover this in a shroud of patriotism. The first step would be to put the word out (and to scale up for it) that there will be no poppy crop next year come hell or high water. The failure to address the poppy and drug issues in Afghanistan will go down as the single most insane US political decision of this war. Still waiting to see how far the corruption has spread in this regard.

Well, you're dressing the Taliban up in clothes that aren't theirs with this statement. None of the insurgent profiles, intsums, or debriefs I saw ever indicated that this was a narco-uprising/narco-insurgency. Remember, this movement is run by the same people who a decade ago nearly ended the poppy harvest - to claim that their existence parallels the poppy market is inaccurate.

[Bob's World]

Bob:

I, for one, really found Clolin Powell's doctrine of "You break it, you buy it," to be an bizarre bureaucratic concept not at all consistent with history.

What would have happened if we just broke something and left it for those folks to clean up? Hasn't that strategy been viable and applied many times throughout history without this British/Empirical Model of "Clear, Hold, Build" until the empire has bled itself to death.

Massive retaliation/intervention with no holding purpose was, after all, used to some effect along the Durand for centuries without too much detriment. Once the climate changes a century ago and the Silk Road broke down, these areas have been marginal/challenging. Shall we fix that little climate stuff, too?

Is there a field manual for Smash, Grab, Run, then Threaten from a Distance.

Dahuyan's point is well said: Not every actor has the same traditional power structure focus that some do. Most just want to keep their riches flowing and could care less about "the people" or anything else. To assume they share our visions is a mistake.

What I meant is that insurgencies happen when governments lose the bubble on their populace. A series of neglects over years, leading to the growth of conditions of insurgency among some segment(s) of the society which are then expolited by some internal or external actor to rise up, organize and challenge the government. At which point the civilians tend to punt the problem to the military to fight the "war" to "defeat the insurgent" so that the same civilians can get back to doing the same stuff that led to the insurgency in the first place. This is why I am all for dropping COIN from the "war" rolls, and addressing it as a civil emergency with civilian leadership being held to task to solve the problems they created. To fix themselves. They broke the country, they must fix the country.

Now, a resistance insurgnecy in an other matter. An external country invades, destroys the government of that country, releasing all of the suppressed insurgent movements caused by the government they took out; and inititating a whole new batch of resistance insurgents caused by their very presence as occupiers. (think IRAQ as the textbook example of this). A good plan going in would have been designed to maintain sufficient aspects of the HN government to keep the existing insurgencies in check until changes of governance can be developed and implemented to address the causal conditions. As to the resistance? It can be mitigated through good actions, good messages, but one needs to expect it as a fact. Zinni had such a plan for Iraq on the books, but it got tossed for the one we employed.

BL is to hold civil governance to task. Also to recognize those in civil government who are the great COIN warriors.

One such was Lyndon Johnson. All anyone talks about is Vietnam and how he escalated the conflict there. True. But his real COIN legacy is how he knowingly destroyed his own personal political career to pass three landmark pieces of civil rights legislation that actually may well have unleashed some racial violence to begin with (Watts came on the heals of one bill passing), but ultimately changed the domestic policies that were leading America into insurgency. That kind of moral courage is rare in a politician. The lack of recognition for his work, combined with the misplaced adoration on Kennedy contributed to his rapid decline upon leaving office.

[Dayuhan]

(think IRAQ as the textbook example of this). A good plan going in would have been designed to maintain sufficient aspects of the HN government to keep the existing insurgencies in check until changes of governance can be developed and implemented to address the causal conditions.

Given the depth and intensity of the sectarian and ethnic antipathies that made up the causal conditions, I'd say a better plan going in would have been to not go in, or at least to have gotten out as soon as Saddam was removed. That was never a situation that was going to be resolved simply by coming up with the right structure or constitution. Pull the lid off a pot like that, and it's going to boil over, no matter what you do. Only way to avoid getting burned is to not be there.

[Backwards Observer]

There seems to be an underlying refrain that in a counterinsurgency effort enabled, as it were, by a foreign power, the enemy centre of gravity is the presence (and related perception) of foreign activity itself. The more insular and, for lack of a better word, xenophobic the society (societies) involved, the more intractable the quandary. A highly xenophobic society seems to view even the most exemplary behaviour of a minimal outside presence as barely tolerable.

[M-A Lagrange]

There seems to be an underlying refrain that in a counterinsurgency effort enabled, as it were, by a foreign power, the enemy centre of gravity is the presence (and related perception) of foreign activity itself. The more insular and, for lack of a better word, xenophobic the society (societies) involved, the more intractable the quandary. A highly xenophobic society seems to view even the most exemplary behaviour of a minimal outside presence as barely tolerable.

I am not sure that ideology or xenophobia (for a lack of better word) has anything to do with the fact that noone likes a foreigner to come in his home to fix what that foreigner perceives as a problem.
In most of the cases, the problematic for a foreign power is to find the right individual who will symbolise both changes and legitimacy in the eye of the Host Nation population.
Even if you tried to install a hardcore islamist government in an environment as Astan (Which could be perceived by an external observer as extremely legitimate and respectfull of population whishes), you would most probably still end up with a strong opposition/insurgency/resistance.
The foreign power is the center of gravity, for the best or the worst.

[Backwards Observer]

M-A Lagrange, along the lines of what you're saying, I recall a German-American emigre and Korean War vet referring to Hitler as, "That insufferable Austrian."

[Dayuhan]

There seems to be an underlying refrain that in a counterinsurgency effort enabled, as it were, by a foreign power, the enemy centre of gravity is the presence (and related perception) of foreign activity itself. The more insular and, for lack of a better word, xenophobic the society (societies) involved, the more intractable the quandary. A highly xenophobic society seems to view even the most exemplary behaviour of a minimal outside presence as barely tolerable.

How do you think Americans would react to having a bunch of Middle Easterners in full battle dress rolling down their streets in armored vehicles and telling them how they ought to be governed? I suppose one could argue that Americans are as xenophobic and insular as anyone, but I suspect that resentment of armed foreign occupation is not limited to insular xenophobes.

[Backwards Observer]

How do you think Americans would react to having a bunch of Middle Easterners in full battle dress rolling down their streets in armored vehicles and telling them how they ought to be governed? I suppose one could argue that Americans are as xenophobic and insular as anyone, but I suspect that resentment of armed foreign occupation is not limited to insular xenophobes.

You seem to be saying that the problem is armed foreign occupation. Is that correct?

[Dayuhan]

You seem to be saying that the problem is armed foreign occupation. Is that correct?

A problem, not the problem. A rather large problem. One of several.

[Backwards Observer]

A problem, not the problem. A rather large problem. One of several.

In your opinion, is there any activity, short of withdrawal, that the occupation forces can engage in that would have a positive effect?

[Bob's World]

In your opinion, is there any activity, short of withdrawal, that the occupation forces can engage in that would have a positive effect?

When we were a couple weeks into the Marjah campaign things we're starting to look a bit better, but the populace was very reluctant to embrace the Coalition. The first week was hell, with everyone literally stuck in the mud within small perimeters barely extending beyond the original LZs. All roadways were heavily planted with IEDs and the muddy poppy fields were a mess and covered by fire from Taliban forted up with innocent civilians in their compounds. Fortunately they changed tactics after a week or so, and stopped challenging the Marines, ANA and SF directly and engagements became more sporadic, with IEDs remaining a major challenge.

During this period, MG Carter was engaging with commanders and staff about the need to gain the support of the populace of Marjah. The populace, quite reasonably, was concerned that the government would ultimately leave again someday, and that the Taliban would return and punish those who had collaborated. During that talk he made made the comment that "we need to assure the people of Marjah that we will not leave them." To which, my reply was "Actually sir, we need to assure them that GIROA won't leave them, and that we won't stay, and that is a far more difficult thing."

Overcoming the presumptions of illegitimacy of a government placed in power and then protected by a foreign army is virtually impossible. Understanding the criticality of doing so and the natural occurrence of resistance when one does not succeed is the first step.

Shortly thereafter we delivered the, now notorious, "government in a box" to the people of Marjah. Under the current constitution Karzai simply created a new District and named a new governor, and the USMC then delivered that governor via USMC military aircraft and guarded by USMC personnel. A Dari speaking German none of them had ever heard of before, picked by a President they did not select, and delivered and guarded by a foreign military power.

I give us an "F-minus" for "Effectively reinforced perceptions of local legitimacy" on that one.

And the Resistance insurgency continues to grow.

[Backwards Observer]

And the Resistance insurgency continues to grow.

Mr. World, by coincidence I was just leafing through a copy of Griffith's translation/interpretation of Mao's, Yu Chi Chan:


The fundamental difference between patriotic partisan resistance and revolutionary guerrilla movements is that the first usually lacks the ideological content that always distinguishes the second.

A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity; it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary guerrilla movement is organized and then begins.

A resistance is rarely liquidated and terminates when the invader is ejected; a revolutionary movement terminates only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent or is liquidated.

Historical experience suggests that there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population. The size of this "significant segment" will vary; a decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent. (p.27, italics Griffith's)


On Guerrilla Warfare - Google books link (http://books.google.com.au/books?id=7mV0j9dpSqsC&printsec=frontcover&dq=samuel+griffith+mao&source=bl&ots=bxPt5SC0_W&sig=k1Htk2hqw7y6FjM6qBg1aRFMIhU&hl=en&ei=cOAMTf73JoHRcd7rmbwK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false)

[Bob's World]

For what it's worth, I see the insurgency in Afghanistan as breaking into two tiers. The Quetta Shura led, political, ideological revolutionary leadership tier (that is best addressed through reconciliation efforts); and the rank and file, mom and pop, apolitical resistance movement among the people of rural Afghanistan that the bulk of our POP-centric COIN is aimed at. These guys are also paid and motivated by Taliban leadership that comes in from Pakistan, and picks them up once the poppy harvest is in just like contractors picking up illegals outside the Home Depot to do a little cheap labor for them.

Key to victory lies in reconciliation, but Karzai is safe so long as we are committed to protecting him, so why should he do more than just talk on this topic? We need to force the issue.

[Backwards Observer]

Mr. World, thanks for your insight. Also, I should mention that the Griffith quote in my post #110 is from his introduction and not from the Yu Chi Chan itself. Merry Griffmas.

[Dayuhan]

Key to victory lies in reconciliation, but Karzai is safe so long as we are committed to protecting him, so why should he do more than just talk on this topic? We need to force the issue.

How do you propose to force the issue?

Do you believe that any of the parties involved have any real interest in reconciliation or in sharing power?

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

How do you force the question while insisting that your presence is unending?

I really worry about the integrity of those, like Bob referenced, that are promising eternity (we will never leave you) when our staying or going is, in reality, no more than a tour, and US strategy can turn on a dime.

Reality is that these folks have seen all of the huffing and puffing of passing "stronger tribes" for so long that it is in their DNA to make deals as they go, and also be ready to turn on a dime.

Is that quicksand or a solid foundation?

[Dayuhan]

In your opinion, is there any activity, short of withdrawal, that the occupation forces can engage in that would have a positive effect?

That would of course depend on what you would see as a positive effect. If we see "positive" as acceptance or at least toleration of foreign occupation... hard to say. Certainly there will be people and groups who will be quite willing to accept foreign occupation if and to the extent that it serves their interests. Whatever serves the interests of one, though, will be inconsistent with the interests of others, making this a slippery slope.

The question to me is whether or not it is in our interest to try and occupy Afghanistan until we can impose the sort of governance we want the place to have. I'm not at all sure that it is, or that we can achieve that goal within an acceptable time frame and with an acceptable resource expenditure.


How do you force the question while insisting that your presence is unending?

