Stateside COIN Academy [Archive]

MikeF

02-04-2010, 03:59 PM

I'm back at Bragg spending a year doing some medical treatment, and I'm considering teaching small wars to deploying units if there is an common interest and support from the Chain-of-Command. I thought I'd throw out my ideas and see what feedback and help that I could receive from the Council. Primary RFIs are:

1. Has anyone else done this?
2. For the academics, is there a Dummy's Guide to creating a syllabus?
3. What is the proper scope and scale for this type of endeavor?

So, here's my initial thoughts:

Organization: Initially ad-hoc, lecture/seminar with less than 20 soldiers. Eventually, if successful, I'd like to have a joint course involving SF and RA soldiers to share ideas.

Intent: Provide basic instruction on general insurgency theory (motivation, mobilization, expanding the base, shaping, and clearing) and general counter-insurgency theory. Additionally, provide platform to openly discuss and capture lessons learned between the theory and practice from different units in different areas of operations.

So, that's the basics. Standing by for feedback.

Mike

William F. Owen

02-04-2010, 04:08 PM

If you basically aim to provide education to soldiers on how to fight irregular forces then I'll do as much as I can to help.

"Irregular Warfare: Conduct and Theory" - call it "Small Wars" maybe? :)

MikeF

02-04-2010, 04:23 PM

If you basically aim to provide education to soldiers on how to fight irregular forces then I'll do as much as I can to help.

"Irregular Warfare: Conduct and Theory" - call it "Small Wars" maybe? :)

That's the plan. I want to keep it simple and concentrate on the basics- no new terms just warfare. I got to teach some classes while I was at NPS and I really enjoyed it. I found that I often learned just as much as I taught.

So Change One- Small Wars Academy:cool:

MM_Smith

02-04-2010, 07:42 PM

MikeF

02-04-2010, 08:20 PM

Are you asking about establishing something within the military as, say, a part of the Infantry School or the JFK Center or are you thinking about courses run by civilians and contracted to teach the military?

If you choose option #1, check with the Army-Marine COIN Center at Ft Leavenworth first.

For option #2, how will you convince DoD to hire you?

Hi MM. I'm just doing this informally. I'm already gainfully employed by the US Army just taking some time between now and ILE to recover from TBI. So, I'm gonna put together some blocks of instruction and teach. The specific audience is geared for E6-O3s. Basically, I'd like to make a crash course in small wars so that one does not have to wait until year eight or ten to go to school to learn. Basically, it's the stuff that I wish that I was taught ten years ago.

Mike

marct

02-04-2010, 08:25 PM

Hi Mike,

Primary RFIs are:

1. Has anyone else done this?

I believe Wilf has, and John Fishel teaches a great course in at at Oklahoma.

2. For the academics, is there a Dummy's Guide to creating a syllabus?

It varies from department to department, and discipline to discipline. Most of the variations at the departmental level centre around whether or not there are core, required readings everyone in the department has to use, and on the type, length and number of assignments. Where you are going to be teaching it, how long you have per day/week and how much tech support will really act as variables to structure your course.

The absolute, basic decisions you (or someone) has to make are the following:

Time format: how many sessions? How often? What else will your students be doing?
Instruction format: the basic split is between lecture, seminar and workshop. Lectures usually have a group discussion or breakout format associated, while thatis assumed as part of the structure of a seminar(usually). Workshops are usually seminars on steroids :D.
Reading amount: this depends on your time format. I've taught seminars at 3 hrs/week and required 150+ pages / week, with "suggested" readings over over 300 pages per week. I have also taught summer courses (6 hours / wk, M & W), with 30 pages for the Monday and 15 for the Wednesday. You have to figure out how much time your students can and will spend reading. BTW, one tactic that works well in a seminar is to assign different readings to several groups of students and have them report and lead the discussion.
Assignments: This is often the killer; students often focus on the assignments rather than on actually learning the subject matter. A lot of ink has been spilled on ways to get around this, but the best one I have found is to a) never use sit down exams if possible (they are a waste of time), b) have every assignment (time permitting) be presented in two genres - written and verbal. So, for example, in my last seminars, I tend to give each of my students half a class to talk about their research projects and hand in a rough draft. They are also required to hand in a paper that may or may not (depends on their ingenuity and research area) "academic". I also assign a mark of +/- 1 grade point for collegiality, and allow the students to nominate up to three people (BTW, Carleton is on a 12 point grade system, so a +1 GP moves a B+ to an A-).
Legal stuff: all institutions require that you lay out policies on a whole slew of issues. I have them on lateness and absences, late assignments, requesting dispensations for a whole slew of reasons, language requirements, etc., etc.
Syllabus format: most departments want to see a session by session breakdown of what will be taught, etc. Some people I know will have a page or more per session, while I go to the other extreme (usually 1 line in a table).

3. What is the proper scope and scale for this type of endeavor?

That is really tough. So much depends under what auspices you are teaching the course, what level the students are at, and what the goals of the course are.

So, here's my initial thoughts:

Organization: Initially ad-hoc, lecture/seminar with less than 20 soldiers. Eventually, if successful, I'd like to have a joint course involving SF and RA soldiers to share ideas.

Okay, so we are probably talking seminar or workshop then. How many sessions a week and how long are the sessions?

Intent: Provide basic instruction on general insurgency theory (motivation, mobilization, expanding the base, shaping, and clearing) and general counter-insurgency theory. Additionally, provide platform to openly discuss and capture lessons learned between the theory and practice from different units in different areas of operations.

Looking more and more like a seminar, Mike. If you have the time, I would drop the "basic instruction" part and convert it to a "doctrine says, how did it play out?" seminar question format. Load a lot of basic instruction reading up front, and let students work in teams on particular cases / readings. I would also encourage them to dig up their own readings as well for it, and let them assign the other students either a particular reading or a short execsum that they will write.

BTW, I'm putting together a course on COIN for the summer up here. My constraints, right now, are that it is a second year, summer school course, so 2 x 3 hours per week for six weeks. The number of students is unknown; could be 10, could be 100. I have to write the syllabus as if it were a lecture course, but be prepared to teach it as a seminar if the numbers drop below 20; I'll also be required to give an exam (:().

On another note, I tend to rely heavily on web based technology for teaching. Unfortunately, my department has started to require that I use WebCT which, as far as I can tell, is about 5 generations behind what I like to use, which is moodle (http://moodle.org/). If you are interested in looking at moodle and, maybe (if you're allowed :wry:) using it for your course, just drop me a line; I have my own installation and I'd be glad to give you a course space on it.

Cheers,

Marc

MikeF

02-04-2010, 11:40 PM

OfTheTroops

02-04-2010, 11:54 PM

MikeF

02-05-2010, 12:33 AM

I don't really understand. Maybe you could clarify a little more.

Is this a informal bookclub type of deal?Hip pocket unit training?
Or a recognized credentialized TRADOC type?

I think you will find a can of worms that everyone (institutionally) has their hands in.

What WE need to be doing is capturing and revitalizing our respective schools?

I wish you the best of luck in your endeavor and if I can assist you in the project just ask. I manage a bit of an adhoc course at the moment.

I probably should have started with a proper background...So, here it goes...After a lot of discussions both on-line and off-line, I've been trying to figure out how to better train our boys for small wars. IMO, warfare really doesn't change too much, but small wars have been long neglected in the US Army for some time.

First, on-line, several thinkers influenced my considerations: 1. Rob Thorton has been trying to figure out how the regular army will do SFA (Security Force Assitance), 2. Cavguy (Neil Smith) wrote a poignant essay on how TRADOC and FORSCOM need to revamp themselves to better prepare our soldiers to fight all wars and not just big ones. 3. Schmedlap has been pushing and discussing company-level operations in small wars on his blog.

Second, I have a bunch of free time right now while I"m getting cleared from a TBI. I've done 4 tours and went to grad school to study small wars, and I'm trying to find a job outside medical appointments in addition to doing other things like Habitat for Humanity. My PLs are now CDRs, my BC is now a BCT CDR in the 101st, and they asked me to come and speak on insurgency.

Third, I found that I really like teaching. After these wars are over and I'm long retired, I'll probably go get a PhD and teach International Relations.

So, I'm developing a plan that I'm gonna try to sell. I may just end up teaching one or two companies and briefing a brigade staff. I don't care. I want to see if I can produce something worthwhile that will help others. I do know that much of my own success in the past was due to a couple of individuals that took the time to mentor me so I'm gonna try and help others.

We'll see where it leads.

Mike

Bob's World

02-05-2010, 05:38 AM

Mike,

While "Size Matters;" it is hardly the defining factor in designing a successful campaign plan. All about keeping it simple, but keep it material as well. A small insurgency has little incommon with a small conflict between states. And a Small conflict between big states has little in common with a same sized "big" conflict between small states.

Purpose for action is the key. Size of action is just an interesting factoid that tells you how much to order of various requirements based upon your understanding of how to address that purpose.

Check in with the guys in the USASOC Commander's Initiatives Group. You'll find some friends there.

Bob

William F. Owen

02-05-2010, 06:07 AM

I believe Wilf has,

Sadly, Wilf has not, but would love to! Very happy to help.
Obviously the first year of the course would be spent reading Clausewitz....... :D

Bob's World

02-05-2010, 10:21 AM

Thanks MarcT. That's exactly the questions/comments that I was hoping for. I'm gonna work on a tentative syllabus and then post it on this thread as a working document for further discussion. I'll make sure that I send you and Dr. Fishel a PM.

