PDA

View Full Version : British COIN (merged thread)



zenpundit
01-12-2006, 04:37 AM
"Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/NovDec05/aylwin.pdf)" (PDF)

To paraphrase one of the Scottish lairds in Braveheart, " A bit less cordial than we're used to";)

Strickland
06-09-2006, 12:47 PM
Moderator's Note

I found five separate threads in this arena and have merged them after a review. (Ends)


Is anyone familiar with the British C-DICT (Countering Disorder, Insurgency, Criminality, and Terrorism) Theory/Doctrine? If anyone has this document or is familiar with the idea, please help.

slapout9
06-09-2006, 01:01 PM
Major Strickland, I have a bunch of stuff on this. Need some time to dig it up.

Tom Odom
06-09-2006, 01:47 PM
Adam,

I have a full CD on Brit OPTAG materials on COIN including the N. Ireland Bluebook I can send to you snal mail: need a military address sent by email (you have mine)

we have also uused some of this in our company level SOSO series of handbooks you can see on the CALL gateway.

Tom

Strickland
06-09-2006, 02:33 PM
I have the Brit Bluebook for N. Ireland, but was of the impression that this C-DICT was something new. Is it the same?

Strickland
06-09-2006, 02:34 PM
Major Strickland, I have a bunch of stuff on this. Need some time to dig it up.

Thank you.

oneknievelfan@msn.com
adam.strickland@usmc.mil

Wagram
07-20-2006, 05:37 PM
British counter-insurgency in history: a useful precedent? Ashley Jackson British Army Review

Accurate assessment of British counter-insurgency successes requires abandonment of certain myths relating to military prowess in the application of 'minimum force' and recognition of essential contributions made by non-military agencies using unorthodox means to intimidate insurgents.

"In particular, it is argued that past counter-insurgency campaigns were won not by the British Army on its own, but by an array of security organizations, and that the threat of maximum force and methods of dubious legality were the keys to counter-insurgency success" (p12).

It is essential not to let such myths (for example, that COIN policy aimed to achieve an orderly path to independence rather than to resist decolonization altogether) shape current doctrine: "doctrinal publications must guard against elevating contested historical interpretations to the status of base-line truths" (p13).

From: http://www.mpr.co.uk/archive/schedule/BAR.HTM

This is an excellent article. Highly recommended and refreshing research which goes deeper than "we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".

Tom Odom
07-21-2006, 01:06 PM
Very good post and one with a lesson that I try and pass on: Brit COIN TTPs are the result of trial, successes, and ERRORS over quite a span of colonial and post-colonial episodes. Brit officers I have worked with are generally quite intellectually honest in stating the same thing.

Bottom line: yes, Brit COIN lessons are useful as are Brit COIN TTPs, as long as one goes beyond as Wagram says,
"we use beret when the US are patrolling wearing helmets".

Best

Tom

CR6
09-11-2006, 05:27 AM
I read this with much interest, and I found Aylwin-Foster's criticism to be accurate and credible, given his time with coalition. We are still grappling with the problems of centralized control of operations, separating ourselves from the population we seek to aid, and the woes of a shallow bench when it comes to personnel. He is also dead-on with his criticism that the Army's ethos of "can-do" sometimes overshadows critical thinking and judgement regarding situations in theater. Somehow I don't think that is what Powell had in mind when he wrote "optimism is a force multiplier." Great article!

SSG Rock
09-15-2006, 09:14 PM
We sit back here and see the changes that should occur in order to acheive any measure of success and I don't know about you guys but I am extremely frustrated at the almost pondering manner in which we seem to move in reaction to the adversary in Iraq. We know what we need to do, the changes that we need to make but we don't. Now, I know that there isn't much we can do to initiate change on the political side of the equation, but on the military/tactical where is the bottleneck? Why do we seem to insist on being predictable? Why are we still using pretty much the same playbook? Or, are we dramtically changing our TTP and I'm just not aware of it? Certainly, the news coming out of Iraq doesn't seem to do anything but get worse. Is it really worse? Rock confused.....

RTK
09-15-2006, 09:52 PM
From my turret there is significant resistance to change in war prosecution at the Bn and above level. Obvious examples to the contrary are evident in the past three years, but if you look at Ann Scott Tyson's article in the Washington Post this morning, there are shining examples of BN level leadership that just doesn't get it.

Fighting COIN is a tactial, small unit endeavor. This takes Majors and Lieutenant Colonels out of the common, everyday decision making posture and they don't like it. It certainly isn't the same as a large, Bn sized frontal attack.

Changes are made daily in theater but they're made at the lowest levels. We are very good at tactically adapting to the enemy. We are very poor at capturing tactical keys to success through our professional development periodicals. We're having tough times finding anyone to even submit articles to professional magazines. Why? Because the guys and gals smartest on the subject right now are getting deployed and redeployed every 14 months or so. The last thing most of them want to do is write a bloody article on redeployment.

We're doing a good job of capturing battalion and brigade lessons learned through CALL after deployments. As most of us will acknowledge, however, COIN is a tactical, small unit fight. The lessons learned of battalions and larger, however important to capture, simply won't help the strategic corporal talking to the sheik in the province.

Tom Odom
09-18-2006, 01:13 PM
RTK

Thanks for this:


We're doing a good job of capturing battalion and brigade lessons learned through CALL after deployments. As most of us will acknowledge, however, COIN is a tactical, small unit fight. The lessons learned of battalions and larger, however important to capture, simply won't help the strategic corporal talking to the sheik in the province.

I have been singing that song as loudly as possibe for nearly 6 years. Please join me in another chorus.

Seriously, it is hard for brigade and battalion commanders to accept they in essence facilitate the fight. Some get it. Many don't.

Best
Tom

Steve Blair
09-18-2006, 01:16 PM
And this will continue to be a problem, I'm afraid. The Army never quite figured it out during 10+ years in Vietnam.

RTK
09-18-2006, 03:35 PM
I brought this issue up recently with some higher ups in CALL. The response was essentially "good idea, when are you going to write a tactical lessons learned book."

I'm working on one in my free time, but I think it would be a subject worthy of someone's full time job right now, especially since we haven't put one out as an army after God knows how many tactical units have gone through twice.

Tom Odom
09-19-2006, 12:34 PM
RTK

Email me what you have and we can get started. I am looking for a VOL 7 of the Company-level SOSO series that I started here in late 2004.

Best

Tom

selil
09-19-2006, 02:56 PM
RTK

Email me what you have and we can get started. I am looking for a VOL 7 of the Company-level SOSO series that I started here in late 2004.

Best

Tom


If you had the data and structure writing it wouldn't take that long.

RTK
09-19-2006, 03:06 PM
RTK

Email me what you have and we can get started. I am looking for a VOL 7 of the Company-level SOSO series that I started here in late 2004.

Best

Tom


Not an issue.

I believe you know Lester Grau, if I remember correctly from a previous post. I think a great idea is a book much like "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" with historical vignettes and AAR's on real world tactical scenarios. This would take time, I know. I'd like to entertain his audience as someone who has done this type of book before to see what he thinks.

Jim Rodgers
10-19-2007, 11:29 AM
I'm looking for a link to the UK Army Field Manual Vol. 1 - it was referenced in MCIP 3-33.01. I think I also recall something called the UK Land Component Handbook, and would be interested in that as well. Does anyone have the links for these?

Failing that, does anyone know where the Brit liaison at Rucker or Benning is?

SteveMetz
10-19-2007, 01:33 PM
I'm looking for a link to the UK Army Field Manual Vol. 1 - it was referenced in MCIP 3-33.01. I think I also recall something called the UK Land Component Handbook, and would be interested in that as well. Does anyone have the links for these?

Failing that, does anyone know where the Brit liaison at Rucker or Benning is?

Alex Alderson has been participating here; I'm sure he'll fix you up. I'll send him an email on it.

Alex Alderson
10-19-2007, 09:36 PM
The reference is slightly off the mark but it matters not. You are looking for Army Field Manual Vol. 1 Part 10, published in July 2001. Written by Brig (Retd) Gavin Bulloch, the British Army's pre-eminent doctrine writer, it served its purpose and held out until a full review was put in place nearly a year ago. That review is nearly complete and has hit the mark with the internal market, taking on the problems of interventionist COIN, raising the issues of sovereignty and legitimacy, reassessing principles and establishing a new view of the Thompson approach of Engage-Secure-Develop. There are one or two final hurdles to clear and no doubt the challenging views of the Small Wars cogniscenti will hit on things we'd wished we had included but... One of the most obvious and important points I have made is to pick up on Steve Metz's view, again obvious, that insurgency is a strategy. Why important? If you are to counter it, you also need a strategy, not just a presence: being there is not a strategy. And military prowess is, as many contributors have made clear, not enough. If you have access to the Royal United Services Institute (http://www.rusi.org/) website or its August 2007 journal (http://www.rusi.org/publication/journal/ref:A46B87098DA056/), you can read more about what my team has been up to.

Norfolk
06-16-2008, 10:21 PM
Zombie Thread...Arise!:eek:

The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: Myths, Realities, and Strategic Challenges, by I.A. Rigden (http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479660&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) (USAWC Strategy Research Project, 15 March, 2008):




Modern British doctrine is founded on both myth and historical collective and regimental experience. Considered in the broader context of the total imperial experience a more comprehensive appreciation of counter-insurgency emerges. The realities of the British experience therefore become the premises for a counterinsurgency theory. What the study of the literature and experience suggest is a more general and inclusive list of realties that better define the basis for a comprehensive approach for the twenty-first century. It reveals at least 16 overarching premises that validate the current British principles and highlight areas not currently addressed in the AFM. Taken together these 16 premises constitute a British theory of counterinsurgency.

Most of what this paper has to offer is not news to many students, let alone practioners, of COIN. But it is a good read, clear and concise, and we speed readers can digest it in about half an hour without missing anything. If one does not have to time or inclination to read Galula, Trinquiere, et al., this paper might be a worthwhile semi-substitute.

Colonel Rigden's 16 Premises for COIN (abbreviated extracts):

1. The first premise is that insurgency is war. War is a political act that requires an active decision to initiate it and a clear declaration of intent.

2. The second premise is that every campaign is unique and the nature of the conflict must be understood. It takes time to fully understand the nature of the problem faced and to develop the lines of operation to deal with it.

3. The third first premise is envisioning the long-term post-conflict end-state. As Sir Basil Liddell Hart wrote: “The object of the counter-insurgency war is to attain a better peace – even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”

4. The fourth premise is that geography matters. World geography and the geography of a particular region is one of the most important factors when trying to understand the nature of the conflict and how to conduct a counter-insurgency. Geography does affect the mindset of the insurgent and the population.

5. The fifth premise is do not fight a war or campaign that you cannot win. There is a potential decision point in the planning or conduct of every war or campaign in which the astute leader may conclude that the costs of success or risks of failure far outweighs the benefits of any success.


6. The sixth premise is the requirement for a clear plan. This is one of Sir Robert Thompson’s five principles and is based on his experience in helping to formulate the Briggs Plan.41 It is an essential factor for success. The plan must, however, be tailored to the peculiar and unique circumstances of the insurgency.


7. The seventh premise is that there is always a learning stage at the beginning of each campaign and that it is vitally important to learn from mistakes quickly. It takes time to understand the nature of each campaign and, in the process of doing so, it is inevitable that some mistakes will be made. [Note: I would not agree with the invocation of Boyd's OODA Loop here].

8. The eighth premise is that politics is the focal point. Politics and war are social phenomena. One key to countering insurgency is therefore to understand the context and nature of the social environment. It is essential to understand what the people’s issues are and what can make them better.

9. The ninth premise is that hearts follow minds in counter-insurgency. In Hanoi in 1956, paraphrasing Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh stated that “The people are like the fish in the sea, they swim with the current.”
Making the people swim in the right direction, the legitimate authority’s current, is the key to winning in counter-insurgency. It is essential to alter their minds to reject the insurgents and accept the justness and legitimacy of the counter-insurgent’s cause and to concurrently win their hearts.


10. The tenth premise is that the requirement for a coordinated multi-agency government approach is paramount to success. This is true for governments externally intervening and for existing internal governments. The overall strategy and ensuing plans must be collaborative and involve multi-agencies and actors using all of the elements of national power of both the supported and supporting governments. In doing this the activities have to be coordinated and synchronized so that they work together and not against one another.


11. The eleventh premise is that it is essential to work within the rule of law. Rule of law is the visible symbol of moral justification. The aim must be to restore the civilian authority and police primacy if it does not already exist. Where it does not exist, the military must shoulder the burden until such time as the relevant civilian and police capabilities can be trained to fulfil their role.


12. The twelfth premise is that counter-insurgents must only use the appropriate force necessary for the situation faced. The appropriate use of force is the minimum amount of force required to achieve a particular legitimate objective. This can range from full scale warfighting against an insurgent base deep in the jungle to the single arrest of an insurgent in an urban area. The British military has relied heavily on flexible Rules of Engagement (ROE) to ensure that only the minimum force necessary is used for each situation. Force must be proportionate and justified and the intent to use force clearly understood.


13. The thirteenth premise is that campaigns must be appropriately resourced to be truly effective. Like all conflicts where fighting is likely, counter-insurgency campaigns are expensive in term of “blood and treasure.” It is, however, the “treasure” element of this equation that is often the most lacking in counter-insurgency campaigns. Such campaigns are often the most expensive to conduct and they generally take longer than conventional warfighting campaigns to conclude.


14. The fourteenth premise is that accurate and timely information and intelligence are essential to success. Insurgency and counter-insurgency both work in the same strategic environment and the currency is intelligence that can be used to act.


15. The fifteenth premise is that the use of indigenous forces is essential to building a an enduring peace for the country concerned. In all British campaigns local indigenous forces have played an important role. They have acted as the backbone of intelligence gathering, police forces and the local military.


16. The sixteenth premise is that every new campaign will face increasing constraints and less freedom in the conduct of operations. The world of the twenty-first century is very different from fifty years ago. The Malayan campaign and Kenya were fought largely out of the glare of the media whereas Iraq and Afghanistan have twenty-four hour news coverage. Conflicts in the nineteenth century were reported weeks later. If history is our guide, this will only become worse and is a significant factor when considering undertaking a counter-insurgency or conducting a counter-insurgency campaign.

davidbfpo
06-17-2008, 06:52 AM
Excellent find. A light reading over breakfast and maybe read again later - when printed. Interesting that this article by a British Army officer, studying in the USA and published in the USA. I wonder if it will be re-printed here, perhaps in British Army Review?

I cannot think of an equivalent review of the British experience in counter-terrorism, where the police / law enforcement / intelligence agencies have primacy. An experience with several different strands: Northern Ireland, domestic or mainland (not exclusively Irish) and overseas (e.g. Greece).

Perhaps others (Slap ?) know of a review of the American (inc. Canadian) CT experience?

From my armchair and not being a soldier I cannot comment on whether the military will gain from this. Not that the lessons of Basra will influence readers.

davidbfpo

PS Not sure if Wagram still visits SWC, so will email him to look again.

wm
06-17-2008, 11:38 AM
Good find.
I am somewhat concerned with Norfolk's synopsis of premise 7. Rigden does not limit learning to the start of the campaign. He notes the need for continuous reassessment as the campaign continues. As Rigden, rightly, notes, learning is not a "done once and over" process.

A corollary to premise 7, by the way, is that the fact that one does not make mistakes early on does not preclude the possibility of making mistakes as the campaign progesses.

slapout9
06-17-2008, 01:20 PM
Hi david, contrary to popular belief the Phoneix program was based primaraly on law enforcement. It is a good example of a LE how to do it approach.

The other was COINTELPRO of the 1960's of domestic spying of the US govt. on US population, good example of what you should not do!!!


more later busy at my day job.

William F. Owen
06-17-2008, 06:35 PM
a.) The British Army Review is an excellent publication. It is the sole bastion of real military thought in the UK.. but it's restricted, thus not on the internet. This is real spoiler for those of us who write for it, and a complete choker for everyone else as very few folks get to read it, and the print run in minute. I urge those of you who can write, to submit articles. PM me for the Editors contact details.

b.) British COIN TTPs (unlike our very mediocre platoon tactics manual) are not generally written down, or stay the same for very long, and are very often forgotten, and have to be re-learnt. However, their main strength is that they change very rapidly to adapt to the conditions and threats and get disseminated in detailed pre-deployment training. Thus copying, or mimicking the British Army can lead to disaster unless, you have some deeper context.. and if you're smart then it's not a problem.

Norfolk
06-17-2008, 10:36 PM
Good find.
I am somewhat concerned with Norfolk's synopsis of premise 7. Rigden does not limit learning to the start of the campaign. He notes the need for continuous reassessment as the campaign continues. As Rigden, rightly, notes, learning is not a "done once and over" process.

A corollary to premise 7, by the way, is that the fact that one does not make mistakes early on does not preclude the possibility of making mistakes as the campaign progesses.

Sorry wm, I did not intend to misrepresent Col. Rigden's 7th Premise; I simply cut-and-pasted the first few lines of each of the 16 Premises in order to save space while providing a rough-and-ready overview of said premises. My apologies.:o

slapout9
06-17-2008, 11:30 PM
Hi david, contrary to popular belief the Phoenix program was based primarily on law enforcement. It is a good example of a LE how to do it approach.