I don't see how we could force a lasting compromise unless an unending presence is assumed. If we force a compromise and everyone knows we will leave, the parties involved will either ignore us or pretend to compromise while preparing an effort to seize power when the force is removed. A forced compromise will only last while force is being applied.

[Backwards Observer]

Whatever serves the interests of one, though, will be inconsistent with the interests of others, making this a slippery slope.

Sad but true. Thanks for taking the time to respond. Maligayang Pasko.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

Right. It is the paradox. Staying, going.

I think the only historically valid occupation model is to control the urban places and key routes, and do sporadic grass mowing elsewhere.

Given the terrain, and the opposition, the force and cost, is unlikely to be survivable over time, even for an Empire, absent substantial host nation support.

[Dayuhan]

I think the only historically valid occupation model is to control the urban places and key routes, and do sporadic grass mowing elsewhere.

To me the validity of an occupation model would depend on the policy the occupation is intended to serve... and I think a large part of our problem in Afghanistan is uncertainty over policy goals and the desired end state. If you don't have clear policy goals that are consistent with the time and resources you're willing to commit, it's very difficult to develop effective strategy or tactics.

[jcustis]

I worked in one of the southernmost districts of Helmand, and probably the poorest at that, and saw an interesting blend of resistance insurgency, narco-insurgency, opportunism, and apolitical apathy at work. I believe that at large, much of the rest of Afghanistan is a complicated blend of the same influences and insurgent problems.

Our district governor was one of the young turks, installed by Helmand Governor Mangel, primarily because he is Baluch, well-educated, and parrots the party line as is convenient. Make no mistake though, it seemed as though very few of the tribal elders respected or supported him, unless it came down to a scenario where coalition forces or PRT representation was involved, or there was an opportunity for an elder to gain something from demonstrating support.

Having said this...in the Afghan context, I think you are right on the money Dayuhan that inconsistent policy goals lead to terrible strategy and tactics. One of our greatest problems in doing anything consistent is the simple fact that we and GIRoA are not "same-same" in deciding the way ahead. When we are adrift at the national level, it's no wonder that at the district and provincial level, things tend to fair only slightly better. It's also no wonder that higher-level policy matters aren't easily translated down to the tactical level (where folks tend to forget that strategic compression can have the greatest positive or adverse affect).

All of the players in that district were governed by self interest and are largely biding their time.

And no, Steve, those are not good foundations, and the locals all know we won't be there forever. Most of the GIRoA officials I worked with mused that if the coalition left, they would be leaving as well. That is a pretty brutal reality.

[Sargent]

I, for one, really found Clolin Powell's doctrine of "You break it, you buy it," to be an bizarre bureaucratic concept not at all consistent with history.

What would have happened if we just broke something and left it for those folks to clean up? Hasn't that strategy been viable and applied many times throughout history without this British/Empirical Model of "Clear, Hold, Build" until the empire has bled itself to death.

Massive retaliation/intervention with no holding purpose was, after all, used to some effect along the Durand for centuries without too much detriment. Once the climate changes a century ago and the Silk Road broke down, these areas have been marginal/challenging. Shall we fix that little climate stuff, too?

Is there a field manual for Smash, Grab, Run, then Threaten from a Distance.

I would point out that "break and leave" is how WWI morphed into WWII, and how post-Soviet Afghanistan morphed into the Taliban, to give a couple of examples of the problems that arise out of abandoned broken societies. As for the notion that it used to be acceptable to muck things off and then do an exit stage left, I would argue that it did not work historically that you could simply go in and break an entire society and walk away. There was usually some hell to pay. On the other hand, once Rome fell, for the centuries until the French Revolution, war was a much more limited affair, so blame Napoleon, not the Brits.

Powell was exactly trying to keep people from thinking that breaking was all you had to do, and trying to make people realize that once broken the thing is very hard to put back together.

The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?

Again, the point is to not break the thing in the first place, to take that step only with great care and for spectacularly great reasons. If we hadn't lost focus on Afghanistan for four years, the rebuild might have been a bit easier. Maybe not. But breaking Iraq was an all time stupid idea.

Jill

[Ken White]

Insurgency is a unique form of illegal political challenge to government.Most are, some are other things couched as such a political challenge. We've written claim and counterclaim on that before so no rehas here, just a note to remind you that many aside from me, here and elsewhere, do not agree with that quite positive statement of yours. *
The "war is war" crowd is uncomfortable with that idea, as it requires them to have more tools than a hammer and to be a bit more sophisticated than "two up and one back."Base canard, there ;) . I and many others in the war is war crowd do not agree at all with that statement. Many have complained about the fact that the attitude you cite does exist but point out that existence is due more to political misuse and desire of the armed forces to comply with the wishes of their civilian taskmasters -- once again, you lambaste the pore ol' GPF wrongly. SF hasn't covered themselves with glory in these latest wars (also due to 'political' misuse and not totally their fault -- though not so much by politicians as by service / congressional / budget / turf politics...).

As usual, after a couple of hyperbolic statements, you get real:
But for the COINdinistas, I would offer that going in and building nations while committing oneself to preserving the current government in power is not COIN either; and is highly unlikely to produce any better results than the "war is war" approach as neither addresses the root causes of the problem. One focuses on the symptoms of popular dissatisfaction, and one focus on the symptom of the illegal violent challengers that feed on that dissatisfaction.True and that applies not only to insurgencies but to many forms of domestic unrest.
I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.Again true -- also not amenable in many cases to any military solution...

As any aside, anyone who praises Lyndon Johnson to me is highly suspect of misplacing priorities. I met the man, talked to him, served under him and participated in his funeral. I am not a fan and his passage of what was effectively Kennedy's Civil rights Bill was a piece of crass political opportunism and party politics covered in glowing rhetoric. Give the Devil his due, he did get the Bill passed -- but give him full due; his errors and and blatantly foolish foreign affairs dabbling and terribly flawed Viet Nam engagement created ill effects world wide -- some of that 'American arrogance' and support of Dictators you often decry -- that permeate the world, this country and the Armed Forces to this day. Not favorably, either. :mad:

That's shorthand for "I disagree with your frequent characterization of Johnson as COIN warrior." Fixing a governmental problem long overdue for repair is not always counter insurgency... :rolleyes:

* I'll also point to Backward Observer's quote of Chairman Mao (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=111815&postcount=28) -- and the issue of ideology versus spontaneity which Bill Moore and I frequently see you ignore... :wry:

As jcustis wrote:
Having said this...in the Afghan context, I think you are right on the money Dayuhan that inconsistent policy goals lead to terrible strategy and tactics. One of our greatest problems in doing anything consistent is the simple fact that we and GIRoA are not "same-same" in deciding the way ahead. When we are adrift at the national level, it's no wonder that at the district and provincial level, things tend to fair only slightly better. It's also no wonder that higher-level policy matters aren't easily translated down to the tactical level (where folks tend to forget that strategic compression can have the greatest positive or adverse affect).That is an extremely perceptive and very import bit of verbiage. I'm sure it is quite accurate with respect to Afghanistan but, far more importantly, that lack of consistency is reflected in the way the US Government does business. That is, in effect, why we're having this discussion (and why Viet Nam was a debacle -- but that's another thread).

Our political system is based on a series of checks and balances and they all work quite well as each arm of government has over the last two centuries slightly tweaked their ability to check in order to enhance their power and lessen that of the other branches. Add to that problem -- and it is a problem in getting things done coherently -- the electoral system with changes of agendas at 2, 4, 6 and 8 year intervals. Until all the master strategists find workarounds in their plans to compensate for those factors, 'consistency' and 'the US government' will be an oxymoron. Unless an existential war appears; different rules then...

Sargent is on the right track(Good post, Jill):
The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?

Again, the point is to not break the thing in the first place, to take that step only with great care and for spectacularly great reasons. If we hadn't lost focus on Afghanistan for four years, the rebuild might have been a bit easier. Maybe not. But breaking Iraq was an all time stupid idea. (emphasis added / kw)Indeed. Iraq occurred because the toolbag had been purposely limited in what it could do in order to constrain the Politicians.

The Politicans didn't play fair and used the only tool seemingly available. We should avoid that in the future. Diplomatic solutions preferred, military involvement only as a last resort, then not in the costly and unsustainable FID / COIN mode but as Strategic raids. Short term, ability to avoid major breakage, economical, adaptable easily to the US political milieu...

[Steve the Planner]

Sarge:


The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again.

Right. What you are indicating is roads not travelled which, had they known what they were going to face, probably should have been considered. Oh, for planning based on relevant facts and reasonable expectations.

I would not be so quick, however, to say anything different about Afghanistan. We had the option of immediately turning it over to the King to sort out the future through a Grand Loya Jirga.

Our brilliant crew of half-assed constitution writers jumped in, though, and mucked it up.

Same bunch as in Iraq--mostly trying to have their cake and eat it too. Let's invade/not invade, but my friend can make a fortune in oil contracts if only we stay around and muck with their country..... (insert the appropriate DoS names (but it was not Cheney or Bush or anybody at DoD)).

Ken: Sorry we just couldn't survive without you.

In grad school, even the most impassioned liberal instructors explained that Great Society (Johnson and Nixon) only came about as domestic cover for the war. Cynical?

Custis: Last Sunday, my WP had 90 pictures of all those young soldiers no longer with us. Pissed me off royally, just like the ones did from Iraq in 2007.

Difference was that a call went out for people to actually come and change things. I don't know about you folks, but my civ/DoS mission in Nov 2007 was explicitly stated as transfer US responsibilities fast, and set us up for exit. And that's what we did.

Afghanistan just looks like a log-rolling mission. Everybody knows what is broken, but covering a lot of asses. Give me that revised Iraq problem definition/mission for Afghanistan, and I'll work my ass off to get us out of that one, too.

I really feel for you and my friends on the ground who just can't get a link between reality and the grand strategy boys.

Stay safe.

[jcustis]

The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?

i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.

[Dayuhan]

i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.

Amen. Squared.



I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.

Hardly appropriate to apply that rule in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the breaking was done before the governments now in power existed. It's more like... "we broke it, then we put you in power and you're supposed to fix it. Now. The way we like it, please."

I guess there's room for interpretation over what "true insurgency" is and whether any given insurgency is "true", but I suspect that our ability to repair anyone else's governance is very, very limited.

[Steve the Planner]

A lesson from US public transportation.

If there is a bus accident in an urban area, the driver is directed to lock the back doors fast. Lots of folks try to jump on after the accident to get a piece of the settlement payments sure to be paid to all involved.

History tells us that Persians have ruled/controlled both Iraq and Afghanistan in the past. Their influence waxes and wanes, played out against both other competing foreign influences, and internal politics.

Dayuhan's point: stubborn occupation depletes the resources, and, as with Brits, US and Persia, often reaches the decision point of costs/diminishing returns of colonization.

Look at the Kurds in (From left to right on a map) in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. If Iranian Kurds (oppressed by Iran, arguably more than in Iraq) become influential to Afghan Kurds, Is that Iranian influence? Is it good/bad?

Ambassador Crocker tells the story of being in final and productive negotiations with Iran (and the other neighbors) over post-2001 Afghanistan when, out of the blue, the "Axis of Evil" speech hit and knocked the whole cart over. Another road not travelled to a possibly more productive end.

[slapout9]

i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.

Now that is some Strategic thinking!

[Entropy]

That is an extremely perceptive and very import bit of verbiage. I'm sure it is quite accurate with respect to Afghanistan but, far more importantly, that lack of consistency is reflected in the way the US Government does business. That is, in effect, why we're having this discussion (and why Viet Nam was a debacle -- but that's another thread).

Our political system is based on a series of checks and balances and they all work quite well as each arm of government has over the last two centuries slightly tweaked their ability to check in order to enhance their power and lessen that of the other branches. Add to that problem -- and it is a problem in getting things done coherently -- the electoral system with changes of agendas at 2, 4, 6 and 8 year intervals. Until all the master strategists find workarounds in their plans to compensate for those factors, 'consistency' and 'the US government' will be an oxymoron. Unless an existential war appears; different rules then...