As you review this, keep in mind that I'm not teaching college students. I'm talking to Company Grade officers and NCOs. Many of them will have multiple tours. So, I want to keep the reading light and no tests. I guess that's best called a seminar:D.

As I'm working on my syllabus, here's the required reading/case studies I'm considering....MTF...

- Zaganiyah- clearing denied rural areas
- Ramadi- Cavguy's ventures into the Sunni Awakening
- Mosul- Y'alls case study on SFA.
- Basilan, Phillipines- JSOTF-P initial entry and use of the McCormick Diamond Model
- Afghanistan- Jim Gant, "One tribe at a time"
- Colombia or El Salvador- need a good paper for this one.

Mike

Less the Latin America scenario, these are 5 campaigns in one war to protect the populace of the United States from terrorist attacks.

You can talk tactics: What was the situation, what worked, what didn't work, etc. That is intersting and helpful for those at Company level and below.

Or you can talk Operations, how each of these campagins contributed and fit into the larger campagins for their respective theaters. Good for the Field Grade level types

Or you can talk strategy. How did these campagins contribute or exacerbate the threat of terrorist attacks on America? etc.

As an aside, I realize you are coming from Monterey, home of the "McCormick Diamond," but I am pretty sure any serious application of the "diamond" to that operation is post facto. The operations there were shaped far more by the simple fact that we had no authorities to do anything other than the things we did. Which is a lesson in itself. "When conducting FID in support of another country's insurgency, are ones operations more effective when forced to subjugate themselves to the governance of that country and operate through their security forces and within the guidelines of their laws and rules; or when you invade, take out the existing government, and do whatever you damn well please."

MikeF

02-05-2010, 01:31 PM

The operations there were shaped far more by the simple fact that we had no authorities to do anything other than the things we did. Which is a lesson in itself.

I'm glad that we both learned the same lessons there. Similar constraints have been placed on forces in Iraq as the gov't steps up sovereignty, and I thought that the Phillipines, El Sal, and Colombia would be good examples to use to show how the rules that may seem limiting can actually prove effective over time. IMO, that's one of the biggest issues with the SFA mission and RA in A'stan. We would rather do the mission ourselves instead of waiting for the Afghans to do it.

As I continue to narrow the scope of this thing, yes, it is GWOT intensive, but the examples covered highlight heavy armor units, light units, and SF units working in urban and rural environments. Different units, different terrains, and different missions. I think that will blend well.

The focus will be on company level planning, operations, and decision-making. Some primary questions will probably include:

1. What is a small war?
2. How does an insurgency mobilize, recruit, shape, clear, and hold an area?
3. How do we fight for intelligence to gain an accurate picture of our area of operations?
4. Once we determine the current situation, how do we shape the environment to allow for infiltration?
5. How do we clear the area?
6. How do we hold the area?
7. How do we build the area? Do we buld the area?

I'm not to concerned on specific TTPs and Tactics. Guys will argue all day long on how to clear a house. I want to develop a course that helps teach how to think and provide some examples of how others did business.

As I'm looking at my written notes, this seminar will probably be 10 x 1 hour classes. My timeline is to be ready to start teaching on 1 March. So, as soon as I'm done with the syllabus, I'll post it for y'alls edit.

Check in with the guys in the USASOC Commander's Initiatives Group. You'll find some friends there.

Thanks for the lead. I'd really like to eventually have a joint course b/c we all have a lot to teach each other (as I learned with SF and Seal friends at NPS).

From Wilf:

Obviously the first year of the course would be spent reading Clausewitz

Here's my thoughts and deception plan on getting the guys to read the classics. For my class, my "Break Point" article will be mandatory. It's short and easy to read. Hopefully, a young E6 or 02 will say, "Wow, I learned something from that." or "That #### was happening in my area, and I never saw it." Then, I'll recommend that they take the time to read Robert Andrews "The Village War."

Throughout the seminar, I'll put in quotes from Galula, Sir Robert Thompson, and others. Over time, they may decide to read up on how others tackled the same types of problems over time.

v/r

Mike

Bob's World

02-05-2010, 02:03 PM

Be sure to ask fun questions too (ie, as in designed to make the Doctirne Nazi's heads explode), for example:

A. "Is it more important to know what phase friendly forces are in (i.e., Clear, Hold, or Build) in your particular sector; or which phase the Insurgency is in (i.e., “strategic defensive,” “strategic stalemate,” or “strategic offensive.”); or neither of the above in recognition that the insurgent can "win" when the sides are in any combinaiton of these phases and that the counterinsurgent can only "win" by moving the insurgent to Phase 0 regardless of which phase the counterinsrgent might be in?

(hell, no need for question B. If you can't fill up a bluebook answering that question you aren't trying!)

marct

02-05-2010, 03:25 PM

Hi Mike,

Just a quick comment stemming from Bob's last...

Be sure to ask fun questions too (ie, as in designed to make the Doctirne Nazi's heads explode),

Some primary questions will probably include:

1. What is a small war?
2. How does an insurgency mobilize, recruit, shape, clear, and hold an area?
3. How do we fight for intelligence to gain an accurate picture of our area of operations?
4. Once we determine the current situation, how do we shape the environment to allow for infiltration?
5. How do we clear the area?
6. How do we hold the area?
7. How do we build the area? Do we buld the area?

1. Nice and unanswerable :D.
2. - 7. You need to invert these as part of the question.

Let me pull this out. Using a rather wonky, yet Sun Tzu inspired analogy, you and the various insurgents, civilians, etc. are involved in a dance; an ongoing improv that co-constructs the campaign, so you need to think about the entirety of the event space in that way. This means that you have to think about how you think about the insurgents and how they think about you. All these current questions do is think about how you think about them, hence the inversion.

You might also think about planting a few mental landmines in your course as well. Probably the simplest one would be a very minor modification of your Q 3. from

3. How do we fight for intelligence to gain an accurate picture of our area of operations?

to

3. How do we gain an accurate picture of how all stakeholders view our area of operations, and what are the limits of our accuracy?
If your students have the time, I would assign them to read Gordon Dickson's Tactics of Mistake (http://www.amazon.com/Tactics-Mistake-Childe-Gordon-Dickson/dp/0812545311/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1265383444&sr=1-1) - it's quite short and easily read in a night.

marct

02-05-2010, 03:38 PM

Hi Mike,

I probably should have started with a proper background...So, here it goes...After a lot of discussions both on-line and off-line, I've been trying to figure out how to better train our boys for small wars. IMO, warfare really doesn't change too much, but small wars have been long neglected in the US Army for some time.

I don't think "neglected" is the most accurate word - maybe "overshadowed" would be a better one, especially since there was a lot of work on them going on in the 1980's and 1990's, but it wasn't part of the mainstream.

First, on-line, several thinkers influenced my considerations: 1. Rob Thorton has been trying to figure out how the regular army will do SFA (Security Force Assitance), 2. Cavguy (Neil Smith) wrote a poignant essay on how TRADOC and FORSCOM need to revamp themselves to better prepare our soldiers to fight all wars and not just big ones. 3. Schmedlap has been pushing and discussing company-level operations in small wars on his blog.

All great sources :D! Personally, I have a rather significant bias towqards storytelling as a form of knowledge storage / transmission, but how that can be done is heavily dependent on the continuity of the organizational structures.

Second, I have a bunch of free time right now while I"m getting cleared from a TBI. I've done 4 tours and went to grad school to study small wars, and I'm trying to find a job outside medical appointments in addition to doing other things like Habitat for Humanity. My PLs are now CDRs, my BC is now a BCT CDR in the 101st, and they asked me to come and speak on insurgency.

So you're starting to feel that odd sense of people looking at you as an "expert" ;)? Disconcerting isn't it?

Third, I found that I really like teaching. After these wars are over and I'm long retired, I'll probably go get a PhD and teach International Relations.

Excellent! I think you would be a fantastic PhD candidate, although I'm afraid you might find IR a touch "sterile" :wry:.

So, I'm developing a plan that I'm gonna try to sell. I may just end up teaching one or two companies and briefing a brigade staff. I don't care. I want to see if I can produce something worthwhile that will help others. I do know that much of my own success in the past was due to a couple of individuals that took the time to mentor me so I'm gonna try and help others.

Pay it forward - I'm all in favour of that!

Even if you can't get the first version of it an official imprimatur, you could achieve roughly the same outcome by running a test case course.

Cheers,

Marc

William F. Owen

02-05-2010, 05:00 PM

I
Here's my thoughts and deception plan on getting the guys to read the classics.

Actually CvC wouldn't be necessary as part of the course, bar 4 Lectures/ guided discussions

a.) War is a Continuation of Politics - Mao as the lead example
b.) The Trinity - what you need to "do" violence for political aims
c.) The concept of "Nation" in the idea of War
e.) The "annihilation" of the enemy

If I could get those across in 4-8 classes I'd be happy

MikeF

02-05-2010, 05:01 PM

First, thanks for all the PMs so far. I did not expect this much help and interest. Second, here's the draft for Day One and Day Two. Please, tear it apart and keep the critiques coming....Keep in mind my "student" audience- E6-O3 paratroopers.