The other was COINTELPRO of the 1960's of domestic spying of the US govt. on US population, good example of what you should not do!!!


more later busy at my day job.


To continue The Phoenix Adviser handbook has been posted on here several times and on the front page it designates the SVN National Police as the ones primarily responsible and as I said it was primarily a LE project which was part of CORDS program. During the same time the evil opposite was the COINTELPRO program being run at nearly the same time, supposedly to stop subversion,espionage,etc. in our country.

These two projects are the only ones that I personally know of and have read and or talked to people involved with these programs. One area that I did want to research was the now defunct School of the Americas. All top secret hush,hush so there is probably some good studies stored away somewhere.

Our own John T. Fishel has written(I love all his stuff having been south of the border a couple of times:wry:) and been involved with this in the Central/South American AO so when he reads this I hope he may respond. Do a search on back issues of Military Review and his name will pop up with some really good articles.


There used to be an International Police Academy run out of Washington,D.C. that did some good studies on LE in COIN type situations. Ken White will remember this one. Later Slap

wm
06-18-2008, 11:23 AM
Sorry wm, I did not intend to misrepresent Col. Rigden's 7th Premise; I simply cut-and-pasted the first few lines of each of the 16 Premises in order to save space while providing a rough-and-ready overview of said premises. My apologies.:o

"No harm, no foul," as we used to say on the basketball court. ;)

MattC86
06-18-2008, 02:59 PM
Not that the lessons of Basra will influence readers.


I sense there's a strong revisionist current in the US "COIN community" (for abject lack of a better term) claiming the British aren't so good at COIN after all - and pointing to Basra as the proof. Abu Muqawama was talking about that a few weeks ago. That's part of the whole "patting ourselves on the back" phenomenon I find so aggravating among many American commentators.

To me the key is, as always, proper context. The Northern Ireland policing/stability ops did not prepare the British Army as well for Basra or Helmand as they thought. But one needn't look very hard to see the influence of Robert Thompson types in US doctrine, nor even British influence in how we've handled sectarian relations in Iraq. . .

Definitely an interesting read, Norfolk. Thanks.

Regards,

Matt

William F. Owen
06-18-2008, 05:54 PM
To me the key is, as always, proper context. The Northern Ireland policing/stability ops did not prepare the British Army as well for Basra or Helmand as they thought. But one needn't look very hard to see the influence of Robert Thompson types in US doctrine, nor even British influence in how we've handled sectarian relations in Iraq. . .


You are so right. The first 3-5 years of Northern where chaotic and counter productive. It was only 30 years of hard knocks, that made us any good, and the colonial experience was mostly irrelevant. Basra ran less than 5 years.

- but some Northern Ireland stuff has been very successfully applied in Helmand.

...if you know anything that Thompson said that was either original, insightful and useful, please point me at it.

slapout9
06-18-2008, 07:03 PM
Wilf,I think Kitson had a lot more to do with Ireland than Thompson. They also had the great advantage of speaking English.

William F. Owen
06-18-2008, 07:20 PM
Wilf,I think Kitson had a lot more to do with Ireland than Thompson. They also had the great advantage of speaking English.


Kitson is useful and from my Regiment. Regardless of the theatre, I never understand why Thompson is deemed such an expert.

Mark O'Neill
06-19-2008, 01:46 AM
Kitson is useful and from my Regiment. Regardless of the theatre, I never understand why Thompson is deemed such an expert.

I suspect that you are being rhetorical, but for what its worth:

1. his performance as a practioner in Malaysia;
2. his observations from SVN; and
3. Defeating Communist Insurgency(you may argue that there is 'nothing new or original' in it, that does not detract from the usefulness of the text as a succint analysis and description of an insurgency phenomena).

Cheers

Mark

William F. Owen
06-19-2008, 03:53 PM
I suspect that you are being rhetorical, but for what its worth:

1. his performance as a practioner in Malaysia;
2. his observations from SVN; and
3. Defeating Communist Insurgency(you may argue that there is 'nothing new or original' in it, that does not detract from the usefulness of the text as a succint analysis and description of an insurgency phenomena).


Not rhetorical in any way. I am well aware of Thompson's reputation, and his written work, some of which I have read. I see both Julian Paget and Frank Kitson as being better writers, practioners and more useful, but based on your advice I may give him another look.

Wagram
07-30-2008, 02:30 PM
Thank you davidbfpo for having warned me...BAR is such a good read it's a shame it's so hard to find.

William F. Owen
12-18-2008, 03:02 PM
I have just acquired an original 1958 copy of the "Conduct of Anti-terrorist Operations in Malaya."

It's brilliantly written and complete antidote to the sort of FM3-24 stuff we see today.

What is more, stuffed in the back of the manual was 4 pages of a typed interview with FM Gerald Templer, hand corrected by someone unknown. I have no idea of how authentic it is, but it is extremely interesting and concerns his view pertaining to the US in Vietnam. It may well be un-published.

I think the interview date is about 1966/7, and it rather stresses the differences, rather than the similarities between Malaya and Vietnam.

He also refers to "hearts and Minds" as a "nauseating phrase"

William F. Owen
12-18-2008, 03:47 PM
The CATOM manual bears the name of "Lt Col P.G. Fleming, MA Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry"

Doing some "Googling" I found this,

http://koyli.com/remembrance/ltcolfleming.htm

This seems to be the man, who owned the manual. He only died recently.

Jedburgh
12-18-2008, 05:09 PM
Great find, Wilf! Beyond the inherent value of the content itself and the added value of the enclosed interview, the provenance of previous ownership is very interesting.

Fuchs
12-18-2008, 06:34 PM
Wasn't the insurgency in Malaya a very unique case with little to tell about other small wars?

The population situation, the de-colonialization context, the ideological dimension - it looks to me as if that war is only good for good anecdotes (like that the CVR/T) family was allegedly designed to be not too wide to pass the natural rubber plantation's trees in Malaya - those trees were planted orderly in a specific spacing).

William F. Owen
12-18-2008, 07:00 PM
Wasn't the insurgency in Malaya a very unique case with little to tell about other small wars?

The population situation, the de-colonialization context, the ideological dimension - it looks to me as if that war is only good for good anecdotes (like that the CVR/T) family was allegedly designed to be not too wide to pass the natural rubber plantation's trees in Malaya - those trees were planted orderly in a specific spacing).

I think the CT Ops in Malaya laid the ground work for UK "best practice" for COIN, and that held up under scrutiny until Northern Ireland.

CVR/T copied it's dimensions from the FV-600 series which was used extensively in COIN Ops. In 1951, the FV-600 could withstand a 9kg land mine under any wheel station!!

Fuchs
12-18-2008, 08:17 PM
see PM ; dimensions are off-topic, after all.

James Alexander
03-15-2009, 03:38 PM
Hi everyone

I've been reading this forum with great interest recently, and thought it was time to sign up and post!

I'm currently doing my politics undergrad dissertation at Manchester Uni, which is under the working title of "What does it mean to promote a British school of counterinsurgency?"

This is based largely around the report prepared on Operation Banner that stated the 'model' from NI had successfully been exported to other COIN operations, and been adopted by the US army etc. I realise there has been a lot of criticism for the report online and elsewhere, so wanted to look at what promoting this NI model really means.

I'm interested in looking at it from the following angles:

-What actors within the army are promoting this model (ie those in charge now that were engaged in clandestine operations during the conflict etc.)
-How Operation Banner is portrayed by the British Judicial system and it's reaction
-Changes in military doctrine and the post-cold war need to redefine the role of the army (and whether this is blurring the lines between the traditional role of the army and police enforcement, crowd control etc.)
-The effect the 'War on Terror' has had on discourses on COIN, whether its making it more acceptable to discuss these things, whereas before it was seen in not-so-great a light, and whether it is just a rediscovery of what Frank Kitson suggested 30-odd years ago.

I apologise for the lengthy post, but I'm finding myself lost in a sea of literature on COIN, and would be grateful for any opinions/suggested readings etc.!

Many thanks

James

William F. Owen
03-15-2009, 04:12 PM
This is based largely around the report prepared on Operation Banner that stated the 'model' from NI had successfully been exported to other COIN operations, and been adopted by the US army etc. I realise there has been a lot of criticism for the report online and elsewhere, so wanted to look at what promoting this NI model really means.

Do you mean Army Code Publication 71842? If so I know the author and I am sure he would be happy to talk to you.

The report does not assert that the 'model' from NI had successfully been exported to other COIN operations, and been adopted by the US army etc. The Forward makes some claims about the NI experience, but does not say what you say it does. The forward was written by the then CGS, and not the author of the report.


-What actors within the army are promoting this model (ie those in charge now that were engaged in clandestine operations during the conflict etc.)
Not sure any are. The report does not develop a "model" that I am aware of. It shows what worked and what did not, in the context it was applied.

-How Operation Banner is portrayed by the British Judicial system and it's reaction
That's all in the statute books, and ROE.

-Changes in military doctrine and the post-cold war need to redefine the role of the army (and whether this is blurring the lines between the traditional role of the army and police enforcement, crowd control etc.)
I doubt the accuracy of that statement. The British Army has been doing "crowd control" (without bayonets) for 50-60 years.

-The effect the 'War on Terror' has had on discourses on COIN, whether its making it more acceptable to discuss these things, whereas before it was seen in not-so-great a light, and whether it is just a rediscovery of what Frank Kitson suggested 30-odd years ago.
No one in the British Army "rediscovered" Frank Kitson. He was always well up in the discussions. Yes, COIN has become a fashion fad of late, probably because of the US involvement, but it has always been at the centre of non-US military thought and debate. Many many books were written on COIN prior to 911.

Red Rat
09-15-2009, 05:44 PM
The UK is busy re-writing its COIN doctrine, which will (in the hierarchy of doctrine) slip in under the Stabilisation doctrine. The UK had pretty good COIN doctrine, it is just that few read it, even fewer understood it and there were bugger all resources to resource any of it! :rolleyes:

The new doctrine stresses that the nature of insurgency has changed while its essential character has not. Different ways and means, same ends and purposes.

The new doctrine lists 10 Principles, and increase from the extant 6. For comparison (I have highlighted the new or significantly changed):

New

Primacy of Political Purpose
Unity of Effort
Understand the Human Terrain
Secure the population
Neutralise the Insurgent
Gain and Maintain Popular Support
Operate in Accordance with the Law
Integrate Intelligence
Prepare for the longer term
Learn and Adapt

Old extant since 2007

Political Primacy and Political AIm
Coordinated Government Machinery
Intelligence and Information
Separate the Insurgent from his Support.
Neutralise the Insurgent
Plan for the Longer Term



What is interesting is that as 'Principles', briefings on them tend to encourage their use as a point for discussion and discussion. A welcome change in an organisation known to cherish the orthodoxy. :D

Some points raised:

Primacy of political purpose - whose? In AFG would that be the IRGoA, NATO, US or ?

Unity of effort in a coalition environment (as well as pan government)

Operate in accordance with the law - whose law?


It also looks like we will adopt a Shape Secure Develop model.

RR

marct
09-15-2009, 11:05 PM
Interesting.... Well, the UK Culture Doctrine (JDN 1/09) was really good. Is the new COIN doctrine available online?

Cheers,

Marc

Chris jM
02-23-2010, 06:13 AM
I was sent this by a friend, and while it isn't new information I found it to be a very well done presentation.

It's a ppt presentation that is 7MB in size, so you have been warned. Available here: http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2010/02/18/the-empire-s-new-clothes.aspx

I didn't see anything controversial or novel about it (which isn't a bad thing), and it kept me engrossed in it for a good 15 minutes. Very slick slideshow balanced by well reasoned content.

Of greatest interest to me was the 'periodic table' of COIN comparing the re-occurrence of COIN principles in British doctrine over the last fifty years+. Also, his 'COIN equation' seemed to be bang-on the mark with regards to reflecting modern COIN thinking. No reactionary or revisionism thoughts here, rather just solid thinking and a few robust models.

For quick reference, his conclusions were as follows:


The British military had an enviable COIN reputation
The Empire’s clothes are not entirely new
The Insurgent Equation has changed
The ‘British COIN Model’ is not the panacea
Must use extant resources to counter insurgency

William F. Owen
02-23-2010, 07:08 AM
Just run through it once, but there are so many things wrong with this, I just do not know where to begin - Sorry to sound harsh, and if the author is out there PM me!

I know this is .ppt and not a Thesis, so I can only react to the slides.

a.) COIN principles? Why just accept they exist? They clearly do not - and there is no such thing as "COIN theory."
b.) Definitions of COIN? - If you cannot get a clear and useful definition, that may tell you something - which is why current UK "COIN" Doctrine is poor.
c.) The delineation of "Classical", ""re-classical," etc adds nothing and is without evidence. It's also highly selective. Irregular warfare has not changed! We have changed, for reasons that never get touched upon. - Context, context and context.
d.) Instead of this "Purity of the text approach," - quotes from manuals and books - why was there no analysis of why UK "COIN" has previously succeeded and why it now seems less effective? - The UK used to solve the problem and there is no evidence the problem has changed in a way that makes it tactically unfeasible to render a strategic end state.

The UK is not being operationally effective because it simply is not allocating the resources it needs to get the desired strategic end state.

If the UK is screwing up, it's far more likely to be a problem with Commanders, than Doctrine - as no one actually seems to read the doctrine anyway - because it is mostly rubbish... with the exception of Theatre Specific guidance like the CATOM - which I could find no reference to?

Yes the UK has lost it's way, because they gave up being good, not because the problem has changed.

Bob's World
02-23-2010, 09:34 AM
I wouldn't be too hard on the Brits. The fact is, I can't really think of any example of effective military COIN.

The problem with applying the military to COIN is that they tend to think of it as warfare; when in fact, COIN is just internal politics gone very bad.

When the military is applied simply as additional resources and capacity to assist the civil government in regaining a handle on the situation and that same civil government takes to heart that the populace is in an uproar for a reason and seeks to address those failures, you have good COIN.

If you are a foreign army in a foreign land, you are not doing COIN.

If you are an army foreign or domestic, and you believe you have the lead for resolving an insurgency, you are not conducting smart COIN.

British "COIN", like American "COIN" are and were far more about maintaining national interests in foreign lands which creates a natural bias of perspective going in that is virually an "intellectual force field" to getting to "Good COIN."

So whether one is "threat centric" and out to kill all the insurgents to neutralize the threats to ones national interests abroad, of if one is "Populationc-centric" and out to put so much sugar on the government that you have carefully crafted to protect your interests so that the populace does not compain too much or too violently; you are still not conducting COIN in either case.

No, I just can't think of any examples of good military COIN. I can find plenty of examples of military forces being employed against foreign populaces either in support of, or opposition to, their sitting governments in order to either preserve or create opportnities for the national interests of the nations that provided that force. But that is not COIN.

At least not in Bob's World.

Woland
02-23-2010, 09:40 AM
Well.

The slides for one are more or less incomprehensible, but as for the overall content I really think this 'if only we could do what we did in Northern Ireland' implication is very unhelpful. Between Northern Ireland and Helmand Province there are scant significant parallels which ought to be guiding our practices.

No-one reads the doctrine. If my official capacity I have never even seen the doctrine, and would make a tentative estimate that no-one on the ground has either, or if they have, they've dismissed it as overly complicated, completely unreadable and largely irrelevant at the ground level in a Helmand village. It is hardly revelatory that a fundamental part of a COIN campaign is good J2, but perhaps another complicated Powerpoint presentation could set about explaining the UK's J2 shortfalls.

The whole implication of the slides is that the doctrine is sound but the carrying out of it is not. But there is nothing to say why not - bugger the doctrine, why are we not as good at it as we used to be? Resources? Complicated command structures? Bureaucracy? Poor use of J2? Inadequate funding or CIVMIL relations? Inadequate traning in the first place? Too kinetically minded? Mission creep? Poor quality commanders? All of the above and more, most likely. Yet identifying these things is not at the crux of this presentation. It more looks at what mistakes have been made, rather than a proper introspective look at why. I very much doubt that the answer is in the official doctrine.

William F. Owen
02-23-2010, 09:56 AM
I wouldn't be too hard on the Brits. The fact is, I can't really think of any example of effective military COIN.

So why say COIN? Thanks to incredibly sloppy thinking the word has lost any merit it may have ever once had.
Irregular Warfare works in exactly the same way as regular does. Defeating the enemy's armed wing denies him the ability to set forth policy using violence and returns to issue to politics and diplomacy. That is what force does. You use it against their force.

The problem with applying the military to COIN is that they tend to think of it as warfare; when in fact, COIN is just internal politics gone very bad.
If it's not Warfare then why is the US Army involved?

But that is not COIN.
At least not in Bob's World.
OK, so how in "Bob's World" are people using violence to set forth "political ideas" countered?

Bob's World
02-23-2010, 09:57 AM
I assure you, "the answer" is indeed not in official doctrine.

That said, there is a great deal of tremendous concepts, TTPs, thoughts, etc in official doctrine. The problem is one of context. Military doctrine on COIN is written in the context of how military forces conduct COIN warfare.