Ken,

That is something you frequently say here and it's something I've come to believe is totally true. The implication for wars like Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam is pretty obvious to me at this point and goes a long way toward explaining why we suck at them.

[Sargent]

i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.


It would be grand if they did everything as stupidly as we have, and pour their treasure into the country in search of creating some truly "correct" regime and society. But, let's assume they don't give a crap about how the Afghans live and just decide to call back the Taliban with the sole provision that in addition to allowing AQ to use the hinterlands for training that the regime allow space for the terrorist commandos of the sponsor's choice. That was, after all, the real problem with the Taliban and Afghanistan -- we didn't really care that they were bastards, but when it became clear that they were a training ground for effective enemies. So, in reality, we do care who controls the country, as in when those in control allow the vast spaces to become terrorist NTCs.

Again, like Iraq, the answer might have been not getting rid of the Taliban but simply compelling the Taliban to get rid of AQ. I'm sure there would have been a route forward on that matter.

But cheers, and thanks for making me refine my point!

Jill

[jcustis]

But, let's assume they don't give a crap about how the Afghans live and just decide to call back the Taliban with the sole provision that in addition to allowing AQ to use the hinterlands for training that the regime allow space for the terrorist commandos of the sponsor's choice. That was, after all, the real problem with the Taliban and Afghanistan -- we didn't really care that they were bastards, but when it became clear that they were a training ground for effective enemies. So, in reality, we do care who controls the country, as in when those in control allow the vast spaces to become terrorist NTCs.

After seeing the US become a very efficient counter-insurgent at the outset of OEF, I don't see where the Taliban would find incentive in doing so. The may have learned a functional lesson from that. The other part that I think is irrelevant is the notion that Iran or Pakistan, or Venezuela :wry: needs ungoverned spaces to train their terrorist commandos by proxy.

Doing so would actually make it even easier for the US to dispatch them through kinetic means such as a cruise missile, JDAM, drone, or little black helicopter visit in the middle of the night0.. Now, training them within the sovereign borders of say, Iran itself, poses a totally different problem set for the US or coalition of the willing if it wanted to address the gnats within that border.

I see your overall point, but I tend to subscribe somewhat to Peter Bergen's recent thesis that Al Qaeda has reached a zenith of sorts and is beginning to dissipate. I don't believe the Taliban, if concentrated again upon a restoration of power, care to taste the blow of our kinetic power because Iranian nut jobs are training somewhere in Nimruz.

[carl]

...I don't believe the Taliban, if concentrated again upon a restoration of power, care to taste the blow of our kinetic power because Iranian nut jobs are training somewhere in Nimruz.

Speaking solely to the point of the Taliban being afraid of American kinetic power, why on earth would they be afraid of that if they managed to retake Afghanistan? They would have just beaten us having taken everything we could have thrown at them. In any case, little black helos and drones need bases close by, cruise missiles haven't scared them in the past and the Pak Army may object to us overflying their country to get to Afghanistan. The Taliban ain't so scared of us now, if they prevailed I don't see them being afraid at all.

[Entropy]

Speaking solely to the point of the Taliban being afraid of American kinetic power, why on earth would they be afraid of that if they managed to retake Afghanistan?

No to pick on you Carl, but this is the kind of statement that annoys me. The Taliban, in the 1990's, could not control Afghanistan despite lots of support from AQ and the Pakistani's and marginal support to the Northern Alliance. If the US withdrew tomorrow, the Quetta Shura would not be running Afghanistan. They would certainly control parts of the "nation" of Afghanistan (quotes are intentional), but they could be kept from complete control through direct assistance to their enemies. Then there is the question of what Haqqani and HIG would do - their support for the Taliban post-US withdrawal is not a sure thing.

Not that I'm advocating the US abruptly pull out tomorrow, but I think the assumption that the Taliban will certainly "take over" absent continued US intervention is a false assumption.

[jcustis]

Speaking solely to the point of the Taliban being afraid of American kinetic power, why on earth would they be afraid of that if they managed to retake Afghanistan? They would have just beaten us having taken everything we could have thrown at them. In any case, little black helos and drones need bases close by, cruise missiles haven't scared them in the past and the Pak Army may object to us overflying their country to get to Afghanistan. The Taliban ain't so scared of us now, if they prevailed I don't see them being afraid at all.

I look at it from the perspective of exactly what you reference, but I don't think that the Taliban would necessarily fear us. In fact, I don't want them to fear us. That causes irrational decision-making. I want them to respect a capability to deliver a blow to a concentrated body of Taliban leaders (and I think concentration would be required if they chose to try to exert power) should we decide to do so.

Killing the Taliban inside Pakistan tends to pose drama, but in the under-governed expanse of Afghanistan, the challenges become less pronounced to a degree.

And Entropy brings up a point I was thinking, but did not articulate. The Taliban will be hard pressed to run Afghanistan in the future, so coupling the Taliban with trans-national terrorism presumes that they will have the ability to influence the scenario in the first place. Sooooo...maybe that means we can worry less about the Taliban inviting terrorist commandos in, and get back to basic containment and counter-terrorism.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy:

I think Nir Rosen's latest piece in Foreign Policy hits a lot of these points well.


http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/20/spare_afghanistan_iraq_s_success?commentspace=true

His focus is on drawing distinctions between Iraqi and Afghan surges, and explains:

Al Qaeda left Af for Pak several years ago, will never create training bases, etc., that are easily targeted, pr return to Af where they can be wiped out wholesale. He notes that they are probably more dangerous and destabilizing there.

He points out the lack of population centers/densities which is a fundamental difference/limitation in controlling populations.

No fan of the Taliban, he, nonetheless, accurately points out that they long ago foreswore allowing AQ into Af, have learned some lessons from the past, but remain Afghans, and members of a substantial minority (40%). They are not "foreign fighters" except for their sanctuaries in Pak.

Note the continuing refrain: Stop sending/spending money there. It is fueling conflict; we (and our money) are the center of gravity for everyone but US. Very destabilizing.

As one who has increasingly failed to understand the whole "money as a weapon" thing (from watching too many misfires), I, for one, long ago grew weary of Clear-Hold-Bribe, school building and anything else that creates irrelevant measurables that do not contribute to stability (and all too often achieves the opposite effect).

I end up in the War is War column, and scratch my head at what the rest of this stuff is.

[Infanteer]

Not that I'm advocating the US abruptly pull out tomorrow, but I think the assumption that the Taliban will certainly "take over" absent continued US intervention is a false assumption.

Absolutely; although the ANA cannot really hold down the more unruly areas of the Pashtun belt, the ANA do have quality formations that would, with a bit of support from the west, likely hold off an insurgent surge a la 1995. A half-credible conventional force is a factor that wasn't in play during the last round of civil war.

As well, I take issue with the statement that "the Taliban have taken everything we can throw at them"; it implies that we cannot defeat them militarily. If they mass, which they must do to affect anything meaningful, we do beat them. Now they don't mass because they know that they will be beaten. The insurgents have dropped down a notch or two in activity and stay below a certain threshold; let's not confuse this determination and patience as some sort of tactical proficiency.

[Steve the Planner]

Infanteer:

I see a lot of conflicting reports. Here is a recent one from KGS Nightwatch:


The NATO command's statement implies that the fighting is waged mostly by anti-government groups that are based in Pakistan. That is simply not true, is grossly misleading to the American public and whoever came up with that nonsense should be dismissed. The anti-government forces in Afghanistan are not foreign ers, but are supported from Pakstan. Thus even without support from Pakistan there would still be a fight against outsiders in Afghanistan.

Pakistan is the origin of and channel for all supplies that support the anti-government forces. Afghanistan has no arms or explosives industries. Everything that explodes comes from the US or Pakistan. Thus, if IED events reached a new high in November 2010 -- as they did -- that means the US and Coalition forces utterly failed to stop the supply of fertilizer, explosives and detonators from Pakistan or stolen from or sold by US and Coalition forces.

The most powerful country in the history of the world cannot seem to seal a border, In Mexico or Pakistan. This is curious because it indicates that this 2010 generation of hi-tech US soldiers and generals have been enormously less able to disrupt the supply line from Pakistan than an earlier generation of American war fighters did to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.

Again, the refrain---Taliban are Afghans. What doesn't kill you leaves a scar?

[Infanteer]

I don't see anything wrong with your snippet and see nothing that contradicts what I wrote.

Insurgents cannot march on Kabul with IEDs.

[Bob's World]

The border is a false issue. It means something to states, who play by state rules, so it does become a component of sanctuary for anyone who can put one between them and the state that is after them.

But for the Pashtun populace the AFPAK border means little, nor should it. Borders are coming to mean a lot less to everybody as globalization continues to expand its influence on our day to day lives. It's just a reality that this time honored metric of "sovereignty" just isn't what it used to be.

We just need to maintain our perspective on the Taliban, as they are not a U.S. problem. It is only our whacked out European Colonial-based COIN doctrine in 3-24 that makes them a problem as we have committed ourselves to preserving the Northern Alliance in power.

Answer this: What trusted, certain and legal means does the segment of the populace represented by the Taliban have to participate in Afghan politics?? None. The Constitution guarantees they have no legal options; Karzai guarantees they have no legal options; and we protect both of the above.

The issue isn't why would the Taliban be willing to work with us, the issue is Karzai not wanting us to work with the Taliban. The Northern Alliance likes things just the way they are. They do not want to give up their little monopoly on governance in Afghanistan; and are very happy to have us stay and guarantee it for them.

We need to refocus on the mission, and the mission is AQ. The Taliban is the key to AQ. Getting to an Afghan government that has room for both Northern Alliance and Taliban "parties" is the key to someday getting to stability in that troubled land. Half a dozen outside state parties will continue to work to manipulate the situation to support their national interests, just as the US seeks to manipulate it to seek our national interests. At some point someone needs to take into account the interest of the people who actually live there. The people of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan don't want to be occupied by a Tajik army any more than they do by a US army.

We picked aside, and then we lost sight of our mission. Time to refocus on the mission and become more neutral in our approach. It's time to learn and practice post-colonial intervention.

[carl]

No to pick on you Carl, but this is the kind of statement that annoys me.

I don't mind if you pick on me. I probably deserve it.

Notice though that I said "if" the Taliban managed to retake Afghanistan. I didn't say "when". But that is just a quibble. The main point remains. They aren't afraid of us now and as they become more successful they will be less so.

The Taliban didn't manage to take all of Afghanistan before 2001, but they came pretty close. If I remember correctly, their last big obstacle, Massoud, was removed just before 9-11.

You are right there is no certainty the Quetta Shura would take the place over if we bugged out. I suspect they would but it would probably depend upon who of the three entities you mentioned the Pak Army/ISI threw its' weight behind. It seems logical they would go with the Quetta Shura as they did before. It also seems logical they have kept the other two around just to hedge their bets.

[carl]

I want them to respect a capability to deliver a blow to a concentrated body of Taliban leaders (and I think concentration would be required if they chose to try to exert power) should we decide to do so.

Why would Taliban leaders have to concentrate to decide anything and even if they did, what would prevent them from holding quorum in a hospital? Or why wouldn't they just do the whole thing by correspondence from scattered locations? That would cut our tron warriors completely out of the picture. In any event you have a lot more confidence in our ability to locate people who don't want to be found, in countries where we aren't on the ground in the immediate vicinity, than I do.

[carl]

Absolutely; although the ANA cannot really hold down the more unruly areas of the Pashtun belt, the ANA do have quality formations that would, with a bit of support from the west, likely hold off an insurgent surge a la 1995. A half-credible conventional force is a factor that wasn't in play during the last round of civil war.

