Bunker and tank busters at section/squad and platoon level

[Kiwigrunt]

In the ‘New rules of war’ (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9795&page=3 ) thread there are some interesting posts regarding effect vs efficiency, also with regards to economics.

In the ‘UK in Afghanistan’ (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=93741&highlight=afghanistan) tread baboon6 and davidbfpo linked this (http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid1184614595?bctid=66448008001) video, where a UK section fires a Javelin at a suspected enemy position thought to hold a single shooter. Note in this video also that the section has two DMs with sniper rifles with one carrying a Javelin and the other has a Minimi (with but stock extended) strapped to his pack as a sidearm. Also it did not look like the GPMG gunner had a number 2, unless it was the DM with the MINIMI. But I digress.

It must be the Dutch and the builder in me that screams ‘waste’ when I see that. From both an economical perspective (which rightly does not concern the trigger pullers who will use what is at their disposal, including CAS), but also from a carried weight perspective. No doubt weapons like Javelin and Spike are unsurpassed against MBTs in a ‘conventional’, like against like war, and also where their extreme range is required. However, in A-stan against AKs, and up to around a range of 500 m, how sensible is this trend towards using what used to be battalion/company level support weapons, at section level? (Will Javelin be the next IW?) Is the range advantage the big issue here and if so, is Javelin indeed often used at section level in excess of 500/600 m?

A historical example that would support the use of the longer-range weapons is Goose Green where B-coy 2-Para was pinned down for several hours in open ground and it required anti-tank platoon’s Milan to get them unstuck. But this was at battalion level.

There are many different unguided weapons available and they are improving in quality and effect, from the lighter M72 up to the heavier Metador and Bunkerfaust. Even the 1948 designed Charlie Guts-ache is still in the running. Australia is purchasing new ones (http://defensenews.com/story.php?i=4512333&c=LAN&s=TOP).
Canada also still uses the Carl Gustav. Is there any feedback of its use in A-stan?

It seems that UK and US units at the sharp end of the stick are leaning increasingly towards the use of Javelin, almost exclusively at times. Again, is this mainly because of range advantage or is there more to it? Is there still good reason (other than from an accountants perspective) for retaining the heavier Bunkerfaust/SMAW type weapons or is the super expensive and heavy Javelin/Spike at section level the way of the future?

[Fuchs]

Well, first you look at the per-unit price of a Javelin shot.

The you look at a realistic storage life (not the shelf life that can be extended by an inspection) or if you dare to complicate the calculation even more: The life expectation as a 1st rate AT munition (about 15 years usually).

Then you look at the time that has already gone past and depreciate accordingly. That can take about 5-10 years off that Javelin, about half of the price.


Yet this calculation was only relevant if you expect to need the munition in another conflict or to replace it with a new round.

The cost of the round is zero if you won't do either. This is one of the great lessons of economic science; it helps us to be rational about this instead of trusting our guts (if we are informed).
The key here is that the money was already spent - sunk costs. Sunk costs must never be considered in a decision - they's past, sun, irrelevant.

Only opportunity costs (we would have needed that round in a later conflict) or replacement costs would be relevant.

Finally a last, unrealistic and thus irrelevant complication: The opportunity cost could also be positive if you would have sold that round. That does never seem to happen and is thus irrelevant.

In short: The Javelin shot was most likely dirt cheap.


----

Now about force planning. That is a different game, it's about the decision to buy munitions. Nobody buys Javelins to bust bunkers (I hope - the Russians offered thermobaric Krizanthemas, though). These munitions are usually bought for other purposes and their use against low value targets is usually just an improvisation.
The typical dedicated anti-bunker munition is an unguided 300-600m Panzerfaust or Bazooka.


----

Personally I wonder why people keep carrying such heavy munitions in AFG. Even a M136 is quite heavy. The Javelin firing post has a great thermal sight (if you have the batteries to run it) and may be justified as a platoon thermal sensor - but the missiles are odd.

[Schmedlap]

I think this is one of those questions that has considerations rather than a clear answer. However, I think those considerations will usually lead one to leave the Javelin back at the patrol base.

The last time that a unit I was in carried Javelins was 2003. After that, we simply never saw any reasonable use for them. They are heavy, bulky, and pack more punch than is necessary. We did carry AT-4's, on every deployment, but not on every mission. Those are relatively heavy and bulky, but not nearly to the degree of a Javelin (and there is no $500K CLU to carry along before and after firing).

My thought has always been that if you cannot rely on indirect fire from your M203's, then you probably need to rethink your task organization or execution. (Obviously, AT-4's and M203's don't have nearly the range of a Javelin, but if the threat is that far away then how dire is the situation?)

Now, if you are conducting a mounted patrol and weight is not an issue, and you have sufficient room to bring Javelins/CLUs, then why not? Other than that situation, the negatives seem to outweigh the positives.

[jcustis]

However, in A-stan against AKs, and up to around a range of 500 m, how sensible is this trend towards using what used to be battalion/company level support weapons, at section level? (Will Javelin be the next IW?) Is the range advantage the big issue here and if so, is Javelin indeed often used at section level in excess of 500/600 m?

In Afghanstan at least, we might see a future curtailing of employment of Javelin and similar PGMs in the wake of the Marjah 27 civilian death incident. Being able to employ a precision weapon to engage a single or even multiple-shooter threat, located inside of a structure, is likely to get a lot more difficult.

I'm already concvinced that the 60 Minutes spot on the SF Team resulted in a shift in at least one application of force policy, and that only took about two weeks to come to fruition.

[reed11b]

There is certainly a need to project HE at the squad/platoon lvl, but are expensive precision AT weapons the best way to do it? See my previous posts on precision mortar rounds and LOS HE weapons at the squad/platoon lvl.
Reed

[Kiwigrunt]

I just had some further thoughts on this.

Let's say that up to about 20 years ago, infantry anti tank weapons existed in two categories, once the likes of the 106 kickless cannon were replaced with ATGMs. There were the light and medium unguided weapons like M72 and Carl Gustav at section up to company level [1] and there were the heavy guided weapons like Milan and TOW above company level[2]. Since then, the lighter weapons keep getting bigger and heavier (and slightly smarter with improved optics) as we demand an ever increasing bang (for an ever increasing buck). At the same time technology allows the heavier weapons to become increasingly light and compact (relatively speaking).

Are we reaching a point where the top end medium weapons of category 1 are being pushed into redundancy by category 2, leaving only the lighter weapons like M72 up to AT4 and its variants with a right to exist? I should think that the cut-off point there would be around the 6 to 8 kg mark.

And to what extent is it mainly the beancounters that throw lifelines to the heavier weapons of category 1 (read also Fuchs’ input).

My personal thoughts are that there is definitely still a place for the light to medium ‘dumb’ weapons like Metador, Carl Gustav and Panzerfaust at around the 8 to 14 kg mark, even disregarding economics. But, to mirror Fuchs and Schedlap, their use in a relatively low intensity conflict like A-stan would, for weight reasons, still need to be carefully considered. Here something like the 40 mm MV revolver might be a more sensible option. Question is, would that be carried instead of something current or in addition to….my guess is in addition to. I’m sure that soldier with the sniper rifle and the Minimi could carry a bit more…..or perhaps the GPMG gunner? Now I’m just being facetious.

[davidbfpo]

IIRC the use of Javelin in Afghanistan was prompted by their advancing redundancy and so firing them off came along as a brilliant idea.

I was puzzled at the UK patrol's weapon mix and why carry Javelin out of the nearby patrol base anyway. The patrol appeared to only go 600-800m from the patrol base; surely Javelin could have been left there?

[Schmedlap]

Javelin is heavy, bulky, takes longer to employ (versus an AT-4). One of the recurring themes in A'Stan is the issue of how much weight Soldiers carry and how mobile they are.

The elation that a PFC felt in OIF I upon destroying a T-72 with a Javelin was not along the lines "woo hoo - I just made a big bang." Rather it was "thank you, God, I no longer need to carry that awkward sonovabitch."

What is the added capability that you get from a Javelin that you cannot get from a few extra rounds of 40mm HE or an AT-4 (other than added range and a bit more precision)?

[William F. Owen]

My broad conclusions are as follows, - and not necessarily more useful or insightful that anyone else's:

a.) The lowest level at which ATGMs cane be usefully controlled is Platoon. That is they must be employed within the framework of platoon tactics, and not below.

b.) The ability to deliver a point target attack to beyond 1,000m is almost certainly useful - especially against enemy ATGM and HMG posts/positions/fortified buildings etc etc.

c.) Javelin is a high cost weapon for this type of capability. There are cheaper ways to do the same thing.

e.) Why use ATGM against enemy snipers - when you have snipers in the platoon?

[Chris jM]

Linking into what has been said above I'm interested in the role an AMW (Anti-Material Wpn) could have at the squad lvl. A .50cal/ 14.5mm rifle, in the role of an AMW, could fill some of the capability gap in the sect/squad/pl for negligible loss of mobility.

It's not an ATGM in it's ability to defeat armour, but the wpns can deliver accurate fire with a high degree of penetration against field fortified posns (say, a crew-served wpn in a bunker) or against a lightly armoured veh.

If the Jav/ ATGM is over-kill for the need to achieve destruction of an eny at a range outside the 40mm can provide for, would an AMW be of benefit either at the sect or pl level?

[William F. Owen]

.
It's not an ATGM in it's ability to defeat armour, but the wpns can deliver accurate fire with a high degree of penetration against field fortified posns (say, a crew-served wpn in a bunker) or against a lightly armoured veh.

Yes, Long range rifles may prove effective, but it's the degree of penetration and blast that are the issues. In my neighbourhood you will probably have to perforated 0.5-1m of rocks and packed earth to kill the bunker, and this is certainly an issue for some of the fortified buildings.

The issue for me, is to be able to hit the bunker from where I can get a shot, so maybe 8-1,800m , and not have to shuffle up to 1-200m to hit it with LASM, or AT-4.

[Kiwigrunt]

As we know, the Barrett and other 12.7 mm rifles have seen some use in the sandbox but probably not so much at section or even platoon level. Although I believe the German army issue it at section level but only to be pulled out of the vehicle when needed. I doubt that a foot patrol would lug it around on the off-chance that the may need it.

I’d agree with Wilf that the range is impressive but the effect against bunkers probably relatively minimal. Against light vehicles, sure. But even an AP 8.6 mm may be good enough in comparison, with a much lighter rifle. And I think that for something like a 12.7 to be effective against an enemy in a bunker, even if the bullet penetrates the bunker, you would still need to know exactly where the shooter is hiding behind that wall to hit him.

At the extreme end you could look at the NTW 20 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vXLRYf9EV2Y), but even these 20 mm grenades are probably a bit light against bunkers and the rifle is a near 30 kg beast. Again, not something for your average foot patrol…..or is it? It’s still lighter than two Javelins. Maybe as an over watch support weapon at platoon level or higher.

I think that these weapons are more suitable for surgical use against dedicated predetermined targets as opposed to knocking out bunkers that a section or platoon may stumble across during a gunfight.

[Fuchs]

A small arms bunker should be knocked out with a man-portable weapon (~89mm LRAC F-1 a.k.a. LRAC 89 a.k.a. STRIM, for example). There's no need for more punch or range.

A sniper position is very unlikely to be revealed at distances greater than the range of the aforementioned weapons.

A heavy weapons position should be taken out with a guided 120mm mortar round. It may be too strong, so in that case either call guided artillery or simply blind the position with mortar smoke.

There's no "infantry gun" capability greater than a relatively lightweight man-portable, shoulder-fired weapon necessary.


example LRAC F.1 (similar to B-300):
Used by the French for decades, reputed to be accurate
calibre 88.9 mm
length 600 mm
flight 1.55 s to 400 m
weight per shot 3.2 - 3.8 kg
weight of weapon 5.5 kg
munitions available: Smoke, Illum, HEAT, AP/AV (shaped charge + fragments)

See:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LRAC_F1
That's a tolerable weight class even for patrols in my opinion.

[William F. Owen]

A small arms bunker should be knocked out with a man-portable weapon (~89mm LRAC F-1 a.k.a. LRAC 89 a.k.a. STRIM, for example). There's no need for more punch or range.
Only 400m? Really? I'd pretty much want to zap any bunker laying down 7.62mm beaten-zone out to 15-1,800m.
I know 14.5 and 12.7mm do not produce good beaten zones, but they can easily cause casualties well beyond 1,000m.
Plus, do not forget the ZU-23mm Duce on the back of 4x4, at maybe 1,500m. Yes GPMG will tell him to poke off, but ATGM will cancel him forever.

[Fuchs]

Areas with fields of fire like 1,800m are no infantry terrain.

Call an AFV to do an AFV's job.

[William F. Owen]

Areas with fields of fire like 1,800m are no infantry terrain.

Call an AFV to do an AFV's job.
You might want to look at the Southern Lebanon, Cyprus, parts of Turkey, the Atlas Mountains, etc etc. If you have weapons which can fire 1,800m, so will the enemy.

[Fuchs]

Who cares?

A threat at 1,800 m could - if spotted and identified at that distance - be dealt with with non-organic fire support. Pillboxes have the habit of not running away in time.

A platoon that's being spotted at 1,800 m against a competent and well-equipped opponent is a) incompetent and b) likely dead anyway.
Infantry should be able to conceal its movement up to a couple hundred meters distance. Maybe it cannot - then the terrain is so poor for them that they should better call AFV and/or support fires.


My point is that infantry should use appropriate terrain and it should not give away its location unless necessary. A 1,000 m HE shot gives away its location.

Some problems need to be dealt with with decisions at Bn or Bde level; AFV and/or indirect fires need to be allocated if the terrain offers 1,500 m field of view.
There's no point in equipping the infantry platoon for a job that others can do much better.

[William F. Owen]

A threat at 1,800 m could - if spotted and identified at that distance - be dealt with with non-organic fire support. Pillboxes have the habit of not running away in time.
Hang on. You're assuming combat occurs in an iterative form and works in a casual and predictable way. We know it does not. Look at the battle of Goose Green. You might not spot them until they engage.