Change the context, and re-read the same doctrine, and you find that 70% of it is definitely worth hanging onto, it just needs to be rearranged into a new context regarding how military forces properly engage to shape and support foreign policy abroad in lands consumed in insurgency.

William F. Owen
02-23-2010, 09:58 AM
It is hardly revelatory that a fundamental part of a COIN campaign is good J2, but perhaps another complicated Powerpoint presentation could set about explaining the UK's J2 shortfalls.
Concur.

Bob's World
02-23-2010, 10:02 AM
So why say COIN? Thanks to incredibly sloppy thinking the word has lost any merit it may have ever once had.
Irregular Warfare works in exactly the same way as regular does. Defeating the enemy's armed wing denies him the ability to set forth policy using violence and returns to issue to politics and diplomacy. That is what force does. You use it against their force.

If it's not Warfare then why is the US Army involved?

OK, so how in "Bob's World" are people using violence to set forth "political ideas" countered?

...but I was just doing a quick scan of SWJ as I got back into uniform after a little PT. I currently am extremely fortunate to be supporting US SOF in a British led NATO HQ that is armpit deep at the moment in these very matters, so while I am learning a great deal from my front row seat, it is a seat I need to get back to! As my current boss is apt to say ""in a dull moment" I will get back to you!

Ken White
10-03-2011, 07:14 PM
Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

LINK (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1086)

Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

I don't think he discussed one area of deficiency by the British that is not to some extent shared by the US. The problem in both nations is, I suspect, a combination of a risk averse political establishment (in total but party dependent with respect to bellicosity as the 'out' party will generally object to anything the government of the day decides... :rolleyes:) and an also risk averse and very bureaucratic military and Defence / Defense establishments (important distinction there, both the military folks and their civilian masters are at fault)...

Pity.

davidbfpo
10-03-2011, 09:36 PM
Ken,

A good catch this paper. On my first reading the arguments appear to be similar to Frank Ledwidge's, in his book 'Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan', which has been discussed on 'The UK In Afghanistan' thread (post 816 is first, debate 840-850).

It would be interesting if the traditional place for military discussion and learning, RUSI, invited both authors to present their arguments in Whitehall. Alas I fear such is the strength of inertia and fear no-one serving would publicly say anything.

Red Rat
10-04-2011, 11:37 AM
It would be interesting if the traditional place for military discussion and learning, RUSI, invited both authors to present their arguments in Whitehall. Alas I fear such is the strength of inertia and fear no-one serving would publicly say anything.

Ooh I don't know; I can think of several serving officers who would love to have a pop, even if only from our cheap seats! :D

Red Rat
10-04-2011, 11:54 AM
[I]
very bureaucratic military and Defence / Defense establishments
Extremely bureacratic. The UK has just formed up a Joint Force Command that at first glance looks like adding another stovepiped staffing chain to an already complex structure. Every time that I mention the increasingly bureacratic nature of the Army I am told that it is because things are more complex now. My riposte is that ultimately the problems are not more complex but the structures we use to solve them are. In the UK Army we have gone from a profession of generalists with a few specialists, to a profession of specialists with a few generalists.



(important distinction there, both the military folks and their civilian masters are at fault)...

Pity.


Definitely. Although in the chattering classes there is a feeling that our Generals got many things wrong in Iraq and Afganistan but we see no public acknowledgement from uniformed chiefs that mistakes were made by the military; and certainly not mistakes at the operational and strategic levels. It is a line that is wearing increasingly thin with politicans, pundits and junior officers alike.

JMA
10-04-2011, 01:56 PM
Ooh I don't know; I can think of several serving officers who would love to have a pop, even if only from our cheap seats! :D

and what would they say?

JMA
10-04-2011, 02:15 PM
Definitely. Although in the chattering classes there is a feeling that our Generals got many things wrong in Iraq and Afganistan but we see no public acknowledgement from uniformed chiefs that mistakes were made by the military; and certainly not mistakes at the operational and strategic levels. It is a line that is wearing increasingly thin with politicans, pundits and junior officers alike.

Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving. This is not good for the military as a whole. But... it must be said that six months in Helmand is better overall experience than a few hours at the Iranian Embassy or on Op Barras (in Sierra Leone) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barras).

Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.

The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.

Red Rat
10-04-2011, 03:43 PM
Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals. Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving. But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.



Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors. The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.


The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest. Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:


Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.

Red Rat
10-11-2011, 08:26 AM
Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

LINK (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1086)

Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

Pity.

Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future.

Ostensibly this monograph is about debunking 10 myths of British Counterinsurgency. I found it a poor read, incoherent, biased and in places just plain wrong. Arguments were both specious and spurious and the good points made were more then overshadowed by the poor quality of the overall piece.

The author lists 10 myths and analyses each in turn. I have to admit that most of the myths I had never heard of so I am not sure how widespread a belief they represent.

Myth 1: The British Military Is An Effective Learning Institution. This is a myth peddled in Nagl’s Learning To Eat Soup With A Knife (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Learning-Eat-Soup-Knife-Counterinsurgency/dp/0226567702/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1318321348&sr=1-1). The British Army is not renowned as a learning organisation, far from it. It has never regarded itself as a learning organisation (it regards itself as a pragmatic, adaptable organisation) and has never been historically regarded as a learning organisation. Speed is also relative and I would suggest that 2 years to adapt in a dynamic environment is not necessarily slow (Malaya).

Myth 2: British Civil Military Coin Planning is Strategically Perceptive. I found this analysis of this element confused, not least because the author seems to confuse strategy with tactics. The Malayan strategy was not “Detention without trial, the forced relocation of elements of the local populace…”, these were tactical and operational methods; but they were not the strategy. While the author makes some good points about a lack of British strategy in Iraq the overall tenor of this section is to confuse strategy, civil-mil command and control and understanding of the context of a campaign to no clear result.

Myth 3: The British Military Has Flexibly Adapted To The Demands Of COIN. Again we see confusion here between Strategy and Tactics; the author citing the British Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency as strategic guidance – it was not. He also seems to think that this guidance was first produced in 2009; it was not. AFM Vol 1 Part 10 has been around since I joined the army in 1988 (and probably longer), the latest iteration was issued in 2009. Overall however I rated this as the best of the sections with some very perceptive points on British Army culture and the ebb and flow of ‘high intensity v low intensity’ demands on the army.

Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Myth 5: Iraq Represented The Zenith Of 60 Years Worth Of Modern COIN Thinking. Utter tosh! I do not know anyone who thinks that. Iraq represented the nadir of British Strategic thinking; no more no less. The British failure in Iraq was more because of strategy then it was because of COIN practice. Furthermore the author in this section ignores the impact of the Iraqi Government on the conduct of operations against Shia elements until 2008. I would also dispute that the insurgent campaign in Iraq was sui generis, totally alien to British historical experience; the British having fought insurgencies in Iraq, Iran, Waziristan and Oman previously.

Myth 6: the British Can Do COIN Alone. Again, I do not know where this ‘myth’ has arisen from. It has been accepted in the UK since the early 1990s that the UK is highly unlikely to undertake any sort of military operation in isolation.

Myth 7: The British ‘Don’t Talk To Terrorists’. There is a myth that the British don’t talk to terrorists, but it is a myth held only by the more gullible members of the public. UK Governments have always talked, and done deals, with whoever they have to. Conflict is political in nature and political processes always run parallel to conflict processes and to facilitate this lines of communication are always maintained.

Myth 8: “Hearts and Minds” and “Minimum Force” Are Sacrosanct Elements Of The British Way Of COIN. The author seems to confuse minimum force with minimal force in his argument. A great deal of force can be applied and it is still the minimum amount of force required to achieve the required effect. This section I found the worst of all. The author cites “the ill-treatment of detainees becoming an all-too frequent event”, yet with no evidence to support this. He fails to raise the issue that the British application of minimal force after the death of six military policemen at Major Al Kabir in 2003 lead to a loss of prestige and influence in the area from which they never really recovered; different societies have different expectations and norms regarding the use of force. Lastly the UK Armed forces have been historically pragmatic in their use of force, it is only recently with the entrenchment of liberal western values regarding human rights and the use of force in the West that a more idealistic stance has been taken; until then little was sacrosanct.

Myth 9: The Malayan Emergency Is The Archetypical COIN Campaign. There is no such thing as an archetypical COIN campaign. The section reads as a ‘Beat the Brits’ diatribe. An example: “A counter-insurgency campaign taking 12 years to eradicate an isolated insurgent group is not a glowing achievement…”. Why not? 12 years to maintain the isolation of a group, transition to independence and lay the foundations for a successful and stable state seems a pretty good result to me. 12 years in terms of societal change is not long. Furthermore the insurgent campaign was defeated long before it ended. The author states that context is everything in his analysis of the Malayan campaign, but then ignores much of the context of the Iraq campaign.

Myth 10: The British Military Are The Ultimate COIN Practicioners. The British Army, and indeed Britain, was guilty of hubris in the period 2003-2005. But again the author is skewed in his analysis. His comments on the insurgents in Iraq as being “well organized, strategically driven, tactically brutal and well supported from within and outside…” could easily apply to the PIRA. One does not however need to fight the ‘A Team’ of insurgencies in order to prove one’s worth as a counter-insurgent; the trick is to stop an insurgency from ever developing to the point that it has masses of support (internal and external) and becomes a ‘Grade A’ insurgency. That said there are some good points about the lack of intelligence capabilities at the beginning of any insurgency (a reflection on liberal values where the State spies by exception) and a good point always worth re-iterating that "If the military cannot succeed in reducing insurgent violence, then no manner of political measures will arrest the worsening security situation”.

All in all a disappointing read. :(

Ken White
10-11-2011, 02:56 PM
Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change... :wry:

This from you:
One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

Red Rat
10-11-2011, 03:43 PM
Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change... :wry:

Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...


This from you:Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens :rolleyes:

Ken White
10-11-2011, 06:05 PM
Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens :rolleyes:Yes, to the first. On the second, some failures but some successes also, most after much time when they could become someone else's idea. That was and is okay... :wry:

So do not stop... ;)

JMA
10-12-2011, 12:06 AM
Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.

To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.


But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.

That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking ;) I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.


The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.

OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?


Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.


The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:

Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.

And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.

One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).

Ken White
10-12-2011, 01:49 AM
The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.
To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry...that of short tours...One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious. ;)
That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking ;) I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds... :D

There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...

Everyone seem to understand that but you. ;)
OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...
... the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...

JMA
10-12-2011, 05:12 AM
The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

You are correct he needs no help from anyone but go ahead... jump in. ;)


What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious. ;)Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds... :D

'Short tours' is the biggest remaining problem for the Brits. It can be changed - easier now that the tempo of operations has slowed - and that must be stated no matter how much it irritates.


There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...

Yes there are sure to be a number smart 'six month wonders' who have figured it out (to some extent) but what's the point if they have finished their tour and are now sitting back at home?

Is it not important to try to identify the problems wherever they may be? Home or abroad.


Everyone seem to understand that but you. ;)I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...

I have noticed that the primary response from serving soldiers these days is a shrug of the shoulders as a submissive acceptance that things can't be changed and they just have to muddle on. This is very sad.

Ken White
10-12-2011, 06:05 AM
'Short tours' is the biggest remaining problem for the Brits. It can be changed - easier now that the tempo of operations has slowed - and that must be stated no matter how much it irritates.It doesn't irritate, longer tours are militarily sound but politically infeasible given current organization and training -- and family matters... -- that simple.
Yes there are sure to be a number smart 'six month wonders' who have figured it out (to some extent) but what's the point if they have finished their tour and are now sitting back at home?It doesn't take all of 'em that long to scope it out but the tour length's a problem, no question -- it, however, is not going to change.
Is it not important to try to identify the problems wherever they may be? Home or abroad.Been identified, long before anyone here heard from you or me. Also been fought and lost so you're in effect preaching to the old choir. You continue to surface it and continue to be told (not just by me...) that you're right -- but! Politics hold sway. One can view little of what happens on these kinds of deployments today through the lens of other wars just one generation ago. The changes in the last forty years have been huge and few have been beneficial. Today's focus is not military, it's political, pure and simple.
I have noticed that the primary response from serving soldiers these days is a shrug of the shoulders as a submissive acceptance that things can't be changed and they just have to muddle on. This is very sad.Yes, it is sad.

It is also acceptance of unpleasant reality; military knowledge and awareness in the civilian population in the UK or US is microscopic. Misperceptions in the political and chattering classes are endemic. The forces today are too small to have any political clout at all. Far different world than it was 30 years ago...

May I suggest your view might be colored by serving in an existential war, where the rules are vastly different (and will be again for anyone involved in such). Having served in a couple of far from existential efforts, the focus is different for everyone involved. Perhaps it should not be but it is. You see deterioration in many areas from your war and day to these expeditions. So do I -- but I'm a bit more sanguine because I'm quite confident that an existential effort, should one come, will cure a lot of current ills real quickly.

Until it's over, then everyone will go back to business as usual... :D

carl
10-12-2011, 07:38 AM
This from you:


One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

I enthusiastically second that.

JMA
10-12-2011, 10:46 AM
Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Mumford (the author is obviously a civvie) and as such tends to make broad statements about the military which obviously do not apply to all parts of the spectrum from Field Marshall all the way down to the private soldier.

To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says. We are dealing on a number of levels here that must be taken into consideration.

(The levels are the command progression officers must pass through (being platoon/company/battalion/brigade/division) and experience command at each level. Where officers have not had sufficient experience in command at any of the levels (which should be three years at platoon and eighteen months to two years at each of the other levels) this limitation will become apparent the higher up the command structure he progresses (especially if his exposure at platoon level has been superficial).)

What Mumford does get absolutely correct is that COIN:


... demands of military commanders a set of characteristics and leadership skills different than regular warfare, ...

So I for one don't quite understand what you mean by:


One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

... in the context of the various levels within the force deployed in a COIN war.

Red Rat
10-12-2011, 11:44 AM
To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on. TTPs evolve week by week, month by month and are different according to which AO you are in and the threat faced. What is seen on TV is a combination of tactical good practice and bad practice. Details on UKSF Ops are extremely hard to come by so it is hard to state how effectively they have evolved. The use of SF has evolved considerably - but that was not necessarily an SF decision.
What most media coverage cannot show is the whole picture; the planning, the ISTAR coverage, the intelligence. I am not saying that mistakes have not been made, they have, especially in the early years, but the army now is different from the army then. The equipment and TTPs have changed out of all recognition.

There are problems with short tours and I agree that we should be on longer tours. Ledwidges comment (Losing Small Wars (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Losing-Small-Wars-Military-Afghanistan/dp/0300166710/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1318416755&sr=1-1)) on 'militarism' is both accurate and damning. Should we change things? Yes? Can we? No; it is not politically possible; we are already in drawdown.




That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking ;) I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

Au contraire my South African sparring partner! Our key intelligence and civilian affairs staff are on 12 month tours. Within our patch we generally know who the key players are, their families, their enemies, their friends, their rivals, their business partners, their business interests, their schools, what they thought yesterday, last week, and last year. What their aspirations are in public and quite possibly what their aspirations are in private; it is a very sophisticated knowledge of the human terrain. We know what weapons are favoured in what areas and at what times. Our knowledge of the terrain, human and physical is, I suspect, as good in many ways as what we had in N Ireland.



OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?
Well British troops don't have that problem. There are always people who do not understand the ROE; this sounds like one of them.



Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

NI was policing for most of the campaign. We enabled the police to carry out their duties and provided niche capabilities; N Ireland at its worst is probably what we would like Afghanistan to become. We realised in N Ireland that everytime we killed someone we were exacerbating the political problem, it caused a greater sense of political grievance, made martyrs out of volunteers and resulted in more even more volunteers; that is why from the mid to late 1980s we tried very hard to capture and not kill. Capturing them and sending them to prison stopped attacks, criminalised the struggle and discouraged others. Very few volunteers who served time in prion re-offended. Mark Urban's book Big Boys' Rules (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Big-Boys-Rules-Struggle-Against/dp/0571168094/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1318418606&sr=1-1) is a good account of the nuanced use of force in N Ireland while Kevin Toolis' book
Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within The IRA's Soul (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Rebel-Hearts-Journeys-Within-IRAs/dp/0330346482/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1318417464&sr=1-1) is a very good look at the impact of violence and how it fed the struggle.



And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.

Already at the strategic level the army is planning for life 2015+. The size and shape of the army in 2020 will be decided in the next 12 months or else 2020 will be come 2021, 2022, 2023...

As to having no answers, no country is prepared to pay the price in blood and treasure to win the conflict in Afghanistan; I suspect they never were. Early on in the UK's engagement in Afghanistan the MOD stated that the engagement would have to be at least 25 years in order to achieve what the stated aims were; 10 years in and we are leaving.



One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).

WW2 and the Rhodesian Conflict were both existentialist conflicts where there is eveything to play for. In such circumstances it is adapt or survive. Iraq and Afghanistan were discretionary wars of choice where the imperative is to evolve so as not to be seen to

a) Fail
or
b) Be culpable


Plus society has changed considerably; we are softer and more liberal now.

Red Rat
10-12-2011, 12:20 PM
To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

Agreed.



Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be. Agreed. And the tactics will be different and evolve for each conflict.


So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says.

I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN. My argument is:


What is required is a technical mastery of your trade (gained through combined arms manoeuvre training) combined with an education system for our officers and SNCOs that is both broad and deep so that they have the knowledge set to apply their technical skills in a COIN environment. Training enables you to do what you do, education enables you to understand the context in which you are operating and therefore to better understand how to apply your technical skills in that environment.

It is also very difficult to train for COIN generically, especially commanders, int staff and civil affairs. This is because COIN progresses relatively slowly compared to combined arms manoeuvre (you are unlikely to win a COIN campaign in a two or even four week exercise) and because you need to understand the human terrain and interact with it. This latter element is difficult to replicate generically and in training. Technical skills (platoon attacks, patrolling, C-IED, using a military decision making process, conducting company attacks) are much easier to train and provide a transferrable skill set to COIN campaigns. Educating for COIN is however is a relatively simple matter. The aim here is to give individuals a broad based theoretical and historical knowledge of COIN together with a working knowedge of the social sciences in order that they can understand the context in which they may have to operate and deliver new solutions (quickly) to new problems.

Combined Arms Manoeuvre is a very difficult technical ability to master and it becomes exponentially more difficult to master as you progress in size from company to battalion to brigade to division to corps. If you lose it it is very difficult to get it back. As a capability it is required at sub-unit, battalion and possibly brigade level in a COIN environment. Even at a higher level in Iraq we (the Brits) noted that the ability of the US to comprehend and execute Corps level operations, flexing combat power across Iraq was highly effective. More salutory for us was that because in part we no longer operate at that level in the British Army we could not tap into that ability to flex assets to us; it was beyond the comprehension of our staff. So there is still a requirement to train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre because it is pertinent to COIN campaigns, let alone the fact that if we lose it it is very difficult to regain.
So train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre and educate for COIN.


As for Mumfords assertion that COIN demands a different set of characteristics and leadership skills from regular warfare I would go further. Every conflict has different characteristics and will demand different characteristics from its commanders and so every conflict will either see commanders adapt or fail. It is not a COIN versus Combined Arms Manoeuvre issue, it is a 'this conflict' versus 'that conflict' issue.

Steve Blair
10-12-2011, 01:32 PM
It is also acceptance of unpleasant reality; military knowledge and awareness in the civilian population in the UK or US is microscopic. Misperceptions in the political and chattering classes are endemic. The forces today are too small to have any political clout at all. Far different world than it was 30 years ago...

Yet it is really the historical norm in both the US and UK. Pining for the days of a massive draft-based force is really silly (note that I'm not saying you are, Ken). Prior to World War II the military had precious little clout, and when they did it was by making use of internal pressures (Indian wars) to motivate specific state delegations (Texas for one). Military experience from the Civil War didn't help them, either, as most of the legislators with experience had been Volunteers and remained quite hostile to a standing, professional military (John Logan is but one example).

JMA
10-13-2011, 05:26 AM
The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

Ken, for an old soldier you are remarkably sensitive to perceived sideswipes.

Reminds of the story out of John Masters' wonderful book The Road Past Mandalay. Here is the extract from page 139 in my paperback:


… And I lured Bill out and to his tent. He collapsed on his camp bed and glared moodily at me. ‘You're all the same,’ he said. ‘Goddam British. Worse than Goldwyn. US, for Christ's sake.’

My own head was firm on my shoulders, but the little muzzy. ‘What?’ I asked.

‘US,’he repeated. ‘No goddam good. I ought to puch you all in the nose'.

At last I understood. Bill had been with us about two months. All that time he had been brooding about our army's habit of describing any article of equipment that had become useless as US. That's what it sounded like though in fact it was written u/s and stood for unserviceable. I had no time to explain. …

OK, so don't pull a 'Bill' on me now please.

I came from a unit which had; pommies (Brits), Aussies (Australians), Kiwis (New Zealanders), yanks (Americans), Cannucks (Canadians), porras (Portuguese), slopies (South Africans), frogs (French), krauts (Germans) etc etc... and of course 2/3 Rhodesians.

Each nationality displayed some or other obvious national characteristic which was seized upon by the rest and used to rib them. Boys will be boys.

JMA
10-13-2011, 07:32 AM
I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN.

OK, when in doubt revert to the text in question.


Consequently, a reliance on training maneuvers is rendered largely irrelevant.

OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO). Training maneuvers were what we termed large scale exercises, remember? Before your time?

So given all that I stick by my interpretation.

All this said I do believe that you cant mix COIN with other training and expect unit to switch on demand.

This is why I suggested that in the US they take 250,000 each from active and reserves and focus them on small wars and insurgencies. Leave the rest to drive around the deserts and plains to make dust and prepare for the next big war. This allows for focus and specialisation and accepts that there are indeed a different set of skills required for the two types of warfare.

If you take Afghanistan for example there is little point in deploying armour and mechanised troops on a rotation as this over time will just confuse them.

Fuchs is correct (in his blog post (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/12/hw-to-get-killed-in-combat-against.html)) that warfare against poor/incompetent enemies leads to a loss of skills which will be paid for in blood if they ever come up against a competent enemy. But then again all raw units learn the hard way when they are inserted into a war. Think of those raw US divisions fed into the Pacific and Europe in WW2 who had to adapt along the way. And they learned quickly.

I am back to continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus.

The problem with the Brits is that whenever the solution is obvious they spend more time figuring out why the problem can't be solved than fixing it. Have you noticed (and this is not a sideswipe at the yanks) how the once "can do" nation, the Americans, are also moving in that direction. They increasingly accept the status quo with a shrug. Man it is such a pity.

What the war in Afghanistan has shown IMHO is that apart from the special forces (who have been magnificent) the rest of the forces have proved unable to adapt effectively to the type of warfare required. It is not that the individuals are incapable it is that there is a combination of misguided political direction (aka interference), doctrine weakness and inept generalship.

Where is a Cromwell (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_Cromwell)when you need him?

Red Rat
10-13-2011, 12:11 PM
OK, when in doubt revert to the text in question.

OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO). Training maneuvers were what we termed large scale exercises, remember? Before your time?

So given all that I stick by my interpretation.

Okay, you stick to yours and I will stick to mine. :D The term manoeuvres as you describe it has not been in use by the Army since at least 1989 (and we were still doing Divisional and brigade exercises when I joined).

But to use your interpretation of 'large scale exercises' what exercises is he referring to? A brigade has not deployed in the field on manoeuvres since 2002; so it is not as if we are relying on it...



This is why I suggested that in the US they take 250,000 each from active and reserves and focus them on small wars and insurgencies. Leave the rest to drive around the deserts and plains to make dust and prepare for the next big war. This allows for focus and specialisation and accepts that there are indeed a different set of skills required for the two types of warfare.

Works for big armies.


If you take Afghanistan for example there is little point in deploying armour and mechanised troops on a rotation as this over time will just confuse them.

Is the issue deploying armour and mechanised troops or deploying on rotation?


I am back to continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus. Sigh..:rolleyes: I know! ;)


The problem with the Brits is that whenever the solution is obvious they spend more time figuring out why the problem can't be solved than fixing it. Have you noticed (and this is not a sideswipe at the yanks) how the once "can do" nation, the Americans, are also moving in that direction. They increasingly accept the status quo with a shrug. Man it is such a pity. Not at all. The argument has never been why the problem can't be solved, but why the problem hasn't been solved (for which there are good and bad reasons).




What the war in Afghanistan has shown IMHO is that apart from the special forces (who have been magnificent) the rest of the forces have proved unable to adapt effectively to the type of warfare required.

Hmm. I don't know how the SF have evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq so I cannot comment. I do know that the green army (non-SF) now uses TTPs and equipment that were SF only capabilities until fairly recently.

The use of the SF has evolved but that was not necessarily an SF decision, but made at Theatre Command level.


It is not that the individuals are incapable it is that there is a combination of misguided political direction (aka interference), doctrine weakness and inept generalship. Plus lack of accountability and apathy. I suspect that this applies to the US as well, but for both Iraq and Afghanistan it was a case for the UK of an army at war but not a nation at war; that is very constraining.

JMA
10-13-2011, 01:46 PM
Okay, you stick to yours and I will stick to mine.

Agreed


The term manoeuvres as you describe it has not been in use by the Army since at least 1989 (and we were still doing Divisional and brigade exercises when I joined).

But to use your interpretation of 'large scale exercises' what exercises is he referring to? A brigade has not deployed in the field on manoeuvres since 2002; so it is not as if we are relying on it...

Remember Mumford is a civvie (or at least talks like one).

So the difference (not so subtle to us) between large scale exercises and field training like 'battle camps' is probably lost on him.

With COIN the training works upwards from the individual skills level to the stick (or what every the smallest operating call-sign will be) and on to sections and platoons. (What would you use a platoon for? Maybe a long term ambush and follow-up (tracking) operations and the like.)


Works for big armies.

True. And for smaller armies it requires smart thinking to make a little go a long way.


Is the issue deploying armour and mechanised troops or deploying on rotation?

Rotation? You mean we are back to short tours again? I suppose if they insist on taking part (to get the campaign medals and so forth) you can allocate them to road block/checkpoint duty, installation and route security and other crappy work like that ;)


Sigh..:rolleyes: I know!

Well yes so I say again... it is all about continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus... did you copy over?


Not at all. The argument has never been why the problem can't be solved, but why the problem hasn't been solved (for which there are good and bad reasons).

Well that is bound to take sufficient time to effectively kick the problem into next year. ;)


Hmm. I don't know how the SF have evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq so I cannot comment. I do know that the green army (non-SF) now uses TTPs and equipment that were SF only capabilities until fairly recently.

Oh goodie.. you mean they now operate in three and four man teams? No? Well then what's the point in getting them all the fancy kit like the black army? This of course brings us to another point and that is the deleterious influence the black army (SAS and hangers on) is having on the rest of the army. The stock question should be how and why should line infantry operating in platoon strength (or at least more than ten men) need the same TTPs and kit as special forces who operate in three or four man teams? If the answer is that the 'black army' does operate in more than ten men call-signs then the question should be asked if those tasks are indeed for special forces or should they be carried out by line infantry. (Hint: read Slim's comments on special forces at the back of his classic book - Defeat into Victory)

For example the new Fieldcraft pamphlet introduces 'break contact drills' for sections. This as we know is a small team recce type of drill and is necessary when in Indian country on a recce on bumping into the enemy. Its a get out of Dodge move. How often will this apply to a line infantry patrol of section strength? As I have said before if a full section is caught out in the open then yes they need to pull back. But once its over you reduce the section commander to the ranks and then jail him for good measure... then take the rest of the section (now with a new commander) through the basics again explaining why when you move (through vulnerable terrain) you always keep one leg on the ground when the other is in the air. (Basic stuff really)

I could go on...


The use of the SF has evolved but that was not necessarily an SF decision, but made at Theatre Command level.

It is well known that Patreus and McChrystal pushed kill-or-capture ops and they have been wildly successful. Dropped off recently for whatever reason. (Probably the new commander believes the Taliban commanders also have a right to life.)

But the bottom line why can't these kind of ops be carried out in their AOs by the line infantry already deployed there? The night is the time to do it as the night vision equipment (especially now with the fourth generation stuff) gives such an advantage it probably takes the fun out of it. ;)


Plus lack of accountability and apathy. I suspect that this applies to the US as well, but for both Iraq and Afghanistan it was a case for the UK of an army at war but not a nation at war; that is very constraining.

Oh dear, just when I thought it could not get worse. Now don't try to rope the yanks in on this (they have their own problems with those clowns in their congress) which makes your Brit problems seem like a mere sideshow.

Well you know the Brits have now lost the equivalent of three battalions killed or maimed in Afghanistan (400 KIA and 1,800 seriously wounded) and yet (the mind positively boggles) don't take the war seriously. I saw this mentality in South Africa where the war was a sideshow which distracted from the real business of peacetime soldiering. You fix this by firing the 'garatroopers'. (actually firing them is altogether a too gentle a process)

Red Rat
10-13-2011, 04:15 PM
With COIN the training works upwards from the individual skills level to the stick (or what every the smallest operating call-sign will be) and on to sections and platoons. (What would you use a platoon for? Maybe a long term ambush and follow-up (tracking) operations and the like.)
The size of grouping very much depends on the size of enemy you are fighting. In the early years it was rare to go out in less then platoon plus strength because the insurgents were operating in platoon plus strength. Now they operate in smaller groups and so do we.



Rotation? You mean we are back to short tours again? I suppose if they insist on taking part (to get the campaign medals and so forth) you can allocate them to road block/checkpoint duty, installation and route security and other crappy work like that ;) Armour and Mech both have their use in Afghanistan. The only reason the UK has not deployed them is that generally the Canadians and now the Americans had enough to go round (heavy armour). Warthog and Jackal in terms of firepower, mobility and protection are effectively a mech capability.


Oh goodie.. you mean they now operate in three and four man teams? No? No, but neither does the SF out there for the most part...


Well then what's the point in getting them all the fancy kit like the black army? This of course brings us to another point and that is the deleterious influence the black army (SAS and hangers on) is having on the rest of the army. The stock question should be how and why should line infantry operating in platoon strength (or at least more than ten men) need the same TTPs and kit as special forces who operate in three or four man teams? If the answer is that the 'black army' does operate in more than ten men call-signs then the question should be asked if those tasks are indeed for special forces or should they be carried out by line infantry. (Hint: read Slim's comments on special forces at the back of his classic book - Defeat into Victory) Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it. Where the SF has had a significant impact on 'green army operations' is in the targeting cycle at company and battalion level. The SF are used for tasks which match their training and capabilties - a good example of this can be seen in the Wardak CH47 Investigation Report (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ch-47-crash-in-wardak-province-afghanistan-investigation-completed)


For example the new Fieldcraft pamphlet introduces 'break contact drills' for sections. This as we know is a small team recce type of drill and is necessary when in Indian country on a recce on bumping into the enemy. Its a get out of Dodge move. How often will this apply to a line infantry patrol of section strength? As I have said before if a full section is caught out in the open then yes they need to pull back. But once its over you reduce the section commander to the ranks and then jail him for good measure... then take the rest of the section (now with a new commander) through the basics again explaining why when you move (through vulnerable terrain) you always keep one leg on the ground when the other is in the air. (Basic stuff really) But the unexpected always happens. It might not be vulnerable ground, the other leg might be armed persistent air surveillance or another section (in the context of a platoon move). Meeting engagements happen and sometimes the other side is better (and yes, sometimes our commanders are wrong). We were taught those basic break contact drills when I was a troopie for use in woods and jungles or for when we got caught with our pants down; they have not come from SF. But it is used very rarely.




It is well known that Patreus and McChrystal pushed kill-or-capture ops and they have been wildly successful. Dropped off recently for whatever reason. (Probably the new commander believes the Taliban commanders also have a right to life.) It is reported as having dropped off, to be honest I do not know if that is the case and if it is, why.


But the bottom line why can't these kind of ops be carried out in their AOs by the line infantry already deployed there? The night is the time to do it as the night vision equipment (especially now with the fourth generation stuff) gives such an advantage it probably takes the fun out of it. ;) They are.



Well you know the Brits have now lost the equivalent of three battalions killed or maimed in Afghanistan (400 KIA and 1,800 seriously wounded) and yet (the mind positively boggles) don't take the war seriously. I saw this mentality in South Africa where the war was a sideshow which distracted from the real business of peacetime soldiering. You fix this by firing the 'garatroopers'. (actually firing them is altogether a too gentle a process)
No! No! No! The military take it very seriously, the government takes it seriously, the nation takes it seriously, but it is not a nation at war. The nation's priority and focus is probably: the economy, the health service, the education system and then who is winning on X Factor. The war in Afghanistan just is not an issue; it is background noise. The UK has a population of 60.2 million and an Armed Forces of less then 200,000 (.3%). By the time you take immediate family involved you are lucky if 2% of the population knows someone who has been to Afghanistan. It is less to do with peacetime soldiering and more to do with the fact that most people just do not care. Because of this it gets the political and capital resources you would expect - minimal.

Ken White
10-13-2011, 05:36 PM
Ken, for an old soldier you are remarkably sensitive to perceived sideswipes.Sideswipes, mis statements, erroneous assumptions, casual asides -- all deserve correction if in error. All part of the service, no thanks necessary... ;)

JMA
10-14-2011, 09:06 AM
The size of grouping very much depends on the size of enemy you are fighting. In the early years it was rare to go out in less then platoon plus strength because the insurgents were operating in platoon plus strength. Now they operate in smaller groups and so do we.

No I don't think that is the correct approach.

The size of your operating call-signs should depend on the comparative military competence of your enemy and the location and the degree of mobility of your operational reserve.

Seems the Brit assessment is that of parity of soldiering ability? Surely not.

Then it is the impact of IEDs which requires a number of donkeys on each patrol to carry related 'stuff'.

Then what if any is the mobile reserve? The reserve section? Some vehicles with mounted MMGs which will drive on mined roads to support the patrol in contact?