As well, I take issue with the statement that "the Taliban have taken everything we can throw at them"; it implies that we cannot defeat them militarily. If they mass, which they must do to affect anything meaningful, we do beat them. Now they don't mass because they know that they will be beaten. The insurgents have dropped down a notch or two in activity and stay below a certain threshold; let's not confuse this determination and patience as some sort of tactical proficiency.

In 1995 there was not a half-credible conventional force, but in 1989 there was and that force was defeated. Your statement "with a bit of support from the west" is key. I am convinced there won't be critical support from the west. We left the ARVN in a position to hold off the enemy with a bit of critical support and we didn't give it to them. If we bug out this time, after doing so we will convince ourselves that the morally superior position will be to hold ourselves above the fray and we won't give them a dime.

Like the NVA officer said, it doesn't matter if we can beat the Taliban militarily. They maybe are winning despite that, without massing. We are far more tactically proficient. But that doesn't matter because determination and patience seem to be serving them quite well. And they are still on the field, having taken everything we can throw at them.

[carl]

Answer this: What trusted, certain and legal means does the segment of the populace represented by the Taliban have to participate in Afghan politics??

I want to make sure I have you straight, are you saying the Taliban is the legitimate representative of the Pashtun people?


We picked aside, and then we lost sight of our mission. Time to refocus on the mission and become more neutral in our approach. It's time to learn and practice post-colonial intervention.

It is helpful to remember that "We picked a side" because AQ killed thousands of our people and the Taliban wouldn't give them up. A bit of historical context.

[Dayuhan]

But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?


It would be grand if they did everything as stupidly as we have, and pour their treasure into the country in search of creating some truly "correct" regime and society. But, let's assume they don't give a crap about how the Afghans live and just decide to call back the Taliban with the sole provision that in addition to allowing AQ to use the hinterlands for training that the regime allow space for the terrorist commandos of the sponsor's choice. That was, after all, the real problem with the Taliban and Afghanistan

Russia, China, or Iran would have little incentive to coddle AQ, which is not exactly friendly to them. The Russians and Chinese have their own issues with Islamist activity, and the Iranians would have noticed AQ's oft-stated feelings toward the Shi'a. I don't think any of them would be stupid enough to think they could control who the Taliban sheltered.

There are of course problems with break-and-leave, mainly potential reversion to the status quo ante. I wouldn't be terribly concerned with Russian, Chinese, or Iranian influnce.

I honestly doubt that any of those three would want to deal with it. The Russians have been there and done that, and it wasn't good. The Chinese and Iranians have observed the complications. And, as stated before, there's nothing there of any real use to anyone. The Iranians have no trouble training their terrorist proxies in Lebanon, and Afghanistan is an expensive and messy prospect. The Russians and Chinese have little use for terrorist groups who could easily end up terrorizing them.

[Dayuhan]

Answer this: What trusted, certain and legal means does the segment of the populace represented by the Taliban have to participate in Afghan politics?? None. The Constitution guarantees they have no legal options; Karzai guarantees they have no legal options; and we protect both of the above.

Do you believe that the Taliban want to "participate in Afghan politics" as anything but a ruler?


The issue isn't why would the Taliban be willing to work with us, the issue is Karzai not wanting us to work with the Taliban. The Northern Alliance likes things just the way they are. They do not want to give up their little monopoly on governance in Afghanistan; and are very happy to have us stay and guarantee it for them.

The issue is that neither side will "work with" the other. They will fight until one loses, and the winner will take all. We're not talking about Democrats and Republicans here; this is Afghanistan. For us, a Taliban win is unacceptable and a Karzai win is not. Silly corner to be in, but we backed ourselves into it when we decided to try to govern Afghanistan by proxy.


We need to refocus on the mission, and the mission is AQ. The Taliban is the key to AQ. Getting to an Afghan government that has room for both Northern Alliance and Taliban "parties" is the key to someday getting to stability in that troubled land.

Do you really believe that if we just find the "right" government structure the Taliban, Karzai, and all other factions will all sit together, play nicely, and morph into good little democratic practitioners? If so, why?


At some point someone needs to take into account the interest of the people who actually live there. The people of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan don't want to be occupied by a Tajik army any more than they do by a US army.

The people who live there don't have one "interest". They have many perceived "interests", and those interests are often conflicting. That's why they fight a lot. Neither Karzai nor the Taliban have any concern for the interests of the people or any segment thereof; they want power, all of it. If they get it they will advance their own interests and crush their opposition until they are overthrown. Again, this is Afghanistan, not the Netherlands. If it was the Netherlands we wouldn't be there.


We picked aside, and then we lost sight of our mission. Time to refocus on the mission and become more neutral in our approach. It's time to learn and practice post-colonial intervention.

We didn't pick a side. We created a side to advance our interests, and now we're shocked and horrified that the side we created is pursuing its own interests. Duh. Time for us to grow a collective brain cell and stop trying to install governments in these places. It's not something we have the tools or capacity to do and it requires more commitment then we are willing to make.

[Bob's World]

I want to make sure I have you straight, are you saying the Taliban is the legitimate representative of the Pashtun people?



It is helpful to remember that "We picked a side" because AQ killed thousands of our people and the Taliban wouldn't give them up. A bit of historical context.

Carl, are you saying that the Karzai government is the Legitimate government of the Pashtun people?? No, certainly not. The Illegitimacy of the Karzai government is legendary. It is "official," but it is not legitimate. Legitimacy comes from the people. It is not some blessing bestowed by the some outside power (ala "the U.S. recognizes the legitimacy of government X"), at least not for purposes of insurgency and COIN. For insurgency and COIN only one flavor of legitimacy matters, and that is the recognition by the governed of one's right to govern them.

I had this conversation with BG Ben Hodges in Uruzgan one day in a discussion about Matiullah Khan. Matiullah is not as official as he could be (though he is a Colonel in the ANP, but he has only been granted Tashkil for a fraction of the men he has in his employ to extend security along Route Bear and around Tarin Kowt); but he enjoys tremendous legitimacy, that expands across tribal lines in ways that most of the "official" government officials do not. He is recognized by the people of Uruzgan. He is legitimate. The Dutch (who were in bed with a hardcore Taliban leader, by the way) and BG Hodges saw him only as a rogue wielding an influence that was not supported by some offical state license or title.

In many areas, yes, the Taliban are legitimate as well, other areas not so much. But my point that you missed is that they have no legal means available to them to compete for official positions of governance.

We picked Karzai.

Karzai Picks all supreme court justices and 34/102 seats in the upper house of Parliament
Karzai picks all Provincial Governors
Karzai picks all District Governors

All of that is very "official", I know this because the Constitution of Afghanistan tells me it is official. None of it is "legitimate" though, and that is the primary reason there is a Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan today. The secondary reason is the resistance to the coalition presence.

We throw words around like "legitimate" without really thinking that in many parts of the world "legitimate" and "official" are often worlds apart. We are very spoiled that in the U.S. they usually align. Though one should not down play the degree of concern raised by the hanging chads in the Bush election; or the degree of concern over what President Obama's birth certificate says. If the U.S. ever loses it trust and confidence in the legitimacy of our leaders as other have, we too will find ourselves on the path to insurgency. These are problems best identified, recognized as critically important, and repaired early. That is good COIN.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Latest reports are that DHS's Homeland effort actively monitors the miscreants in the Tea Party and any other groups that challenge the status quo.

Hopefully, this may avoid the need to apply COIN domestically (?????).

On the other hand, Nir Rosen's recent piece prays to not do for Afghanistan what was done in Iraq. Maybe the US would, in fact, be a great place to apply COIN.

Personally, I think there are plenty in the US that would love to have somebody rebuilding their schools, hospitals, handing out cash to businesses, etc... Soldiers could even visit friendly politicians to slip them a little, and assure they got key positions on spending committees. How could any of that create any anger locally?

[carl]

Carl, are you saying that the Karzai government is the Legitimate government of the Pashtun people??

No fair responding to a question with a question. That is a deflection. I will restate the question in an expanded form. Are you saying that the Taliban & company are the legitimate representatives of the Pashtun people, in that in any negotiations they should be seen as speaking for the Pashtun people and their interests?


In many areas, yes, the Taliban are legitimate as well, other areas not so much.

My next question is this. In the areas in which the Taliban & company are legitimate, would they be able to maintain their rule, power, legitimacy or plain old ability to run the joint without the ruthless use of terror? They seem to have killed lots of local leaders and people who have disagreed with their theology in order to establish dominance.

[Infanteer]

+1 to Bob's World's statement about borders and their lack of value in what may be best described as a "pashtun intifada". However, I think it is still important to understand that all insurgents in Afghanistan do not hail from madrassas in Pakistan; a lot of these guys are local - if you get shot at from village A, chances are some of the insurgents are from village A.

This is a huge issue with FM 3-24 that it seems to wish away; if you only separate the insurgents from the poor Afghan civilians, you've solved your problem. I posit that insurgents and the insurgency are so intertwined within the community that hedgeing success on being able to separate the two is bad policy; only the locals seem to have the ability to do this.


Like the NVA officer said, it doesn't matter if we can beat the Taliban militarily. They maybe are winning despite that, without massing. We are far more tactically proficient. But that doesn't matter because determination and patience seem to be serving them quite well. And they are still on the field, having taken everything we can throw at them.

They aren't winning anything, as long as we are there. We can and do go wherever we wish. If we want a town, we will take it and occupy it. If we have the will to stay in Afghanistan for 100 years, than the Taliban will never be more than a minor nuissance. They aren't "in the field"; they take the chance to fire a pot shot when they can.

Defeat in Afghanistan will not be military and will have nothing to do with tactics. It will have everything to do with how we define "victory" and "defeat". It will be a failure of strategy to anticpate and meet policy.

[Sargent]

Dayuhan wrote:

Russia, China, or Iran would have little incentive to coddle AQ, which is not exactly friendly to them. The Russians and Chinese have their own issues with Islamist activity, and the Iranians would have noticed AQ's oft-stated feelings toward the Shi'a. I don't think any of them would be stupid enough to think they could control who the Taliban sheltered.

There are of course problems with break-and-leave, mainly potential reversion to the status quo ante. I wouldn't be terribly concerned with Russian, Chinese, or Iranian influnce.

I honestly doubt that any of those three would want to deal with it. The Russians have been there and done that, and it wasn't good. The Chinese and Iranians have observed the complications. And, as stated before, there's nothing there of any real use to anyone. The Iranians have no trouble training their terrorist proxies in Lebanon, and Afghanistan is an expensive and messy prospect. The Russians and Chinese have little use for terrorist groups who could easily end up terrorizing them.

I doubt that any of those three have much use for AQ either. The only purpose in that bit was to describe a situation wherein the "mentor" country imposed as little as possible upon the domestic policies of the of the "client," thus ensuring the least friction in the relationship and ensuring the greatest success. The only quid pro required would be that the Taliban would guide AQ to keep the mentor state out of their sights.

And quite frankly, while none of the three have a particular use for an AQ directed at them, they might look at it as a "the enemy of my enemy/competitor is my friend" type of opportunity.

Whether the specifics of the scenario work, the point is that broken or failed societies are not often things that can easily be ignored. Even if no other state steps in, the anarchy often has international repercussions -- look at the costs being imposed on international shipping by Somali piracy -- these are former fishermen, and the fact that their activities continue is in the fact that they have a land-based safe haven given that there is no effective authority within the state to deal with it.

Bottom line, just breaking a thing -- the proposed military strategy to which my comment was originally directed -- is a bad idea. Powell was wise to promulgate the Humpty Dumpty Doctrine, and it's only hubris that fuels the notion that the Incredible Hulk Doctrine can succeed.