Sure bunkers are fixed, but if my lead section is pinned and taking casualties, I can get a Jav or Spike round into it, long before I can call for, and adjust fire - which I might not get.

If I do have MBTs in support I can back-load the ATGM. If I do not, I detail a fire team to man and support it.

I just ask the question, is a platoon able to move and sustain guided weapons better or worse off, given the reasonable or possible contexts and conditions?

[Fuchs]

There are those one-pound smoke hand grenades.
You should use them to survive a surprise encounter (if the enemy is really that incompetent that you can escape at all).

Smoke, disperse, run for cover, call in fires.

No mater what kind of ammunition and weaponry you give to the platoon - it will always be at a terrible disadvantage against an enemy platoon that thought it was a good idea to open fire - and did so with surprise effect.


Those Goose Green guys did not survive by using Milan missiles before taking cover.
They would have benefited a lot by a few good bazookas, though.

[Firn]

What can deliver a bigger yet portable bang than a 40 mm at the squad or platoon level?

1) Rifle grenades come in different shapes and sizes, but I doubt that a 5,56 round can propel a medium warhead (1-2 kg) or even a heavy (3-4 kg) to medium distances (300-400 m). Perhaps still a interesting way to deliver grenades like SIMON or a heavy bunker-busting grenade over a short distance.

BTW, the 7,62 should be better suited for such tasks, even better should do the 8,6 Lapua Magnum and best the 12,7. However it might be asked much to develop a specific rifle grenade for the "sniper grenadier". :D

2) A light shoulder-fired weapon. A modern LRAC sounds interesting, what about a Panzerfaust III with a reusable tube and a broad spectrum of warheads? The Carl Gustav has been made lighter, but the package is a bit too heavy for a squad.

Firn

P.S: Kiwigrund, I found this bit (http://armyapp.forces.ca/allc-clra/Downloads/bulletin/TheBulletinVol12No3eng.pdf) about the use of the Carl Gustav in Afghanistan. As Schmedlap posted, it depends if the operation is mounted or not.


With respect to anti-armour weapons, B Coy maintained a three-layer approach (light, medium, and heavy). Short range continued to be dominated by the M72 disposable rocket. Readily available in the LAV III carriers or patrol packs, the M72 was perfect for neutralizing most armour threats in theatre. As each section carried two, the M72 could also be employed against bunkers or enemy soldiers in the open. If a heavier threat materialized, the 84 mm Carl Gustav rocket was the main system for medium engagements (regularly carried in the Pl HQ LAV III). Firing both standard and rocket assisted munitions, the Carl Gustav was more than capable destroying all known armour threats that existed in Afghanistan.

[Kiwigrunt]

Those Goose Green guys did not survive by using Milan missiles before taking cover.
They would have benefited a lot by a few good bazookas, though.

They survived by pushing their faces in the dirt and holding their breath. They had Carl Gustav (I assume) but they would have been just out of range and were manned by the very guys with their faces in the dirt. The Milan gave them the relief they needed because is fired from an over-watch position and from a safe distance. And that is where I do agree with you with regards to using battalion level (as opposed to organic) fire support. Had B-coy carried Milan themselves they may not have been able to use them as effectively.

[Kiwigrunt]

What can deliver a bigger yet portable bang than a 40 mm at the squad or platoon level?

1) Rifle grenades come in different shapes and sizes, but I doubt that a 5,56 round can propel a medium warhead (1-2 kg) or even a heavy (3-4 kg) to medium distances (300-400 m). Perhaps still a interesting way to deliver grenades like SIMON or a heavy bunker-busting grenade over a short distance.

An 81 mm mortar fires a 3 to 4 kg warhead. Imagine your shoulder underneath the base plate. ;) So firing something that size from a rifle could only work (perhaps) by using the bullet for the initial launch after which a rocket would have to take over. By then you've got something like an AT4.



2) A light shoulder-fired weapon. A modern LRAC sounds interesting, what about a Panzerfaust III with a reusable tube and a broad spectrum of warheads? The Carl Gustav has been made lighter, but the package is a bit too heavy for a squad.


Pzf 3 weighs up 15 kg depending on the type of round. Carl Gustav M3 is a few kg lighter but can not be fired from an enclosed space. I'd say that giving a Pzf a reusable tube would add to the weight because it's calibre is greater than that of the Carl Gustav. (think RPG)
Firn


P.S: Kiwigrund, I found this bit (http://armyapp.forces.ca/allc-clra/Downloads/bulletin/TheBulletinVol12No3eng.pdf) about the use of the Carl Gustav in Afghanistan. As Schmedlap posted, it depends if the operation is mounted or not.

Thanks for that link. This sounds like a common sense approach.

[Fuchs]

What can deliver a bigger yet portable bang than a 40 mm at the squad or platoon level?

1) Rifle grenades come in different shapes and sizes, but I doubt that a 5,56 round can propel a medium warhead (1-2 kg) or even a heavy (3-4 kg) to medium distances (300-400 m). Perhaps still a interesting way to deliver grenades like SIMON or a heavy bunker-busting grenade over a short distance.

BTW, the 7,62 should be better suited for such tasks, even better should do the 8,6 Lapua Magnum and best the 12,7. However it might be asked much to develop a specific rifle grenade for the "sniper grenadier". :D

German AT rifles were converted for long-range rifle grenade fire in the midst of WW2.



Rifle grenades can have a sustainer rocket like RPG, but accuracy (or lack thereof) and possibly a rocket smoke trail may rule it out.


M72'sand RPG18's have been heavily used as infantryman's "infantry gun", but a reloadable weapon would be more weight efficient in that calibre group. The French had SARPAC on offer, that was pretty much a reloadable M72.

There's no real market for this today because of the 40mm MV cartridge. That cartridge hasn't the HE power to deal with structures, but it offers similar effect on soft targets without cover.


The USMC "Spike (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/04/spike-missile-lighter-one.html)" missile project may be of interest; it combines one pound explosives, more than a mile range and TV lock-on or (night) semi active laser guidance. It's supposedly $ 5,000 a piece.

[Fuchs]

@ Kiwigrunt: Pzf 3 is more like 13 kg and the barrel is already reusable. The rounds are being transported without a full container.
A lighter version is available at 90mm.


I chose to mention the LRAC F-1 for a reason; it looks - despite its age - like a very good firepower/weight compromise.
A weapon weight of 4-5 kg and a munition weight of a bit more than 3 kg seems to be a modern optimum compromise to me. The munition should have its own single-use rear barrel around itself and the weapon should be just barrel+sight+grip. That can be broken down to two very handy packages and there's no wasted container weight. Ammunition could use the Armbrust's marginal firing signature technology or normal tech - even a sustainer rocket could be used. The only fixed thing would be the calibre unless you use some kind of subcalibre design.


Weapons in that weight class are available, but there's no standardization of concepts around the world. This may be an indicator of insufficient experience (no weeding-out of poor concepts) and/or of small differences between the different compromises in use.

[William F. Owen]

The USMC "Spike (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/04/spike-missile-lighter-one.html)" missile project may be of interest; it combines one pound explosives, more than a mile range and TV lock-on or (night) semi active laser guidance. It's supposedly $ 5,000 a piece.

There's also Rafael's Mini-Spike (http://defense-update.com/photos/mini_spike.html) developed from recent operational experience. I think I've posted this before, but this is exactly the sort of thing I am talking about.

[baboon6]

In the ‘New rules of war’ (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9795&page=3 ) thread there are some interesting posts regarding effect vs efficiency, also with regards to economics.

In the ‘UK in Afghanistan’ (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=93741&highlight=afghanistan) tread baboon6 and davidbfpo linked this (http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid1184614595?bctid=66448008001) video, where a UK section fires a Javelin at a suspected enemy position thought to hold a single shooter. Note in this video also that the section has two DMs with sniper rifles with one carrying a Javelin and the other has a Minimi (with but stock extended) strapped to his pack as a sidearm. Also it did not look like the GPMG gunner had a number 2, unless it was the DM with the MINIMI. But I digress.

It must be the Dutch and the builder in me that screams ‘waste’ when I see that. From both an economical perspective (which rightly does not concern the trigger pullers who will use what is at their disposal, including CAS), but also from a carried weight perspective. No doubt weapons like Javelin and Spike are unsurpassed against MBTs in a ‘conventional’, like against like war, and also where their extreme range is required. However, in A-stan against AKs, and up to around a range of 500 m, how sensible is this trend towards using what used to be battalion/company level support weapons, at section level? (Will Javelin be the next IW?) Is the range advantage the big issue here and if so, is Javelin indeed often used at section level in excess of 500/600 m?

A historical example that would support the use of the longer-range weapons is Goose Green where B-coy 2-Para was pinned down for several hours in open ground and it required anti-tank platoon’s Milan to get them unstuck. But this was at battalion level.

There are many different unguided weapons available and they are improving in quality and effect, from the lighter M72 up to the heavier Metador and Bunkerfaust. Even the 1948 designed Charlie Guts-ache is still in the running. Australia is purchasing new ones (http://defensenews.com/story.php?i=4512333&c=LAN&s=TOP).
Canada also still uses the Carl Gustav. Is there any feedback of its use in A-stan?

It seems that UK and US units at the sharp end of the stick are leaning increasingly towards the use of Javelin, almost exclusively at times. Again, is this mainly because of range advantage or is there more to it? Is there still good reason (other than from an accountants perspective) for retaining the heavier Bunkerfaust/SMAW type weapons or is the super expensive and heavy Javelin/Spike at section level the way of the future?

In the video at least one of the soldiers is carrying an M72A9 and that and the AT4 have been extensively used by UK troops in Afghanistan. A poster on another forum I frequent wrote that the AT4s his unit had received a year or two ago were unreliable with a high percentage of blinds; possibly they were in storage too long. The M72 (always referred to by British soldiers as a "66" after its calibre) is more popular, not least because of its lighter weight. At present it is being issued to British troops in Helmand instead of the AT4. The anti-structure version of the Matador weapon is meant to enter service with the British Army later this year, having been originally ordered as far back as 2006:

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Shoulder+launch:+more+than+ever,+light,+shoulder-launched+weapons+are...-a0168432753

http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/5/925.pdf

So they are not exclusively using Javelins...

[Schmedlap]

A poster on another forum I frequent wrote that the AT4s his unit had received a year or two ago were unreliable with a high percentage of blinds; possibly they were in storage too long.

Blinds? Is that a British/Aussie word for dud? Or does that mean the sights were broken off?:confused:

[baboon6]

Blinds? Is that a British/Aussie word for dud? Or does that mean the sights were broken off?:confused:

It means a dud.

[Tukhachevskii]

There's also Rafael's Mini-Spike (http://defense-update.com/photos/mini_spike.html) developed from recent operational experience. I think I've posted this before, but this is exactly the sort of thing I am talking about.

Given the capabilities of this system (which include providing route and local area reconnaisance for the section) would it be a feasible idea to replace the Minimi SAWs in each section fireteam with something like the above and simply pooling two SF GPMGs (each manned by three man crews) at PLt HQ allied to a lightweight 60mm Commando mortar. With each section fire team also having an MGL-140 40mm multi-shot grenade launcher (for which IMI has also developed a nifty little mini-rpv) or even the HK M25 25mm air-burst rifle for fireteam leaders wouldn't that provide better fire support for the section given that the application of "precision" HE seems to be a better method for "suppression" than simply filling the air with lead (for which dedicated SF GPMGs would be better anyway)? (apologies for treating this like the "Section/Squad weapons thread" but I just had to ask).

[William F. Owen]

..... wouldn't that provide better fire support for the section given that the application of "precision" HE seems to be a better method for "suppression" than simply filling the air with lead (for which dedicated SF GPMGs would be better anyway)? (apologies for treating this like the "Section/Squad weapons thread" but I just had to ask).
You're kind of in the zone of one of my real-life debates here. My contention is HE is what kills, while bullets tend to suppress - so someone who is suppressed, cannot be killed by bullets -while suppressed- but can be killed by HE. All very obvious but it sometimes needs saying.

[jcustis]

The Mini-Spike looks like it holds promise, as of course all precision guided systems do. Setup time, weight, and time of flight are always the killers.

After a workup involving considerable amount of AT-4, M72, and MK-153 use on static ranges and LFAM exercises, I've seen a poor engagement rate within our unit, due to a number of factors, the least of which is terrbile range estimation. Try hitting a target at or near max range and on rolling terrain vice a pool table, and I've seen our gunners perform really poorly. I was conversing with a Marine captain yesterday at one of the LFAM attack ranges here at 29 Palms, and he said the current average of hits across all infantry battalions running through training and conducting platoon and company-level attacks is at a pretty dismal percentage that I won't actually go into in depth with. I will say, however, that the number was shocking.

What shocked me was the fact that the infantry trains pretty damn hard during our workups, and have access to a variety of training systems to facilitate virtual and live simulation, so we should not be so jacked up. Granted, we are talking about engagine tire stacks and vehicle hulks, so success via proximate impacts in Afghanistan may be much higher, but the fact remains that free flight rocketry at the limit of engagement range is a tough task to accomplish, even though it can be trained to.

SMAW takes a long time to get into action, relative to M72 and AT-4, and it really requires a degree of exposure that the other rockets don't require. There is the SMAW-D, which the Corps decided to pass on, and which provides HE capability which the AT-4 does not, but the issue remains one of precision. So...going back to the original question from our Kiwi, it would seem that the pressure to carry and employ Javelin might in fact come simply from the issue that it is a PGM, vice a free-flight system.

[J Wolfsberger]

What is the added capability that you get from a Javelin that you cannot get from a few extra rounds of 40mm HE or an AT-4 (other than added range and a bit more precision)?

Killing tanks. At longer ranges, and with more certainty.

Having said that, the leader in the story Kiwi wrote to start this thread, used a Javelin, I suspect, because he had it, and using it let him clear the sniper without risking any of his men. 40mm or an AT-4 would have been much more appropriate to the job, but it sounds like he didn't have those.