Then (going back to exchanges I had with Wilf some time ago about) the aim of the patrol activity needs to be carefully assessed. You would have read 18 Platoon by Sydney Jary (http://www.amazon.com/18-Platoon-Sydney-Jary/dp/1901655016) at Sandhurst (where it was I believe required reading) and learned that even then (between D-Day and VE Day) he (as a young subaltern) questioned the wisdom of patrolling for the sake of patrolling. From page 72:


During the campaign, 18 Platoon carried out three types of patrols: reconnaissance, standing and fighting. The first two were invariably useful because they provided information, if only negative. Fighting patrols, of which I led many, were a different and contentious proposition. Unlike the German and American armies, we had a vigorous policy regarding fighting patrols, particularly at night and when things were static with both sides on the defence. The thinking behind this policy seemed to me, at times, be superficial and probably left over from the Great War. If, when detailed for a fighting patrol, young officers queried the wisdom of this given object, there was always the standard reply: “I quite agree with you, but it all helps to dominate no man's land.” There is undoubtedly a certain validity to this argument but was it worth the consequent loss of good young officers and NCOs? I doubt it.

Note: for any young officers reading this you must read this book. For senior officers reading this make it available and required reading for your subbies.

I/we went through this period of (aimless) patrolling in Mozambique (1973-76) following Brit Malaya practice with fan patrols, base line patrols and river-line patrols etc etc where the large area and the low density of troops together with the lack of intelligence made the whole business very much a hit and miss affair. Sure we had chance contacts where they would shoot and scoot and we would drop our packs and give chase with generally low results - normally reported as a fleeting contact with no casualties either side.

Surely the idea of making contact with the Taliban is not once it happens to get rescued by air support or the arrival of vehicles to allow the patrol to pull back into their beau geste fort but rather to maintain the contact (iow fix them) then get a response/reaction team in to kill them?

I have suggested that you send out small patrols to make contact while an airborne reaction force is loitering just out of sound range and ready to come in and do the business once the Taliban have given away their position.

Hint: Read Skeens Passing it On - it proves that the Brits once knew what they were doing in Afghanistan. and sums up his paper as follows:


To Sum up
That is all of use I can tell you. But I think I have said enough to show that, as the Manual says, while the principles of war remain
unchanged, “The tactics and characteristics of the inhabitants and the nature of the theater of operations may necessitate considerable modification in the method” of their application to warfare on the North-West Frontier of India. And that unless a good working knowledge of the methods indicated by experience is acquired in peace and applied in war, trouble if not disaster is bound to be the outcome. But I also hope I have made it clear that previous training, energetic and common-sense application, and unrelaxing care will give you and your men complete ascendency over an enemy whose great natural advantages at first sight may seem to be unchallengeable. And I trust what I been able to pass on of my own experience and of my observation of others will help you in this. If so I have discharged my debt to those who taught me and to those who taught them, and to those, my comrades in war, with whom I proved the truth of those teachings.

Compost
10-14-2011, 10:39 AM
When I hear "COIN vs CT" in general it sets my teeth on edge; for certainly that dichotomy of choices is no way to look at a foreign intervention and hope to attain a comprehensive, successful scheme of engagement.

However, that IS how we approached Iraq and Afghanistan, so to drill into how those terms were defined during the course of those operations, what types of operations were conducted under those banners; what types of effects were achieved, etc is indeed something worth laying open for inspection.

The above is from another thread but the real problem was and is the setting of viable goals and objective conops.

A military organization that has COIN as a concept of operation has taken a long step toward poor performance and unwanted outcomes. (CT is fought in a different arena and is not further discussed here.)

Most people probably agree that military power is essentially coercive. Its effective employment is based upon taking the initiative: applying or threatening to apply force where it is damaging or difficult for an opponent to defend. To voluntarily adopt a defensive posture is – regardless of any subsequent pre-emption – to concede initiative to that opponent. Of course ‘counter’ in a name does not necessarily mean an entire doctrine given over to defence. However, ‘anti-insurgency’ as in ‘anti-submarine’ would be preferable. But why insurgency ?

In a dictionary and in thought the term insurgent means ‘ rebel. That is an opponent who is indigenous and whose concerns and activities could be entirely homegrown as in “rebel with a cause”. Insurgent/insurgency does not extend to include foreign nationals, sanctuaries in other countries, weapons suppliers, fund raising or other materiel and propaganda support provided by outsiders. To concede a point, give away a pawn, thoughtlessly or thoughtfully employ inappropriate words is to move closer to failure.

A lot of words to state the obvious. Mindset is important and poor choice of terminology is corrosive. COIN is a malapropism to be avoided like a highly infectious disease.

There was a time when the US military was more aware . For example when use of PAVN/Peoples Army of Vietnam was banned and replaced by NVA/North Vietnamese Army. But despite such overdue corrective action, the USA went down to defeat in Vietnam and the flawed conop of that era’s COIN was only a contributing factor.

The primary cause was the political goal imposed on the military. That goal was seemingly fixated on creating a state which was in large part an image of the USA: a functioning democracy that had obtained internal peace.

A person does not have to read Michael Howard to realize that a state or society can have either of two kinds of peace. In an orderly society, peace can be upheld anywhere by a single policeman (or woman) with a sidearm and radio. That individual has of course to be supported by others with weapons such as shotguns, and backed up by an infrequently needed riot squad.

In a disorderly society, open conflict is suspended and peace exists when a single policeman with sidearm and radio closely supported by a heavily armed police/infantry team can function and survive anywhere. Typically the coercive power of that team has to be supported by an on-call force of infantry/engineers/armour augmented in some instances by artillery/rifled mortars and a few helicopters.

Afghanistan is a disorderly society. It is divided by geography, tribal and religious history and beliefs. The Taliban are alleged to include a large number of religious and societal fanatics. But how can one describe the apparent zeal of the US administration in seeking to rapidly create a functioning democracy and orderly peace ? That administration was either affected by group think/collective stupidity or evangelism which is much the same thing.

To create a functional democracy in Afghanistan would require decades. So instead of COIN fixated on creating a mini-USA, a reset of the political objective and the military conop is long overdue. A major revision would be to focus on the second form of peace and hence peace-making operations in a disorderly society. The debased currency of COIN replaced by PMOPS.

Is there sufficient scope and time to redirect the distribution of sizable proportions of funds and resources directly to the village, district and whatever canton levels exist ? The pre-requisite for such arrangements would be the application of coercion to the autocracy in Kabul. The result would likely be an expanded form of plutocracy but at least that would be moving in the right direction toward what seems to be the eventual target.

There could be other ways in which to revise and realign political and military objectives. Some of those might be more realistic than that outlined above.

What is clear is that the USA and ISAF have to make a binary choice in the near term: ‘get real, or get out’. The pity is that after heavy loss of life and gross material expenditure the present US administration seems intent on getting out.

Bob's World
10-14-2011, 12:17 PM
Well, for my money, "getting real" is very possible, but not very likely.

Getting real demands:

1. Recognition and understanding of the distinction of the revolutionary insurgency between the GIRoA leadership and their dedication to sustaining a Northern Alliance monopoly on the governance of Afghanistan and the former Taliban government in exile in Pakistan, (the primary, political, issue that must be addressed first); and the resistance insurgency among the people of Afghanistan that is primarily a function of the presence of ISAF and ISAF's efforts to push GIRoA "governance" out into the largely self-governed populaces of the country.

2. Recognizing that AQ draws their "sanctuary" not from any particular plot of dirt, but rather from the support of the revolutionary Taliban leadership, and the populace that that revolutionary leadership represents and draws their support from.

Once we accept that, we can pull back from the outrageously expensive (and offensive) "COIN" practices we wage across Afghanistan; and can also radically narrow and focus the CT activities we conduct vs AQ. We can then shift focus to hard political pressure on GIRoA to evolve to represent all Afghans and to disassemble the patronage Ponzi scheme that the current Constitution is. We can get serious about talks with the Taliban leadership as to what we can offer them in exchange for them withdrawing the sanctuary they grant AQ.

New Tactics, or new generals, or switching from a conventional lead to a SOF lead are not the answers. More COIN or More CT are not the answers. First we must re-frame the problem, and then focus on the fundamental aspects of the problem. I believe we will find that less is indeed more.

Or, we go home. Either way, the US and our allies will be more secure than they are due to the higher order effects of our current approaches.

Surferbeetle
10-14-2011, 03:03 PM
Compost,

Western military power is indeed the expression of coercive power in support of the institution of the state, both physical and conceptual.

Unfortunately it has not yet percolated through much of the bioreactor of western decision making that the Western concept of the state having a central location/primacy within society, is not a concept shared by all of the world or an idea of the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Societies in these non western regions and places have fought, successfully over the ages, for primacy over the state.

This misunderstanding impacts the development, and implementation, of ideas such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counter-terrorism by the Western state.

JMA
10-14-2011, 05:09 PM
Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it. Where the SF has had a significant impact on 'green army operations' is in the targeting cycle at company and battalion level. The SF are used for tasks which match their training and capabilties - a good example of this can be seen in the Wardak CH47 Investigation Report (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ch-47-crash-in-wardak-province-afghanistan-investigation-completed)

We need at this point to refer to Fd Marshall Slim an his thoughts on Special Forces (page 546 in my book):


Special Forces

The British Army in the last war spawned a surprising number of special units and formations, that is forces of varying sizes, each trained, equipped, and prepared for some particular type of operation. We had commandos, assault brigades, amphibious division, mountain divisions, long-range penetration forces, airborne formations, desert groups, and an extraordinary variety of cloak and dagger parties. The equipment of the special units was more generous than that of normal formations, and many of them went so far as to have their own bases in administrative organisations. We employed most of them in Burma, and some, notably the Chindits, gave splendid examples of courage and hardihood. Yet I came firmly to the conclusion that such formations, trained, equipped, and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation only, were wasteful. They did not give, militarily, a worthwhile return for the resources in men, material and time that they absorbed. To begin with they were usually formed by attracting the best men from normal units by better conditions, promises of excitement, and not a little propaganda. Even on the rare occasions when normal units were converted into special ones without the option of volunteering, the same process went on in reverse. Men thought to be below the standards set or over an arbitrary age limit were weeded out to less favourable corps. The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d’elite could be expected to undertake them. ...

That said we see the cap fits today as much as it did then.

The Rhodesian SAS did magnificent work during the war especially in the last two years. However, if one reads their Op Log one will note that 95% of the type of work they did prior to the end of 1977 would by the end of the war be routinely done by the RLI and even by elements of some of the Territorial Units (Reserves).

So when one looks at the work the 'black army' does its probably better we don't hear publicly what they are doing because if we did we would probably identify much of it as being work properly trained normal infantry should be or could be doing.

Compared to my day it makes sense to conduct night operations because the night vision equipment and thermal imaging gives the troops such a massive advantage over the enemy. Again how special is an operation where troops are inserted by chopper into an LZ at night and from there they fan out to take on an objective while being covered by Apache and Spector gunships? In my book that is a normal infantry operation for well trained troops. There are relatively few of these opportunities going around so (as I mentioned above) the special forces and their hangers on (SAS, Seals, Rangers, Paras) will hold onto those tasks as if only they could possibly succeed. The mindset needs to change.

Compost
10-15-2011, 12:44 AM
Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it.

Generally yes but probably not with NV equipment.

Here’s an anecdote heard so long ago that OPSEC no longer applies. A member of the ADF serving as a peace keeper in the Middle East in the 1960s had early use of one of the first type of US starlight scope. He commented that he was very impressed because it enabled him to both see and recognise an Israeli liaison officer helping to lay a mine under a UN inspection track along a fenceline.

SF commonly stretch the limits of what is practicable for and with equipment.

The general case is that SF routinely operate all types of vehicles from ATVs to helicopters aggressively and with heavy loads yet appear surprised when vehicles fail. That cutting of corners carries through to obtaining new model equipment regardless of obvious design flaws. A recent example was procurement of a novel type of forward control light truck whose enclosed and reinforced wheel stations are apparently expected to provide protection rather than channelling mine blast.

Sigaba
10-15-2011, 12:47 AM
Prior to World War II the military had precious little clout, and when they did it was by making use of internal pressures (Indian wars) to motivate specific state delegations (Texas for one). Military experience from the Civil War didn't help them, either, as most of the legislators with experience had been Volunteers and remained quite hostile to a standing, professional military (John Logan is but one example).FWIW, I respectfully disagree with this assessment.

The inability of the American army to achieve its policy aims was more due to the tone of specific reformers--specifically Emory Upton and like minded soldiers-- in the army than to civilian indifference/hostility/disinterest in military affairs. As one historian of the Old Army put it.
By proposing a military policy that the country could not accept, Emory Upton helped ensure that the country would continue to limp along with virtually no military policy at all.*Many soldiers and civilians made potentially viable suggestions for the reform and modernization of the army but, time and again, the Uptonians either shouted them down or refused to help build the kind of intellectual and political momentum that might have led to change.

By contrast, American navalists articulated a multi-faceted argument that made an intellectual, strategic, historiographical, political, cultural, and economic case for the a new vision of American maritime power.

Granted, given the realities of international and domestic politics as well as the vastly different traditional views of the army and the navy in American culture, the army had a bigger hill to climb than the navy. However, I am of the view that the army's "lack of clout" was more the result of miscalculations within its leadership than of external factors.

This distinction is crucially important today because contemporaneous discussions of military policy are still shaped by the ongoing acceptance of a trajectory of American military historiography. This trajectory accepts uncritically the views of Emory Upton, Peter Michie (his biographer), and William Ganoe (his advocate).

My $0.02

</hijack>
__________________________________________________ _____
*R. F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1967), p. 281.

Bob's World
10-15-2011, 12:34 PM
The difference between the Army and the Navy is due primarily to the difference in their peacetime roles. The US will always be a nation that benefits from a lack of peacetime ground threats (so no need for a large standing peacetime army to secure the homeland), and the requirement for unhindered access to global markets and resources, that demands a robust Navy in both peace and war.

This is not a matter of policy so much as a matter of geostrategic realities and common sense. Any policy or effort to somehow treat or view these two services as "equals" in times of peace is not well thought out at best, and at worst subjugated the needs of the nation to the desires of the individuals and organizations advocating for an excessive peacetime ground force.

Oh, and while we are currently a nation with troops in combat, we are not a nation at war, so to play the "we're at war" card every time one wants to justify more deficit spending on ground force capabilities is growing wearisome as well. Current "COIN" definitions and doctrine accentuate this problem.

Fuchs
10-15-2011, 12:42 PM
OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO).


British English is "manoeuvre", and that was prominent in French military literature even a hundred years ago already.

JMA
10-15-2011, 04:39 PM
British English is "manoeuvre", and that was prominent in French military literature even a hundred years ago already.

Yes, I should have made it more clear. The American led warfighting concept of maneuver warfare in its current form is relatively new. The term certainly was not in use (with its current meaning) in Brit doctrine back in the 60s and 70s.

Fuchs
10-15-2011, 04:40 PM
The current form basically goes back to the Lind gang of the 80's. See Maneuver Warfare Handbook.

JMA
10-15-2011, 05:08 PM
The current form basically goes back to the Lind gang of the 80's. See Maneuver Warfare Handbook.

Yes, this use or misuse of terminology is problematic IMHO. Old terms and concepts are redefined and reworked to the extent that from a military history point of view one needs to learn that for a specific word the meaning prior to a specific date would be x and thereafter the meaning y. Can be confusing as Mumford shows.

Fuchs
10-15-2011, 05:12 PM
Compare "manoeuvre priori" and "command push", "manoeuvre posteriori" and "recon pull".

Nobody seems to use the old terms any more, as if an army not exactly excelling in a war made its language unfashionable for foreign military theory.

JMA
10-15-2011, 06:09 PM
Compare "manoeuvre priori" and "command push", "manoeuvre posteriori" and "recon pull".

Nobody seems to use the old terms any more, as if an army not exactly excelling in a war made its language unfashionable for foreign military theory.

One accepts that new developments and refinements of old concepts take place. All I suggest is that they create new words for the new stuff and not bastardise the old terminology and definitions. I really don't think that is too much to ask.

Fuchs
10-15-2011, 06:14 PM
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/01/schwerpunkt-and-center-of-gravity.html :wry:

JMA
10-15-2011, 06:23 PM
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/01/schwerpunkt-and-center-of-gravity.html :wry:

You said in your blog post:


It's OK to invent a new concept, but please name it accordingly - and don't misuse an old, famous and established term for it.

Good we agree on something at last ;)

JMA
10-15-2011, 10:17 PM
But the unexpected always happens. It might not be vulnerable ground, the other leg might be armed persistent air surveillance or another section (in the context of a platoon move). Meeting engagements happen and sometimes the other side is better (and yes, sometimes our commanders are wrong). We were taught those basic break contact drills when I was a troopie for use in woods and jungles or for when we got caught with our pants down; they have not come from SF. But it is used very rarely.

I keep posting stuff from the distant past (not my past) but from the past from which I learned and from which the modern soldier should learn (rather than copying how he thinks special forces operate and of course wearing all the kit).

The break contact drills came from the time Vietnam and Borneo. You can argue with the yanks who developed what.

The question is whether the line infantry need this drill other than for when conducting a three or four man recce patrol. I don't think so.