Jill

[Entropy]

The issue isn't why would the Taliban be willing to work with us, the issue is Karzai not wanting us to work with the Taliban. The Northern Alliance likes things just the way they are. They do not want to give up their little monopoly on governance in Afghanistan; and are very happy to have us stay and guarantee it for them.

Bob, I've been saying for a long time that Afghanistan is still in a civil war in which we picked a side. Yes, for the most part we do support many of the old "Northern Alliance" factions because they opposed the Taliban and AQ. Same reason we supported Karzai - enemy of AQ and the Taliban.

I do agree with you that the over-centralization of Afghan governance (especially the executive authority that Karzia wields) is a problem, but I'm very skeptical of your suggestion that we can somehow get these two sides together through better governance.

You say the Taliban have no legal means to compete for governance. Well, legal by whose reckoning? The Taliban don't recognize the legitimacy of the GOIRA to begin with and, with a few notable exceptions (the dozen or so "reconciled Taliban"), don't show any interest in "legal" competition.

Not that we shouldn't try to promote reconciliation, but I think we need to be realistic.

Secondly, borders do matter. If borders didn't matter we could be sending you SoF guys into Pakistan with a bunch of air support to go after AQ.

Infanteer,


Defeat in Afghanistan will not be military and will have nothing to do with tactics. It will have everything to do with how we define "victory" and "defeat". It will be a failure of strategy to anticpate and meet policy.

Well said.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy:

Right on all points.

Taliban. For a minority group within a minority group, these sure seem to take up a lot of resources/significance. Have some 150K NATO troops committed and billions and billions (Excuse me, Professor Sagan) of US dollars chasing them.

If they are irrelevant, have we just defined a floor for some definition of victory?

[Bob's World]

Insurgency is illegal politics.

Who I, or any non-Afghan citizen, thinks is legitimate is moot. The question that must be asked is "Does the Pashtun populace see the Taliban as legitimate." Indicators are that more and more the answer to that question is "Yes."

Personally, I do not care who the Afghan people select or even allow (if not given the chance to select) to govern them. That is their business. If allowed legal venues of politics to weigh in on such matters, they will employ them. If denied legal venues to weigh in on such matters, they will opt for illegal ones.

Given the design of the current Afghan constitution; given the manner in which Karzai came to power; given the presence of a foreign coalition dedicated to the preservation of the Karzai government, insurgency is not only natural, it is inevitable. The Taliban are just the flavor of the day stepping up to lead that illegal challenge. If the Taliban were destroyed by some miracle tomorrow, some new group would soon emerge from this same base of the populace to continue the challenge.

This is what FM 3-24 fails to make clear: Insurgents do not start insurgencies, governments do.

Good COIN is not about protecting the populace from the insurgent alone, but also must protect the populace from the government.

Who is protecting the populace of Afghanistan from the government of Afghanistan?? Certainly we are not, as we enable that government's existence.

Who is protecting the populace of Yemen from the government of Yemen??
or
Who is protecting the populace of Egypt from the government of Egypt??
or
Who is protecting the populace of Saudi Arabia from the government of Saudi Arabia??

In the U.S. we are protected from our government by our constitution, and the military then in turn, protects the constitution. In too many other places the military merely protects the government itself.

We enable many governments to stay in power with little concern of consequences from popular challenges. Legal venues are either corrupted beyond credibility, or simply do not exist. Illegal challengers are labeled as "terrorists" and we praise or even assist such government when they act efficiently to suppress such movements.

We never learn. And by "we" I mean whoever the powerful external party is that exerts its influence over an area in order to serve their own interests.

I was channel surfing a couple days ago and ran across the movie "Gandhi." At one point in the film a frustrated British official challenged Gandhi's efforts, praising the great effectiveness of British government and how that if the British left it would be chaos under Hindu and/or Muslim rule. Gandhi replied "any government of our own choosing no matter how flawed is better than any government forced upon us, no matter how good." This is a generally understood concept of COIN, Lawrence essentially said the same thing in "Seven Pillars."

Then yesterday I am re-reading Delveccio's Vietnam classic "The 13th Valley." In a scene early in the book a few of the guys (Egan the savvy Plt Sgt; Doc the smart, radical black NCO; Cherry, the college educated new guy and some guys from BDE) are smoking a little dope prior to going into the valley the following morning. Le Huu Minh, the company's Vietnamese scout and interpreter says:

"It is time for you all to go," Minh said from the far end of the bar.
"Yeah, I think so too, " George (a BDE guy whose hooch they are in) said. "It's three-twenty. What the F are you guys doing in my AO at three-twenty?"
"No," Minh said. "I mean it is time you all leave my country and let us work out our separate peace."
"Minh," Egan said, "you know, if we were all to leave, even if we negotiate a separate peace, that won't mean peace for your country."
George mumbled, "That's like oh three-hundred and twenty."
"That is true," Minh said. "But my friend Egan, then the war will be a Vietnamese war and not an American war. Your money is too much and now I do not recognize my own home. Your President must have you leave."

This is a lesson that while obviously not learned over and over; is certainly taught over and over.

[jcustis]

I was channel surfing a couple days ago and ran across the movie "Gandhi." At one point in the film a frustrated British official challenged Gandhi's efforts, praising the great effectiveness of British government and how that if the British left it would be chaos under Hindu and/or Muslim rule. Gandhi replied "any government of our own choosing no matter how flawed is better than any government forced upon us, no matter how good." This is a generally understood concept of COIN, Lawrence essentially said the same thing in "Seven Pillars."

You two, eh sir?


Good COIN is not about protecting the populace from the insurgent alone, but also must protect the populace from the government.

Who is protecting the populace of Afghanistan from the government of Afghanistan?? Certainly we are not, as we enable that government's existence.

The one critical thing that observers often fail to note is that the government does not need to even perform an act against the population which can be taken as a grievance. Inaction serves to harm the population as well, as does failing to provide for the common good of the people and limiting the benefits through nepotism.

This hurts the people probably more deeply that any overt aggressive act, and the wound is very, very difficult to heal.

[jcustis]

Why would Taliban leaders have to concentrate to decide anything and even if they did, what would prevent them from holding quorum in a hospital? Or why wouldn't they just do the whole thing by correspondence from scattered locations? That would cut our tron warriors completely out of the picture. In any event you have a lot more confidence in our ability to locate people who don't want to be found, in countries where we aren't on the ground in the immediate vicinity, than I do.

I do place more stock in our capabilities, but having seen exactly what those capabilities are, I am a believer that we could find our targets with the same success that we would were they across a border of a sanctuary country. Sans any border, we could deal with them more easily in Afghanistan.

[M-A Lagrange]

Bob,


The Taliban are just the flavor of the day stepping up to lead that illegal challenge. If the Taliban were destroyed by some miracle tomorrow, some new group would soon emerge from this same base of the populace to continue the challenge.

Which makes the point occuping forces/government/fake supportive government as the centre of gravity of any “insurgencies” even more relevant.

You are opening an open door Bob but it seems that door needs to be open and reopen million times before anyone sees it.
Any successful invasion/occupation was made through keeping in place the former administration and then finding out inside it who will be the puppet.


Good COIN is not about protecting the populace from the insurgent alone, but also must protect the populace from the government.

Actually not that true. Good population centric COIN is to install a government that will protect its people and act accordingly Rule of Law. But that’s a dream somehow.
Good COIN can also be to crush insurgent quick, fast and hard; Leave them no political room to build a propaganda.

Actually, the paradox is: webberian/modern government is a need for modern occupying powers. (Cf Kilcullen). You need someone to talk to and with. Populations do not! Even in West, we cope with governments and do bargain with it.
Establishing the fact that population need post webberian government based on responsability to protect is what we (let say some dreamers) would like.

[Bob's World]

Actually not that true. Good population centric COIN is to install a government that will protect its people and act accordingly Rule of Law. But that’s a dream somehow.
Good COIN can also be to crush insurgent quick, fast and hard; Leave them no political room to build a propaganda.



This is the fallacy of pop-centric COIN, in that it is a change of "tone" perhaps from threat-centric COIN, but it is still just as deeply rooted in the promotion and preservation of illegitimate governments over the populaces of others as derived from the Colonial roots of our COIN doctrine. It seeks to be just as controlling over the populaces of others as threat-centric approaches.

It is a half-step in the right direction, but a half-step all the same. Doing the wrong thing gently is sadly more apt to get one hurt in the process than doing the wrong thing aggressively. Both produce the same failed results, but the pop-centric approach opens one up to a lot more punishment in the process.

One cannot install a legitimate government over the populace of another. To buy into the belief that we can ties back to what we learned from the Europeans and refined in our own Colonial efforts. Its a lie we tell ourselves, and rationalize by saying that we are "enforcing the rule of law" or "bringing democracy to the people." What brings stability is self-determination of governance and justice under one's own laws; not forced sham democracies and injustice under the laws of some foreign power.

There are good concepts within Pop-centric COIN, but the overall construct as currently defined and as we currently attempt to implement it is fatally flawed.

If we must conduct such interventions to promote and preserve our own national interests, then we must learn to do so in a fashion that does not seek to control specific outcomes, dictate specific leaders and forms of government, or project specific values. Instead we must find ways to empower self-determined solutions within the parameters of broad principles designed to prevent abuses of more universal concepts of human rights than what we currently see as "proper" in U.S. culture. Those who attempt to disrupt such proceedings with violent challenges must be met with even greater violence. No need to buy the support of the people with vast development and charity either. We don't need their support, we just don't want their animosity. Their government needs their support, and they will support a government that they know to be theirs. A government that is constrained by a good constitution tailored to their own culture, but designed to prevent too much efficiency or power in any one man or section of government, and that protects the populace from government abuses of power as well.

Americans may not approve of who is selected to lead, or of the forms of government adopted. So be it. Americans will approve of not being stuck in long, expensive, bloody efforts to force our will unnecessarily onto others; Americans will approve of foreign populaces that do not feel compelled to bring acts of violence to the shores of America as well.

[slapout9]

Americans may not approve of who is selected to lead, or of the forms of government adopted. So be it. Americans will approve of not being stuck in long, expensive, bloody efforts to force our will unnecessarily onto others; Americans will approve of foreign populaces that do not feel compelled to bring acts of violence to the shores of America as well.

And that should be the Center of Gravity of our Foreign Policy.....who gives a flip what kind of government they have so long as they are not going to do us any harm. Hank Williams,Jr. wrote a song about it. It's called "Why don't you mind your own business and you want be minding mine":wry:

[carl]

I do place more stock in our capabilities, but having seen exactly what those capabilities are, I am a believer that we could find our targets with the same success that we would were they across a border of a sanctuary country. Sans any border, we could deal with them more easily in Afghanistan.

I will remain skeptical. There are too many people we couldn't or haven't been able to find, AQ no. 1 & 2, MO, al-Awaki, Saddam, not to mention aspirin factories destroyed and talks with top Taliban commanders who weren't, for me to have confidence that we would know enough to make "death from the air" a credible threat if we weren't on the ground in the area.

[Steve the Planner]

My trouble with the Bob Brief derives from my experience in state/local government in the US.

Somewhere, by focusing overseas, there is an inaccurate underlying myth about the nature of our government.

Federal, state and local governments in the US are, in most substantive applications, a contest for resources, with explicit and implicit decisions about winners and losers---and substantial "spoils" at stake, including by folks who never even know what was at stake, or what was trade away on their behalf.

Democracy is a constant struggle (including by folks like the K-Street lobbyist crowd whose focus is to keep everything behind the scenes), played out since the inception of our democracy, and gridded by rules and protections which often must be enforced through FBI busts (Prince George's County, Maryland), and Congressional Ethics Actions (Rangel). I am not being paranoid---this is the essential reality that has not, and will never change. The price of freedom is ETERNAL vigilance, questioning, verification, and, when needed, enforcement.