(Or, in keeping with other observations, he wanted to get rid of the awkward heavy thing once he had a good excuse to do so. :D)

[baboon6]

Killing tanks. At longer ranges, and with more certainty.

Having said that, the leader in the story Kiwi wrote to start this thread, used a Javelin, I suspect, because he had it, and using it let him clear the sniper without risking any of his men. 40mm or an AT-4 would have been much more appropriate to the job, but it sounds like he didn't have those.

(Or, in keeping with other observations, he wanted to get rid of the awkward heavy thing once he had a good excuse to do so. :D)

The section commander himself had a 40mm UGL on his SA80 and he did use it during the action that was filmed; as I wrote above at least one man had an M72 but I don't know if it was used or not, it's not show in the footage. The section also had fire support from 40mm GMGs at one stage.

[SethB]

If range estimation is an issue then why not issue a small laser rangefinder?

[jcustis]

If range estimation is an issue then why not issue a small laser rangefinder?


It might not even need a rangfinder attached. In the USMC squad structure, there should be a dude running about with a AN/PSQ-18 attached to his M203, and that dude should be giving the rocket gunner an ADDRAC with a computed range solution.

We don't do it in practice because we just don't freaking think about it, and in fact I only thought of the above once you asked the obvious question. Looks like I know what I'll be chatting with our Gunner about over dinner tonight!...rocket battle drill.

[Kiwigrunt]

If range estimation is an issue then why not issue a small laser rangefinder?

That would indeed appear to be the immediate simple solution. They are cheap, light and compact.
I also wonder why more advanced sights are not used more widely. They have been around for a while now and include night capability, range finding and can be matched to the munitions so that the cross hair automatically adjusts. Most light disposable AT weapons now have scope rails on them so it should not need to be that hard. These sights are meant to turn dumb weapons into half intelligent.
Photo’s show one on a Carl Gustav and IMI Shipon with its own.

(That Mini-Spike looks great. Wait till they come up with thermobaric heads...)

[SethB]

The reason that I first thought of the LRF was when I was considering Wilf's point about a .338 in the PLT.

An LRF takes a lot of the voodoo out of distance shooting. A BORS from Barret takes even more mystery out. Then it's just point and click to 1500M.

I'm not against using equipment to solve training issues. It's an American favorite.

[Ken White]

Until they go inoperative or you run out of batteries. Then what... :D

[Firn]

That would indeed appear to be the immediate simple solution. They are cheap, light and compact.

I also wonder why more advanced sights are not used more widely. They have been around for a while now and include night capability, range finding and can be matched to the munitions so that the cross hair automatically adjusts. Most light disposable AT weapons now have scope rails on them so it should not need to be that hard. These sights are meant to turn dumb weapons into half intelligent.

(That Mini-Spike looks great. Wait till they come up with thermobaric heads...)

The Dutch Marine Corps seems to use already DYNARANGE on their Panzerfaust 3. I wonder if the smaller warheads (60mm and 90mm) will get soon fielded and if a reusable rear container is possible with this specific design.


A weapon weight of 4-5 kg and a munition weight of a bit more than 3 kg seems to be a modern optimum compromise to me. The munition should have its own single-use rear barrel around itself and the weapon should be just barrel+sight+grip. That can be broken down to two very handy packages and there's no wasted container weight. Ammunition could use the Armbrust's marginal firing signature technology or normal tech - even a sustainer rocket could be used. The only fixed thing would be the calibre unless you use some kind of subcalibre design.

A wide array of warheads is of course a clear plus, and the Matador has a lot of them. But the subcalibre design allows your soldiers to train on one system and adapt it with a wider range of warheads-weights and thus targets, from modern MBTs, heavy bunkers to lightly fortified positions.


In consequence, the improved PzF 3-T replaced the original model in the late 1990s, introducing a dual hollow charge "tandem" warhead to defeat Explosive Reactive Armour. This means that the spike projecting from the warhead itself also contains an explosive charge to set off the reactive armour and free the path to the real armour for the main warhead. The latest incarnation of the Panzerfaust 3, the PzF 3-IT-600, can be fired from ranges up to 600 meters thanks to an advanced computer-assisted sighting and targeting mechanism.

As of 2005, there were two additional models in the development or testing stage, both relying on smaller and therefore lighter warheads. Those were the RGW (Rückstoßfreie Granatwaffe, Recoilless Grenade Weapon - which would make it just like the original in name and operation.) in calibers 60 and 90 millimeters. Both new weapons are expected to help facilitate the transition in German military doctrine from preparation for major tank battles to urban and low-level warfare.

Let us see how those new RGW work out...




Until they go inoperative or you run out of batteries. Then what...

The you use the simply the next LRF/FCS in your section/platoon :D


It might not even need a rangfinder attached. In the USMC squad structure, there should be a dude running about with a AN/PSQ-18 attached to his M203, and that dude should be giving the rocket gunner an ADDRAC with a computed range solution.

Jokes aside, even though I upped my range estimation skills thanks to hunting in our mountains, I'm still rather bad at range estimation, especially when you have to guess up and down steep slopes. A decent scope helps a lot, but a LRF makes things just sooo easy. ;)




Firn

[Kiwigrunt]

Until they go inoperative or you run out of batteries. Then what... :D

Then that individual may have to rely on a buddy with the same gismo. At the weight of a single 40 mm round you could easily have a few of these (http://www.eurooptic.com/leica/Leica-Laser-Range-Finder.asp?category=XCRF&vendor=XXLE&parent=XXLE&gclid=CI7Qo8LQmaACFQVaagodQSSdTw) in a section, or for a little more weight this one (http://www.opticsplanet.net/leupold-digital-rx-iv-rangefinder.html) has a built in inclinometer. Or else he/she is back to square one, which, if jcustis’ post 31 is anything to go by, isn’t much of an alternative.

I agree with you that good training and the individual’s ability to master these skills without the gadgets is preferable, but it just doesn’t seem to be happening (enough). So would it not be better to swallow our pride and break the status quo by allowing today’s technology to help us out?

How long did it take for optics to become common on almost all rifles before we dropped that silly ‘we should simply be able to use open sights because optics may fail’ attitude (read Arthur Schopenhauer’s quote below). Sure they may fail, but so what? Rifles may fail too, so let’s go back to swords.

I’m not suggesting that we drop training without the gadgets, not at all. Map reading and use of compass for instance should (and I hope is) still be taught and trained along side the use of GPS, but while GPS is available and it works, and its accuracy is required, use it.
In fact, a LRF can aid in training range estimation because you can check your guesses immediately. I do that with hunting and that is sometimes a good thing.:o

I’ll admit that over-reliance on gadgets will almost certainly blunten the ‘naked’ skills, and minimising that is/will be a challenge, but I think that using that as a justification to not use these tools does us a disservice, especially where the use of these tools increases effect measurably.

How many AT4s and other such weapons, and perhaps lives, could potentially be saved (money, carried weight and exposure through unnecessary firing signature) by increasing first hit capability through issuing these simple LRFs? Bean counters may even be happy to hand them out as disposable items.

Alternatively, issue the heavier and better military specific LRFs to team/section leaders so they can give accurate fire control orders for all weapons in their teams including 40 mm and machine guns. But for that to work effectively we may have to go back to some form of normality with regards to the number and variety of support weapons carried.

[Fuchs]

Until they go inoperative or you run out of batteries. Then what... :D



There are 1,000 m LRF (http://www.amazon.com/Bushnell-Yardage-Pinseeker-Rangefinder-Calculator/dp/B0007PEONM) for Golfers and hunters on the market. A few hundred bucks a piece. They use civilian standard batteries and the power consumption is ridiculously low - a battery set could easily serve for a full deployment.

The weight is about 1.5 lbs, one per squad is easily acceptable.

Them getting dirty or break is a less marginal problem than power.

[Tukhachevskii]

While reading this article, The Defence of Strong Point Centre (http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no1/horn-eng.asp) from the Canadian Military Journal, I came across the following statement;


Larochelle thought he was hallucinating when he witnessed what he perceived as mini-explosions going off above his outpost. Little did he realize at the time that the enemy was using RPG munitions that emitted mini cluster rounds from their 75mm warheads, which, in turn, exploded, spraying deadly shrapnel, much like an air-burst round .

AFAIK the RPG series do not have sub-munition/DPICM-style rounds. Is the report accurate or is it simply a case of the Taliban using the self-destruct fragmentation effect of the warhead when fired at extreme range?

I think the latter (thus pointing to the Taliban using RPGs either from farther away than the contact reported above or using the RPGs in the ad hoc mortar role as the Mujahedeen did during the Afghan-Soviet conflict, though usually out of necessity). I say that because the target of the above RPG strike was the Forward Observation Post/Strong Point centre located in and around a thickly built mud, straw, thatch hut within which above mentioned Pvt Larochelle was manning a GPMG and which had a “loose tarpaulin” roof which likely would have proved a tempting target; they may have decided to use their RPGs to lob one into/over the compound.

Of course the other possibility is that, in the absence of Taliban mortars equipped with such rounds (there is no mention of mortars being used by the Taliban in the engagement recounted in the original article, only RPKs and RPGs) and assuming that the munitions identified were indeed sub-munition rounds could they be the result of rcl rifle fire? Which leads me to ponder the same question above?

What say my betters?

(p.s. Can anyone tell me where I'm going wrong with my quotes?)

[baboon6]

Part of the British Army's FIST (Future Infantry Soldier Technology) plan is for officers and NCOs to be issued Vectronix MOSKITO binoculars with a built-in LRF, while the SA80/UGL will be fitted with the Rapid Acquisition Aiming Module which also has an LRF.

http://www.armedforces-int.com/article/vectronix-raam.html

http://www.miloptik.se/pdf/moskito_flyer.pdf

http://www.jag.as/Wilcox_Media/TDS117%20-%20Rapid%20Acquisition%20Aiming%20Module%20-RAAM.pdf

From what I've read the US has similar kit either already or coming soon. To a layman like me at least though some of this stuff appears unnecessarily heavy and bulky. Are their lighter solutions out there?

[kaur]

First I thougt that I'll post this letter to "Indirect fire support in small wars" thread, but I decided to post it here.


Supporting assets is either artillery, if in range, or more commonly air strikes. My question, can U.S. troops be provided enough organic lethality that they can overmatch the enemy with both direct and indirect fires without having to wait for air strikes? Prompt air support might not always be available and the infantry must have the weapons to overmatch the Taliban.


Another U.S. shortcoming in the small arms fight is the lack of a GPS guided mortar round. Only now is the Army developing a GPS round for its 60mm and 81mm mortars, and they have yet to reach the battlefield. With a 60mm mortar and GPS guided rounds, American infantry would be ale to accurately target Taliban fighters on the next ridgeline, and even behind it.

http://defensetech.org/2010/03/01/taking-back-the-infantry-half-kilometer/

Is this restart for UK Merlin shell project?

http://www.armyrecognition.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=763

[William F. Owen]

IMI has Laser and GPS guided Mortar rounds in 120 and 81mm. Having said, IIRC that the stated accuracy is a CEP of about 5-8m for GPS.
60 is not yet possible last I checked.

Basically on this subject, if we just looked to improve performance and stopped seeking "new capabilities" life would get a lot simpler.

[kaur]

Kiwigrunt's first post started the discussion about Javelin and Spike. Wilf, could you disclose the approximate price of this IMI 81 mm round to make comparsion with Javelin/Spike? Isn't 120 mm mortar too much for dismounted infantry in mountains?

[Firn]

Kiwigrunt's first post started the discussion about Javelin and Spike. Wilf, could you disclose the approximate price of this IMI 81 mm round to make comparsion with Javelin/Spike? Isn't 120 mm mortar too much for dismounted infantry in mountains?

If you have to hump it, I consider the 81 mm mortar to too heavy to transport and to sustain to be a dismounted company weapon. With pack animals this can be different. Even 60 mm rounds get *very* heavy if you have to transport a sensible amount spread out on your backs up and down steep slopes. :o


Firn

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, could you disclose the approximate price of this IMI 81 mm round to make comparsion with Javelin/Spike?
Errrr... no, cos I don't know and I do not want to make enemies out of both IMI and Rafael by asking :)
- and actually I cannot see it as a useful comparison.


Isn't 120 mm mortar too much for dismounted infantry in mountains?
I wouldn't argue. Back in the day we routinely carried 2 x 81mm, but I never saw it as being particularly sensible.

[Ken White]

Or else he/she is back to square one, which, if jcustis’ post 31 is anything to go by, isn’t much of an alternative.METT-TC. Right tool for the job. At 29 Palms, rocky desert, range estimation is difficult for several reasons and thus the LRF and such are beneficial as are they in mountains or on open plains but they aren't necessary in urban, heavily wooded or jungle environments.

Range estimation is not difficult, it just is poorly and rarely trained. Once trained it must be practiced and that isn't done either because most units spend too much time in garrison and not enough in training; the cop out for saving that money because filed training is expensive is to spend more money buying technological substitutes for competent training. :mad:

Basic problem is that you're going to do the same thing with military equipment we've done with social welfare -- make it truly unaffordable. Not even the wealthy west can afford to really equip a large Army that well. True, today's Armies are small and professional and thus lots of good equipment is affordable -- but they will have to train any required future large Armies and they won't know how...

We prove daily that we do not learn well from the past.
I agree with you that good training and the individual’s ability to master these skills without the gadgets is preferable, but it just doesn’t seem to be happening (enough).We agree that more and better training is required but we really disagree on the answer -- 'giving in' to technology is the old slippery slope. Most warfighting skills are cognitive, use 'em or lose 'em.
So would it not be better to swallow our pride and break the status quo by allowing today’s technology to help us out?I have absolutely no problem with using all the technology that's available and pushing the envelope to get more. What I do have a problem with is the fact that substituting technology for training is a fool's game. A well trained individual will get more benefit and therefor more power from technology than will a barely competent user.

It is not a question of pride, not at all. it is a question of enhancing capability -- and retaining only slightly degraded capability under adverse circumstances. That's just common sense. US Artillery adopted computers early on -- and they learned the hard way they had better teach FDC personnel how to use the old manual Plotting Board as well. So they do...