Now here is some advice from 1756 which I suggest if followed by the lads in Afghanistan would lead to a marked and instant improvement:


Rogers' Rangers Standing Orders
1. Don't forget nothing.
2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minute's warning.
3. When you're on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first.
4. Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don't never lie to a Ranger or officer.
5. Don't never take a chance you don't have to.
6. When we're on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can't go through two men.
7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so it's hard to track us.
8. When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us.
9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.
10. If we take prisoners, we keep'em separate till we have had time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between'em.
11. Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed.
12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a scout 20 yards ahead, 20 yards on each flank, and 20 yards in the rear so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out.
13. Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force.
14. Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries.
15. Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and Indians attack.
16. Don't cross a river by a regular ford.
17. If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your own tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.
18. Don't stand up when the enemy's coming against you. Kneel down, lie down, hide behind a tree.
19. Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch, then let him have it and jump out and finish him up with your hatchet.

Numbers #1 and #19 are my favourites ;)

But in all seriousness work through the points and find every one is as valid today as they were 250 years ago - and I did not have to go search in a special forces manual to find them.

Yes I know, this old stuff is not sexy, one does not get to wear fashion grade shades, designer body armour and webbing and a personal weapon different to the standard issue. ;)

Red Rat
10-16-2011, 11:41 AM
No I don't think that is the correct approach.

The size of your operating call-signs should depend on the comparative military competence of your enemy and the location and the degree of mobility of your operational reserve.

Seems the Brit assessment is that of parity of soldiering ability? Surely not.

Poor wording on my part. I think that the British approach is that the size of the grouping depends on the military capability of the opponent and by military capability I mean the effective combat power he is likely to bring to bear in any given engagement.


Then it is the impact of IEDs which requires a number of donkeys on each patrol to carry related 'stuff'.
IEDs have increased the equipment load, both with ECM equipment and differing sets of detection equipment for differing types of IED threats. I think one of the most significant impacts on the load carried is the appetite for risk. As the appetite for risk has decreased the personal load has increased. The appetite for risk is largely articulated by politicians and is related closely to the public support for the conflict.



Then (going back to exchanges I had with Wilf some time ago about) the aim of the patrol activity needs to be carefully assessed. You would have read 18 Platoon by Sydney Jary (http://www.amazon.com/18-Platoon-Sydney-Jary/dp/1901655016) at Sandhurst (where it was I believe required reading) and learned that even then (between D-Day and VE Day) he (as a young subaltern) questioned the wisdom of patrolling for the sake of patrolling.
I know the book well. Patrolling for the sake of patrolling is bad. It does not feature in British doctrine or training at any level; I am not aware of it happening in practice. All the post operational reports and post incident reports that cross my desk indicate that this is not happening.



Surely the idea of making contact with the Taliban is not once it happens to get rescued by air support or the arrival of vehicles to allow the patrol to pull back into their beau geste fort but rather to maintain the contact (iow fix them) then get a response/reaction team in to kill them?
That is the normal procedure. Of course very often the response team comes in the form of a precision guided munition. :D


I have suggested that you send out small patrols to make contact while an airborne reaction force is loitering just out of sound range and ready to come in and do the business once the Taliban have given away their position.
That's been done and still happens. Like anything though do it too often and you set a pattern which makes you vulnerable, possible HLSs, fire support locations, interdiction points and overwatch positions are all very often mined or covered by fire. We found that placing snipers out before sending CallSign Tethered Goat out the front gate is highly effective as well.

PS - I have read Skeen's Passing It On (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Lessons-Imperial-Rule-Instructions-Infantrymen/dp/184832507X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1318767139&sr=8-1), it sits next to Operations In Waziristan 1919-1920 (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Operations-Waziristan-1919-1920-Headquarters-General/dp/1843427737/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1318767245&sr=1-2) and The Frontier Scouts (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Frontier-Scouts-Oxford-Paperbacks/dp/0192851640/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1318767353&sr=1-1) on my bookshelves ;)

Red Rat
10-16-2011, 11:52 AM
The Rhodesian SAS did magnificent work during the war especially in the last two years. However, if one reads their Op Log one will note that 95% of the type of work they did prior to the end of 1977 would by the end of the war be routinely done by the RLI and even by elements of some of the Territorial Units (Reserves).
We see the same sort of process happening in some respects. However, as in N Ireland, I suspect that what we will see as Afghanistan enters drawdown is that many of the missions currently undertaken by regular soldiers will be once more undertaken by Special Forces. This is simply because that as 2015 approaches political appetite for risk will sharply decrease.



Compared to my day it makes sense to conduct night operations because the night vision equipment and thermal imaging gives the troops such a massive advantage over the enemy. Again how special is an operation where troops are inserted by chopper into an LZ at night and from there they san out to take on an objective while being covered by Apache and Spector gunships? In my book that is a normal infantry operation for well trained troops. There are relatively few of these opportunities going around so (as I mentioned above) the special forces and their hangers on (SAS, Seals, Rangers, Paras) will hold onto those tasks as if only they could possibly succeed. The mindset needs to change. Properly trained troops can take on that task, but the added value is in the backroom functions and processes that the SF have. if we resourced and trained everyone to the same level as the SF then we might not need the SF so much, but part of the reason they are so effective is because they are so well resourced and certainly the UK cannot afford to resource everyone the same.

As for night ops it - there are advantages and disadvantages to operating at night.

Red Rat
10-16-2011, 12:27 PM
Compost,

Unfortunately it has not yet percolated through much of the bioreactor of western decision making that the Western concept of the state having a central location/primacy within society, is not a concept shared by all of the world or an idea of the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Societies in these non western regions and places have fought, successfully over the ages, for primacy over the state.

This misunderstanding impacts the development, and implementation, of ideas such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counter-terrorism by the Western state.

I find myself in violent agreement here :D

Not only is the societal and social contruct different, it is based on a different style of logic and a different cocept of time. It is not just that we do things differently, we do things differently because we are fundamentally different.

In practical terms this may limit us to two options:


- Imposing our construct on them (unlikely to be acceptable to them, likely to be messy, unlikely to be acceptable to large parts of our liberal western society which dislikes imposing anything on anyone)

- Working within their construct (likely to be impalatable at home as the public is only likely to understand it and less likely to accept it as many parts of their construct are taboo in our current societal construct (ie: patronage, treatment of women, use of violence).
Messy either way!

ganulv
10-16-2011, 04:49 PM
But in all seriousness work through the points and find every one is as valid today as they were 250 years ago - and I did not have to go search in a special forces manual to find them.

I spent a couple of hours at Rogers Island (http://mapper.acme.com/?ll=43.26174,-73.58568&z=14&t=T) as part of a day trip early this summer and was a bit taken aback to find the monument which includes the Rules of Ranging to be in a generally unkempt status (below, after a bit of brushing up). The associated and recently refurbished museum on the grounds was quite nice, on the other hand: http://www.rogersisland.org/.

http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5306/5854391371_477321ac9b_z.jpg

A fun article about the raid on Saint-Francis (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Day%E2%80%94Oral%20tradition%20as%20complement.pdf )—which ended up going almost as badly for Rogers’s men as it did for the Abenakis—should anyone be interested.

JMA
10-16-2011, 08:26 PM
We see the same sort of process happening in some respects. However, as in N Ireland, I suspect that what we will see as Afghanistan enters drawdown is that many of the missions currently undertaken by regular soldiers will be once more undertaken by Special Forces. This is simply because that as 2015 approaches political appetite for risk will sharply decrease.

Simply the problem in using the rotated line regiments for such work is that they are not there long enough to get fed into the type of operations carefully and then to allow them to grow and flourish. Its the 'C' word again (continuity) and it is that which will keep the SAS busy doing basic infantry work or force the Brits to suck in another Para Bn into the 'Black Army'.


Properly trained troops can take on that task, but the added value is in the backroom functions and processes that the SF have. if we resourced and trained everyone to the same level as the SF then we might not need the SF so much, but part of the reason they are so effective is because they are so well resourced and certainly the UK cannot afford to resource everyone the same.

Ah the backroom boys... I have heard a cynic refer to them (not me this time) as being like a baby... self focussed, demands attention, eats a lot, makes a lot of noise, grows fast... and produces piles of shyte in return. ;)

I think you want to research special forces training a little. I would suggest that training on specialist equipment and special drills is first class. I would look into how much standard infantry tactical training a person who joined as a corporal (for example) and who is now a sergeant has had since joining. Do they send people to the Infantry Battle School in Brecon for example?

Maybe its time to be more specific on what their tasks are to be. Strategic stuff at short notice (like targeting in Libya) rather than a standard infantry tasks such as an airborne raid (day or night). Once the relevant tasks have been defined then you force them to share the kit. Might have to fire a few officers to force sanity onto the current situation.

If any of this work is too much for any of the existing regiments I guess it makes the decision on which to disband a lot easier.


As for night ops it - there are advantages and disadvantages to operating at night.

Appreciated, but many of the disadvantages are as a result of legacy issues caused by bad decision making back then.

JMA
10-16-2011, 08:59 PM
A fun article about the raid on Saint-Francis (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Day%E2%80%94Oral%20tradition%20as%20complement.pdf )—which ended up going almost as badly for Rogers’s men as it did for the Abenakis—should anyone be interested.

There is an old saying 'it all comes out in the wash'.

We used radio intercepts to confirm the results of our actions into Mozambique and Zambia. We used to get accurate casualty figures that way.

Accurate post combat reporting is very difficult and I often recall when my sergeant and I had beers with the troopies after a good days work. Every time when we left he would, 'I don't know about you, sir, but in the contact I was in we only killed 20 gooks, but it seems the one our troopies were in they killed over a hundred.' Troopies will be troopies, they are like fishermen.

Surferbeetle
10-16-2011, 10:52 PM
Red Rat,

Agreed on a number of your points. In spite of the nosebleeds, the cheap seats sometimes offer a different perspective which of course can come in handy. :wry:


Not only is the societal and social contruct different, it is based on a different style of logic and a different cocept of time. It is not just that we do things differently, we do things differently because we are fundamentally different.

To judge from the results, there has got to be a better way than the path we presently find ourselves upon.

Here are some of the places that I am looking (and ideas are always welcome):


How Soccer Explains the World, Franklin Foer, 2004, Harper Collins Publishers, NY



A History of Iraq, Charles Tripp, 2000, Cambridge University Press



Inside Rebellion, Jeremy M. Weinstein, 2007, Cambridge University Press



Strong Societies and Weak States, Joel S. Migdal, 1988, Princeton University Press



A History of Islamic Societies, Ira M. Lapidus, 2002, Cambridge University Press



The Financial Times Guide to Options, Lenny Jordan, 2011, Pearson Education LTD, :wry:


Although the FT Guide is a bit tongue in cheek, I too am of the opinion that elements of the old 'business models' developed in that part of the world (I am thinking about Ottoman solutions of late) are far more appropriate/efficient/effective. However, as you wisely and succinctly point out:


Working within their construct (likely to be impalatable at home as the public is only likely to understand it and less likely to accept it as many parts of their construct are taboo in our current societal construct (ie: patronage, treatment of women, use of violence).

The current business model to realize 'Switzerland South' is ruinously inefficient and expensive in blood and treasure.


Imposing our construct on them (unlikely to be acceptable to them, likely to be messy, unlikely to be acceptable to large parts of our liberal western society which dislikes imposing anything on anyone)

...and so we are left with:


Messy either way!

...indeed.

Steve the Planner
10-17-2011, 02:59 AM
Beetle:

I was interested in an NYT review by Rob't Kagan:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/books/review/libertys-surest-guardian-by-jeremi-suri-book-review.html

What interested me about it was how little people who claim to be in the know actually know about the things they jabber on about.

US Reconstruction of the South after the Civil War as proof and models for US nation-building? Either someone took a hit of acid when they read a brief Wiki on this, or they are just poorly informed.

US Reconstruction in the South was, perhaps a better model of what we actually did in the South (punative, victors and spoils, repressive) contributed to the lack of modern economic development in the south until well into the 20th Century when Councils of 100 and Economic Development/Infrastructure/Education finally started to take hold to bring the south into a normalized relationship with the rest of the US.

The real history of the Marshall Plan begins with the initial punative allied effort to completely dismantle Germany's industrial capability and return it to an agrarian and pastoral area no longer capable of war. It only changed later, when faced with the reality of the millions who would die or be dispossessed by this approach, riveted attention on the need for a new plan.

In both Japan and particularly Germany you had a skilled and educated society, similar in many ways to our own (or like Japan, looking for a better model), and a high degree, from inception, of collaboration between US occupiers and indigenous local community and business leaders.

The above paragraph's opportunities, I believe, existed much more in Iraq than we initially understood, and possibly in Afghanistan, but we missed every boat that sailed bye, whether by hubris, ego or distraction.

I really wish that, at some point, these military think tankers actually took the time to understand how real nations and regions work, before they throw all the soup knives and tea cups around in support of Nation-building. It really misses the whole point of why, when not properly targeted, our valuable resources get mis-deployed, mis-applied, and mis-successful.

Fuchs
10-17-2011, 12:12 PM
The real history of the Marshall Plan begins with the initial punative allied effort to completely dismantle Germany's industrial capability and return it to an agrarian and pastoral area no longer capable of war. It only changed later, when faced with the reality of the millions who would die or be dispossessed by this approach, riveted attention on the need for a new plan.

To be fair, the Morgenthau plan was long dead when Marshall plan began to include Germany (it was meant for Europe at first, and most of the recipients did recover worse than Germany did).

It's notable that it did only kick in when Germany was already in a strong upswing and it was overall smaller than reparations in the opposite direction.

The greatest influence of the U.S. on German recovery was (unthinkable today, but true: ) its insistence on rationing (almost an outright planning economy) that was torn down (in part with legal tricks) by the German economy minister Ludwig Ehrhard during the '49-'53 period.

Yeah, take this: The U.S. was the force for planning economy, and a German politician with strong social motives was the model capitalist in the 'German economic miracle'. :D

Red Rat
10-17-2011, 04:53 PM
Here are some of the places that I am looking (and ideas are always welcome):


How Soccer Explains the World, Franklin Foer, 2004, Harper Collins Publishers, NY



A History of Iraq, Charles Tripp, 2000, Cambridge University Press



Inside Rebellion, Jeremy M. Weinstein, 2007, Cambridge University Press



Strong Societies and Weak States, Joel S. Migdal, 1988, Princeton University Press



A History of Islamic Societies, Ira M. Lapidus, 2002, Cambridge University Press



The Financial Times Guide to Options, Lenny Jordan, 2011, Pearson Education LTD, :wry:


Although the FT Guide is a bit tongue in cheek,



Bugger! More books for my reading list :D

Red Rat
10-17-2011, 05:08 PM
Simply the problem in using the rotated line regiments for such work is that they are not there long enough to get fed into the type of operations carefully and then to allow them to grow and flourish. Its the 'C' word again (continuity) and it is that which will keep the SAS busy doing basic infantry work or force the Brits to suck in another Para Bn into the 'Black Army'.

I think I am following your thought here in that if there was more continuity there would be better preparation and therefore less Risk? That is not my experience of it. In N Ireland tasks which were line infantry tasks were given to Special Forces because sensitivities and therefore (political) Risk increased. The risk was mitigated by the use of SF. No matter how well trained the line infantry are if the operation is sensitive and carries strategic or operational risk then it will be allocated to the SF - that is what they are there for (a strategic asset for strategic tasks).



I think you want to research special forces training a little. I would suggest that training on specialist equipment and special drills is first class.
It is. The SF is a higher grade of soldier - no doubt about it. Like any unit that has gone through a demanding selection process you will get a higher grade soldier. They also tend to be experienced soldiers when they join. This, plus the extensive and intensive training and specialist equipment they receive makes them a highly capable asset. We can and do offer aspects of what used to be SF training and equipment to line infantry now, but that still will not give us the calibre of soldier, nor the level of training that the SF have.



Maybe its time to be more specific on what their tasks are to be. Strategic stuff at short notice (like targeting in Libya) rather than a standard infantry tasks such as an airborne raid (day or night). Once the relevant tasks have been defined then you force them to share the kit. As a strategic asset they get used on strategic tasks. What that means in the ground I do not know less that they get used for High Value Targets. If I said anything else it would be pure speculation!!

Red Rat
10-17-2011, 05:17 PM
I really wish that, at some point, these military think tankers actually took the time to understand how real nations and regions work, before they throw all the soup knives and tea cups around in support of Nation-building. It really misses the whole point of why, when not properly targeted, our valuable resources get mis-deployed, mis-applied, and mis-successful.

I think that the problem is that they are military think tankers and lack a broad perspective? Certainly my experience of the UK military is that there is depressingly little cross fertilisation amongst the social sciences when it comes to the application of force and the consequences thereof (and I regard military studies as a social science). Clausewitz (a leading military theorist that some will have heard of...) was widely read in the fields of science and arts and social sciences. SurferBeetle's post below (127036) is a good example of a highly relevant reading list for operational and strategic level planners; but with very little about military theory in it.