Day One: Introduction to Small Wars

(Notes for SWJ: Day One is intentionally broad and heavy in theory. After Day One, we'll get into the meat and potatoes of company-level small wars. The intent is to help broaden the students perspective of warfare outside of their own individual tours.)

Required Reading: None
Recommended Reading: David Kilcullen's Accidental Guerilla

Outline:
1. Course Overview
2. Discussion on relevant perceptions, experience, and thoughts on small wars
3. Lecture

Teaching Objectives:
1. What is a small war?
2.. Why do men rebel? What drives a man to martyrdom? How are social revolutions, religious movements, insurgencies, and gangs similar?
3. How do men rebel? A concise overview of Mao's 3-phase Protracted War.
4. How has the West helped/intervened in small wars? Brief overview of Malayia, Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq.

Discussion Questions
1. What did you do during your previous deployments? What did you accomplish? Were you succesful? Did you help, hurt, or remain neutral to the overall goals?
2. What is winning the hearts and minds in small wars? Is it achievable or just academic wishful thinking?
3. What is enemy-centric versus population-centric small wars? In your own experience, is their really any difference?

************************************************** ************************************************** ************

Day Two: Dude, I want my own safe-haven. Practical lessons on how an insurgency mobilizes, shapes, and clears a denied area.
Required Reading: "The Break Point: How AQIZ established the ISI in Zaganiyah"
Recommended Reading: "The Village War" by Robert Andrews

Outline:

1. Clandestine Organization.and Social Mobilization
1a..Penetration
1b. Transformation
1c Application

2. Psychological Preparation of the People-
2a. Propaganda,
2b. Deception,
2c. Reduction of Prestige,
2d. Peasant Resistance,

3. The Break Point- this point is "achieved by establishing a local military advantage, displacing (or neutralizing) the residual presence of the old regime, and creating an alternative set of administrative and governing institutions”

4. Expansion of Control
4a. Destruction of the Oppression
4b. Land Reform

5. Consolidation of Power
5a. Paramilitary Forces
5b. Mutual Surveillance
5c. Movement Controls

Learning Objectives:
1. Understand the Enemy Situation. What is the insurgent trying to accomplish? How will he go about achieving his goals?

Discussion Questions:
1. Did you see this in your AO?
2. What are the indicators?
3. Do you understand that no IED attack, assassination, or propaganda letter is random? Do you get that we're fighting an enemy that believes in his cause, and he is planning and executing operations in the same way that we are?
4. How do we defeat this?

OfTheTroops

02-05-2010, 05:21 PM

The persistance of conflict.

We have had a good deal of success with your day 1 and day 2 lesson plans no where near the depth that you describe but i can see the use. We focus on police.

And you may want some lectures like that. The breakdown of the law, criminal enterprises vs insurgencies, the role of the police, the role of the army, the role of the governator (get to the chopper!!).

You know if you correlate it to business practices or adminstration somehow (lessons in change) you will probably make millions. The Phd will get you extra change too. Make the suit feel like he was in Ramadi or wherever. nah!

The common good is more important. You could probably almost definitely sell it to the local university as a way to get troops in the seats. Case in point this very forum.

MikeF

02-05-2010, 06:09 PM

Day Three: Fighting for Intelligence- The use of Reconnaissance and Surveillance to overcome our Information Disadvantage

Required Reading:
"Saving Zaganiyah" TBP,
FM 17-98-1 "The Scout Leaders Handbook,"
FM 7-8 "Infantry Platoon,"
The Ranger Handbook

Recommended Reading:
Once a Warrior King by David Donovan,
Hunter-Killer Squadron: Aero-Weapons, Aero-Scouts, Aero-Rifles by Matthew Brennan
The Man Who Never Was by Ewen Montagu
Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion by Robert Cialdini

Outline:
1. The value of the General Area Survey- listening to the current and former stakeholders in your AO.

2. Develop a Hypothesis of the Current Situation

3. Conduct Reconaissance to confirm/deny hypothesis.
3a. Covert Reconnaissance- sneaking in under the cover of darkness to take a look around
3b. Overt Reconnaissance- Route, Area, and Zone patrols to define the terrain.
3c. Conduct leadership engagements- Meet the People.

4. Conduct Surveillance to confirm/deny hypothesis

5. Define the environment- Final commander's decision on current situation

6. Develop the "Message"
6a. The use of Propaganda to shape the environment
6b. The use of Deception to prepare for initial entry

MikeF

02-05-2010, 06:49 PM

The persistance of conflict.

We have had a good deal of success with your day 1 and day 2 lesson plans no where near the depth that you describe but i can see the use. We focus on police.

Two years ago Robert Andrews came down and gave a lecture on his time in Vietnam. As I read through his book, all the events of my experience in Iraq made sense...The culmination of that was "The Breakpoint." So yeah, that part is detailed but there is a method behind it.

And you may want some lectures like that. The breakdown of the law, criminal enterprises vs insurgencies, the role of the police, the role of the army, the role of the governator (get to the chopper!!).

That will come once I get done showing how to do it.

The common good is more important. You could probably almost definitely sell it to the local university as a way to get troops in the seats. Case in point this very forum.

The common good is much more important. It's not about me.

marct

02-05-2010, 07:41 PM

Mike,

A quick question - how long are your "days" in this syllabus?

MikeF

02-05-2010, 08:04 PM

Mike,

A quick question - how long are your "days" in this syllabus?

Tentative plan was 1-2 hours. 30 minute lecture followed with 30-90 minutes of discussion. Looking at my tentative syllabus that maybe a stretch given the input.

The test case will be with guys from my former unit so I'll be able to see how it flows.

marct

02-05-2010, 08:16 PM

Hi Mike,

Tentative plan was 1-2 hours. 30 minute lecture followed with 30-90 minutes of discussion. Looking at my tentative syllabus that maybe a stretch given the input.

Yeah, I suspect it is a stretch :wry:. I was thinking 3 hours minimum until I saw day 3 and thought you might be looking at an 8 hour day!

The test case will be with guys from my former unit so I'll be able to see how it flows.

Good idea running a test case first. You might think about doing a test talk run on each of the lecture components. It's been my experience that we tend to grossly underestimate time involved, but the underestimate factor varies widely depending on how much audience input / interaction we are looking for. A 30 minute lecture gives you, roughly, time to read ~ 20 pages, double-spaced with no interaction. I usually try and do a test run on talks and conference presentations with some of my colleagues up here (including past and present students) just to try and get a feel for the time length. Even then, I'm frequently off :wry:.

Cheers,

Marc

MM_Smith

02-05-2010, 08:16 PM

Wow.

I'm truly impressed by the breadth and depth of the responses you have received and your replies. I think you will do well with your presentation.

As a suggestion, have someone record the presentation. I guarantee you will learn from your audience and you will learn even more by reviewing the presentation. You may end up with a couple of articles out of your ideas and/or questions and comments.

I was an instructor at the JFK Center and an O/C at JRTC. A lot of the topics you and others have suggested we have tried to incorporate. I'm afraid that what a lot of us see as "common sense" will never become apparent to some of the folks who really need that information.

For what it's worth, I'm still learning from things I observed in Vietnam and subsequent locations. As a result I feel kind of bad about all the things we tried to teach but couldn't get across or didn't think about.

Please recover completely and quickly. You are the future of the Army.

marct

02-05-2010, 08:27 PM

Hi MM,

As a suggestion, have someone record the presentation. I guarantee you will learn from your audience and you will learn even more by reviewing the presentation. You may end up with a couple of articles out of your ideas and/or questions and comments.

Mike, this is a REALLY good idea! When I was prepping for my first conference paper, my father dragged me down to his office and made me go through the presentation about 8 times, videotaping each one. In between, he offered some really devastating critiques on tempo, content, body language and tonality. By the end of the exercise (over 4 hours!), I had the frakin' paper memorized, with stage directions! Nowadays, I don't go to such great lengths, but I do do dry runs for my colleagues and really, seriously take their comments into consideration.

I was an instructor at the JFK Center and an O/C at JRTC. A lot of the topics you and others have suggested we have tried to incorporate. I'm afraid that what a lot of us see as "common sense" will never become apparent to some of the folks who really need that information.

For what it's worth, there are times when I feel like I am bashing my head into a brick wall when talking with some of our (Canadian) policy people about COIN, etc. It's not our military folks - they get it - it's dealing with some of the bureaucrats whose agendas are solely aimed at building their own, personal little empires :(. Luckily, we also have some great bureaucrats who do get it but, sometimes, it just makes me want to ...

For what it's worth, I'm still learning from things I observed in Vietnam and subsequent locations. As a result I feel kind of bad about all the things we tried to teach but couldn't get across or didn't think about.

The sign of a true scholar - in the Socratic tradition ;).

Cheers,

Marc

MikeF

02-05-2010, 11:19 PM

Just some quick notes for tonight then I'm off on a date with a sweet southern belle. Smalls wars can wait :D. Unfortunately, they are not going anywhere.

From Bob's World:

Mike sounds more like a GWOT campaign assessment

I think I'm gonna start calling this post-colonial small wars.

As a suggestion, have someone record the presentation. I guarantee you will learn from your audience and you will learn even more by reviewing the presentation. You may end up with a couple of articles out of your ideas and/or questions and comments.

Working on it. We found a scout that also does photography and videos.

I was an instructor at the JFK Center and an O/C at JRTC. A lot of the topics you and others have suggested we have tried to incorporate. I'm afraid that what a lot of us see as "common sense" will never become apparent to some of the folks who really need that information.