The broader problem is that warfare provides a harsh environment and most modern tech, while reasonably sturdy is not fail safe -- and you can't always rely on the availability of others in order to swap or borrow equipment. Murphy says, correctly, that it will not work when you most need it... :D
I’ll admit that over-reliance on gadgets will almost certainly blunten the ‘naked’ skills, and minimising that is/will be a challenge, but I think that using that as a justification to not use these tools does us a disservice, especially where the use of these tools increases effect measurably.I did not say or even imply that; those are your words and the rifle / sword analogy has no relationship to anything I did say. ;)

Fuchs:
Them getting dirty or break is a less marginal problem than power. Exactly. Also add the logistic footprint of that power...

That and the skill loss. Most forces today are professional and capable of learning and doing far more than they are currently asked. They are trained and treated as a bunch of barley competent conscripts. That is just stupid.

[Fuchs]

Isn't 120 mm mortar too much for dismounted infantry in mountains?

60 and 80mm may have insufficient range/ceiling to meet the requirements for mountain (not hill) warfare.


The German army uses exclusively 120mm and that's enough in my opinion. 60mm mortars with aimed indirect fire capability (= with bipod, not commando mortars) are already very heavy and the ammunition is very heavy as well. That limits the potential in mobile dismounted actions much.

It's often better to have two teams of 120mm mortars leap-frogging and providing continuous support from somewhere where they can still use small vehicles to carry the hardware.


I have never understood why some people like the idea of a 60 or 81mm mortar in an infantry company. That sounds about as smart to me as telling the Coy to carry barbed wire and filled sandbags ready to use into action.

[baboon6]

6


I have never understood why some people like the idea of a 60 or 81mm mortar in an infantry company. That sounds about as smart to me as telling the Coy to carry barbed wire and filled sandbags ready to use into action.

Well, a lot of armies have mortars at the platoon or company level, mainly 60mm, either commando or bipod/tripod-mounted, though most of the latter can be used in the handheld mode too. They include the US, British (who are replacing their 51s with 60s), Danish (who recently reintroduced 60mm mortars after getting rid of them for a while), South African, Canadian (though their 60s might go and their 81s are already part of the artillery), and at least some units of the Italian army. The US, Canada, Britain and Denmark have all used them recently in Afghanistan. So they can't be that useless. I suppose different armies just have different ways of doing things.

[Ken White]

... So they can't be that useless. I suppose different armies just have different ways of doing things.METT-TC. Combination of experience factors and who got fought where; the British, french Russian and US have fought over far more diverse terrain and have used far greater separation between units than some others.

[William F. Owen]

Well, a lot of armies have mortars at the platoon or company level, mainly 60mm, either commando or bipod/tripod-mounted, though most of the latter can be used in the handheld mode too.
Very, true, because Kg of kg they are the most efficient HE Projectors you can find. - they are also highly effective. The UK had the 2inch/51mm for nearly 70 years. Excellent weapon, if correctly used in a sensible way. The hand-held 60mm should provide much the same capability.

....all dear to my heart as i did several presentations in 2003-4 telling folk that getting rid of the 51mm was madness, and got told I was wrong. In 2006, they bring in the 60mm!!! - for exactly the reasons I said the 51mm should stay! :)

[jcustis]

60mm mortars with aimed indirect fire capability (= with bipod, not commando mortars) are already very heavy and the ammunition is very heavy as well. That limits the potential in mobile dismounted actions much.

I don't think it does limit the potential at all, at least not if you know what you're doing and can plan effectively. That's like saying that the ability to only move at 3.5 mph limits mobility...it's a big "no duh!", but it has to be applied in context.

There is no reason why a dismounted force cannot move with 60mm mortars and an effective load of ammo spread throughout the platoons. It takes training and a certain degree of intestidunal fortitude, but it isn't making water we are talking about.


It's often better to have two teams of 120mm mortars leap-frogging and providing continuous support from somewhere where they can still use small vehicles

Let's take an Op Khanjar scenario. Wheeled assets require routes to move on...routes can be susceptible to IEDs, so for the purpose of conducting a strike mission, a heliborne force avoids those routes during the initial push(es). In that scenario, ownership of a 120mm based on a wheeled platform could be considered a mobility penalty as well. It's all in the context.

Then again, we were talking about rockets, weren't we?

[kaur]

Wilf said:


In 2006, they bring in the 60mm!!!

Mystery Ranch’s new pack: Go ahead, Overload it


Here’s the man himself to explain his creation. There are few photos below showing the rig hauling some Marine Corps mortar tubes and base plates.

http://militarytimes.com/blogs/gearscout/2010/02/22/go-ahead-overload-it/

Wilf, don't you know if IMI is intending to make this kind of launchers for Lahat missile? This missile is 3x cheaper than Javelin, but gives with it's NLOS capacity for some units in some METT situations really good opportunities.

http://d.imagehost.org/t/0045/img152.jpg (http://d.imagehost.org/view/0045/img152)

[William F. Owen]

Mystery Ranch’s new pack: Go ahead, Overload it
The UK has the C6-210 hand-held.


Wilf, don't you know if IMI is intending to make this kind of launchers for Lahat missile? This missile is 3x cheaper than Javelin, but gives with it's NLOS capacity for some units in some METT situations really good opportunities.
LAHAT can be launched from very light vehicles, but I've never seen a ground launcher. Not a technical challenge, I'm sure.

[Fuchs]

I don't think it does limit the potential at all, at least not if you know what you're doing and can plan effectively. That's like saying that the ability to only move at 3.5 mph limits mobility...it's a big "no duh!", but it has to be applied in context.

There is no reason why a dismounted force cannot move with 60mm mortars and an effective load of ammo spread throughout the platoons. It takes training and a certain degree of intestidunal fortitude, but it isn't making water we are talking about.

"spread throughout the platoons".

There's one problem; platoons should not move close to each other. They themselves should march apart. Any ammo supply for a company mortar that's based on "the platoon" is quite impractical or it implies a very suboptimal movement.
A company that marches together can be fixed as one, while a company that's marching separated may have one platoon fixed, but the others would often retain their ability to move.

In short: A company mortar section should have its ammo spread in no more than a platoon equivalent. This means 3-7 kg extra weight for several dozen men.


Next the old question; why have an organic mortar when the battalion can support you with 120mm mortars over 7-13 km?

The answer can be unreliable comm (no line of sight in mountains, for example) and in the idea of the platoon/company mortar as a quickly available line of sight (direct) fire weapon.
That doesn't fit well with bipod mortars (60 and 81mm). 60mm commando mortars - okay, if the gunner is well-trained. Bipod mortars - not much different than 120mm Bn mortars; just smaller, less powerful and firing at shorter distances.

Keep in mind the availability issue as well.
You've probably not set up your bipod 60mm mortar and its crew is marching with the company. This means a slow reaction to calls for fire because they need to set up the mortar first. They may also become suppressed.

The alternative is to have it set up. Well, now you're either forced to wait at times till they caught up and set up their mortar in a new position before you can resume your march or you're back to often not having it ready while advancing.
The alternative is to use two or more mortar teams leap-frogging. This multiplies the necessary amount of mortars and mortar teams. Still, they're only moving 1/2 or 2/3 or 3/4 of the time that the infantry can move (2, 3 or 4 mortars per Coy). This still slows the Coy down (not that much, but significantly).
The mortar team in its rear firing position would also need to pull security for itself (=needs more than just carbines) and to carry the mortar and the ready ammunition. That requires a rather large section for a single 60mm mortar.

In the end, you need a mortar platoon at Coy level, every Coy in the Bn (3x or 4x) to match the firepower available from a Bn-level mortar Plt. On top of that your mortar-laden infantry Coy is still slowed down and unable to use its bipod mortars inside a forest or on a steep slope.


Even a single company action, far separated from other Bn units, could benefit more from a temporary 120mm mortar firing base in a quite remote location than from carrying its own 60mm NLOS mortars.

An incompetent, weak enemy can of course conceal most problems of yours.



Things are all very different with commando mortars; the bipod-less variety. They can be considered to be a Plt-level weapon just as a heavy sniper rifle or a tripod machine gun. They're line-of-sight weapons that are as quickly set up as the other Plt weapons and their weight is close to that of a loaded 7.62mm rifle.
I'm not sure that they're necessary, though. Infantry should be used on closed terrain that makes commando mortars unnecessary if not useless (at least in regard to HE).



In short: Keep heavy stuff away from the infantry Plt and Coy if you can substitute for it at the Bn level. Mortar and especially mortar ammunition = heavy.

[William F. Owen]

"spread throughout the platoons".
For platoon mortars the mortar team really has to carry the first line load. The biggest problem we had man-packing 81mm bombs was moving each company through the base plate location, and then cycling them back to pick up unused rounds.

Next the old question; why have an organic mortar when the battalion can support you with 120mm mortars over 7-13 km?
because you may be detached away from the battalion or battle group, and they may not be able to cross attach a mortar section to you - but I have to concur, I do not really see why you need BN and COY mortar sections. The ability to attach BN mortars to COY or group COY under BN control seems to me to offer the best of both worlds.

The alternative is to use two or more mortar teams leap-frogging. This multiplies the necessary amount of mortars and mortar teams.
We, (UK) always tried to moved with at least 2 tubes covering. - and again, that's where man-packing the bombs creates problems. It can be done. We did it, but it was always problematic

I'm not sure that they're necessary, though. Infantry should be used on closed terrain that makes commando mortars unnecessary if not useless (at least in regard to HE).
Hand-helds work well in jungle and have a good record for doing so - and infantry do not get to choose where they have to go.

I agree with not making the infantry mini-all arms teams, but you need more than just rifles and MGs.

[Firn]

Then again, we were talking about rockets, weren't we?


Yes, but it mortars are part of the firepower and weight context. When spreading mortar rounds you have to cut back on BB or AT rounds.



Let's take an Op Khanjar scenario. Wheeled assets require routes to move on...routes can be susceptible to IEDs, so for the purpose of conducting a strike mission, a heliborne force avoids those routes during the initial push(es). In that scenario, ownership of a 120mm based on a wheeled platform could be considered a mobility penalty as well. It's all in the context.

Agreed.



I don't think it does limit the potential at all, at least not if you know what you're doing and can plan effectively. That's like saying that the ability to only move at 3.5 mph limits mobility...it's a big "no duh!", but it has to be applied in context.


It depends, as said before, on context and METT-TC. If, and a big if the (mounted) heavy 120 mm mortars of the battalion can support you both effectively, due to good training and coordination and efficiently, due to the efficient supply and great accurate big bang from the sky, than it might be a better idea to go lighter or to carry something else.

Considering the points raised by Fuchs the 120 mm mortar, both self-propelled, inserted or drawn can be a very attractive choice. I'm also firmly convinced that "It's often better to have two teams of 120mm mortars leap-frogging and providing continuous support from somewhere where they can still use small vehicles to carry the hardware."

Still there are time and places where the company or even the platoon might have to work outside the umbrella offered by the battalion's mortars. A "true" 81mm or 60 mm mortar transported in by a vehicle and operated by a skilled crew should do great. Especially a 60 mm could fit well into most vehicles and helicopters and is IMHO the most you can sensibly support over difficult terrain and long distances from your back.


METT-TC. Right tool for the job. At 29 Palms, rocky desert, range estimation is difficult for several reasons and thus the LRF and such are beneficial as are they in mountains or on open plains but they aren't necessary in urban, heavily wooded or jungle environments.

Range estimation is not difficult, it just is poorly and rarely trained. Once trained it must be practiced and that isn't done either because most units spend too much time in garrison and not enough in training; the cop out for saving that money because filed training is expensive is to spend more money buying technological substitutes for competent training.

I think that both training and LRF are complementary. The closer the range, the swifter the projectile and the richer the environment, the easier it is to train people to guess and hit correctely. On the other hand the longer the range, the slower the projectile and the plainer the terrain the greater the benefit of the LRF.


Firn

[baboon6]

The UK has the C6-210 hand-held.


LAHAT can be launched from very light vehicles, but I've never seen a ground launcher. Not a technical challenge, I'm sure.

They also have the M6-895 as an alternative to the 81 for battalion mortar platoons.

[SethB]

Being able to range either by making an educated guess or milling the target is great, but the accuracy required makes an LRF a very good thing to have.

The following is from Zak Smith of Demigod LLC:


Knowing the range of the target is critical to making long-range hits. Between 500 and 1000 yards, the best .308 Winchester loads are dropping at one inch every four yards forward travel, up to one inch every yard forward travel. For example, at 700 yards, it drops at about 1/2" per yard. If a target is 16" in diameter (a pretty large target) and the shooter aims at the center, he has 8" of vertical error margin.

This margin is used up by rifle and shooter accuracy, accuracy of "data book" drop values compared to current real conditions and load, and ranging error. If we look only at ranging error, that 8" of error margin translates into 16 yards. In other words, the estimated range which is used to look up the drop value, must be within plus or minus 16 yards of the real value. If his range estimate is 25 yards short, the bullet will be 12.5" low, and it will miss the target.


Obviously he is discussing small arms and not crew serveds/rockets/grenades, but the principles of trajectory stand.

[Firn]

Being able to range either by making an educated guess or milling the target is great, but the accuracy required makes an LRF a very good thing to have.

Obviously he is discussing small arms and not crew serveds/rockets/grenades, but the principles of trajectory stand.

The far lower muzzle/flight velocity of the grenades and rockets in question magnifies the error derived from bad range estimation compared to the .308.

A LRF and good tables can greatly increase the hit probability at long ranges, wind permitting. However there are times and places where there will no time to consult the range finder, and chances are high that especially in this situations you need quickly a lot of HE on target.


Firn

[jcustis]

Next the old question; why have an organic mortar when the battalion can support you with 120mm mortars over 7-13 km?

I think that's a bit like saying we shouldn't have 120s because 155mm artillery can do the job, and can do it farther.