Originally Posted by Surferbeetle
Here are some of the places that I am looking (and ideas are always welcome):

How Soccer Explains the World, Franklin Foer, 2004, Harper Collins Publishers, NY
A History of Iraq, Charles Tripp, 2000, Cambridge University Press
Inside Rebellion, Jeremy M. Weinstein, 2007, Cambridge University Press
Strong Societies and Weak States, Joel S. Migdal, 1988, Princeton University Press
A History of Islamic Societies, Ira M. Lapidus, 2002, Cambridge University Press
The Financial Times Guide to Options, Lenny Jordan, 2011, Pearson Education LTD,

Steve the Planner
10-18-2011, 03:44 AM
Rat:

Absolutely agree: Military is a social science.

Beetle, however, will tell you that social sciences are influenced by hard technical sciences too---finance, engineering, economic geography, systems operations, logistics.

Just too damned complicated to reduce down to anthropology and tribal connections (who the same rules also apply to) or military think tankers.

I actually think stuff could be a whole lot easier than is sometimes made out by them---problem in Uganda: go kill the bad guy every decade or so then come home. Locals will go forward (or not). No need for a major new military industrial or foreign aid program.

Fuchs: Right. Sorry to have truncated much of that history. Didn't want to bog it down too much with the details of actual histories that are actually opposite of common myths.

Same with the carpetbaggers that descended on the US south when reconstruction began (Galbriath and the KRG Oil Deals?), or the imposition of some very tough customers to administer US re construction on the post Civil War South.

The famous Plessey v. Ferguson case in US law (for JMA's sake) is ripe with implications of how, in many ways, local resentment against reconstruction created almost a boomerang effect by 1890s where locals were tightening up on racial restrictions in places like New Orleans where it was not as explicit as before (a train marked for whites and coloreds where society mulattos like Plessey in New Orleans had not seen such restrictions). They challenged it, and ended up in front of some of the meanest cusses ever in the Supreme Court, and ended up with a national policy of separate but equal. Thurgood Marshal spent a lifetime trying to unravel the threads of Plessey---really a rebound of Reconstruction in so many ways.

Martin Luther King has a statue on the Mall now, and Thurgood Marshall has an airport named after him in Maryland where he was not even allowed to attend a white law school. Times change, but history provides important lessons.

JMA
10-18-2011, 03:45 PM
To judge from the results, there has got to be a better way than the path we presently find ourselves upon.

Here are some of the places that I am looking (and ideas are always welcome):


How Soccer Explains the World, Franklin Foer, 2004, Harper Collins Publishers, NY



A History of Iraq, Charles Tripp, 2000, Cambridge University Press



Inside Rebellion, Jeremy M. Weinstein, 2007, Cambridge University Press



Strong Societies and Weak States, Joel S. Migdal, 1988, Princeton University Press



A History of Islamic Societies, Ira M. Lapidus, 2002, Cambridge University Press



The Financial Times Guide to Options, Lenny Jordan, 2011, Pearson Education LTD, :wry:




Are you sure you are looking in the right places?

The people who got 'you' into this mess were never qualified to make the decisions in the first place. You elected one or two of them and then they brought in their cronies, acolytes, sycophants, hangers-on and groupies so what did you really expect?

Surferbeetle
10-18-2011, 07:37 PM
Gentlemen, I apologize for being a bit slow on my responses, but I appreciate the conversation. - Steve


I really wish that, at some point, these military think tankers actually took the time to understand how real nations and regions work, before they throw all the soup knives and tea cups around in support of Nation-building. It really misses the whole point of why, when not properly targeted, our valuable resources get mis-deployed, mis-applied, and mis-successful.

STP,

'Reconstruction' is a tough problem to work on, whether at home, abroad during peacetime, or during war. Mike in Hilo recommended a book the other day entitled Pacification: The Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds, by Richard A. Hunt. Although a bit dry sometimes, it nonetheless does a very good job of describing the organizational friction present in how we do things in this arena. It hurts to see that we are fighting some of the same battles today that we did then. I continue to wonder why we haven't reorganized our 'reconstruction' approach/line of operation to a whole of government one, civilian led.


The greatest influence of the U.S. on German recovery was (unthinkable today, but true: ) its insistence on rationing (almost an outright planning economy) that was torn down (in part with legal tricks) by the German economy minister Ludwig Ehrhard during the '49-'53 period.

Yeah, take this: The U.S. was the force for planning economy, and a German politician with strong social motives was the model capitalist in the 'German economic miracle'.

Fuchs,

Those were interesting times and I would appreciate a reference, German is fine, if you have one to offer?


Are you sure you are looking in the right places?

The people who got 'you' into this mess were never qualified to make the decisions in the first place. You elected one or two of them and then they brought in their cronies, acolytes, sycophants, hangers-on and groupies so what did you really expect?

JMA,

We went to Afghanistan and Iraq for what I see to be solid reasons. With respect to these two operations I grumble about organization, execution, cost, and outcomes. ;)

It has been my experience, at home and abroad, that technocrats and politicians are generally two different demographics. With respect to the political class I recognize that they run multiple calculus equations several times a time a day in order to determine which way the wind is blowing, who (and how many) they can sway to their side, and what they can influence (get away with) today. :wry:

As to where I am looking for ideas, I don't claim to have a silver bullet, and recommendations are always welcome...

Fuchs
10-18-2011, 07:41 PM
Fuchs,

Those were interesting times and I would appreciate a reference, German is fine, if you have one to offer?

From the master himself:
http://oron.com/ch90a12v103w/11.wmv.part2.rar.html

From a wannabe-master:
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2008/07/marshall-plan.html

JMA
10-18-2011, 10:03 PM
JMA,

We went to Afghanistan and Iraq for what I see to be solid reasons. With respect to these two operations I grumble about organization, execution, cost, and outcomes. ;)

It has been my experience, at home and abroad, that technocrats and politicians are generally two different demographics. With respect to the political class I recognize that they run multiple calculus equations several times a time a day in order to determine which way the wind is blowing, who (and how many) they can sway to their side, and what they can influence (get away with) today. :wry:

As to where I am looking for ideas, I don't claim to have a silver bullet, and recommendations are always welcome...

I appreciate your position but what I am saying is that it takes an officer 20 years before he is given command of 600 men (a battalion) whether in battle or not while the civilian politicians require no training or qualifications before committing 100,000 troops to places like Afghanistan. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the generals of today get there by being politically aware and tuned in and while they strut around like demigod peacocks in front of their troops they are little more than obsequious yes-men groveling before the politicians (and their hangers on) in the White House and Congress.

The Brits have the same problem (as probably do most nations).

If you want an example of the amateur hour decision making process you need look no further than the footage/photos/stories of the Obama led planning cycle leading up to the OBL hit. Pathetic. The politicians can be forgiven because they are elected but the senior military commanders can not. You could take five guys off your current Command and Staff Course and they would make a better plan with less fuss and bother... and then not have the spin doctors try and spin it into the greatest raid operation of this century and the making of this Presidency. The mind positively boggles.

When a military operation turns out a cock-up an investigation follows and careers are (often justifiably) ruined. What, I ask you are the consequences for incompetence in political decision making?

JMA
10-18-2011, 10:47 PM
I think I am following your thought here in that if there was more continuity there would be better preparation and therefore less Risk? That is not my experience of it. In N Ireland tasks which were line infantry tasks were given to Special Forces because sensitivities and therefore (political) Risk increased. The risk was mitigated by the use of SF. No matter how well trained the line infantry are if the operation is sensitive and carries strategic or operational risk then it will be allocated to the SF - that is what they are there for (a strategic asset for strategic tasks).

As stated before it was the caution bred in NI which emasculated and all but destroyed the Brit military as a fighting force.

The SAS are able to take on these varied tasks because of the experience they have in doing all these tasks when they come up. Very experienced and competent soldiers but look again at Slim's comments on special forces and question why the cream of the military are being used on some of the basic - line infantry - type operations they are?

I highlighted the last sentence of the Slim piece I quoted and quote it again because of how true it has turned out to be right now in 2011.


The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d’elite could be expected to undertake them.


It is. The SF is a higher grade of soldier - no doubt about it. Like any unit that has gone through a demanding selection process you will get a higher grade soldier. They also tend to be experienced soldiers when they join. This, plus the extensive and intensive training and specialist equipment they receive makes them a highly capable asset. We can and do offer aspects of what used to be SF training and equipment to line infantry now, but that still will not give us the calibre of soldier, nor the level of training that the SF have.

If you take a look at their organisation structure you will note that they are rank heavy as they have more officers and SNCOs in a troop than in a line infantry company (and not only for pay purposes). And as you rightly say they have longer service per man than in most line-infantry units but this should rather demand that they are only used on operations and tasks which are really strategic and/or are really beyond the ability of line infantry units.

What is a strategic task? Surely a raid within the current AO is not really strategic? OBL's hit, yes, but a raid on your local common or garden variety Taliban leader, no.

That said they really have to do these tasks don't they? Because of the 'short tours' and lack of continuity and experience in the rapidly rotated units the line units are really not up to the job are they? Read Slim again.

So if a unit commander on a quick rotation were to form up and 'demand' that he be given such tasks when in his AO he quite rightly could be asked when he would be ready to assume such duties when effectively his unit will:


... spend two months learning the job, two months doing it and then two months counting the day until they go home for 'tea and medals'.



As a strategic asset they get used on strategic tasks. What that means in the ground I do not know less that they get used for High Value Targets. If I said anything else it would be pure speculation!!

Here we would need to define 'strategic' and also how 'high' are the Taliban leader 'high value targets' they take out.

There is no secret that they have to do these tasks as there is plainly no one else to do them. My guess is that you will see the SFSG (special forces support group) continue to grow and grow as the comparatively few numbers of actual operators (not the parade ground strength) exhaust themselves doing all the work (they should be doing plus that which the line infantry should be doing in their respective AOs).

The problem, this problem is a self inflicted wound.

Red Rat
10-19-2011, 09:35 AM
As stated before it was the caution bred in NI which emasculated and all but destroyed the Brit military as a fighting force. The NI experience did not seem to hamper the UK in the Falklands, Gulf War 1 or Iraq 2003...



The SAS are able to take on these varied tasks because of the experience they have in doing all these tasks when they come up. Very experienced and competent soldiers but look again at Slim's comments on special forces and question why the cream of the military are being used on some of the basic - line infantry - type operations they are?

The SF take the cream, but they do not take all the cream. One of the problems they have had since 2005 is recruiting.







If you take a look at their organisation structure you will note that they are rank heavy as they have more officers and SNCOs in a troop than in a line infantry company (and not only for pay purposes). I do not know enough about troop structure to comment. But I know that the Military Police have a heavier rank structure then a line infantry company. I think it depends on the level of independence you intend to give them. SF and RMP work in smaller discrete groupings, we do not expect our infantry to do so.


And as you rightly say they have longer service per man than in most line-infantry units but this should rather demand that they are only used on operations and tasks which are really strategic and/or are really beyond the ability of line infantry units. I suspect that the SF would say that they are only used on high end tasks. That is not to say that these are necessarily beyond the abilities of line infantry, certainly not appropriately trained infantry, but they are the high end tasks.



What is a strategic task? Surely a raid within the current AO is not really strategic? OBL's hit, yes, but a raid on your local common or garden variety Taliban leader, no. Depends on risk involved and effect achieved and must be placed within the campaign context. AT the moment the SF are being used to pursue a Counter-Terrorism campaign and the remainder a COIN campaign as part of an overarching campaign plan.


That said they really have to do these tasks don't they? Because of the 'short tours' and lack of continuity and experience in the rapidly rotated units the line units are really not up to the job are they? Read Slim again. I disagree. My fundamental issue with short tours in a COIN context is that it does not allow the relationships to be built up and proper understanding to be gained. It is more inefficient then ineffective. Units deploying in to theatre are well equipped, trained and have a very good feel for the ground. They are not entering blind and they do have residual experience of the Theatre. Even 14 Army and Slimn rotated units in and out of the line.


So if a unit commander on a quick rotation were to form up and 'demand' that he be given such tasks when in his AO he quite rightly could be asked when he would be ready to assume such duties when effectively his unit will: Except his unit will have been training for 9 months prior to deployment, will have pax in theatre on deployment (advance elements go 6-8 weeks ahead of main body) and the request will have been made 12 months in advance when unit tasks are allocated and CONOPS looked at.


There is no secret that they have to do these tasks as there is plainly no one else to do them. My guess is that you will see the SFSG (special forces support group) continue to grow and grow as the comparatively few numbers of actual operators (not the parade ground strength) exhaust themselves doing all the work (they should be doing plus that which the line infantry should be doing in their respective AOs). If this was to happen it would have happened in 2004-2008 in Iraq; but it didn't. Line infantry were given the skill set (which until then only the SF had possessed) to enable them to carry out the tasks at the tactical level; they still retain this skill set and still carry out these tasks at a tactical level in Afghanistan. You seem to think that line infantry do not carry out tactical level raids, strikes, arrest operations etc - but they do.

JMA
10-19-2011, 03:49 PM
The NI experience did not seem to hamper the UK in the Falklands, Gulf War 1 or Iraq 2003...

If you say so ;)


The SF take the cream, but they do not take all the cream. One of the problems they have had since 2005 is recruiting.

There would have been a time when soldiers went in search of action and joined the SAS. From 2006 (or so) onwards they got action on their rotations with their respective units so that motivation would have fallen away.

I agree that not all the cream goes to the SAS as they are really quite a small unit in terms of operators. There are soldiers who are excellent who are not suited to 'cloak and dagger' operations but excel in more conventional settings (like proven in the Falklands).


I do not know enough about troop structure to comment. But I know that the Military Police have a heavier rank structure then a line infantry company. I think it depends on the level of independence you intend to give them. SF and RMP work in smaller discrete groupings, we do not expect our infantry to do so.

You can take my word for it (with the exaggeration on the number of officers in an SAS troop) they are what we would term 'top-heavy' in terms of NCOs (which they will say is warranted by the work they do).

Back to Sydney Jary (in 18 Platoon) who when sent on patrol would take his sgt, a corporal and if necessary a bren gun team. It is true that seldom a gash troopie would be taken on a recce, standing or fighting patrol when the numbers were small.

But as we have seen the numbers for these Afghanistan ops are not always small (like at Wardak). It is these ops where larger numbers are employed that I question the use of the SAS in the role of bayonets.

For example At Chimoio (Op Dingo) the SAS called up everyone they could to fill four Daks (96 men) and the RLI made up the numbers with 88 on the target by parachute or heliborne and a mortar section and others at the helicopter admin area (meaning effectively more RLI on the op than SAS). It had to be seen as a SAS op you see because they were in a pissing contest with the Selous Scouts (who had pulled off the wildly successful Nyadzonya raid where the first 1,000 kill count had been achieved) and they wanted to better it. It needs to be said that the SAS were well equipped for these operations but should they not have been locating targets for an Air Force / RLI strike-force to take out? And been concentrating (as they did later) on going after the external leadership in Lusaka and Maputo? The difference though was that unlike in Afghanistan there was a battalion of infantry who were permanently deployed on operations and probably more combat experienced than the SAS themselves - being the RLI.


I suspect that the SF would say that they are only used on high end tasks. That is not to say that these are necessarily beyond the abilities of line infantry, certainly not appropriately trained infantry, but they are the high end tasks.

They would say that wouldn't they ;) (apologies to Mandy Rice Davies)

Fish and chip units looking up at the SAS tend to be left in awe at whatever they do and hang onto every word they say. It is not for the SAS to decide what is a high end task (whatever that means) but rather to find itself tasked to carry out specific tasks... but then you will find they don't fall under the local Bde for operations.


Depends on risk involved and effect achieved and must be placed within the campaign context. AT the moment the SF are being used to pursue a Counter-Terrorism campaign and the remainder a COIN campaign as part of an overarching campaign plan.

That risk word again. The question must be asked why the risk on carrying out these type of operations is so great that only the SAS can attempt them. I doubt it is based on operational complexity but rather more on unavailability of units capable of carrying out reasonably standard operations by day or night with the competence arising from experience.


I disagree. My fundamental issue with short tours in a COIN context is that it does not allow the relationships to be built up and proper understanding to be gained. It is more inefficient then ineffective. Units deploying in to theatre are well equipped, trained and have a very good feel for the ground. They are not entering blind and they do have residual experience of the Theatre. Even 14 Army and Slimn rotated units in and out of the line.

You are attempting to defend the indefensible now. Six months on operations every two years with personnel changes thrown in offers minimal continuity.

Every level needs continuity. Currently with the short tours Brit forces are always playing catch-up to the Taliban (especially as it appears so few Taliban are being killed thesedays). It is quite possible that in years to come the Brit forces will be mentored by the ANA and not the other way around.


Except his unit will have been training for 9 months prior to deployment, will have pax in theatre on deployment (advance elements go 6-8 weeks ahead of main body) and the request will have been made 12 months in advance when unit tasks are allocated and CONOPS looked at.

Out of theatre training is better than a poke in the eye with a sharp stick but quite honestly pretty close to valueless especially if it requires the unit to deploy away from home base in the process. Advance parties during a two yearly six month rotation is like the man with one eye being king in the land of the blind. Better than a kick in the ass but not significant enough to allow the whole unit to hit the ground running on arrival in theatre.