For what it's worth, I'm still learning from things I observed in Vietnam and subsequent locations. As a result I feel kind of bad about all the things we tried to teach but couldn't get across or didn't think about.

MM, thank you for your service. The more I consider, common sense and METT-TC seem to be learned along the way directly correlated to one's age and experience. I look back at how much I've absorbed from combat, grad school, and SWJ from guys like Ken White, Goesh, BW, Wilf, Stan, Tom Odom and countless others. I want to minimize that gap.

So back to the real world. A 1SGT (former PLT SGT of mine) is crashing at my place while he's going through a divorce. Right now, while I"m working through my own ####, he's helping me. In his own words, "Sir, brother, you took care of us and now I'm gonna take care of you." That's the type of unit we had. Anyways, he's done four tours in Iraq and A'stan, and we've spent many nights with a bottle of Jack just talking things out. He told me that I've always had a way to know and explain things on a level that was comprehendable from a PFC to a 4-star.

I showed him the first three days of courses today. He loved it, but he laughed. "Mike, you gotta dumb that down for the E6's. Too many college words. Take your enemy situation and make it 'shape, hold, and clear.'"

So, I'm gonna relook the format and the questions (as per MarcT's suggestions on inversion) to make something accessible for everyone.

With that, here's some good tunes (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nmi7CiqQq44) for the weekend that cover it all...

v/r

Mike

MikeF

02-05-2010, 11:53 PM

Dayuhan

02-06-2010, 01:24 AM

I think I'm gonna start calling this post-colonial small wars.

Post-colonial, yes, but "post Cold War" is also appropriate. The prominent insurgencies of the second half of the 20th century may have been primarily driven by opposition to colonial powers and postcolonial dictatorships, but our response to them was driven primarily by our own "communists vs capitalists" stategic equation. Our tendency to impose the latter paradigm over the fiormer often led us to surrender the moral high ground of opposition to antiquated, abusive, and crumbling power structures to our opponents, which really didn't do us any good.

Certainly there are useful lessons to be learned from the Cold War insurgencies, but we also have to recognize that many of today's conflicts are very different, and not all the lessons apply. There's a danger, for example, in trying to apply COIN principles to a conflict against a group like AQ, which is not an insurgency at all, or to a situation that is less an insurgency than an armed competition for control of an ungoverned space.

Bob's World

02-06-2010, 01:29 AM

MikeF

02-06-2010, 12:54 PM

This is NOT a recipe for effective foreign policy. If this is what you are having your military do, your foregin policy is hard broke.

I was rereading Mao yesterday so I had his thoughts in my head when I wrote that :D. Yes, I need to relook at the tone. However, it's not that far off.

Annihilation of the Opposition- If you shut down the Enemy's training camps, political and military apparatus, and convince him to CHANGE behavior, you have won. Keep in mind, the enemy is an IDEA. I'm not talking about genocide or trying to take total control. The former is immoral and the latter is an illusion. One could argue that Greg Mortenson is attempting to annihilate al Qaeda through teaching the girls how to read.

Application of Violence- It is a necessary function. The level depends on the intensity of the insurgency, the threat level in one's particular AO, and the ROE from one's CoC.

Post-Colonial/Post-Cold small wars- this is not my foreign policy. I"m much more of an isolationist. The more that I study these type of wars, the more I remain convinced that one can only help someone that ASKS for help.

marct

02-06-2010, 01:04 PM

This is NOT a recipe for effective foreign policy. If this is what you are having your military do, your foregin policy is hard broke.

Post-Colonial/Post-Cold small wars- this is not my foreign policy. I"m much more of an isolationist. The more that I study these type of wars, the more I remain convinced that one can only help someone that ASKS for help.

Which brings us, by way of your 10 days, to day 11 - reintegrating the local into the global.

Mike, the one thing that I see as missing in this is the global context, whether you call it foreign policy, IR, or post-capitalist globalization. There will be times when you have to do this type of operation where you haven't been asked for help. Hades, neither Iraq nor Afghanistan did :wry:!

So you might want to finish it off by tossing out various foreign policy scenarios for intervention, and how each of those scenarios changes the on the ground problems.

Okay, having tossed out that cryptic suggestion, now I've got to run off and sing ;).

Cheers,

Marc

John T. Fishel

02-06-2010, 01:25 PM

sorry, Mike.:o Email me with your current email and I'll send you a copy of my Small Wars syllabus.
The only thing I will add to the discussion/recommendations is something I learned while teaching at CGSC (amazing that the educationists actually have something useful:eek:) and that is Learning Objectives. Note that it is not teaching objectives but learning objectives. What is it that we want the student to be able to do when he finishes a lesson, section or the course. The key word is "do." specifics are important. Understand is a poor objective because it is too general. At a low level, you may want the student to be able to describe the tactical environment. A higher level objective would require the student to evaluate the impact of culture on the tactical environment. A place to find some of the levels of learning objectives would be to Google Bloom's Taxonomy which offers some 5 levels. Personally, I think that is both too much and so much educationist jargon so my simplification is 2 levels of learning objectives: Puke it and Use it;)

Cheers

JohnT

PS A PhD would be great for you - it would help in your quest to become a true renaissance man!

Commando Spirit

02-06-2010, 08:52 PM

Here's where I'm headed next week.

Day Four: The Biggest Tribe- Clearing the Village and taking Control

Day Five: Annihilation of the Opposition- Holding the Village

Day Six: Reconstruction at Gun-Point: Armed Nation-Building and the Build Phase

Day Seven: Transition- Conflict Resolution and moving to the Role of the Arbitrator

Day Eight: The Combat Advisor: FID. SFA, and the alternative, indirect approach- One Tribe at a Time

Day Nine: The Intangables: Three Cups of Tea, Winning Friends and Influencing People, and Peace Corps ####

Day Ten: Having a Life/Going Home before 2100- Resetting, Rebuilding, and Revamping our Army in a time of war: Working through injuries, grief, training the next breed, and new commanders.

Hi Mike, I run these type of courses but for the British Army. I deliver to all units types mainly to fit with their training programme but, as with many units, they go with my recommendations! I go in initially with a two day package (full days 0830 - 1630). The package, whilst flexible to the needs of the unit, is an intro to the 10 x British Principles of COIN, which underpin all "Small Wars" and then drill down into more detail. Happy to discuss if you wish and even share resources??

I have a concern though with your proposed content. I think you're coming at it too heavily on the kinetic side. Whilst I appreciate the need for kinetic effect (I am a serving member of the British Army) I am not so sure it should have quite such a high profile that you suggest? There is a distinct danger that you will set the conditions in your students heads that these Small Wars are best resolved through the sole use of kinetic effects; I would argue that this is not the case.

As I have said; happy to chat if you want me to?

CS

Commando Spirit

02-06-2010, 09:02 PM

...that is Learning Objectives. Note that it is not teaching objectives but learning objectives. What is it that we want the student to be able to do when he finishes a lesson, section or the course. The key word is "do." specifics are important. Understand is a poor objective because it is too general

At a low level, you may want the student to be able to describe the tactical environment. A higher level objective would require the student to evaluate the impact of culture on the tactical environment. A place to find some of the levels of learning objectives would be to Google Bloom's Taxonomy which offers some 5 levels .....

Cheers

JohnT

UNDERSTAND - Agreed - furthermore, 'Understand' cannot be measured; so how do you confirm the learning has taken place?

BLOOM - This might be a bit heavy but it will, as JohnT says, give a great foundation of how you should approach teaching. In my experience it's not as easy as just 'gobbing off in front of the troops'! You will get so much more out of your own teaching if you have clearly defined objectives that are measurable. I'm sure you're well aware of SMART Objectives? (Google if not) but this is a nice way to think of Bloom.

CS

MikeF

02-06-2010, 09:25 PM

sorry, Mike.:o Email me with your current email and I'll send you a copy of my Small Wars syllabus.
The only thing I will add to the discussion/recommendations is something I learned while teaching at CGSC (amazing that the educationists actually have something useful:eek:) and that is Learning Objectives. Note that it is not teaching objectives but learning objectives. What is it that we want the student to be able to do when he finishes a lesson, section or the course. The key word is "do." specifics are important. Understand is a poor objective because it is too general. At a low level, you may want the student to be able to describe the tactical environment. A higher level objective would require the student to evaluate the impact of culture on the tactical environment. A place to find some of the levels of learning objectives would be to Google Bloom's Taxonomy which offers some 5 levels. Personally, I think that is both too much and so much educationist jargon so my simplification is 2 levels of learning objectives: Puke it and Use it;)

John- good to see that you made the conversation. A couple of more days, and MarcT would have me back down in Guatemala studying Mayan Tribes :D.

Good comments all and keep em coming. I'm gonna mull them over the next couple of days and come back with a better product. Thanks.