If we are to presume that platoons are going to be dispersed, and then that companies are going to be dispersed, then by advocating a consolidation of fires to the battalion level, we also restrict the timeliness of fire support in turn, because the company commander has to potentially compete with at least 3-5 other maneuver elements for HE fires when he might be able to resolve the situation with his organic support.

Add to this the factor of deconflicting gun-target lines from a distant fire support agency, when rotary-wing or fixed-wing CAS is being called in, and the 60mm mortar may be just the ticket to establish suppression and marking.

As for the concern about getting at 81mm or smaller mortar into action, the standard for the gunner to get one mounted is 90 seconds or less. It can take about that same length of time for the FDC to completely process the call-for-fire from the FO, so I don't see where timeliness is at all an issue since we trained to a standard and meet it routinely.

If I follow the argument correctly, it seems as though the weight of HE fires from a 60mm section are deemed to be not worth the trouble, but I would have to totally disagree. I recognize the 120s bring a big punch, and would not disagree that they are a substantial enabler, but they can't be taken at face value when so many employment considerations are at issue.

[Fuchs]

Deconfliction is ridiculous nonsense. The chance of one mortar bomb hitting an aircraft is marginal. There's a lot of nonsense happening around the topic of "deconfliction". Present-day deconfliction is a bureaucratic overreaction to a marginal problem and hurts more than it helps.

About the difference between 120 and 155mm; indeed, you could do many jobs with 155mm instead. The problem is human behaviour; you need a low performance, low-range asset that's not much worth to higher commands to ensure that you have the support at all. Artillery can too easily be occupied with other tasks than supporting you.
This works for 60mm vs 120mm as well - and is at the same time a completely different story due to many factors (especially the fact that the Bn depends on the success of its Coys while Art doesn't depend on some Inf Bn 20 km away).


About setting up a 60mm mortar:
- the ground may be rather unsuitable (slope or too soft)
- GPS jamming may prevent a quick set up
- the team may be suppressed because it's relatively close to the action
- they may be below foliage


Again, my point is that everything that can be substituted for at Bn level should not be in a Coy - similar with Coy and Plt.
I would want the infantry to be as nimble as possible - the acceptable weight limit can too easily be reached with its line of sight hardware alone.

[reed11b]

Deconfliction is ridiculous nonsense. The chance of one mortar bomb hitting an aircraft is marginal. There's a lot of nonsense happening around the topic of "deconfliction". Present-day deconfliction is a bureaucratic overreaction to a marginal problem and hurts more than it helps.

About the difference between 120 and 155mm; indeed, you could do many jobs with 155mm instead. The problem is human behaviour; you need a low performance, low-range asset that's not much worth to higher commands to ensure that you have the support at all. Artillery can too easily be occupied with other tasks than supporting you.
This works for 60mm vs 120mm as well - and is at the same time a completely different story due to many factors (especially the fact that the Bn depends on the success of its Coys while Art doesn't depend on some Inf Bn 20 km away).


About setting up a 60mm mortar:
- the ground may be rather unsuitable (slope or too soft)
- GPS jamming may prevent a quick set up
- the team may be suppressed because it's relatively close to the action
- they may be below foliage


Again, my point is that everything that can be substituted for at Bn level should not be in a Coy - similar with Coy and Plt.
I would want the infantry to be as nimble as possible - the acceptable weight limit can too easily be reached with its line of sight hardware alone.

Have you ever used a 60mm mortar Fuchs? No need for GPS to set up, patrol baseplate will fire on darn near any surface, and no foliage is going to detonate a 60mm mortar round. As far as being close to the action, ta-da, trigger fire mode!
Reed
former 60mm gunner.

[SethB]

US has suffered mortar-plane intersections in the past. In peacetime, even.

You do realize that the max ord of a 120MM mortar is very high? It's not a low angle weapon.

[Ken White]

- they may be below foliageNot a problem.
- the ground may be rather unsuitable (slope or too soft)Not a problem; shovels and sandbags can fix that (lacking sandbags, just use a folded poncho full of slammed down dirt).
- the team may be suppressed because it's relatively close to the actionShould not be a problem; need not be a problem other than very, very rarely.
- GPS jamming may prevent a quick set upOr the batteries on the GPS may be depleted... :D

Where's a map reader when you need one...;)

[William F. Owen]

Deconfliction is ridiculous nonsense. The chance of one mortar bomb hitting an aircraft is marginal. There's a lot of nonsense happening around the topic of "deconfliction". Present-day deconfliction is a bureaucratic overreaction to a marginal problem and hurts more than it helps.
De-confliction is a very real problem. I can think of 3 occasions I know of where field artillery has downed aircraft accidently, and while it may be an acceptable risk in some circumstances you need to practice some form of de-confliction for a whole range of reasons.
EG: As an MFC you cannot call in fires if your LOS is blocked by dust from a an air strike. - and you want make sure the correction your calling is actually being called on you guns and not someone else's.

[Fuchs]

The max. altitude of a 120mm mortar bomb is about 3,500 m for a 7,000 m shot. Longer-ranged shots are the exception even for those mortars that are capable of reaching farther.

Modern combat aircraft in a ManPADS environment prefer to fly above 15,000 ft for their safety = about 4,500 m Add the max. altitude of nearby mountain tops to this and subtract the altitude of the mortar for comparison with the previous figure.

Helicopters hovering over the mortar need no deconfliction to avoid being shot by the mortar crew. Helicopters hovering over the target area need no mortar bomb to crash.

So how exactly is there a need for deconfliction of mortars/aviation?

I didn't even make a probability calculation (too difficult for being made for free anyway) and it already looks ridiculous.


The deconfliction craze has even limited the use of 5 kg hand-launched UAVs. It's a bureaucratic overreaction.


OK, some aircraft were downed somewhere, sometime by artillery (!= mortars).
Fine, now can you also tell me how many troops on the ground were killed due to lack of fire support or UAV recce because of deconfliction? It's simply wrong to ignore the other side of the coin, after all!
Also keep in mind that those who are kept busy by deconfliction and similarly excessively practiced bureaucratic procedures could be removed and their funds be allocated to the infantry. What would you prefer? 200 more infantrymen in AFG and 200 support personnel less or to keep deconfliction in a country that's almost devoid of aircraft?

Now tell me again that the present deconfliction regime is appropriate.


You know what? Sometime in WW2 RAF operational researchers meant that losses of bombers would drop considerably if they arrived in a shorter time window over the defended target. They developed a plan how to achieve that. Pilots feared that there would be collisions in such a hazardous plan. The OR people told them that on average only two aircraft would collide, but several more would be saved from Flak. It turned out they were right.

You can maximize safety procedures and make sure that no avoidable accident becomes a burden on the CO's career. Alternatively you could do the job as well as possible.

[Pete]

So how exactly is there a need for deconfliction of mortars/aviation?
In November-December 1983 when I was the Fire Support Officer for the 1/32 Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, I took my Forward Observers to Arctic Weather Training with 1/32 at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. During a live fire exercise one of my FOs was in an OH-58 helicopter directing mortar fire--81mm or 4.2-inch, I don't remember which but we fired both--when the FO and pilot decided to go down to take a look at what the rounds had done to the tundra. The mortars were only supposed to fire "At my command," or when they had been specifically told to do so. As they were hovering 30 feet over the ground looking down at the craters--which on the frozen ground were pretty negligible--the words "Splash, over" came over the radio. That is, rounds were on the way using the same firing data as the previous rounds. Needless to say, the pilot wasted no time flying away, and we had a polite word with the mortar section.

[Fuchs]

In November-December 1983 when I was the Fire Support Officer for the 1/32 Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, I took my Forward Observers to Arctic Weather Training with 1/32 at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. During a live fire exercise one of my FOs was in an OH-58 helicopter directing mortar fire--81mm or 4.2-inch, I don't remember which but we fired both--when the FO and pilot decided to go down to take a look at what the rounds had done to the tundra. The mortars were only supposed to fire "At my command," or when they had been specifically told to do so. As they were hovering 30 feet over the ground looking down at the craters--which on the frozen ground were pretty negligible--the words "Splash, over" came over the radio. That is, rounds were on the way using the same firing data as the previous rounds. Needless to say, the pilot wasted no time flying away, and we had a polite word with the mortar section.

So basically they had disobeyed orders or not behaved according to agreement.

That kind of behaviour could also have lead to accidents in a battle if deconfliction is required.
Yet again, in actual war you wouldn't have been interested enough in those craters because you would have expected a lethal OPFOR at the place. Helicopter OVER the target is simply a poor idea.

[Uboat509]

First of all, what does GPS have to do with setting up the 60MM? OUr guys have been doing it for years with out GPS for immediate suppression missions. If you are talking about precision fires at range then yes, a GPS would be nice but for immediate suppression missions our mortar guys just needed a general location. They would put it intentionally long and then let the element in contact walk it back, and they would do so much faster than battalion ever could, even assuming that they weren't already busy engaging another target.

Second, I would submit that anyone who thinks that 60MM is an ineffective mortar caliber has never had 60MM fired at them.

Third, in my experience, if you do not have control of an asset, you will not have it when you need it most. If you only have mortars at battalion level then you will find that you have a lot of situations where Bco deparately needs suppressive fires but the battalion mortars are already committed to firing for Aco who made contact five minutes earlier or you will have instances where 3rd Platoon Bco needs immediate suppressive fires but they are outside of the range of battalion mortars.

Also in my experience, instances of a mortar team coming under direct fire were rare and were most often due to one of two things, either the command screwed up and left the mortars without protection or the company was already badly depleted of manpower.

Onto another subject, large caliber rifles like the Barret may look cool on TV and all but they do not live up to the hype. They are heavy and awkward to carry, their rounds are heavy and either you have to give the gunner another long gun to carry, such as an M4, or hope that he does not get into a fire fight as he can neither suppress effectively at closer ranges nor move particular fast to break contact and all that so that you can take the odd 1000+ meter shot, which even with the Barret is by no means a guarenteed hit especially if you are taking effective fire. 7.62X54 and .300 Win Mag are more than adequate for the overwhelming majority of engagements that you will find. The best use for a Barret is in a static defensive position and even then I would rather have an M2.

SFC W

[Firn]

Very, true, because Kg of kg they are the most efficient HE Projectors you can find. - they are also highly effective. The UK had the 2inch/51mm for nearly 70 years. Excellent weapon, if correctly used in a sensible way. The hand-held 60mm should provide much the same capability.

....all dear to my heart as i did several presentations in 2003-4 telling folk that getting rid of the 51mm was madness, and got told I was wrong. In 2006, they bring in the 60mm!!! - for exactly the reasons I said the 51mm should stay! :)


A company that marches together can be fixed as one, while a company that's marching separated may have one platoon fixed, but the others would often retain their ability to move.

In short: A company mortar section should have its ammo spread in no more than a platoon equivalent. This means 3-7 kg extra weight for several dozen men.



There is no reason why a dismounted force cannot move with 60mm mortars and an effective load of ammo spread throughout the platoons. It takes training and a certain degree of intestidunal fortitude, but it isn't making water we are talking about.

The key quality of the 60 mm mortar is the ability to deliver responsive and effective indirect firesupport. It can also be a good stepping stone to get the breathing space and time to ease the employment of heavier assets. To have always two tubes covering the company you need three independent sections and enough bombs spread out over many nearby backs. Could this be achieved for dismounted infantry by having sections armed with commando mortars attached to rifle platoons or concentrated in the coy?

Another question regarding the original topic. I recently looked at the Hirtenberger c-mortar (M6-895) used by the British which is said to be able to deliver "direct" fire due to the trigger mechanism and, I suppose, an "arresting" device in the barrel, which keeps the bomb in place. Could it not be used to bust with direct fire and standard bombs and the right fuse setting light "bunkers"? The ammunition to do so is already transported and used. As I never fired a c-mortar I might be confused. :p


Firn

[Fuchs]

There's no need for an arresting device because it's never fired with depression.

A triggered firing pin is standard with all "Commando" mortars (bipod-less light mortars).

The greatest problem with low elevation firing is the recoil. You could do it if you have something to rest it against.

[Firn]

There's no need for an arresting device because it's never fired with depression.

A triggered firing pin is standard with all "Commando" mortars (bipod-less light mortars).

Yes, it might be an interesting, yet superfluous option.


The greatest problem with low elevation firing is the recoil. You could do it if you have something to rest it against.

The lowest possible charge will of course mitigate the problem with the recoil. Perhaps the military should issue a specially protected "c-mortar gunner direct-fire boot" for the guy putting his foot behind the mortar at those low elevations :D


Firn

[Fuchs]

A very low charge produces only a low V0. That requires a relatively high angle to reach beyond 40x46mm range.

And then again - why not simply fire in the upper elevation group ~(43-80°)?

40x46 shoots quite nicely through windows and Panzerfaust/Bazooka/RPG category weapons project explosives nicely at low elevation.

[Kiwigrunt]

At Rusi (following another link from Wilf here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=94772&postcount=4)) I came across High Explosive:Shock Effect in Dismounted Combat (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/storr_RDS_feb2010.pdf) by Dr Jim Storr. I find this article a bit disappointing after his more thoughtful The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdf).
He states (correctly and in line with what many on this board preach) that HE is the main killer. He then uses two historical examples of infantry guns to suggest reintroducing a modern equivalent so that an inf-coy in contact can immediately saturate the enemy position with rapid, aimed HE. His example scenario appears to me a bit simplistic by assuming that a coy level gun section with light vehicles will always and immediately be available for direct-fire support. Many patrols in A-stan are section and platoon level. Also, I should think that we have a good range of infantry carried HE projectors already in our repertoire; we just need to think about how to get better effect from them.

What do others think about reintroducing something like 90 or 106 recoilless rifles? Perhaps on a Wiesel? Or even something like Ontos (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M50_Ontos)? :eek:That would make a nice little RPG and IED magnet. Anything like this would most likely be at coy level or above, but it might still affect the platoon org.
Mini-Spike is looking better than ever.:wry:

[Fuchs]

The role of infantry guns has been taken over already.