Even with a very open fourth (press) and fifth (public info/engagement) estate, we stand on the bring of looming and very serious state/local budget/bond dilemmas (June 30 budget cycles) unprecedented in recent years (but not in US history). Obviously, as in the past, they will threaten the foundations of democracy and public integrity, but does that mean they will end it? No. We, as a people of common purpose, will face the challenges and move forward.

Where are the viable and highly complex checks and balances (the essential DNA) in our pretend "nation-building" if all we do is stand as sentinel to an Afghan national government with so little to offer its people, and so much being looted?

Acceptable representative government means a lot of different things to a lot of different peoples.

If our mission is to really be accomplished in Afghanistan, it must reckon objectively with the actual dilemmas that jcustis has explained. Many confusing, contradictory and self-dealing parties, all in conflict with each other. The "success" in Iraq is, despite substantial instability, removal of a genuine threat to the institution of government, and focus on conflict-resolution through institutions (not warlords and local tribes).

[Dayuhan]

If we must conduct such interventions to promote and preserve our own national interests, then we must learn to do so in a fashion that does not seek to control specific outcomes, dictate specific leaders and forms of government, or project specific values.

National interest may not require that we control the outcome of a given process, but it often requires that we prevent certain outcomes, typically a return to the status quo ante. If that were an acceptable outcome we'd have had no reason to intervene in the first place.


Instead we must find ways to empower self-determined solutions within the parameters of broad principles designed to prevent abuses of more universal concepts of human rights than what we currently see as "proper" in U.S. culture. Those who attempt to disrupt such proceedings with violent challenges must be met with even greater violence.

The process of arriving at a "self-determined solution" often involves violence, especially in diverse societies where different components of society have radically different perceived interests, and where there is no broad consensus on the idea of shared power.


Their government needs their support, and they will support a government that they know to be theirs. A government that is constrained by a good constitution tailored to their own culture, but designed to prevent too much efficiency or power in any one man or section of government, and that protects the populace from government abuses of power as well.

I think you vastly overestimate the power of a Constitution. A Constitution in itself is a pile of paper with words written on it; it cannot protect anyone from anything and it cannot prevent or assure anything. These are accomplished not by the Constitution, but by the basic elements of consensus that the Constitution codifies, and by the will to follow the Constitution. Important to note that the document does not create the consensus, it merely codifies it. If there is no consensus to codify, that doesn't work very well.

Our founding documents represent a set of basic principles on which we've agreed to agree. Without that consensus they can accomplish nothing. Democrats and Republicans may disagree on almost everything, but they agree that power can and generally will be shared, and that the source of legitimacy is the will of the people. If different factions do not accept the idea of shared power, or if they believe that legitimacy is, say, inherited, or derives from the will of God, Allah, or The Great Pumpkin (whose will they alone know), no words on paper will create a foundation for shared power.

Trying, for example, to impose the idea of shared power on a society not prepared to accept it is a form of control, no less so than imposing a dictator.


Americans will approve of foreign populaces that do not feel compelled to bring acts of violence to the shores of America as well.

What foreign populace has ever brought acts of violence to the shores of America?

[Bob's World]

National interest may not require that we control the outcome of a given process, but it often requires that we prevent certain outcomes, typically a return to the status quo ante. If that were an acceptable outcome we'd have had no reason to intervene in the first place.



The process of arriving at a "self-determined solution" often involves violence, especially in diverse societies where different components of society have radically different perceived interests, and where there is no broad consensus on the idea of shared power.



I think you vastly overestimate the power of a Constitution. A Constitution in itself is a pile of paper with words written on it; it cannot protect anyone from anything and it cannot prevent or assure anything. These are accomplished not by the Constitution, but by the basic elements of consensus that the Constitution codifies, and by the will to follow the Constitution. Important to note that the document does not create the consensus, it merely codifies it. If there is no consensus to codify, that doesn't work very well.

Our founding documents represent a set of basic principles on which we've agreed to agree. Without that consensus they can accomplish nothing. Democrats and Republicans may disagree on almost everything, but they agree that power can and generally will be shared, and that the source of legitimacy is the will of the people. If different factions do not accept the idea of shared power, or if they believe that legitimacy is, say, inherited, or derives from the will of God, Allah, or The Great Pumpkin (whose will they alone know), no words on paper will create a foundation for shared power.

Trying, for example, to impose the idea of shared power on a society not prepared to accept it is a form of control, no less so than imposing a dictator.



What foreign populace has ever brought acts of violence to the shores of America?

Dayuhan,

As my team medic used to say "you need to step away from the Crack Pipe."

As a student of human nature and motivations as assessed through behavior, you are a bit of a mystery. I'm not quite sure what it is you are afraid of that you feel compelled to persistently argue any position I make, even when they are ones that you yourself have made and defended previously with equal vigor. I'll give you the benefit of the doubt that you are not some agent provocateur. Perhaps a Dick Cheney adamantly committed to the rightness of US approaches; or equally a Bin Laden who knows his best chances lie in the US holding the course of the past 9 years.... writing under a pseudonym and the cloak of anonymity the web provides.

No, it is you, my friend, who underestimates the power of a proper constitution. It is you that does not appreciate the critical nuance of the difference between national security forces dedicated to protect and preserve the very document that defines governmental powers and popular rights, rather than national security forces dedicated to simply preserving the government itself.

Of course "self-determined" governance is violent. Anything worth having is worth fighting for; and those who currently possess power and wealth are not apt to surrender their selfish and ill-gotten gains in favor of more equitable forms of governance easily. This is why the role of the intervening power as a neutral buffer on such violence is essential. This is why the role of the intervening power as an establisher and enforcer of broad, principled, equitable limits for such self-determination to occur within is so essential.

No, your arguments hold little water. Not intervening at all is indeed often the wisest course. To set and enforce such limits more indirectly, and without the strategic risk and burden of placing it all within a context of a war that must be "won" or interests elevated artificially to the "vital" level that implies a linkage to national survival.

The world is changing, the US must change as well. Currently we resist such changes, as many others similarly situated have before us. But change is inevitable, what the U.S. needs to decide is on who's terms will we change, and in what manner we wish to be perceived when the histories of this era are ultimately written.

[carl]

Dayuhan,

As my team medic used to say "you need to step away from the Crack Pipe."


No, it is you, my friend, who underestimates the power of a proper constitution. It is you that does not appreciate the critical nuance of the difference between national security forces dedicated to protect and preserve the very document that defines governmental powers and popular rights, rather than national security forces dedicated to simply preserving the government itself.

I believe I will join Dayuhan at the crack pipe. It seems to confer a bit of wisdom.

If the adoption of an enlightened constitution alone made certain a good government, should not some of the notably savage police states of the 20th and 21st centuries have been fine places to bring up the children? I read that Red China had a fine constitution, but it didn't do a thing. It wasn't followed. Great Britain doesn't have a written constitution at all, but they do well. Refugees tend to flow into Britain, not out. The Brits do well enough because they have agreed upon "the basic elements of consensus" as Dayuhan said. Because they agree they don't need a written constitution. If they had one it would they be any better, or worse?

I think Dayuhan very well understands the difference between cops and soldiers dedicated to protecting the regime in power and those who protect "the basic elements of consensus" as stated in a constitution. That is a glaring, radical, fundamental difference, not a "critical nuance". That difference comes from more than a piece of paper. In our case anyway, it comes from culture that was shaped over a long time by a lot of people. Things can change for the better most anywhere, but it takes more than waving a piece of paper in front of their face.

[Ken White]

who that Team Medic said that to...:wry:

It seems I'm far more in accord with Dayuhan and Carl than with thee, Bob's World. Your somewhat unique take on history and governance -- and on what the US has done and / or should do does have some inconsistencies and people simply tend to point those out -- much as Gian did on the Blog this morning. As Bill Moore and I have done for years -- recall that we both agree with you on some things, disagree on others but, to my knowledge, you didn't construe either of us as agents provocateur...

You may not realize that you sometimes address the expressed concerns in a post by apparently modifying your position slightly and often then proceed to repost the same thing later. Volume and repetition in a sales pitch is good but it can invite more questions or comments... ;)

Still we can discuss all that, hopefully, without rancor or getting personal. :cool:

Now I gotta go find my pipe.

[carl]

Bob's World:

Though you have not stated it as such, you seem to be inching toward the position that Taliban should be viewed as the proper representative of the Pashtun people and we should recognize them as such. Please correct me if I'm reading you wrong. I don't believe that Taliban & company can be viewed in such a way because they maintain their power at the barrel of a gun. They acquired power initially through violence and by professing to redress real grievances. They do pretty much the same thing now. But once they take an area by they maintain their power though violence and they inflict upon the Afghans things they don't want through violence. Their ability to wield this violence is critically underwritten by a foreign military entity. If they did not have the support of that entity, they would not have the power to impose their will upon others through violence. There are lots of dead Pashtun local leaders and dead Pashtuns who disagreed with Taliban and company's theology who might disagree with the view that Taliban & company speak for the Pashtuns. I can't agree that this violent minority can really speak for anyone but themselves.

You have also stated in the past that good governance will prevent insurgency. I think that is (I am going to get into trouble for using this word) naive. Good governance is one way to preclude an insurgency. Another way that works just as well, maybe better, is having a well organized, properly run and sufficiently violent police state; preferably one backed up by some kind of ideology (that is from Revolutionary Civil War by Wilkinson...I think). North Korea is a rather poorly run country filled with unhappy people, but there is no insurgency. They have a vicious police state that stifles any hint of insurgency before it gets a chance to start. The Soviet Union, Red China and any number of states were able to have peace within their borders for the same reason.

The Taliban & company are similar, very similar. When they take over an area they impose a police state, and they have a nice little ideology to back them up-God is on their side. Anybody living in a Taliban and company area had better toe the line or they will be killed in a most theatrical fashion.

Your statement "The question that must be asked is "Does the Pashtun populace see the Taliban as legitimate." Indicators are that more and more the answer to that question is "Yes."" ignores the effect that violence and terror have on a peoples outlook.

Your above quoted statement brings a further question to mind. Which part of Taliban & company are you referring to, MO's boys, Haqani's crew, one of the others or all of them?

You have decried us attempting to influence what kind of gov is established in Afghanistan. You have not decried the Pak Army/ISI attempting to influence what kind of gov is established in Afghanistan. I believe you have defended their attempts. Those are inconsistent positions. I don't understand why the west attempting to keep Taliban & company out is wrong but the Pak Army/ISI trying to put them in is not.

[Jedburgh]

Tufts, Nov 10: Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Balkh Province (https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/38966405/WinningHearts-Afghanistan.pdf?version=1)

...The Balkh Province case study is part of a larger five-province Afghanistan country study looking at the assumption (https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958) that humanitarian and development assistance projects can help to bring or maintain security in strategically important environments, and can help “win hearts and minds,” (https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/34085577/WP1022.pdf?version=1) thereby undermining support within the local populace for radical, insurgent, or terrorist groups. Afghanistan provided an opportunity to examine one of the most concerted recent efforts to use “hearts and minds” projects to achieve security objectives. It has been the testing ground for new approaches to using reconstruction assistance as a counterinsurgency tool. The assumption that aid projects improve security has lead to a sharp increase in overall development funding, an increased percentage of activities based on strategic security considerations, and a shift of development activities to the military. In this light, it is essential that policy makers understand whether and how aid projects can actually contribute to security....

[Dayuhan]

Bottom line, just breaking a thing -- the proposed military strategy to which my comment was originally directed -- is a bad idea. Powell was wise to promulgate the Humpty Dumpty Doctrine, and it's only hubris that fuels the notion that the Incredible Hulk Doctrine can succeed.