Mike

Ken White

02-06-2010, 11:02 PM

however, I will throw in a caution. The 'M' stands for measure and most educational treatises will point out that all activities should be or are measurable at some level. That's a true statement. The SMART process was used to design our current training system of Tasks, Conditions and Standards -- so we end up with the required measurement activity defining the methodology and even what gets taught by who and where! Not a good idea because while you can get pretty objective result reports, they are at the micro level. Teach or train at the micro level in order to grade at that level and the guys don't learn to do macro... :mad:

You can dumb things down to the micro level to get metrics and objective measurements (as we did, under some pressure) but I submit combat is an art that requires the amalgamation of a number of knowledges, skills and abilities -- put another way, combining all or parts of a number of tasks under some widely varying conditions to survive and win -- to achieve composite results and that measurement of those results at the macro level will usually, in training, be subjective. Do not get too heavily into metrics...
The sign of a true scholar - in the Socratic tradition.;)Oh and avoid the koolaid... :D

William F. Owen

02-07-2010, 05:47 AM

I have a concern though with your proposed content. I think you're coming at it too heavily on the kinetic side. Whilst I appreciate the need for kinetic effect (I am a serving member of the British Army) I am not so sure it should have quite such a high profile that you suggest? There is a distinct danger that you will set the conditions in your students heads that these Small Wars are best resolved through the sole use of kinetic effects; I would argue that this is not the case.
OK, but to clarify, Small Wars, as in warfare conducted against irregulars, by a regular force is predicated on killing and destruction, ("kinetic") and not diplomacy ("non-kinetic") - that is why it is warfare.
Who you apply death and destruction to is key - as in all wars.
If you have deployed military force, then whole policy is based on conditions set through use of violence.
Britain won all it's "Small Wars" by inflicting de-facto military defeat on the enemy, via violence or threat of violence. Not using "Effects" "Influence" or any of the other post-modern malarky.

Not all "Small Wars" are COIN! COIN refers to a very specific context, that may or may not be relevant to the desired political end state. - alteration of political power.

To whit, if you teach "Irregular Warfare," you are teaching folks how best to use violence against irregulars in support of policy. Everything else you do, (Med Patrols, handing out aid etc) is predicated in setting the conditions to allow you to harm the enemy.

MikeF

02-07-2010, 06:35 PM

OK, but to clarify, Small Wars, as in warfare conducted against irregulars, by a regular force is predicated on killing and destruction, ("kinetic") and not diplomacy ("non-kinetic") - that is why it is warfare.
Who you apply death and destruction to is key - as in all wars.
If you have deployed military force, then whole policy is based on conditions set through use of violence.
Britain won all it's "Small Wars" by inflicting de-facto military defeat on the enemy, via violence or threat of violence. Not using "Effects" "Influence" or any of the other post-modern malarky.

Not all "Small Wars" are COIN! COIN refers to a very specific context, that may or may not be relevant to the desired political end state. - alteration of political power.

To whit, if you teach "Irregular Warfare," you are teaching folks how best to use violence against irregulars in support of policy. Everything else you do, (Med Patrols, handing out aid etc) is predicated in setting the conditions to allow you to harm the enemy.

I'm going to take another stab at this building off what Wilf wrote. Please continue to critique to help me to articulate what I want to say. Some of my ideas maybe contentious, but that's a good thing.

Okay, the specific area that I'm addressing is "when do we send in Regular Army units in a small war?" This is neither FID nor SFA; this is counter-insurgency. This is a specific case where the host nation CANNOT govern or FAILS to secure,, an insurgent movement has taken over significant areas, or the "conflict-ecosystem" has evolved into a civil war, genocide, or utter anarchy. My example is Zaganiyah Iraq (2006-2007). Other areas of Iraq during this time period may apply. Portions of the current situation in Afghanistan apply, and other nasty spots like Darfur or Rwanda apply.

I am not an advocate of doing these kinds of missions; however, I understand them well. If I never have to do this again in my life, then I'll be content. IMO, if you understand this situation, then you can easily "get" other aspects of small wars- humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, combat advising, or nation-building.

So, the first question one must consider when going into these areas is "how do I want to be perceived by the local stakeholders?"

Here's my take:

1. Enemy. My enemy will fear me. I don't care if he's an accidental guerilla or a die-hard believer in the cause. I will establish an environment where he has three choices: 1. change his behavior, 2. go somewhere else, or die. We used to call this "terrorizing the terrorist."

2. Civilians. I am the honest broker. For a short-time period, I may have to govern because you failed to govern yourselves. You may not agree with some of my decisions, but you will respect me. Over time, we will gain your trust, b/c my men will never take advantage of our power, steal from you, dishonor your women or children. When your ready, I will help you secure your village, regain the peace with your neighbors, and get your children back to school.

Case in Point:

After AQ had taken over Zag, the place was a mess. Shias and Iraqi Army were being publically beheaded in the town square with the masses cheering "God is Great." Neighbors stole land, homes, and property from neighbors. Decades of repressed feuds between families and tribes erupted in violence. AQ established training camps in the area, and young men and women were being recruited, trained, and employed as suicide bombers. It was some Old Testament stuff. Never in my wildest dreams did I imagine that I would ever be thrust into an environment like that.

So, we moved in, cleared the town, and lived there. For a 90 day period, we received 12 attacks a day until we pacified the town. AQ either died, changed sides, or fled. I still had to deal with the local leaders and people feuding. I wasn't sure how to address the situation so I used shame. I made the leaders watch the beheading videos over and over again. I'd point out each one in the video and shout, "that's you cheering while your neighbor's head is cut off. You're screaming God is Great!!! You call yourself a religious man? This is what you stand for? This is who you are?" The technique worked.

By forcing the civilians to take a look in the mirror, they realized they were wrong. Once they were broken emotionally, we could finally help. Major Aziz, my Iraqi counterpart, took charge of the area. Sheik Aziz, an affiliate of Sistani, came in and started doing conflict resolution. Things simmered down.

FM 3-24 calls it "stopping the bleeding," but in reality, it's much harsher than that. Hopefully, Scott Shaw will jump in to contribute. He worked the area a year later and saw the improvements.

Thoughts?

davidbfpo

02-07-2010, 08:31 PM

MikeF,

I have two reservations about the teaching as you've described; it is centred around your American experience and outlook. History has a nasty habit of placing you - soldiers - in unexpected places, whilst there are common features in COIN, there are also differences.

Who would have thought in 2002 the UK would deploy thousands to Kabul and in 2006 re-appear on the other side of the Durand Line?

Clearly not all US military deployments to fight in COIN situations are 'heavy', resource intensive (like Iraq & Afghanistan now) and the 'lighter' campaigns need to feature (from those in the public domain: Dhofar, Phillipines etc).

How will you establish what they know - at the start and the end?

Lessons unlearned even. How to avoid them - at my level - and where to learn, in quick mode and with leisure (good for bad weather days). Pose the question: which three people, alive or dead, would you want to talk to?

Personally, thinking quickly, General Giap, General Peter Walls and pause...no, cannot think of a third. Of course you!

MikeF

02-08-2010, 06:14 AM

Ken White

02-08-2010, 06:25 AM

As a cadet studying economics, Major John Nagl was the wicked smart Rhodes Scholar working on important stuff that I looked up to. Maybe he got part of his studies wrong.Indeed. All things are possible...:D

You have experience he does not. Don't sweat the small stuff, keep on pushing. :cool:

As a smart old general once told me, "If you don't blow your own horn every now and then, People will start thinking it's funnel."

MikeF

02-08-2010, 06:37 AM

Indeed. All things are possible...:D

You have experience he does not. Don't sweat the small stuff, keep on pushing. :cool:

As a smart old general once told me, "If you don't blow your own horn every now and then, People will start thinking it's funnel."

I know Ken, and I know that you'll jump in when I'm off base.

At our Superbowl party tonight, I showed some of my boys what I'm doing, and they just laughed.

"Sir, no one's going to believe it. No one will every understand it. Yes, please come teach our boys on how to do business."

I made them do push-ups. They made me do shots.

Life was good :D.

Final thoughts before I sleep. 40 beers accumalated around my sink. I looked around the room and the boys that I know. I counted up the years that they had served in Bosnia, Iraq, and A'stan. The number far exceeded the beers around my sink. I;ve written and published before. Initially, I wrote trying to understand my own experiences. I wrote for me. Now, as I gazed at the beers and my friends with tours upon tours upon tours, I'm starting to believe that future writings and instruction will actually teach and help others. Now, I'm that major that cadets look up to.

MikeF

02-08-2010, 02:16 PM

So, that's the first third of the class- if you're going to use a hammer, here's the appropriate way to use it. I'm trying to decide if I should just use the case study of Zaganiyah or extend it out and include others. We'll see.

Ultimately, that answer can best be described as a post-colonial pseudo-occupation. We've used the American regular army to take back areas that the host-nation couldn't govern (Bob's World is upset). We crushed the enemy (Wilf is happy). Now, we're stuck being in charge. It sucks. As displaced families start coming back into the village or neighborhood, we have to determine land rights and property ownership. Teachers are coming to us asking for funds, books, pens, and paper to start school. Doctors are asking for Class VIII materials to reopen the clinics. Mohammed and Ahmed come to try to settle a dispute over some cow that got run over by a car. Sheik Septar, who used to roll with al Qaeda, is now an American "friend," and he's now coming by everyday to ask for compensation for the house we destroyed that was used to make VBIEDs. Everyone wants something.

So, what do you do now? You're stuck governing, and you realize that dismantling the insurgency was the easy part. Higher command is very happy with your efforts because the metrics look good. Attacks have gone down from 12 a day to one every five days. That looks good on a powerpoint slide while drinking Green Beans I guess. Generals fly in to observe your success. Reporters come by to hang out with the real "Spartans" living out in patrol bases. Command wants you to move on to clear the next village. They want you to make storyboards capturing TTPs and "lessons learned" to send across the force.