In closed terrain: Bazooka / RPG / Panzerfaust type weapons, mostly using HEAT warheads with weak fragmentation effect

In open terrain: assault guns, tanks, "mobile gun systems", in part also IFVs

In the indirect fire role: 98 - 120 mm mortars


Maybe some recoilless gun might justify itself in a niche even today. I wouldn't go back to the M40A2, though. Americans love it - because it's apparently the only large calibre RL gun they know. Nevertheless, there are much better ones on offer.
The Italians had/have their crew-portable Folgore - superficially a Bazooka, but in reality a Bazooka with an unusually high velocity of its round and thus a good potential for relatively long-ranged shots.
The Swedish had/have their Pvjs 1110, a 90mm RL gun with a great muzzle velocity (700 m/s).

[William F. Owen]

At Rusi (following another link from Wilf here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=94772&postcount=4)) I came across High Explosive:Shock Effect in Dismounted Combat (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/storr_RDS_feb2010.pdf) by Dr Jim Storr. I find this article a bit disappointing after his more thoughtful The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdf).
As can be seen from the article, myself and Dermot Rooney commented on a draft of this article, while it was still being written.
Point being:

This article does not pretend that lightweight 75mm field guns
are the answer to every battlefield problem, but it does suggest
a clear, simple way of linking tactical movement and weapons
effect to tactical success. The path lies through surprise,
suppression, neutralisation and destruction; and then via shock
and surprise. It enables us to clarify what kinds of weapons we
need, and why.
Dr Storr's (former Infantry Lt Col) reasoning as to what creates the desired effects are founded on what weight of high explosive filling needs (0.67kg) to be delivered at what rate (1 rnd per 3 secs), and what consistency (accuracy) to cause shock. If you can find a better way to do that, then you answer the exam question he asks.
Now I'm not sure about those assumptions, for a number of reasons.

What do others think about reintroducing something like 90 or 106 recoilless rifles? Perhaps on a Wiesel? Or even something like
Single RRLs have not got the rate of fire. An M67 90mm can fire 10 rounds in a minute and then needs 15 mins cooling off.

[Infanteer]

A Pl with a 60mm mortar and a couple GPMGs is good to go; hard to fix it if it is marching properly.

60mm with spade baseplate is simple to carry, deploy, and fire - after a little experience, guys get pretty good with kentucky windage with a bomb with 0 or 1 increment.

As for delivering HE, it's hard to beat a mix of frange and HEI-T from an M-242 Bushmaster....

[Firn]

As for delivering HE, it's hard to beat a mix of frange and HEI-T from an M-242 Bushmaster....

When you have an AFV nearby and a cannon on it, all the better. It is hard to carry that kind of firepower on your back. A Leopard should make the enemy in Afghanistan think twice before directly attacking you.




Firn

[Kiwigrunt]

Dr Storr's (former Infantry Lt Col) reasoning as to what creates the desired effects are founded on what weight of high explosive filling needs (0.67kg) to be delivered at what rate (1 rnd per 3 secs), and what consistency (accuracy) to cause shock. If you can find a better way to do that, then you answer the exam question he asks.


Point taken.
So I read it again, thrice. Still pondering it and still not sure where to go with it.

It appears the Russians in A-stan made good use of the Vasilek, I think reasonably well within the context described by Jim Storr. However, they seem to have mounted most on light armoured vehicles. That would go well beyond what Storr is trying to achieve for light infantry, I think. And bringing back the old Scorpion might then even be more suitable.

Speaking of Scorpion, this (http://www.pica.army.mil/PicatinnyPublic/news/archive/08-09-04.asp) may (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?21404-Russian-mortar-for-82nd-Airborne-Division) be of some interest.
Probably still a bit too big and heavy though.

[Kiwigrunt]

A Pl with a 60mm mortar and a couple GPMGs is good to go; hard to fix it if it is marching properly.

60mm with spade baseplate is simple to carry, deploy, and fire - after a little experience, guys get pretty good with kentucky windage with a bomb with 0 or 1 increment.

As for delivering HE, it's hard to beat a mix of frange and HEI-T from an M-242 Bushmaster....

Infanteer, have you get any feedback on Carl Gustav?

[Uboat509]

As for delivering HE, it's hard to beat a mix of frange and HEI-T from an M-242 Bushmaster....

I'm a little confused, are you saying that it is nice to have an AFV nearby mounted with one of these or are you suggesting that they be used in a dismounted role?

[Uboat509]

Years ago I had a buddy who was involved in a program (sometime in the early '90s I think) to test mounting the Bushmaster on a HMMWV. This was when the idea of light cav was still controversial and they were experimenting with ways to upgrade the gun HMMWVs. He was a cav guy from the old days when 2nd Cav still had the Fulda Gap mission. According to him, the Bushmaster simply shook the truck apart in fairly short order. Naturally the program was scrapped.

[William F. Owen]

According to him, the Bushmaster simply shook the truck apart in fairly short order. Naturally the program was scrapped.

Years ago, as a very young soldier, I spent time in a Wombat platoon (L6) - 120mm RRL mounted on a Land-Rover. You ONLY fired it mounted on the Land Rover in an Emergency! - cos it basically broke the vehicle by all accounts - yet skills and drills wise, we always practised bringing the weapon into action while it was mounted on the vehicle!!

[Uboat509]

Years ago, as a very young soldier, I spent time in a Wombat platoon (L6) - 120mm RRL mounted on a Land-Rover. You ONLY fired it mounted on the Land Rover in an Emergency! - cos it basically broke the vehicle by all accounts - yet skills and drills wise, we always practised bringing the weapon into action while it was mounted on the vehicle!!

That reminds me of a piece of equipment that I heard about that was designed to launch a nuclear device, but could not launch it further than the effective radius of the explosion. Maybe it's me but that doesn't seem like a good idea.

[Ken White]

the same one used in the ADM and also used in a few other applications. In low KT versions, the one used by the Davy Crockett, the effective blast and killing radiation radius was less than a fifth of the nominal effective range of the weapon. The weapon was in service for about ten years; its major prob was the CEP. Picture trying to use an RPG as a point weapon at max range... :o

[Uboat509]

the same one used in the ADM and also used in a few other applications. In low KT versions, the one used by the Davy Crockett, the effective blast and killing radiation radius was less than a fifth of the nominal effective range of the weapon. The weapon was in service for about ten years; its major prob was the CEP. Picture trying to use an RPG as a point weapon at max range... :o

Now that I think about it I think that I might have heard about this thing in Hackworth's book which may be why I didn't know that that was a myth.

[kaur]

Wilf, is this mortar still prototype? Did the STI Kinetics manage to put this mortar only on truck?

http://i.imagehost.org/t/0123/p2224358oa1.jpg (http://i.imagehost.org/view/0123/p2224358oa1)

Here is one Rhodesian mortar unit.

http://i.imagehost.org/t/0319/Rhodesian_mortar.jpg (http://i.imagehost.org/view/0319/Rhodesian_mortar)

[Fuchs]

The mortar is in use on Singapore's Broncos.

http://www.military-today.com/apc/bronco.htm

[Firn]

Here (http://www.stengg.com/upload/941ODIGE8n7HXT53ki4.wmv) and there (http://www.google.at/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=6&ved=0CCoQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stengg.com%2Fupload%2F1044MLQ 8ZAeCOAW4C496.pdf&ei=rnafS6qEAqTqnAPDlqXSDA&usg=AFQjCNFrFNlgbMVmcSegpv5LRr1HjvQugw&sig2=GJaSXF-wSSnCMdfnmeX_3g) are the answers. :D

Still the very simple and very plain 120 mm mortars have a lot going for them.

Lighter cheap mortars placed on good cheap trucks are certainly a very cost-effective solution for many a small war if manned and commanded by good units.


Firn

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, is this mortar still prototype? Did the STI Kinetics manage to put this mortar only on truck?

http://i.imagehost.org/t/0123/p2224358oa1.jpg (http://i.imagehost.org/view/0123/p2224358oa1)

Here is one Rhodesian mortar unit.

http://i.imagehost.org/t/0319/Rhodesian_mortar.jpg (http://i.imagehost.org/view/0319/Rhodesian_mortar)

See Fuchs. It's on a whole range of vehicles. The problem with it on the "Flyer" in the picture, is that you need another vehicle with the ammo.

[Ken White]

Now that I think about it I think that I might have heard about this thing in Hackworth's book which may be why I didn't know that that was a myth.He also spread a lot of myths... :rolleyes:

[carl]

The max. altitude of a 120mm mortar bomb is about 3,500 m for a 7,000 m shot. Longer-ranged shots are the exception even for those mortars that are capable of reaching farther.

Modern combat aircraft in a ManPADS environment prefer to fly above 15,000 ft for their safety = about 4,500 m Add the max. altitude of nearby mountain tops to this and subtract the altitude of the mortar for comparison with the previous figure.

In the place where I fly there are many small aircraft, manned turboprops and drones, flying around below 12,000 ft., sometimes stacked at 500 ft intervals. They do occasionally shoot manpads at us.

Perhaps Fuchs argument is more geared toward a high intensity fight.

[kaur]

Wilf, sometimes you need to trade all-in-one solution :) It seems that those guys need also second car.

http://i.imagehost.org/t/0265/efssus09.jpg (http://i.imagehost.org/view/0265/efssus09)

Fuchs can correct me, but if I rembember correctly in German paratrooper batallion 1 120 mm mortar team has 2 MB jeeps with (50 mortar shells).

I can just speculte that in IED-intensive world those crews are real magnets and top target lists.

[Kiwigrunt]

It appears that the procurement of the ludicrously expensive Growler (http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/military/article_e5fa44d8-7159-55e2-af03-908938175f7f.html) was justified to help justify the Osprey, or was it the other way around:p? Cool little vehicle though. I want one.

From linked article:

The system requires two of the hybrid helicopter-airplane Ospreys in order to be moved - one to transport the unarmored vehicle and mortars and one to carry a second unarmored vehicle and ammunition trailer.
In the Marine Corps' planning, a third Osprey would ferry troops to support the mortar team.


It looks like a Jeep, but it’s not. (http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-12-28-corps-jeep_x.htm)


Now if a direct fire 81 mm version of the afore mentioned STI Kinetics mortar could be fitted on or behind a vehicle like this, than that could be just what Jim Storr is looking for with added indirect fire capabilities.

[Fuchs]

Wilf, sometimes you need to trade all-in-one solution :) It seems that those guys need also second car.

http://i.imagehost.org/t/0265/efssus09.jpg (http://i.imagehost.org/view/0265/efssus09)

Fuchs can correct me, but if I rembember correctly in German paratrooper batallion 1 120 mm mortar team has 2 MB jeeps with (50 mortar shells).

I can just speculte that in IED-intensive world those crews are real magnets and top target lists.

Is it just me who thinks that the vehicle/trailer combo is faced wrongly? The vehicle should be able to move out without much trouble, so it should face towards the rear ramp when in the V-22 body.

The German mountain and airborne infantry use Wolf 4wd vehicles (Mercedes G Wagon) (0.75t class iirc) for their 120mm mortars; a known deficiency. A LRIP of 120mm Wiesel 2 is expected for the next few years. I'm not sure about the supply part in the Wiesel2 mortar concept; likely Wolf.

[Kiwigrunt]

Is it just me who thinks that the vehicle/trailer combo is faced wrongly? The vehicle should be able to move out without much trouble, so it should face towards the rear ramp when in the V-22 body.


On the Growler homepage (http://www.capitaldefense.com/AmericanGrowler.shtml), check out the back wheel on the first photo of the vehicle. Does it look like it’s turned? That could go a long way to explaining the cost increases and would have been done to allow the vehicle with trailer to back in or out of the Osprey easier, I suspect.

[Fuchs]

Maybe.
The German army had a similar requirement for all-wheel steering during the late 20's and early 30's until it was generally accepted to be unimportant in comparison to 4wd OR very low ground pressure.

The price is in my opinion simply a product of profit, custom engineering, tiny production run and non-industrial assembly.

They should have bought one-the-market 6wd ATVs instead.


I would load an Osprey with this hardware by pushing the trailer backwards up the ramp with the vehicle, uncouple it and push it to the front end of the cargo area.
The drive vehicle into it backwards, pull the trailer to the vehicle, connect both, rig the whole stuff and voila - about five to ten minutes.
Upon arrival you would only need to loosen the rigging and drive out - one minute or less.

[GI Zhou]

If the issue is the effect vs efficiency the use of the Javelin IS VERY cost effective. The cost of a Javelin missile is far less than the cost of just one British soldier's widow's pension and his cost of replacement, let alone the costs if any are wounded by the shooter

[William F. Owen]

If the issue is the effect vs efficiency the use of the Javelin IS VERY cost effective. The cost of a Javelin missile is far less than the cost of just one British soldier's widow's pension and his cost of replacement, let alone the costs if any are wounded by the shooter
THAT is an interesting argument. Bravo. Like it!

[Fuchs]

Umm, no. It's actually a very stupid argument.

Let me explain:
I observed a subsidy project a few years ago. It was an utter waste of money, the return was probably worth 20-40% of the investment only.
It was a pilot project and thus had to be evaluated in order to learn whether it works. The bureaucrat who invented the project (and whose career depended on it) paid an university to do an efficiency analysis project.
The university - knowing well that it would get no more contracts like that if it disappointed its client - wrote a study that plaseed the guy.
What did they do? They compared the project to similar projects. The result was favourable; the pilot project achieved 30% more per buck.
The problem: The alternatives were terrible. Complete waste of money projects. The pilot project was 30% better, yet still a terrible waste of money.

The benchmarking technique can be used with good effect if the comparison is done with the best known alternative (such as no stupid subsidy project at all or a check rocket on the bunker). It's utter BS if applied with a terrible alternative.


To be absolutely clear:

Would you like to be shot in your leg?
Compare it to the alternative of getting shot in your skull.
Is getting shot in the leg a good choice?

Why squander several per cent of our economic output (up to 20% is realistic) with terrible ressource allocations. This is a line of though that must not be tolerated - I'd rather tolerate bank robbers.