If this was to happen it would have happened in 2004-2008 in Iraq; but it didn't. Line infantry were given the skill set (which until then only the SF had possessed) to enable them to carry out the tasks at the tactical level; they still retain this skill set and still carry out these tasks at a tactical level in Afghanistan. You seem to think that line infantry do not carry out tactical level raids, strikes, arrest operations etc - but they do.

You are starting to resort to jargon. There is no question that there is a weakness in operations at platoon level among Brit forces in Afghanistan as the majority lack the operational continuity and recent experience to acquit themselves with distinction. Their frame of reference is a comparison with other '6-month wonder units' and this is why they are in jaw dropping awe of what the SAS do. I am not going on about what they currently do but rather what the SAS currently do that they (the line infantry) should be doing as a standard part of a COIN company/platoon/section/fire-team skill set. You will never get the rotating line infantry up to the required standard as long as the tours are short.

Red Rat
10-20-2011, 08:39 AM
If you say so ;)
But as we have seen the numbers for these Afghanistan ops are not always small (like at Wardak). It is these ops where larger numbers are employed that I question the use of the SAS in the role of bayonets.

But the SF raised this issue themselves in 2002 which resulted in the raising of the SFSG. The SFSG are not SF, but operate in direct support of and under command of the SF.


It is not for the SAS to decide what is a high end task (whatever that means) but rather to find itself tasked to carry out specific tasks... Which is what happens.


That risk word again. The question must be asked why the risk on carrying out these type of operations is so great that only the SAS can attempt them. I doubt it is based on operational complexity but rather more on unavailability of units capable of carrying out reasonably standard operations by day or night with the competence arising from experience.
No. Risk is not just risk to the soldiers carrying out the op, it is the impact of the op going right or wrong, the sensitivity of the operation, the sensitivity of the intelligence involved, the value of the target, the tempo of the operation and a multitude of other factors. Could other units do it if they had the competence arising from experience - quite possibly yes. But the other units are busy doing other things - not least of which is carrying out similar operations in size and complexity but against tactical level targets.


You are attempting to defend the indefensible now. Six months on operations every two years with personnel changes thrown in offers minimal continuity. Rabbit hole alert. We've both decided to agree that short tours are bad in the context of this type of campaign, disagree in parts as to the vaidity for the rationale that got us to there (I agree on the charge of militarism, but few others), disagree in places on the impact of it and what can be done about it. :rolleyes:



Every level needs continuity. Currently with the short tours Brit forces are always playing catch-up to the Taliban (especially as it appears so few Taliban are being killed thesedays). Hmm. Where is your evidence on this? In Helmand the evidence would tend to support the counter-proposition; the the Taleban are playing catch-up to ISAF at the tactical and operational level. They are heavily attrited, have comprehensively lost influence, lost control of ground, and their ability to prosecute successful attacks has declined markedly as well. We have now seen over 12 months of steady decline in violence in Helmand, no summer campaign season in the traditional sense and winter season which has seen ISAF move from consolidation to offence. Part of the reason that so few insurgents are being killed now is that there are far fewer of them left - attrition still plays a role in campaigning :D


You are starting to resort to jargon. There is no question that there is a weakness in operations at platoon level among Brit forces in Afghanistan as the majority lack the operational continuity and recent experience to acquit themselves with distinction.
Every corporal (section commander) will have 12 months operational experience, in Iraq or Afghanistan, every sergeant 24-36. In terms of frontline experience that is a level of experience comparable to the 8th Army in 1944 or the Chindits in 1945, or indeed 14th Army in early 1945 (by the end of the war experience levels had dropped considerably as the government insisted on releasing soldiers for UK leave if they had been away from the UK for 5 or more years - that gutted entire officer and SNCO cohorts). Again, where is the proof for the weakness in platoon operations?

As to jargon sorry. Many of the tasks done by the SF early on in Iraq were done because the field army lacked the training to do them, especially in the area of house assault. This was a standard skillset in the US Army but an SF skillset in the British Army (SF did it as it was regarded as a Counter-Terrorism skillset). Now, like the US Army, it is a basic skillset that we all do.



Their frame of reference is a comparison with other '6-month wonder units' and this is why they are in jaw dropping awe of what the SAS do. I am not going on about what they currently do but rather what the SAS currently do that they (the line infantry) should be doing as a standard part of a COIN company/platoon/section/fire-team skill set. You will never get the rotating line infantry up to the required standard as long as the tours are short. But what are the SF doing that the line units aren't? In types of operation there is no difference that I can see.

JMA
10-21-2011, 12:58 AM
But the SF raised this issue themselves in 2002 which resulted in the raising of the SFSG. The SFSG are not SF, but operate in direct support of and under command of the SF.

Well I put it to you that when a given operation requires additional 'support' from non special forces then (in the context of Afghanistan) it ceases to be a 'special operation' commanded by the SAS (or what-have-you) and control should pass to the numerically predominant unit.

We finally got to this in operations into Zambia against dug-in conventionally trained ZIPRA units. Command passed to the unit which had supplied the most troops being the RLI and those SAS involved were under command. Now compare that to Op Barras where the A Coy 1 Para (120-140 men with attachments) made up the numbers with the 60 man SAS squadron. (Understandably because at the time there was virtually no combat experience in the Para company and the reported average age was 19)


Which is what happens.

And with this we return to the problem of who other than the SAS to task for these ops. I have mentioned line infantry to illustrate a point but do acknowledge that there are two tiers involved here and that the Paras and the Royal Marines by virtue of their selection process place them at the head of the infantry list as first tier units being the obvious first choice for such tasks after the SAS (this said wondering why the SAS were considered for these non-recce and non-small team tasks in the first place).

I will say again (at the risk of touching a nerve) that the use of the SAS (special forces) to carry out otherwise pretty standard infantry raid operations is a barometer as to the declining operational ability of line infantry units in the British army. As long as the SAS are the only real option for these tasks it remains a poor reflection on the rest of the army.

Given that the Cold War period nonsense has been dropped from training (or should have been) I continue to wonder what these units do during the 18 months of 'real' soldiering between the 'distracting' tours in Afghanistan? Surely between guarding palaces and ceremonial duties and parades there is time to do some real training or is there no budget to fund anything other than merely going through the motions?


No. Risk is not just risk to the soldiers carrying out the op, it is the impact of the op going right or wrong, the sensitivity of the operation, the sensitivity of the intelligence involved, the value of the target, the tempo of the operation and a multitude of other factors. Could other units do it if they had the competence arising from experience - quite possibly yes. But the other units are busy doing other things - not least of which is carrying out similar operations in size and complexity but against tactical level targets.

What ops are you talking about? Some the locally deployed units seem to be able to do themselves but others seem to need the SAS with 1 Para (SFSG) support.

We have turned full circle and back to unit operational capability and which units are capable of conducting certain types of operations. We get to another grey area now. A few years ago I suggested that for continuity purposes (for example) the Royal Marine Commandos (... note the word commando) be instructed to have a full strength commando (battalion) in Afghanistan (at all times) to be able to take on any commando type (specialized raiding tasks) as required. That's too simple a proposition and the Brits prefer to fiddle and fart around with short tours with long breaks with the subsequent serious negative operational outcomes.


Rabbit hole alert. We've both decided to agree that short tours are bad in the context of this type of campaign, disagree in parts as to the vaidity for the rationale that got us to there (I agree on the charge of militarism, but few others), disagree in places on the impact of it and what can be done about it. :rolleyes:

Yes I know we can go on and on about this and I understand that for you to accept the catastrophic outcome of this approach on operational efficiency is difficult (to say the least) because that would indicate an acceptance that the Brit performance in Afghanistan has been sub-optimal (to say the least). Once again the ineptitude of Brit generals has been exposed and that I appreciate is humiliating and hard to bear.


Hmm. Where is your evidence on this?

I'll show you mine, if you'll show me yours ;)


In Helmand the evidence would tend to support the counter-proposition; the the Taleban are playing catch-up to ISAF at the tactical and operational level. They are heavily attrited, have comprehensively lost influence, lost control of ground, and their ability to prosecute successful attacks has declined markedly as well. We have now seen over 12 months of steady decline in violence in Helmand, no summer campaign season in the traditional sense and winter season which has seen ISAF move from consolidation to offence. Part of the reason that so few insurgents are being killed now is that there are far fewer of them left - attrition still plays a role in campaigning :D

No, the Taliban having absorbed the surge in troops into Helmand (from 9,500 to around 30,000) have reverted to type and are watching and planning and adapting (remember what Skeen wrote about them from experiences back then). When the 'poppy money' comes in this year being estimated at more than ever before they will be in a position to spend it wisely on operations producing the maximum psychological and propaganda effect (like the raid in Kabul and the Panjshir Valley attack). Remember they have the time.

Thanks to the surge and with pockets full of money (thanks to the acceptance of the Afghan drug trade as being beyond the ability of ISAF and hangers-on to control) the Taliban will have to learn to operate more cleverly and have pots of money to do just that. Good for them, not so good for Karzai and ISAF.


Every corporal (section commander) will have 12 months operational experience, in Iraq or Afghanistan, every sergeant 24-36. In terms of frontline experience that is a level of experience comparable to the 8th Army in 1944 or the Chindits in 1945, or indeed 14th Army in early 1945 (by the end of the war experience levels had dropped considerably as the government insisted on releasing soldiers for UK leave if they had been away from the UK for 5 or more years - that gutted entire officer and SNCO cohorts). Again, where is the proof for the weakness in platoon operations?

Clutching at straws? I accept that having experienced NCOs in a platoon (with experienced officers at battalion level) looking after raw and inexperienced troops is way ahead of feeding in whole raw units into the field (read up on the Australian Forces on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea and the difference in performance between the 39th and 53rd battalions). I quote:


“In August 1942 the 39th and 53rd Battalions of the Australian Militia, composed of 18 year old conscripts, collided with a Japanese brigade advancing south across Papua New Guinea’s Kokoda Trail. The 53rd battalion turned and ran. The 39th battalion, which a few weeks earlier had received an influx of experienced officers and NCO’s, stood its ground and over the next month fought the Japanese to a standstill. This action is regarded as a test in laboratory conditions of the impact of leadership on fighting performance.” - Serve to Lead

... so as I say having experienced NCOs is better than deploying the blind school (apologies to the PC police) but nowhere near what can be classed as a lean, mean, fighting machine which is quite frankly what the spin doctors at the MoD want the country and the world to believe is happening. Pretty sad really.


As to jargon sorry. Many of the tasks done by the SF early on in Iraq were done because the field army lacked the training to do them, especially in the area of house assault. This was a standard skillset in the US Army but an SF skillset in the British Army (SF did it as it was regarded as a Counter-Terrorism skillset). Now, like the US Army, it is a basic skillset that we all do.

I wonder how many operational house assaults up to that point the SAS had done in combat up to that point? Or was it a case that the line-infantry had merely just gone through the motions during FIBUA (fighting in built up areas) training? And that out of the whole British Army at that time only a few hundred soldiers were considered capable of carrying out a house assault? So what, it should be asked, filled the year of these units if basic FIBUA training was not covered? I need to dig out my copy of the Brit Infantry Platoon in Battle and refresh myself on what is contained therein. I ask myself how long it would take to take sections through FIBUA house clearing training. Dangerous work, yes, rocket science, no.

What else I wonder (of what I would consider to be basic soldiering skills) are not being covered these days in section and platoon training? In my own experience because of constant operations we battled to find the time required for training in aspects we did not do everyday. With 18 months between tours the Brit Army has no excuses.


But what are the SF doing that the line units aren't? In types of operation there is no difference that I can see.

Then why are the SAS still doing those types of operations?

davidbfpo
04-28-2012, 07:07 PM
Post Ten refers to the 2001 edition being updated and in May 2012 a link was found on the BBC News website to the 2009 edition, but has now disappeared.

This was the link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf

I did note the document has no official markers and was found on a BBC website, so I assumed it is for public use. Today May 12th 2012 a SWC member has drawn attention to the copyright notice, which also proclaims it was an official document and not for public use. Maybe someone noticed thirty months later it was in the public domain?

Moderator's Note

I found five separate threads in this arena and have merged them after a review. (Ends)

davidbfpo
04-28-2012, 07:45 PM
Not to overlook the impact on British COIN of the Malayan experience, well explained IMO in this SWJ article:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/malaya-the-myth-of-hearts-and-minds

With a comment added today that refers to an AFJ March 2011 'Slow learners: How Iraq and Afghanistan forced Britain to rethink COIN', which I don't think has been caught on SWC before and is very good:http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/11/6292362

It ends with:
The British military’s experience in contemporary COIN operations elicited an unfortunate smugness and complacency in an organization that thought that it “got it.” Successful experiences in the past gave it a false sense of security in its approaches to Iraq and Afghanistan, and it suffered the consequences. Officers within the organization identified these shortcomings, but also began to point out failures in adaptation, while the U.S. seemed to embrace change. Though the early misperceptions may have delayed the response, the British military — especially the Army — eventually experienced very similar dynamics as its U.S. counterpart in its approaches to counterinsurgency.

With older threads Managing COIN: Lessons from Malaya:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2900

davidbfpo
05-12-2012, 04:36 PM
Actually the Sandhurst Library bibliography, alas dated August 2010; includes general matters, UK and others campaign histories; a mixture of books and articles:http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/RMAS_COIN_BIB_AKX_3.pdf

It has no official markers nor a copyright notice.

JMA
05-13-2012, 10:47 AM
Further to previous discussions on the Brit SAS there is a book out now which shines a light on to workings of the SAS:

Special Force: The Untold Story of 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) : by Alastair MacKenzie

amazon.com (http://www.amazon.com/Special-Force-Untold-Service-Regiment/dp/1848850719/ref=sr_1_7?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1336900504&sr=1-7)

amazon.co.uk (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Special-Force-Untold-Service-Regiment/dp/1848850719/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1336900517&sr=1-1)

I will quote two passages:


"Now, as I say, the soldiers [in the SAS] are the best you will ever meet. Nonetheless, within your troops too you have got men who will lie in their teeth, who will deliberately falsify accounts in order to make money for themselves, who will seduce their comrades' wives while they are overseas, whi will steal and who will even carry out armed robbery, and in case you think I am exaggerating all those things have been done by soldiers of this regiment in the last two years. Nor should you be surprised. You don't train tigers and expect them to sing like canaries and those men are highly individual and highly active." - Briefing to Troop Commanders by the Commanding Officer on 11 November 1975

and


As the myth of the SAS regiment has grown, it has become an increasingly introspective organisation, beset by the contradictions between its past and present values and by bad feelings within its ranks. Regimental officers have seen their authority undermined by the potent working-class ethos of their soldiers.

...

This book identifies that the utilisation of the special troops has not been at an appropriate political or military level. The strategic use of this exceedingly small, elite group of specialists has been based more upon the personal drive of relatively low-level officers than upon national necessity.

Note: my comments above were made before obtaining a copy of this book.

davidbfpo
05-27-2014, 02:34 PM
A WoTR review by Mark Stout onEmpire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1468307150/ref=as_li_qf_sp_asin_il_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=1468307150&linkCode=as2&tag=httpwaronthec-20&linkId=EXP4HCNDA3O53DPG)by Calder Walton:
It views the process of decolonization during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s through the lens of British intelligence operations. Walton’s main message is that “one of the most important ways in which British governments prepared for, and smoothed, the end of colonial rule was with intelligence.”

(Slight snag) The repeated use of, and problems with, pseudo-gangs highlight another important point that Walton brings out: the British intelligence services, unlike the British military, had no mechanism for recording and promulgating lessons learned in the various wars of the period. Instead, MI5 and the Special Branches had to make it all up from scratch in each conflict with the inevitable inefficiencies, failures, and mistakes that happen in the steep part of the learning curve.

Link:http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/intelligence-at-the-end-of-empire/#comment-14224

One for the buy one day list.

davidbfpo
06-15-2015, 08:02 AM
Then two books on COIN: 'Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the the challenges of modern warfare' by David Ucko & Robert Egnell and 'Counterinsurgency: Exposing the myths of the new way of war' by Douglas Porch.

Both are excellent and very, very critical of the pursuit of counter-insurgency school of thought and practice. Ucko focusses on the UK and Porch has a wider outlook.

From Ucko two quotes:
The case of Afghanistan thereby points to the significant problems inthe British way of preparing for and prosecuting modern wars: the failure to properly formulate and resource strategy; the failure of civil-military coordination at both the strategic and oerational levels; the limitations of military improvisation and of 'muddling through' in the absence of a plan; and the dangers of letting strategic intent and operational approach develop independently (pg. 108)

...there is no fig leaf large enough here to cover the deep flaws in the British government's own approach and conduct in these counterinsurgency campaigns.Porch is incredibly direct in his criticism, based on his historical knowledge and watching the last decade plus. I doubt if anyone in an official military education post in the UK could have written such a book.

SWJ Blog
08-25-2017, 06:25 AM
British Counterinsurgency: Returning Discriminate Coercion to COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/british-counterinsurgency-returning-discriminate-coercion-to-coin)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/british-counterinsurgency-returning-discriminate-coercion-to-coin) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.