Back in the real world, back in the village, the insurgency has just moved back into a Phase One/Zero. They've gone underground, and they are carefully planning a counter-attack. The underlying tensions between the tribes and families and sects that allowed the initial problems are still simmering. As some of the Shias come back, fights break out and ten people are killed.

So what do you do now? That's the second part of this course. You've moved from the role of the counter-insurgent to the arbitrator. Here's what we did...

1. Delegation/Decentralization. No man is an island. A commander can't do this part on his own unless he is a natural dictator. My platoon leaders became the village elders. My platoon sergeants took different jobs: 1st platoon became the Police Chief. 2nd platoon remained focused on recon operations at night to keep the roads safe. 3rd platoon became the City Manager/Planner working schools and medical stuff. My mortar platoon sergeant became the Mayor of Zaganiyah. Every night we'd have a huddle and talk things out.

2. Partnering with the Iraqi Army. The first IA unit was part of the problem. They were commiting war crimes against the Sunnis. So, we placed the commander in jail and sent that unit down to Baqubah. Major Aziz and his boys showed up. Three weeks into it, Major Aziz and I realized that we fought against each other in Nassiriyah on the first night of the war. He was an infantry commander defending Talil Airfield. I was a tank platoon leader. After we found this common ground, we became best friends. Within 120 days, his unit to over full responsibility for Zaganiyah. We moved into an advisor role. Major Aziz just walked in one day and said, "Mike, this is my country. This is my fight. You're boys stay here, and I'm taking charge."

3. Conflict Resolution. Sheik Aziz showed up one day. He was a Baghdad lawyer working under the Ayatollah Sistani's movement out of Najaf. We drank some tea and smoked some cigarettes. We discussed the issues in my village, and he smiled. "Mike, it's not your village. These are Iraqi problems and only Iraqis can solve them." He started a movement of reconciliation and rebuilding. He began leading a series of negotiations to help the people

So, that's a portion of the second part. The final part is the most important. It describes my journey since I last left Iraq trying to understand it all and look for better ways to do business and other tools besides the hammer. For this part, I had to study under men that worked in the Phillipines, El Salvador, and Colombia, a woman who tried to establish governance in Afghanistan for the UN in the late 1990s. I had to work on a gang problem in Salinas. I read about this guy that builds girl schools, some dude who is the banker for the poor, and a quiet professional that works one village at a time. More to Follow...

Mike

marct

02-08-2010, 02:25 PM

Mike,

You should look at some of the CORDS stuff for this and, if you really want to go back a ways, some of the Roman stuff. In keeping with calling it "post-colonial", you could also call it "pseudo-indirect rule".

Steve Blair

02-08-2010, 02:54 PM

You could also look at the Indian Wars for some examples of power transition and the tension that arises when military and civilian organizations both try to do the same thing. It can also be very instructive regarding what happens when both organizations get the initial read wrong or when they fail to understand the basic nature of the culture they're working with. There was a great deal of tension between the Army and the Indian Bureau during the entire period, with the Army convinced that only they had the experience to administer the reservations while the civilian agency was convinced that the Army officers were amateurs or too disposed to violent solutions to the problem. And of course there were the corrupt and venal on both sides who just stirred the waters.

And with Nagl, the more I re-read his stuff, the more I'm convinced that his real focus was the way the Army deals with and learns (or doesn't learn) lessons and not so much the insurgencies themselves. It's a good example of how folks with agendas can grab onto a book and twist it to suit their own needs (and I'm thinking of people on both sides of the COIN issue).

Ken White

02-08-2010, 03:20 PM

...his real focus was the way the Army deals with and learns (or doesn't learn) lessons and not so much the insurgencies themselves. It's a good example of how folks with agendas can grab onto a book and twist it to suit their own needs (and I'm thinking of people on both sides of the COIN issue).Regrettably, people will do that... :wry:

Commando Spirit

02-08-2010, 06:14 PM

OK, but to clarify, Small Wars, as in warfare conducted against irregulars, by a regular force is predicated on killing and destruction, ("kinetic") and not diplomacy ("non-kinetic") - that is why it is warfare.

Point taken William but I disagree with your presumption that non-kinetic effect is diplomacy; it isn't. Granted diplomacy is a non-kinetic effect but it is not the only non-kinetic effect. For example, an aggressive, ground dominating patrols programme is non-kinetic and yet it is explicit in it's need to be conducted by military forces.

John T. Fishel

02-08-2010, 06:29 PM

about the Indian wars, I'd recommend Fred Chiaventone's novel about the Fetterman "massacre" - A Moon of Bitter Cold.

Cheers

JohnT

Steve Blair

02-08-2010, 06:31 PM

about the Indian wars, I'd recommend Fred Chiaventone's novel about the Fetterman "massacre" - A Moon of Bitter Cold.

Cheers

JohnT

That is a really good one, John, as is his previous outing about the Little Bighorn.

Mike, if you decide to include anything from this era, let me know. I might be able to kick a couple of source ideas your way.

MM_Smith

02-08-2010, 07:27 PM

Marc T & Mike F,

Thanks for the kind words. Marc, does being Socratic mean I should go drink some poison?

Mike, you have a very ambitious outline. I won’t go into my current work save to say it is connected to advanced training and/or education in what we’re now calling irregular warfare (IW). Training for a specific civil-military-political-cultural scenario is one of the issues we face; what worked one tour in Baghdad can’t be expected to work next tour in Khost. You mentioned the number of years of experience accumulated in your living room. May I ask how many of those troops had repeat tours to an area with which they had familiarity? There is a considerable amount of discussion within the military about developing non-FAO regional or cultural specialists. One of the requirements would be to spend multiple tours, multiple years, on station. This, of course, does not sit well with branch managers (detailers). I won’t go into the “ticket punchers” because they aren’t interested in this stuff anyway.

Marc, you mentioned CORDS and SWJ just published a SWJ prize winning article on CORDS. I have my own opinions about CORDS, of course, but won’t inflict them on you. What I find most objectionable is the fact that CORDS like projects had been going on for years but were ignored until it became obvious even to the dunderheads that a purely military, force-on-force, solution was impossible. We, meaning then international community, have a number of civil-military-political-cultural options in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. What we lack are comprehensive, cohesive, integrated, long range, etc., plans to make use of the full range of these options.

Clausewitz hat recht! War is an extension of policy; ergo we need a policy.

In order to secure and stabilize an area, both bottom up and top down approaches are needed. Why should the locals follow a desired course of action if it will antagonize the insurgents and they have no reason to believe the “official” government?

Just for grins I found a copy of the very first COIN book I ever read. It has a 1962 copyright date (I think) and focuses on the Communist threat and revolutionary warfare, but you know what? Many of the lessons and observations are still valid. And, if you don’t have it, I suggest putting the RAND Corp. document “Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962” onto your hard drive. It is report number R-412-1 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R412-1/); just take a look at the list of participants.

And now I’ll go back into foxhole defilade for a while.

Bob's World

02-09-2010, 01:48 AM

Something worth considering is that perhaps no amount of "good tactics" can overcome poor policy/strategy.

Think about the way the military has been vigorously doing what we do: Accomplish the mission. If something doesn't work, just keep adjusting and re-attacking until it does.

The problem is that we've let the policy/strategy types totally off the hook, as they sit back and watch the military dutifully churn itself apart, changing virtually everything about how we think, organize, train, operate, equip, etc over the past 8 years in the elusive search for that one magic answer, that one silver bullet, that will accomplish this mission. And the policy/strategy types wring their hands in nervous disappointment at the lack of progress. How can the military be failing them so?

News flash: we are not dealing with military failure here; we are dealing with the failure to recognize that the military is not the primary solution to the problems we face. In an age where logistics (surge) and tactics (pop-centric) are considered strategy; we are probably in an age of "Strategic Uncertainty."

So, what is the role of the military in an Age of Strategic Uncertainty? There is no "right answer" for what we need to do. I do believe that the first step to getting to good answers though, is to recognize that the world is in what I believe will be looked back upon as a historic era of transition; and to ask long hard questions at the policy/strategy level as to what changes are relevant, which are not. To hold to what should be held to, and to accept risk and change that which appears to be no longer as valid as it once was seen to be.

Through all of this though, the military will still be on point, working dutifully to accomplish "the mission." In other words, Mike, don't be too hard on yourself if you feel like you and your men have been out there kicking intellectual and physical ass and not seeing the effects or recognition you expect. There is a Dutch boy "finger in the dike" aspect to what we do. Someone need to run and tell higher that the dike is failing, but you're there all alone and to pull your finger out of the dike may well cause it to fail as well.

So we go out, and we stick our finger in the dike. That is our duty. I do not think it is an abrogation of our duty to also inform higher that from our perspective, the dike is failing and that our efforts will only mitigate that for so long.

William F. Owen

02-09-2010, 06:28 AM

For example, an aggressive, ground dominating patrols programme is non-kinetic and yet it is explicit in it's need to be conducted by military forces.
Sorry Spirit, but that is fine slicing the doctrine cooky to no good effect. Did that come from DCDC?
Patrolling is part of the Core Functions - explicitly, it is a fixing action, predicated on the delivery of lethal force. If you patrol for any other reason than to reduce the enemy's freedom of action, you're a clown. - Reducing the enemy's FOA can and might "reassure" the population. Flying a flag over a FOB might do the same for less risk!