[Uboat509]

If the issue is the effect vs efficiency the use of the Javelin IS VERY cost effective. The cost of a Javelin missile is far less than the cost of just one British soldier's widow's pension and his cost of replacement, let alone the costs if any are wounded by the shooter

I would agree absolutely, and so would most I think, if it were an either or proposition. Either we expend a Javelin or we lose a soldier. That is an easy one. That, however, is not the issue. The issue is can we achieve the same effect, neutralized enemy position, without unnecessarily endangering a soldier, by other means? There are times when a Javelin is appropriate but it is too heavy, too awkward and too expensive to be the go to tactic. There are other ways to achieve the same end result that don't involve me lugging this heavy awkward piece of equipment around so that I can launch the equivalent of my pay for the next few years down range to kill one or two guys. That's not a good idea.

[William F. Owen]

There are other ways to achieve the same end result that don't involve me lugging this heavy awkward piece of equipment around so that I can launch the equivalent of my pay for the next few years down range to kill one or two guys. That's not a good idea.
So is this a weight or a cost issue?

If we can get the same effect for less money, Im all for it, but JAV has range and accuracy that few cheaper or lighter systems can match.
Javelin is predicated on delivering accuracy, over a distance for under a certain weight. If we can get the same range, and accuracy for the same weight at less cost, then I'm very interested.

If you want real knotty problem then factor in the issues surrounding Loitering Munitions for cost effectiveness.

[Uboat509]

So is this a weight or a cost issue?

All of the above plus the consideration that, in order to carry the Javelin and all its assorted bells and whistles, something else needs to get left behind, usually some combination of food water and ammo. Using Javelins as bunker busters strikes as the equivalent of using a backhoe to get rid of an ant hill. Will it work? Yes. Is it necessary to go that far? Not usually.


If we can get the same effect for less money, Im all for it, but JAV has range and accuracy that few cheaper or lighter systems can match.

But how often do we need to be able to engage a bunker from that kind of range?


Javelin is predicated on delivering accuracy, over a distance for under a certain weight.

In my experience that "certain weight" is usually determined by people who don't have to carry it. :D


If we can get the same range, and accuracy for the same weight at less cost, then I'm very interested.


My question remains, do we really need that range and accuracy for bunker busting munitions?

[GI Zhou]

Well I will tell the Australian Army they suffed up as the Javelin is being pushed down to the comapny and below. It appears all the experts forget that most leg infantry have access to some sort of motorised support to carry heavier munitions. If someone is shooting at a group of soldiers and they have access to a Javelin you can be damn sure it will be brought up and used.

Bunkers generally are hardened, have tiny aperture for a shot to go through it, so require a decent sized amount of kinetic energy/high explosive to penetrate kill/disable its occupants. LAWs are generally too inaccurate and lack the warhead to guarantee a kill. To get close enough to deliver a good shot will put the user in the kill zone of the bunker and did I mention land mines or IEDs.

As for the next best alternatives, the issues using LAW have been explained so the only real alternative is a Carl Gustarv if the force has any. If it is not available a Javelin or two and its sight are quicker and easier to bring up if needed than: a tank which most likely not be available, an attack helicopter using a Hellfire or HOT, artillery using a PGM and whoops no one to call in the coordinates or desgnate the target and at $85,000 the round costs more than a Javelin anyway. A Javelin will hit the target and destroy it so what is the argument about, as it has the range, accuracy and lethality. On the battlefield, soldiers don't give a flying f... about its cost, if it works its used. I guarantee there were 'chair borne commandos' in the PLA in 1979 complaining about the cost of PLA soldiers using their HJ-73 ATGMs (Sagger copies) against Vietnamese bunkers in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.

[Fuchs]

You may go into range of a bunker before you can hit it with a relatively light weight and low-cost Bunkerfaust (600m), but that doesn't mean anything in itself. Especially not hat the bunker's team will get the first shot (if that bunker is manned at all and not an unoccupied or fake position).

The terrain may offer enough concealment to get into range unseen. Then there's no need for a Javelin.

The terrain may offer a long line of sight. Then you call in an AFV with a gun, an AT team with an ATGM (NOT organic to your Inf Plt) or indirect/aerial support fires.

Thee most likely alternative is another one, though: The line of sight is rather short and the bunker crew spots (and shoots at) you (the moving one) before you spot it (the well-camouflaged stationary one).
In that case you're closer than 600 m and can much quicker respond with a Bunkerfaust than with a Javelin (the Bunker might even be within the minimum range of Javelin!). It's furthermore likely that the bunker is situated for flanking fire and in a terrain full of concealment; that generally makes it unlikely that your fixed Plt would be able to call for non-organic fires to shoot at the Bunker from outside of 600 m range.


In the end, ATGM at Plt level likely make no sense for an infantry attack/patrol unless you keep them in reserve for AT work.

[GI Zhou]

Some countries buy ATGM for the bunker busting role and have the Carl Gustarv/Bunkerfaust etc as well. It depends on what your army has, how far you are from the main base, the terrain etc. Anyone can make up a scenario to justify their argument. The fact is that a Javelin missile is cheaper than the cost of a Western soldier's pension and medical costs if wounded, or his widow and children's pension if killed. That justifies its cost in economic terms and that is where my argument finishes. QED

[William F. Owen]

My question remains, do we really need that range and accuracy for bunker busting munitions?
Well my opinion is you need a 1-1,500m SACLOS wire guided system like M47 DRAGON, but NOT DRAGON. AT-7/AT-13 Metis-M is probably about right. System like that might be a bit of a game changer at the platoon level. It's basically the reasoning behind Mini-Spike.

[Uboat509]

The fact is that a Javelin missile is cheaper than the cost of a Western soldier's pension and medical costs if wounded, or his widow and children's pension if killed. That justifies its cost in economic terms and that is where my argument finishes. QED

What you are therefore saying is that if a Javelin is not used to neutralize a bunker, casualties are inevitable because no other means exist to neutralize a bunker. That simply is not the case. There are other means to neutralize bunkers effectively. I am not one to tell someone to take a tool out of the toolbox. There are certainly times when the use of a Javelin would be appropriate. I am simply saying that it should not be the go to TTP. I mentioned cost because that is a factor whether we like it or not. If cost were no issue we could have unlimited air cover, but, of course we don't have that. But that is, by far, not among my chief concerns.

My first concern is my natural dislike of the over-reliance on technology. The more bells and whistles a piece of equipment has, the greater the chance that it will fail when you need it most.

My second concern is the weight and size of this thing. It works out to roughly forty pounds for one missile plus the CLU. Forty pounds doesn't sound like much until you consider that modern soldier, at least in the US Army, before he even picks up his weapon ammo or a single piece of equipment is already loaded down with body armor. Then he has his weapon, all his ammo, food and water, communications gear and then whatever other equipment he needs. Now you are going to add forty pounds on top of that, plus twenty-six pounds for every extra missile that you are carrying. And let's not forget the size. I don't have the dimensions of the CLU and it has been a while since I handled one but I recall that they are pretty good size, something that would take up a lot of space in a ruck. The missiles are almost four feet long. Now either somebody has to strap it to the top of their ruck so that it sticks out a foot and a half or so on each side or they have to sling it on their body so that it will always be in the way. And all this so that you have the capability to engage a stationary bunker at range. That is assuming, of course that there are no restrictions on using a missile on the target and that you are not within the minimum distance of seventy-five meters. Carrying it in a vehicle mitigates the weight issue but it still takes up a good amount of space and the question remains, what is getting left behind so that the Javelin can be brought along?

My next concern is with the habits it builds. If the Javelin becomes the go to TTP for bunker clearing, what happens when the bunker is within the seventy-five meter minimum range? What if you don't have a Javelin because it was a bunker complex and you did not have enough reloads, or because the missile or the CLU was broken or one of the crewmen was wounded and now you don't have the equipment? Those of us who have been in the military know that when you have a go to technique or procedure, alternatives tend not to get practiced as much as they should. You can argue all day long that that is wrong and that it shouldn't be that way and you would be absolutely right. But the way things are and the way things should be often do not match up. Over-reliance on technological solutions to problems invariably leads to bigger problems later on.

Taking the habits argument to the next level, what happens if and when we go to war with someone who has armor? Do we continue to engage bunkers (which we can neutralize by other means) with Javelins and hope that we have enough to deal with any armor (which we generally cannot neutralize any means other than ATGMs)? Or do we change a combat TTP right before we go to war?

My final concern is that this whole concept smacks of the whole idea that combat can be made safe. Combat is an inherently dangerous undertaking but in our modern world people have been conditioned to believe that it can be made safe or at least a whole lot safer than is truly and practically feasible. That breeds a sort of risk adverse mindset that is absolute anathema to the successful prosecution of war. Prior to Iraq, the only time I ever wore body armor was on occasions when we would be throwing live grenades. Most of the time we did not have it and we did not miss it. Now I cannot go outside the wire unless I have been individually wrapped in rebar and dipped in concrete. God help the commander who has a soldier who is injured or killed when he was not wearing all of the myriad pieces of required body armor protection. So now the talking heads in DC can point and tell John Q. Public, "See we have fixed the armor problem and now little Jane and little Johnny are safer." And they are safer from small arms and shrapnel, but at the cost of being much slower, much less agile, more prone to overheating, having much less endurance and just generally being that much more miserable and that much less alert. Is there a time and a place where armor should be mandatory? Absolutely. Does it need to be mandatory for everyone at all times without exception or modification? Absolutely not. But that is the state of things. And the list of things that have come about in recent years to make things safer, without enough consideration to the cost of that safety (I'm not talking money here although that is an issue as well), or whether that "safety" is even real or simply a comfortable illusion.

Ok I think that I have ranted long enough.

[William F. Owen]

My next concern is with the habits it builds. If the Javelin becomes the go to TTP for bunker clearing, what happens when the bunker is within the seventy-five meter minimum range? What if you don't have a Javelin because it was a bunker complex and you did not have enough reloads, or because the missile or the CLU was broken or one of the crewmen was wounded and now you don't have the equipment?
I thing the answer may be that Javelin is an option. It's one tool in a box.

When I did my Junior Brecon/Combat Commanders course, the answer to "how do I kill a bunker" was "Milan!" - then it was "OK, you do not have Milan, what now?" - then we got on did it, "old-School, a-la 1918!" Worked well.
You can "what if" tactical doctrine all day. The aim is "better rather than worse", applied using good judgement - which is why I equipment without training is useless. Nothing is perfect.

[Firn]

On the battlefield, soldiers don't give a flying f... about its cost, if it works its used. I guarantee there were 'chair borne commandos' in the PLA in 1979 complaining about the cost of PLA soldiers using their HJ-73 ATGMs (Sagger copies) against Vietnamese bunkers in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.

Nor should they. Good luck with a "strategic financial corporal" :D

Ubout pretty much sums it up and Fuchs righly points out that the discussion can not be undertaking in isolation.

Said that I'm pretty curious about that last tool called Mini-Spike. It has quite some things going for it and could be put in the right context to some good uses.

Firn

[Uboat509]

I thing the answer may be that Javelin is an option. It's one tool in a box.

When I did my Junior Brecon/Combat Commanders course, the answer to "how do I kill a bunker" was "Milan!" - then it was "OK, you do not have Milan, what now?" - then we got on did it, "old-School, a-la 1918!" Worked well.
You can "what if" tactical doctrine all day. The aim is "better rather than worse", applied using good judgement - which is why I equipment without training is useless. Nothing is perfect.

That's why I made the comment about not telling anyone to take a tool out of their tool box. I absolutely agree that Javelin should be an option, if it available, but some here are presenting it as if it should be the go to option. That I do disagree with.

[Schmedlap]

A Javelin to take out a bunker? Why not use the 25mm on your Bradley, or the .50 or MK19 on your M113? Or are we suggesting that Javelins are going to be humped by light infantry? If it's an airfield seizure and you're jumping in and you think you're likely to need it, maybe that makes sense. If you're carrying these things for any significant distance "just in case" a Javelin is needed, then I think that is absurd. These things are heavy and enormous. The CLU is nice to have so long as you've got enough of the bulky, heavy batteries, but we often carried the CLU without the Javelin simply because the missile was too bulky, heavy, and unlikely to be used, to justify bringing it. If you're in wheeled vehicles and got room - okay, fine. But as for dismounts, I don't think anybody in my entire battalion used a Javelin for anything other than killing tanks. Could they have? Sure. But why? Bunkers were cleared with 25mm at a distance and 40mm closer in, or hand grenades at close range. If someone had wasted a Javelin on a bunker or on some knucklehead in a building then his squad leader would have rightly throttled him.

[Ken White]

Or are we suggesting that Javelins are going to be humped by light infantry?like these. Light infantry has no 25mm or 40mm AGLs nor even many .50s. They also are allergic to armored vehicles... :D

[Schmedlap]

Other than the narrow examples I cited (airfield seizure or a mission of short duration in which need of Javelins is likely) how could the weight and bulk of Javelins, CLUs, and those giant batteries (I forget the nomenclature) possibly offset any lack of capability? I think I've stated this elsewhere, but the elation that most PFCs felt after destroying a T-72 in Iraq was not the joy of eliminating a mortal threat to themselves and their buddies. It was the joy of not having to hump that heavy, awkward, sunofabitch any longer.:D And those guys were dismounting from Bradleys, not hiking 25 km.

[GI Zhou]

That's why I made the comment about not telling anyone to take a tool out of their tool box. I absolutely agree that Javelin should be an option, if it available, but some here are presenting it as if it should be the go to option. That I do disagree with.

I totally agree. I never said it was the only tool, just that there is an economic argument showing it is cost-effective to use one against a bunker, nothing else. Everyone else is adding their fice cents worth. I've been told that slewing the tracks of a tank over a bunker makes a very satisfying sound as well.

[Ken White]

...how could the weight and bulk of Javelins, CLUs, and those giant batteries (I forget the nomenclature) possibly offset any lack of capability? are used by the bad guys can be a seemingly very long duration 'mission.' METT-TC applies to Javelins just as it does to everything else. Guys in the late 40s used to complain about carrying the "heavy and clumsy" M9 RL -- until they tried to shoot T-34s and found out they didn't stop 'em.