The Humpty Dumpty Doctrine assumes what has yet to be demonstrated: the capacity to fix. Very simply, we don't have it. We're good at the Incredible Hulk stuff: we have armed forces and they know how to break things. We have no organized entity trained and equipped to repair nations. What we've done is to deploy forces that are trained and equipped to break things and asked them to do what they are not trained and equipped to do. Not surprisingly, we haven't fixed much and we've exposed ourselves to a war of attrition, our single greatest vulnerability. This is not smart.

Iraq and Afghanistan were arguably broken before we ever went there. A reasonable goal might have been to neither break further nor to attempt to fix, but simply to demonstrate to the inmates that while we've no concern with their domestic issues, attacking us or our allies, or sheltering those who do, will provoke highly undesirable consequences. That we could have done. Letting the mission creep from there to the appalling construct of "nation-building" was a spectacularly costly mistake.

[Dayuhan]

You have also stated in the past that good governance will prevent insurgency. I think that is (I am going to get into trouble for using this word) naive.

I've no real complaint with the idea that good governance prevents insurgency and can resolve insurgency. It's true enough, it just doesn't get us anywhere, because we cannot govern these states, we cannot impose "good governance", and we cannot transform bad governments into good ones. There is no magic power-sharing formula or perfect Constitution that will persuade the various actors in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, DRC, or many other places to lay down their guns and be polite to each other.

Good governance that is appropriate to its environment is not installed, and it does not appear. It evolves, and the evolutionary process often involves violence. We may at times be able to cushion the worst effects of that violence, and we may at times have to try to mitigate the impact of these processes on our interests, but we can't eliminate the process.

[davidbfpo]

Nearly slipped by. Sub-titled:
United Nations security assessments show an escalating pattern of violence in Afghanistan in recent months, contradicting the largely upbeat conclusions of a White House review of progress published less than a fortnight ago.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8227073/UN-charts-escalation-of-violence-in-Afghanistan.html

Alas no link to the actual UN report.

It does end with this, from a RUSI commentary:
The US-led coalition is not winning, or even beginning to win, in Afghanistan. For each of the last four years, military officials and politicians have said that they are starting to turn the corner in the conflict. In each of the last four years the insurgency has grown larger, more powerful and more deadly.

This commentary is behind a pay-wall. Once again a UK-based think tank, with a history of close links to Whitehall, sounds a note of dissent (like IISS did a few months ago).

[Bob's World]

Carl,

Who has standing to legally advocate for the Pashtun people today? They are split between two nations, neither of which is inclined to offer them legal, Representative participation in government.

This feeds directly to the causal factor I label as "Hope." A populace that perceives that it has access to legal, trusted, and certain means of influencing governance has "hope," and as such is far less likely to participate or look to the illegal forms of violent and non-violent politics that make up insurgency. A populace without such an outlet is much more likely to act out. There is no "hope" in Afghanistan for anyone not directly affiliated with the Northern Alliance or Mr. Karzai.

So this brings us to the question of "who represents the Pashtun people?" Who indeed.

Historically, prior to the Taliban and the current Karzai constitution, local, provincial and district Shuras were the basis of legitimate government, selected and serving locally; with patronage also being a local dynamic. From these local forums a Khan was selected who would then represent the Province (not sure off the top of my head exact selection process or level represented) to the Afghan government. These representatives were then recognized by the King as having official authority. Legitimacy from the people, Authority from the King. By all accounts, while not an incredibly effective government, it was widely regarded as "good governance", and there was stability.

Not many are willing to outlaw themselves to represent the people so excluded from official governance. Often those who are willing to outlaw themselves have their own selfish interests or the interests of some foreign power at the heart of their motivations. If you bleed in the water, it is likely that predators will appear before help does. Same-same with a populace excluded from good governance.

But my point is not that the Taliban are the representative of the Pashtun people (though be default, in many ways they are), but rather that they are the organization with influence, access, capability and capacity to evict AQ from the FATA. That is US mission in AFPAK. That is the U.S interest at stake in AFPAK. Historically we have worked with all manner of rogues to service our interests; many suggest that we work with rogues in dealing with the current official governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. If one must work with rogues, at least one can have the common sense to work with the rogues that can actually help one accomplish what they are attempting to do.

Ms Flournoy often talks of how we must quit being so idealistic and must become more pragmatic. Well, here's a bit of pragmatism for us to consider: We currently side with two parties who cannot help us accomplish our mission to gang up on the one party who can. I suggest we stop doing that, sit down with the Taliban and figure out what it takes to deal with AQ, and then make it happen. I suspect our friendly rogues will not like it much, but that they will play ball. Particularly Pakistan. Afghanistan less so, as the populace that makes up the Northern Alliance dreads any opening of the door of a return to potential Pashtun rule for good reason. We will need to protect them, and the number one tool for providing such protections is a proper constitution that is in turn protected by a military that places its loyalty to that constitution first, and their commander in chief second at best.

[carl]

Bob's World:

Very well stated. I see your point clearly. I don't know if it is practicable though. There are a lot of reasons for my opinion, all or most of which have been well stated in the past by others.

There is something I want to run by you. In "The Sun In the Sky" the author made it clear that the Afghan insurgents disliked and distrust the Pakistanis. If we weren't there the Pakistanis would be no. 1 on their hate list. They need them though and are somewhat at their mercy since they have to use Pakistan as a sanctuary.

Do you think we could somehow use that in our favor? For example-Mullah Baradar got picked up they say because he was threatening to break the leash, the implication being that nobody can stray to far from what the Pak Army/ISI wants and get away with it because they are in Pakistan. If, a huge if, we were to say to MO, come to this place in Afghanistan and you will be safe there, would useful talks be more possible because the Pak Army/ISI couldn't physically get at him and his people? Could something along that line work?

[Bob's World]

My take when the Quetta Shura got rolled up a few months back was that it was a none to subtle reminder from the Government of Pakistan (I refuse to abdicate them from responsibility for the ISI and the military; just as I refuse to abdicate the Government of Lebanon for the actions of LH. To do so only creates and enforces further sanctuaries from the rule of law that states rely upon to sustain effective power and control) to the Taliban as to who they work for and that there is no quitting.

By the U.S. reaching out to the Taliban we disempower the coercive hold that Karzai has on us (essentially that we need him and the Northern Alliance in power in Afghanistan in order to secure ourselves from AQ) and also free the Pashtuns from the coercive power of Pakistan (similar, that they need Pakistan sanctuary and support to wage their insurgency against what they perceive as illegitimate government in Afghanistan).

We face an impossible mission in AFPAK only because we have defined the mission in impossible terms. By redefining the mission we can make this a much more viable operation and potentially make it more likely to produce the security we seek as well.

This thread is about indicators. There are 14 indicators of Late-Stage Insurgent success and 14 indicators of effective COIN in the CIA "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency" that was apparently produced sometime in the 1980s.

http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf

This is actually a pretty good outline on insurgency that I probably originally was made aware of here on the SWJ. I was reviewing it this week, and these 28 factors and indicators should cause thinking people to ask hard questions about our current course in Afghanistan. I will list them here, but be sure to look at them in regards to GIROA, not the Coalition. Afterall, this is an Afghan insurgency and an Afghan COIN. The Coalition intervention and support to that effort is a very different animal driven by very different interests and objectives. I think we tend to forget that.

I mean, people discuss the "COIN Strategy in Afghanistan." I think about this everyday, and yet I don't have the faintest idea what the GIROA COIN strategy is. I would ponder this as I would sit in large command and staff meetings in RC-South as we prepared for and executed the Marjah (central Helmand) operation and prepared for the Kandahar operations, with heavy emphasis on Afghan partnering. After 5 months a single Afghan LNO was brought into the room. Never did we say "here is the Afghan strategy, now lets figure out how we best support them;" always it was "here is the ISAF strategy, now lets figure out how we get our Afghan partners to help us execute the plan we've put together to support it." There is a difference, and it is a telling one.

So, from our friends at the CIA:

14 Indicators of Insurgent Success:

Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government:
- Withdrawal of support by specific , critical segments of the population.
- Growing popular perception of regime illegitimacy.
- Popular perception of insurgents as leading nationalists.
- Insurgent co-optation, incorporation, or elimination of other major opposition groups to government.

Progressive withdrawal of international support for the government:
- Withdrawal of foreign support by specific, critical allies.
- Increasing international support for the insurgents.

Progressive loss of government control over the population and territory:
- Significant expansion of territory under insurgent control.
- Escalation of guerrilla / terrorist violence.
- Increasing inability of government to protect supporters / officials from attack.
- National economy increasingly weakened by insurgent activity.

Progressive loss of government coercive power:
- Military plots or coups against the government.
- Armed guerrilla forces multiplying in size.
- Lack of sufficient government troops for counterinsurgency.
- Government seriously negotiating sharing of power with rebels.


And 14 Military and Nonmilitary factors of effective COIN (again, think GIROA first; then reconsider for the Coalition as a whole separately, but the GIORA assessment is the critical one):

Military Factors
Leadership. The degree of professionalism that characterizes a country’s military forces.
Tactics and Strategy. The ability of counterinsurgent forces to employ the various unconventional strategies and tactics required for combating insurgents in the field – tactics that deemphasize the concentration of forces and firepower and emphasize constant patrolling by many small, lightly armed units supported by larger backup forces.
Military Intelligence. The ability of the military intelligence apparatus to collect, analyze, and exploit quality intelligence of guerrilla personnel, modus operandi and locations, not just on insurgent order of battle.
Troop behavior and discipline. The quality of the relationship between soldiers deployed in the field and the surrounding populations.
Air and naval operations. The quality of air and naval support to the government’s counterinsurgency forces – for example, fire support, reconnaissance, supply transport, medevac.
Civil-Military relations. The ability of civilian authorities to influence military operations, especially with regard to proper consideration for political objectives.
Popular Militia. A government’s ability to establish and maintain a popular militia to assist regular forces in maintaining security.

Nonmilitary Factors:
Political operations. The ability of the police to maintain law and order and implement population – and resources – control programs.
Civilian intelligence. The ability of the civilian and police intelligence organizations to collect, coordinate, evaluate, and exploit intelligence on the insurgents and their political /military activities.
Psychological operations. The quality of a government’s psychological warfare effort, its information and media activities, and its ability to promote its cause domestically and internationally.
Unified management of counterinsurgency. The government’s ability to establish an organizational infrastructure capable of coordinating a coherent counterinsurgency campaign.
Political framework. The overall political form and appeal of the government and the validity of its claim that it is the legitimate expression of the people’s aspirations and of the country’s traditions and ethos.
Improvement of rural conditions and administration. The ability of the government to implement the programs and reforms necessary to gain popular acquiescence in and support for the government’s efforts against the insurgents.
Legal reform. The ability of the government to implement and administer special laws and regulations specifically designed to counter and suppress the insurgency.

Even with a simple "Red-Amber-Green" assessment, there is a whole lot of Red on the chart.

[Dayuhan]

Ms Flournoy often talks of how we must quit being so idealistic and must become more pragmatic. Well, here's a bit of pragmatism for us to consider: We currently side with two parties who cannot help us accomplish our mission to gang up on the one party who can. I suggest we stop doing that, sit down with the Taliban and figure out what it takes to deal with AQ, and then make it happen. I suspect our friendly rogues will not like it much, but that they will play ball. Particularly Pakistan.

Do the Taliban want to sit down with us? Why should they be interested in our mission? They have a mission of their own: get back the power they lost. All they have to do to accomplish it is to outlast us, and if they follow our discussions at home they know they can do that.

The Pakistani Army and ISI would not want us dealing with the Taliban. AQ will not want us dealing with the Taliban. The Deobandi religious core of the Taliban will not want us dealing with the Taliban. Maybe some politically-inclined pragmatists might feel otherwise, but will they have enough influence on the organization to bring about a deal? Or will an effort to make a deal just end up with anyone pragmatic enough to deal getting rolled up and buried?