The only actions that can be usefully described as non-kinetic are those not predicated on the use of force - eg: delivery of aid, Medical assistance etc.
If we start calling Patrolling "Non-kinetic" and "Influence," we've lost the plot completely.

The word "Kinetic" only appears in the 2005 UK ADP Land Operations once! - and "non-kinetic" is never used.

MikeF

02-09-2010, 12:07 PM

Good comments all. Keep 'em coming. I'll try to respond to several posts. I gotta think some more on some of the comments :).

Just for grins I found a copy of the very first COIN book I ever read. It has a 1962 copyright date (I think) and focuses on the Communist threat and revolutionary warfare, but you know what? Many of the lessons and observations are still valid. And, if you don’t have it, I suggest putting the RAND Corp. document “Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962” onto your hard drive. It is report number R-412-1 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R412-1/); just take a look at the list of participants.

You're a lucky man to have that as the first small wars book that you read. That symposium is one of the most influential writings that I've ever read. I just nodded my head the entire time saying "yes, yes, yes" outloud. As each war is different, each war is really the same. All that changes is METT-TC. Small Wars Journal is one of the closest things that we have to reproducing that form of learning.

You should look at some of the CORDS stuff for this and, if you really want to go back a ways, some of the Roman stuff. In keeping with calling it "post-colonial", you could also call it "pseudo-indirect rule".

In keeping with Steve Blair's suggestion about the Indian wars, I'd recommend Fred Chiaventone's novel about the Fetterman "massacre" - A Moon of Bitter Cold.

Great suggestions. I've got to be a bit more picky on my reading list this year, but I want to get smart on the Indian Wars, and Fred seems to be the man to read. First, I gotta focus on one piece of the puzzle that I haven't studied yet- Africa and the role of the Foreign Area Advisor. I'm gonna take a look at Tom Odom and Stan's adventures.

May I ask how many of those troops had repeat tours to an area with which they had familiarity? There is a considerable amount of discussion within the military about developing non-FAO regional or cultural specialists. One of the requirements would be to spend multiple tours, multiple years, on station.

Oddly enough, I can only think of two guys (outside of my SF and Seal brothers) that have worked the same areas in multiple tours. I'd argue that there are advantages and disadvantages to the current system. At a minimum, at least we're deploying as units and not individual augmentees like in Vietnam.

Mike, you have a very ambitious outline.

I'm a dry-erase board and map and acetate type of guy. I'll start broad to try and encompass as much stuff as possible, and I'll narrow things down as I go along. Take two of the questions- Why do men rebel? Why do people blow themselves up? Entire books are written on these topics.

In reality, I have a very small area of expertise- working in and around the denied rural areas. My urban experience is limited to the "Thunder Runs" in Baghdad and several weeks of patrols in Baqubah.

Commando Spirit- I'd suggest taking a look at the thread on Presence Patrols here. Bill Moore and JCustis do a good job talking things out. Personally, I'd get rid of the terms kinetic and non-kinetic. As with so many other things in life, these labels are minimizing that makes war seem zero-sum when it's not.

Bob's World- I gotta let your comments simmer for a day. What you wrote is parallel with what I was thinking.

I guess I'll end this part with some of Ken White's mantras. There are many variables in war, but

1. Everything is METT-TC.
2. Well trained combat units can accomplish ANY type of mission.
3. Small wars are best to be avoided.

Steve Blair

02-09-2010, 02:32 PM

marct

02-09-2010, 03:15 PM

Hi Bob,

News flash: we are not dealing with military failure here; we are dealing with the failure to recognize that the military is not the primary solution to the problems we face. In an age where logistics (surge) and tactics (pop-centric) are considered strategy; we are probably in an age of "Strategic Uncertainty."

So, what is the role of the military in an Age of Strategic Uncertainty? There is no "right answer" for what we need to do. I do believe that the first step to getting to good answers though, is to recognize that the world is in what I believe will be looked back upon as a historic era of transition; and to ask long hard questions at the policy/strategy level as to what changes are relevant, which are not. To hold to what should be held to, and to accept risk and change that which appears to be no longer as valid as it once was seen to be.

You and I have batted this one around a few times before in various forms. Let me start by saying that the first thing we need to do is to consciously bring back the term "Grand Strategy" to replace the newer (incorrect) meaning of strategy as logistics and tactics.

What are the key environmental variables that condition a successful grand strategy? I think you have listed a fair number of them already over various threads: WMD proliferation, increasing economic and communicative interdependency, an increasingly even playing field at the international level (mainly as a result of changing the game rules, but...), etc., etc. This is the type of environment in which COIN operations are taking place and which act as the selection pressures on the tactics and grand tactics Mike is talking about.

Mike, you are in an interesting position planning / teaching this course. One thing that I didn't think about earlier (mea culpa!), was that you have to make a decision on your - let's call it grand strategic ;) - approach. Are you teaching it from a retrospective, analytic framework or from a prospective one? Basically, are you trying to teach them an analytic model to understand insurgencies / COIN or are you trying to teach them how to analyze current situations and come up with (new) solutions to them?

Cheers,

Marc

John T. Fishel

02-09-2010, 03:53 PM

His books are fiction. That said, he told me that in Moon of Bitter Cold he was specifically looking at analogies to the kinds of Small Wars we had been engaged in in the 90s.

Cheers

Johnt

MikeF

02-09-2010, 04:07 PM

Mike,

Chiaventone's work is fiction, but he brings a very solid history to it and manages to explore some of the issues in ways that history just can't. For the frontier period, ALWAYS start with Robert Utley and then narrow down. His two books on the Frontier Army are simply outstanding and will give you a good groundwork for further research.

Thanks Steve (and John). When I drove back cross-country, I stopped at some of the Frontier Army battlegrounds and historical sites. I was trying to envision what it was like for them. Now, I got the bug and want to read up on it.

Mike, you are in an interesting position planning / teaching this course. One thing that I didn't think about earlier (mea culpa!), was that you have to make a decision on your - let's call it grand strategic - approach. Are you teaching it from a retrospective, analytic framework or from a prospective one? Basically, are you trying to teach them an analytic model to understand insurgencies / COIN or are you trying to teach them how to analyze current situations and come up with (new) solutions to them?

Hi Marc, I'm not sure yet. I've never let the initial parts of the creative or decision-making process be hampered by things like rules and questions:D. I'm gonna try to push out one more posts on "alternative" approaches, listen to y'alls feedback, and then start thinking critically on design, intent, and process.

Mike

MM_Smith

02-09-2010, 04:22 PM

-I wasn't clear when talking about books. I've been in love with the RAND report since I found it but that was relatively recently.
-The first COINish book I read was "The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him" edited by T.N. Greene. It is a collection of selections from the Marine Corps Gazette and does have a 1962 copyright. I wasn't sure of the title or date so went to the library to check and, wonder of wonders, someone has it checked out!
-I'll have to go back into the cave and do some more searching. I have a vague recollection of a collection of insurgency case studies. The printing was horrible which leads me to believe it was one of the "Special Texts" Army schools were so enamored of.

At a minimum, at least we're deploying as units and not individual augmentees like in Vietnam.
-To which I can only say "Amen"

-Semper White Board!

marct

02-09-2010, 04:22 PM

Hi Marc, I'm not sure yet. I've never let the initial parts of the creative or decision-making process be hampered by things like rules and questions:D. I'm gonna try to push out one more posts on "alternative" approaches, listen to y'alls feedback, and then start thinking critically on design, intent, and process.

Best way to do it, Mike ;)! Hey, I'm using this discussion to help design my own COIN course as well, so it really is an "inter-active" process :D.

BTW, let me know if you want an online course site at any point (I run my own courseware and I'd be happy to give you one).

Cheers,

Marc

MikeF

02-09-2010, 04:55 PM

Side Note- my physical therapist decided to induce dizzyness today so she could isolate specific areas of damage. Left inner ear. Check. Now, I gotta wait a day for my brain to unwind.

Another Way- Part Three

After my last deployment, I stepped away from direct involvement in war for the first time in seven years. Just like every warrior going back to the Hellenic wars, I came back trying to re-integrate into the "normal" world. Nate Ficks does a good job in his book describing the differences, the numbess, and the struggle for purpose. I've written about it SWJ, and it was a period of transition, healing, maturation, and understanding. Thankfully, I've walked away from it a better person.

During that time, as I wrestled with the violence I unleashed, my neighbor's hatred towards each other, the seemingly futility of war, and the deep sense of grief that I felt from the loss of my boys, I grabbed a board and went surfing. In that time of solitude, I'd just sit on the board and watch the waves grow, peak, and crash in perpetual flow. Other days, I'd just hike deep into Big Sur, sit on the mountain top, and listen and observe. I began to understand the laws of nature and science, and I started having ideas on how they apply to human nature. I guess I found my Zen moment. I walked down from that mountain understanding several things: 1. Who I am. I was finally able to look myself in the mirror and know that I did the best that I could in every situation, 2. I see the world differently than others and that's okay. 3. I developed a gift on the ability to articulate and describe the realities of war by moving words around on paper.

Simultaneously, I was thrust into the world of small wars through the world view of Special Forces, State Dept, NGOs, missionaries, and academics. I was the hammer in the toolbox; they are the rulers, screwdrivers, pliars, saws, and drills. As I worked on different projects, I started trying to consider how we could build a house if we have to. At the same time, I started understanding that we've been trying to build houses with the wrong tools, no freaking blueprint, and we forgot to order the building supplies. Additionally, we thought we could build these houses overnight and put it on a credit card b/c we live in a nice house. We forgot how long it took our parents struggled to save up for the house, the sacrifices they made to build the house, and the time, effort, and care they took into maintaining that house. We just wanted everyone to have a big house today.

So, I've got some ideas on how to build a house. I'll describe them in a minute. As an officer, I'm a project manager. I don't know have the technical expertise of the plumber, the electrician, the architect, or the carpenter, but I do know where to find them- the NCO corps. I want to brief these experts on these new ideas that I've been introduced to, and I want to give them the opportunity to think it through and determine what will work and what won't work....

In other words, come to a better understanding on our limits of control and constraints on our ability to influence others.

Okay, enough with the analogies and metaphors. That's the background. Here's what I've seen.

MikeF

02-09-2010, 05:55 PM

Unconventional War- 10th Group and the Kurds

In 2005, I was assigned to CJSOTF-AP. The staff guys (Majors and CSMs) went into Northern Iraq during OIF One while I was with the Rock of the Marne bringing shock and awe from Kuwait to Baghdad. I'd tell the stories of the Thunder Runs, and they memorized me with tales of 10-man SF teams teaming up with a Kurdish Brigade of 5000 men and taking on the Hammarabi Division. While a shaping effort, they managed to cause enough harrassment to confuse Saddam into believing 4th ID was coming in from the North. Their maneuvers made my job easier.

Next, they started giving me the SF manuals to read and schooling me on something called Foreign Internal Defense. "Mike, dude, we don't do anything ourselves. We teach others how to do it." Or, as I joke with my SEAL friends, "we just sleep, eat, and lift." Traditionally indoctrinated as a tanker, that mindset sounded good to me :).

Foreign Internal Defense- Phillipines, Colombia, and El Salvador

In Monterey, I started meeting some new friends and instructors. Many of these men do not have combat patches or CIBs. In Class A's, they have no medals of valor. It's a strange sight because they still have many skill identifying badges, numerous scrolls on their sleeves, and wear a Green Beret. They walk into a room with a quiet, humbled self-confidence. When they choose to speak, even though it may be soft-spoken, you listen. I come from a world of cavalry officers and the Airborne Mafia. We lead large groups of young men. We are supposed to be loud, bold, and out-spoken if not overwhelming and overbearing at times. Quite a culture shock.

Anyways, they started showing me another way- the way of the quiet professional that mentors, advises, and assists. Because of the political sensitivity in the areas that they operate, most of what they do is done out of the limelight with little to no visibility. In systems terms, they attempt to have the least amount of physical presence and shock and the highest output of return on effort. Oftentimes, they are constrained on what they are allowed to do.

We shared long discussions on how to intervene in small wars outside of the US. We debated over what works and what doesn't, timing of intervention, and the escalation of violence.

Salinas- Narco-Terrorism, Gangs, and Effective Law Enforcement

There's a long thread on this in SWC and a corresponding article in the WaPo. I learned that gangs and insurgencies have similar characteristics albeit different goals. I also had to adjust my thought process on how to "fix" the problem. If I applied my Iraq solution to Salinas, we would wall off the neighborhoods, enforce curfews, and ration food controls to force population-control, drop JDAMs on the gangs safe-havens, and send the drug lords back to Mexico.

Some might consider that too harsh. So, we had to relook the problem, and we were striving for innovative, holistic solutions.

1. This is not a police problem, but you need to fix your police. Live with the people, gain the trusts, and stop shooting innocent people.
2. This is a community problem. The people of Monterey County refused to increase sales tax by one cent to pay for more police so until they determine the problem is severe, nothing will change.
3. How is the village working the issue? Are the schools adequate, is their after-school activities, are the churches involved?

Lots of learning points...More to Follow....

MikeF

02-09-2010, 07:10 PM

Greg Mortenson- Teaching the Girls to Read

3 Cups of Tea unnerved me. I had spent so much time trying to burn the village down in order to save it, and here's a guy, a white, middle-aged, hippie rock climber from Berkley, that builds schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is nothing impressive about him until you understand the impact that he's had on others. Seriously, I almost resigned my commission to join him. I was going to take the Hippocratic Oath of "do no harm" and spend the rest of my days as an ex-patriot doing humanitarian work.

Instead, I want to learn to work with him. COL Chris Kolenda figured that one out as told in Stones into Schools. Greg's work will be for naught if his toolbox doesn't have a hammer. These days, I give back through working with Habitat for Humanity and helping build the villages of my own home.

Nancy Roberts- Wicked Problems

Dr. Roberts is the smartest person that I've ever met. A pioneer of women's rights, Nancy worked her way through Stanford and became a teacher. In 1997, as the Taliban was almost done winning the civil war in A'stan, the United Nations ask her to lead the initial planning/collaboration effort for the UN nation-building mission that was to follow. She left NPS and spent four days in Kabul trying to bring together 100 different NGOs with competing interests and goals to find unity of effort. After her deployment, the UN decided not to support the Taliban. This experience led her to study wicked problems- finding solutions to unsolvable problems.

She became my thesis advisor, mentor, and second mom.

Frank Giordano- The theory of games and human nature

Dr. G, a two-tour Vietnam vet, went on to teach mathematics at USMA. After retirement, he headed to NPS to teach in DA. He reintroduced me to John Nash and how mathematics are God's language. We continue to work together trying to use math to explain why people do the things they do. Or, simply put, sometimes one plus one equals three because people are crazy :).

Mohammed Yunnis- Banker to the poor

Yunnis developed the concept of micro-lending to the poor. Instead of just giving money away and creating future welfare states, Yunnis provides low-interest loans to improverished small businessmen. The results are startling. His efforts have already been rewarded with a Nobel Peace Prize, and other groups are using social networking to take it global.

So, that's a snapshot. As you can see, I've been extremely blessed with the people that I've gotten to meet or read about. That's all I'm gonna write today, but at least I'm writing again. Y'all can dissect it and discuss it. What I want to do is frame these ideas into a format for discussion to allow junior leaders to figure out how we can use these ideas to better accomplish our mission.

Thoughts?

Mike

MM_Smith

02-09-2010, 08:29 PM

Don’t you just love the medical community when they screw you up just to see how you react? Run two marathons & call me in the morning.

Rumor has it that the ill fated Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq fame was offered the services of Dr. Yunnis because of his expertise in microfinance. The source of my information was less than complimentary about the CPA in general so I won’t repeat or give credence to his explanation of why his services were not requested/accepted. Besides the anatomical improbability required I don’t think that science is currently capable of the DNA manipulation he implied.

A profound “YES” to Drs. Roberts and Giordano; you are fortunate to know and have access to them. Wicked problems indeed.

Unfortunately for me I’m not familiar with Mr. Mortenson. He sounds like the “Ugly American” who was, in fact, the good guy in the book.

You will find folks like him in the oddest places. I’ve been interested in water and sanitation (Wat/San), primarily potable water, and my sources for things like slow sand filters and hydraulic rams have been almost unbelievable.

NGO story: A few years ago I spoke with a very nice NGO lady from an almost unspeakable hole. When she found out I was in the Army she asked me if I knew anything about Special Forces. Mentally I braced for impact, but all she had was praise for how a couple of NCOs helped her and her organization by teaching an abbreviated class in decision making, course of action analysis and preparing an “OPORD.”

Okay; I found “The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him” in .pdf. It turns out the Marines reprinted it as FMFRP 12-25 in January of 1990; it is 4,784KB. If there is an e-mail address for the SWJ “library” and y’all want it, I’ll send it.

The other reference book is actually three volumes: “Isolating the Guerrilla” Vol. 1, 2 & 3. It was done by the “Historical Evaluation and Research Organization” for a 1965 Army Research Organization contract and was published on 1 FEB 1966. #1 is 6,870KB; #2 is 32,790KB and #3 is 22,450KB so there may be transmission problems but the same offer stands.

MikeF

02-10-2010, 01:01 PM

Don’t you just love the medical community when they screw you up just to see how you react? Run two marathons & call me in the morning.

Actually, we've come a long way. I've been absolutely impressed with the calibre of doctors, physicians assistants, and nurses that I'm currently working with at Fort Bragg. The research and studies that they're doing on concussions and TBIs is ground-breaking. In short, before, the doctors told me that I just had to learn to deal with some things (dizzyness, headaches, fatigue, etc...) Now, these doctors are very clear- "We're going to fix you."

Rumor has it that the ill fated Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq fame was offered the services of Dr. Yunnis because of his expertise in microfinance.

Greg Mortensen experienced the same thing initially in A'stan. Now, we're embracing them. One thing I'm currently studying is why were we so adverse to embrace the technical experts in the field? Naomi Klein argues in "The Shock Doctrine" that it was the undue influence of Milton Freidman and the Chicago Boys brand of free-market, deregulated capitalism.

A profound “YES” to Drs. Roberts and Giordano; you are fortunate to know and have access to them. Wicked problems indeed.

In my final assessment, there is no such thing as a wicked or unsolvable problem. All there exists is limitations in our own thoughts and creativity. For example, we used to think the world was flat:o.

Thanks for the anecdotes and links. The next thing that I have to do is figure out how to take all this story-telling and put it into a proper outline for instruction.