We have to accept that any deal made will be seen, by both Karzai and the Taliban, as a step toward full control. They might make a deal if they think it will provide them opportunity in the long run, but both will break the deal as soon as they have an opportunity to get what they want. I doubt very much that this is about representation. It's about power, and when the dust settles somebody's going to be in and somebody's going to be out. Whoever ends up out is going to have a bad time of it.


Afghanistan less so, as the populace that makes up the Northern Alliance dreads any opening of the door of a return to potential Pashtun rule for good reason. We will need to protect them, and the number one tool for providing such protections is a proper constitution that is in turn protected by a military that places its loyalty to that constitution first, and their commander in chief second at best.

It is not in our power to create an army that places its loyalty to a Constitution first. We can train and equip soldiers, but we cannot transform their loyalties. It would be nice if we could, but we can't. It would be lovely if we could set up a nice system with representation for all, checks and balances, legal protection for minorities, and a chicken in every pot, but we can't. So how realistically do we propose to protect our erstwhile allies if the other guys take over? A Constitution won't do anything if the people in power choose not to follow it. We have to deal with what is and what we can realistically accomplish, and modern constitutional democracy is not in either category.

The only real virtue I see in a forced compromise, if we can create one at all (highly debatable), is that it might give us a graceful exit point: "ok, you've made peace, we're outta here". Of course as soon as we were gone the compromise would end and the parties involved would proceed to chew each other up, but that would not be our problem, unless the Taliban won. Odds on that might not be so favorable, to us at least.


By the U.S. reaching out to the Taliban we disempower the coercive hold that Karzai has on us (essentially that we need him and the Northern Alliance in power in Afghanistan in order to secure ourselves from AQ) and also free the Pashtuns from the coercive power of Pakistan (similar, that they need Pakistan sanctuary and support to wage their insurgency against what they perceive as illegitimate government in Afghanistan).

The US reaching out to the Taliban will not in itself accomplish any of these goals. This only works if the Taliban reach back. If we reach out publicly and get rebuffed we accomplish nothing at all.

I have nothing against sending quiet overtures where they seem appropriate, and pursuing any that seem to have potential. I don't see how making a grand overture to the Taliban is likely to get us anywhere. Why would they want to play along with us?

You speak sometimes as if the only obstacle to a viable power-sharing deal is us, and if we only reach out all things will fall into place. Why would this be the case? Do you really think the guys on the other side of the fence are that amenable to making a lasting deal?

[jcustis]

Dayuhan, I see you as a "We've got all the watches, but they have all the time" sort of realist. Good points on all accounts. I agree with you that a goal of a constitution that is held up as some sort of glue that binds, is a terribly lofty one that we cannot reach.


I think about this everyday, and yet I don't have the faintest idea what the GIROA COIN strategy is.

Sir, I don't think we will ever get to a point where there is one, and if we do, it will be so tainted by our hand that it will be marked for death.

I used to think that it still mattered that we should at least try to get things upright, but the costs simply do not justify it any longer. The best we can hope for is probably a decent interval.

[Bob's World]

I too am a realist. It is idealistic to think that mere suppression of the Taliban through brute force, coupled with buckets of cash and development projects to temporarily bribe good behavior in the populace will work. History tells us it can achieve temporary effects at best.

I see in the current ISAF strategy an effort to create just such a temporary suppression effect, just long enough to declare victory, and depart. Perhaps that is a bit of realism as well, and not idealistic wishing that makes them think it will produce perm. effects, and that any proclamations of that as our goal being calculated lies to appease the court of global opinion. But it won't help us resolve the AQ problem, and that is still the mission.

The Taliban see themselves as a government in exile. If we wanted to take out the Karzai government we'd be drinking tea with the Taliban right now plotting just how we would make that happen. But because we don't want to take out the Karzai government, but merely force an incorporation of Taliban and Northern Alliance influences in one government such plotting is "idealistic"? No, it is cold, hard realism. Use the tool that works. Make hard compromises. Work with people you would not hang out with. Get the job done, and move on. Do the Taliban want the entire thing? Perhaps, perhaps not. We'll know better when we talk to them. They do indeed have the time, and if they can get their foot in the door at the low cost of admission of simply helping the US with AQ (who they really don't like that much to begin with), I suspect yes, they will evict that bad house guest and bide their time as to achieving their ultimate ends. We'll be long gone, dealing with other problems elsewhere by then.

"Realism" is not avoiding difficult workable solutions in favor of solutions that cannot work. To think we can build an Afghan nation that is stable to solve this problem, or defeat the Pashtun populace's quest for participation in governance and opportunity on their own, or that the Northern Alliance will allow such participation legally of their own volition is the Idealism in play here.

[Dayuhan]

I see in the current ISAF strategy an effort to create just such a temporary suppression effect, just long enough to declare victory, and depart. Perhaps that is a bit of realism as well, and not idealistic wishing that makes them think it will produce perm. effects, and that any proclamations of that as our goal being calculated lies to appease the court of global opinion. But it won't help us resolve the AQ problem, and that is still the mission.

I agree, this strategy won't work. I just don't think what you propose will work either. In fact, I suspect strongly that a sequence of bad decisions and unrealistic policies has painted us into a corner where there may be nothing that will work, at which point we face an exercise in damage limitation.


But because we don't want to take out the Karzai government, but merely force an incorporation of Taliban and Northern Alliance influences in one government such plotting is "idealistic"? No, it is cold, hard realism. Use the tool that works. Make hard compromises. Work with people you would not hang out with. Get the job done, and move on. Do the Taliban want the entire thing? Perhaps, perhaps not. We'll know better when we talk to them.

If they talk to us.

Of course we'd be willing to compromise. Putting the Taliban and the Karzai crowd into one government, having the Taliban ditch AQ and walking away is a perfect "solution" for us, why wouldn't we compromise? The question is whether they would be willing to compromise, and that seems to be a point that you assume, for reasons yet unexplained. Why would these two parties get together, share power, and play nicely together just because we want them to? It's not just about us, and this isn't going to happen just because we want it to happen.


They do indeed have the time, and if they can get their foot in the door at the low cost of admission of simply helping the US with AQ (who they really don't like that much to begin with), I suspect yes, they will evict that bad house guest and bide their time as to achieving their ultimate ends.

What basis is there for that suspicion? Have the Taliban shown any evidence of willingness to make such arrangements? What influences would move them in that direction (we all know what influences would move them in the opposite direction). The Taliban could have turned over OBL long ago and deprived us of much of our rationale for being there. They aren't doing that.


"Realism" is not avoiding difficult workable solutions in favor of solutions that cannot work. To think we can build an Afghan nation that is stable to solve this problem, or defeat the Pashtun populace's quest for participation in governance and opportunity on their own, or that the Northern Alliance will allow such participation legally of their own volition is the Idealism in play here .

Why do you assume a "Pashtun quest for participation in governance"? When did "participation" ever come into the picture, except in American minds? When the Taliban held sway they didn't allow anyone else to participate, and of course they wouldn't expect anyone else to allow them to participate. They know there's going to be a winner and a loser, and they intend to be the winner. The solution you propose is indeed "workable", for us. That's not enough. It has to be workable for the other parties involved... is it?

I think the solution you propose is a quite lovely one and it would be wonderful if we could implement it... I just don't see any reason to think the other parties that would have to cooperate have any interest in playing along. As I said above, I'd have nothing against quiet contact with Taliban leaders and exploring any avenues that come up (I suspect this has already happened) but the chances of it going anywhere have to be pretty slim. Coming out with a public proposal is something we have to avoid; it it's shot down (and it almost certainly would be) it leaves us in a worse position with everybody concerned.

[jcustis]

Coming out with a public proposal is something we have to avoid; it it's shot down (and it almost certainly would be) it leaves us in a worse position with everybody concerned.

As is currently obvious from the wikileaks issue, the key diplomatic construct at play is knowing when to keep the collective mouth shut about these sort of things. Excellent point.

[Bob's World]

I never said we had to set up the deal publicly.

The Taliban have made indications in the past that they are willing to remove the sanctuary they provide AQ in exchange for being able to compete legally for a role in governance.

As this articles indicates, all is not roses in their relationship with Pakistan. I strongly suspect that the roll up of the Quetta Shura was due to the Taliban making overtones at reconciliation as well.:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40849142/ns/world_news-the_new_york_times

We need to take such accusations more seriously than we have to date. We condone and encourage governments to help us with our interests, and this is often the types of measures they employ. Serving their own interests in fact, but gaining a pass from the US by claiming that it is supporting our concerns on terrorism. The Saudis are just as bad, and just as enabled by the US as the Pakistanis. I suspect that in Egypt and Yemen one can find similar governmental bad behavior being similarly enabled and ignored by the US. I think that it is in such relationships that the roots of terrorism take hold. Ideology is just the fertilizer applied to help it grow, and organizations like AQ the trellis that lends the structure to control and focus that growth.

[carl]

Bob's World:

In your view is it the Afghan Taliban or the Pakistani Taliban covering for AQ? If it is the Pakistani Taliban they might not care to do business in any event. Personally I think the ISI is covering for them too.

[Dayuhan]

I never said we had to set up the deal publicly.

The Taliban have made indications in the past that they are willing to remove the sanctuary they provide AQ in exchange for being able to compete legally for a role in governance.

As this articles indicates, all is not roses in their relationship with Pakistan. I strongly suspect that the roll up of the Quetta Shura was due to the Taliban making overtones at reconciliation as well.:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40849142/ns/world_news-the_new_york_times

We need to take such accusations more seriously than we have to date. We condone and encourage governments to help us with our interests, and this is often the types of measures they employ. Serving their own interests in fact, but gaining a pass from the US by claiming that it is supporting our concerns on terrorism. The Saudis are just as bad, and just as enabled by the US as the Pakistanis. I suspect that in Egypt and Yemen one can find similar governmental bad behavior being similarly enabled and ignored by the US. I think that it is in such relationships that the roots of terrorism take hold. Ideology is just the fertilizer applied to help it grow, and organizations like AQ the trellis that lends the structure to control and focus that growth.

We don't enable the Saudis to do anything they couldn't do without us. There is no dependency there, not even a shadow of dependence really, and we can't assume influence we haven't got.

Of course the Pakistanis are not known for expecting human rights. Neither are the Taliban, or the Karzai crowd for that matter. We aren't going to change any of them. We do enable the Pakistanis to some extent, but that works in two directions: our forces in Afghanistan are too large to supply by air via Kyrgyzstan and/or Uzbekistan (supply lines with their own share of complications) there are real limits to the degree to which we can push the Pakistanis. There aren't a whole lot of options on the logistic front: even in the very hypothetical event of an arrangement with Iran, that would bring its own barrage of quid pro quo complications and vulnerabilities and would be at least as fraught as the deal with Pakistan. As long as we have a large scale presence in Afghanistan, our ability to press Pakistan is constrained.

We cannot assume influence that we do not have. We cannot force the Pakistanis (or the Saudis) to conform to our human rights standards. We cannot force the Taliban to negotiate with the GIRoA, or vice versa. All of these parties are going to follow their own interests and their own agendas regardless of what we want, and the best we can do is inspire a (generally pretty superficial and lethargic) facade of compliance with our wishes.

The relationship between the Taliban and the Pakistani government/military/ISI is of course complicated and of course has its own tensions. Whether or not we're in a position to effectively exploit those tensions is another question altogether. Building plans on the assumption of influence (or control) that we do not actually have is possibly not the best place to start.

We put ourselves in this position by assuming a capacity that we did not actually have: it really didn't take an abacus to figure that "installing" a functioning, stable government in a place like Afghanistan was a bit of a pipe dream. I don't see how we're going to get out of the situation by making the same mistake over again.