They got the bigger, heavier and more clumsy 3.5" M20 and didn't complain a bit. That was in Korea. Hopefully we won't go there again... :wry:

Javelins are like everything else, a pain to carry when you're on foot -- but literally vital when they're needed. Don't base everything on one war. Or on peacetime, which is essentially what now we're now in -- except for the guys outside the wire in Afghanistan. Sometimes.

No real need for Javs in Iraq and, time and place dependent, not so much in the 'Stan. No one really needed Recon or Scout platoons in Iraq, either. That isn't guaranteed to be true at another time and place. I guess Javelins are like that old saw about guns. "You usually do not need a gun but when you do, you need it really bad."

As an aside, my time in both light and mech infantry showed me that they are two different breeds of cat. Neither is 'better' than the other; neither is 'wrong' in what they do and how they do it. They just do things quite differently and they literally think on a different plane. Not having a vehicle to come home to gives one a different outlook and changes what's important. And what one has to carry... :D :cool:

[kaur]

Ken White, well said! I'll bookmark this post :) 1 comment. Your example was about complaining that concerned weight and soldiers on the ground. I'd like to add bureucrats complaining about price. If it works, then buy it or "Buy quality, cry once!"

[Schmedlap]

Javelins are like everything else, a pain to carry when you're on foot -- but literally vital when they're needed.

Agree regarding the presence of enemy armor. I guess I was reading the discussion as suggesting that we need to be toting these things around just in case we stumble upon a bunker, or on the off chance that some bad guys decide to start shooting at us from the roof of a concrete building.

[Firn]

METT-TC applies to Javelins just as it does to everything else. Guys in the late 40s used to complain about carrying the "heavy and clumsy" M9 RL -- until they tried to shoot T-34s and found out they didn't stop 'em.

The only thing worse than carrying a heavy weapon is to haven't it when you need it.


Said that the "new" Bunkerbusters and GL do certainly influence the way you handle bunkers and fortified positions. But certain things don't seem to have changed much, just as Suppress, blind, destroy - 3:30 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvct_n16FVc&feature=related)

An interesting detail of the whole movie is that only once you saw somebody shooting with his IW, and that after he smacked the opponent down with the rifle butt. Of course a huge emphasis on thourogh preparation, coordination and surprise as well as bunker-busting with rifle/pistol grenades, hand grenades, staff demolition charges, smoke grenades, flame throwers supported by automatic weapons, light artillery and mortars. The panzerfaust was certainly later quickly adopted for such roles.


Firn


P.S: The Leuchtpistole/ Kampfpistole/ Sturmpistole (http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=5233) was completely off my radar.

[Tukhachevskii]

From “Iraq: Italian Lessons Learned” (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/MarApr05/cappelli.pdf), Military Review, March-April 2005;

...the Italians employed the Panzerfaust antitank weapon (with 15 rockets) and the Milan Antitank Guided Missile System (with 4 missiles) to neutralize Mahdi Army positions.(p.59)


The Italians fired five or six Milan missiles to neutralize four enemy positions, but a deluge of fire stopped their advance. One Centauro had two ripped wheels, and eight Mahdi RPGs (luckily loaded with antipersonnel instead of antitank explosives) hit two VCCs armoured carriers.(p.60)

[Firn]

@Fuchs: Btw, as far as I know all Breda "Folgore" launchers are stored after having been hardly used and cost a considerable sum.


Firn

[Nevyan]

First any new weapon system must be lightweight. If an Infantryman cannot carry it up a mountain it is useless. If he needs to use a vehicle to transport the weapon system it is useless.

Second, it must not be a single shot weapon in the way of the AT4, M72E10 or SMAW-D. If an Infantryman cannot quickly reload the weapon and engage the next target it is useless weight to him.

Third, if it uses a separate sighting system this usually means it will require additional power sources. This is more weight that the Infantryman must carry. This prevents further logistics problems forcing a trade-off between more batteries (already too many in one squad or a platoon) or more ammunition. Fewer batteries means shorter time between needing a resupply and less time to be independent in accomplishing the mission.

Four, the effective power of the weapon system must be able to handle a wide range of targets. This either means several TYPES of weapons systems each fulfilling a need (M72, AT4, SMAW-D, Javelin) or one weapon system that is able to utilize different re-loadable ammunition mixes that are chosen based on the mission.

Five, the cost. First to develop such a weapon system will cost money. Then fielding the weapon will cost more money. The cost of ammunition, maintenance and training will deplete more funds. Army leadership will look at these costs versus already present weapon systems and most definitely keep the older paid for systems.

In the end though the five things I just covered are already found in one weapon system. In fact it is an entirely flexibile system that is easy to use and that an American company has already adopted and modified improving it's range, warheads, weight and without adding significantly to cost. That weapon system is the lowly RPG-7.

With a mix of ammunition it can act as an anti-armor weapon (PG-7V Tandem HEAT), anti-personnel weapon (OG-7V HE Frag), indirect fire weapon (airburst rounds) and bunker buster (TBG-7V Thermobaric). It allows one Infantryman to have a single weapon system with a flexible quiver of rounds to use as the situation develops.

Western ingenuity can increase the accuracy and range of the weapon. Western ingenuity can increase the power of the warheads. And Western ingenuity can come up with numerous tactics to utilize this weapon system against enemy forces that already have adapted it to mountain warfare, urban warfare and anti-armor warfare.

The American company Airtronic has already done the work for us. We just have to have Big Army swallow a little pride.


----

http://www.airtronic.net/datasheets/airtronicrpg7.pdf

[Ken White]

and range, an equally broad array of ammunition (plus an Illum and IR Illum round), is capable of indirect fire and is already in the inventory: LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m3-maws.htm). Neither is perfect.

One can carry ten LAWs for the same weight as the RPG-7 launcher or the M3 RR alone, not counting ammo -- and the LAWs can be spread among the Squad or Platoon. Of course, the LAW isn't perfect either...

The search continues... :wry:

[Kiwigrunt]

One can carry ten LAWs for the same weight as the RPG-7 launcher or the M3 RR alone, not counting ammo -- and the LAWs can be spread among the Squad or Platoon. Of course, the LAW isn't perfect either...

The search continues... :wry:

Before someone comes along and listens to what you say as opposed to what you mean (I get people doing that to me all the time):p …….. 3 LAWs……..if it was 10 than the search might have ended there.:cool:

Just for interest, came across this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:M72A2_LAW_1969.jpg) photo demonstrating backblast on an M72.

[Nevyan]

and range, an equally broad array of ammunition (plus an Illum and IR Illum round), is capable of indirect fire and is already in the inventory: LINK. Neither is perfect.

A PG-7V will travel 920 meters before detonating. As an Indirect weapon that's good range. In 1975 the Army conducted tests using recently acquired Soviet RPG's and found their accuracy and range were not that great. However this weapon system has undergone dozens of refinements in the preceding 35 years and it has become a more accurate and powerful weapon.

Now an American company is trying to improve it even more.





One can carry ten LAWs for the same weight as the RPG-7 launcher or the M3 RR alone, not counting ammo -- and the LAWs can be spread among the Squad or Platoon. Of course, the LAW isn't perfect either...

The search continues... :wry:

What happens to the LAW tube once it's been fired? If you abandon it the enemy will use it against you. It will be filled with explosives as an IED, it will be left in a field for the local people to find and so that the enemy can set up an ambush on it.

Or your 1SG and Company Commander will tell you that when you fire an M72, AT4 or SMAW-D you need to bring the tube back (true story). Great now I have a Soldier walking around Afghanistan with an expended rocket tube on him...

Or, I have a Soldier carrying just the launcher and 5 rocket rounds and expending his rounds he has with him and supported by an ammo bearer with extra rounds. Or we split additional rounds up between the Platoon the way my unit did with 60mm mortar rounds and linked 7.62.

Example:

Airtronic RPG launcher -- 15 lbs
OG-7V HE Frag -- 4 lbs x 4 = 16 lbs
TBG-7V Thermobaric -- 9.9 lbs x 1 = 9.9 lbs

Total weight 40.9 lbs... heck that's comparable to an Automatic Rifleman in my light infantry platoon (17 lbs M249 + 28 lbs 800 rounds linked 5.56 = 45 lbs).

To get even as much combat effectiveness out of using the M72 variants you would have to have 4 soldiers with M72E10's using the HE Fragmentation warhead and still be short on anti-structure capability since the only option would be the M72A6. But in order to use the M72 a soldier would have to do the following:

1. Stop firing his primary weapon
2. Remove the launcher assembly from his back/pack/ruck etc
3. Engage the target

The above is also dependent on if he has the proper rocket configuration for the task, unless we want to start trying to shoot through qalat walls with HEAT rounds...

RPG-7 -- Low cost and flexible.

[Ken White]

What happens to the LAW tube once it's been fired? If you abandon it the enemy will use it against you. It will be filled with explosives as an IED, it will be left in a field for the local people to find and so that the enemy can set up an ambush on it.Totally true. Four choices, all proven then to work. (1) Put a golf ball sized chunk of C4 in each tube and detonate it [not recommended, labor intensive but does work]; (2) Beat it into submission [CAUTION: Do NOT use an M-16 or M4 to do this -- a 240 will work. Simplest solution is two big rocks]; (3) Haul 'em out on the log bird (Sorry if you don't have one. You should...); (4) Pop a Frag in the tube (s) [not a good idea of you're out in the boonies, too noisy...]; (5) Carry the tube back with you -- been done before, hundreds if not thousands of times and in a lot of places.

Since it's empty, it only weighs about two pounds, a day's meal...
Or, I have a Soldier carrying just the launcher and 5 rocket rounds and expending his rounds he has with him and supported by an ammo bearer with extra rounds. Or we split additional rounds up between the Platoon the way my unit did with 60mm mortar rounds and linked 7.62.Yeah. Isn't it hilarious that old stuff and ideas still work?
Total weight 40.9 lbs... heck that's comparable to an Automatic Rifleman in my light infantry platoon (17 lbs M249 + 28 lbs 800 rounds linked 5.56 = 45 lbs).IMO another dumb weapon but we have a few...

As an aside, I hope you aren't having that poor SAW gunner carry all 800 rounds. I'd ask why carry so many but I know the answer. :rolleyes:
To get even as much combat effectiveness out of using the M72 variants you would have to have 4 soldiers with M72E10's using the HE Fragmentation warhead and still be short on anti-structure capability since the only option would be the M72A6. But in order to use the M72 a soldier would have to do the following:

1. Stop firing his primary weapon
2. Remove the launcher assembly from his back/pack/ruck etc
3. Engage the target

The above is also dependent on if he has the proper rocket configuration for the task, unless we want to start trying to shoot through qalat walls with HEAT rounds...In order:

Not necessarily on the four and / or on the A6.

The RPG gunner has it as a 'primary weapon' so your net rifle firepower doesn't change.

The remove / employ bit take only a few tens of seconds with halfway decently trained people.

Carry the variants that the mission seems likely to require.

Depends on how thick they are and whether or not the locals have reinforced them with anything. HE will punch a hole in most, so will a few careful bursts from a 240. Satchel or pole charge may be better, area specific.

The RPG 7 has merit, so does the CG / M3 or the LAW. All also have shiortfalls.

Problem is that we have to work with what we have, not with what we'd like to have. Best solution I've found is to give what's available and what's required some thought and you'll generally work out some decent compromises.

As I said, the search for perfection continues... ;)

[Backwards Observer]

There was a video of a North Korean RPG squad or platoon firing in unison at the range a while back. Also some photos of all-RPG squads in Cambodia if I recall correctly, like a foot-tech katyusha.

[William F. Owen]

In the end though the five things I just covered are already found in one weapon system. In fact it is an entirely flexibile system that is easy to use and that an American company has already adopted and modified improving it's range, warheads, weight and without adding significantly to cost. That weapon system is the lowly RPG-7.
Do you have shares in that company? :D

Airtronic do seem to have made a nice launcher, but that's a "so what" compared to the PG-7 grenades, which are the important bit. I remember the RPG being a squad weapon in the IDF. It isn't anymore. Why, I'm not precisely sure, but my guess is there is some sound reasoning behind it... or maybe not.

From a tactical applications stand point, I cannot really see a reason to rush out buy an RPG-7 system right now, as I can't see the need. Nice launcher though.

[Polarbear1605]

I skimmed the tread (I may have missed it) but I have to ask the question, especially if your looking at going to the RPG-7; what about the old 3.5 Rocket Launcher (Bazooka). The 3.5 RL had a couple differnet warheads (WP, AT); it packed a punch (it would get a enemy machine gunners attention real quick), accurate, relatively inexpensive, and direct fire (something a Company Commander has to have IMHO). I also thought the ammo was a bit more reliable when compared to the LAAW. (or am I stilling venting because when they exchanged the 3.5 for the LAAW as a Company CO I felt short changed ?)

[Fuchs]

I skimmed the tread (I may have missed it) but I have to ask the question, especially if your looking at going to the RPG-7; what about the old 3.5 Rocket Launcher (Bazooka). The 3.5 RL had a couple differnet warheads (WP, AT); it packed a punch (it would get a enemy machine gunners attention real quick), accurate, relatively inexpensive, and direct fire (something a Company Commander has to have IMHO). I also thought the ammo was a bit more reliable when compared to the LAAW. (or am I stilling venting because when they exchanged the 3.5 for the LAAW as a Company CO I felt short changed ?)

There are much better weapons of that kind now. The M3 Carl Gustaf, the SMAW (B-300), RGW90, ...
The greatest advantage of the RPG is that it doesn't wrap a full barrel around every single grenade as the German weapons and can use overcalibre warheads unlike M3 Carl Gustaf and SMAW (although I have seen info about a prototype 120mm HEAT munition for M2 CG; a project of about 1980 +/- 5 years iirc).


So basically we might think about a 50-60mm barrel to be muzzle loaded (with potential for overcalibre warheads obviously) and a good range of munitions (AP & AT, including confined spaces versions with minimised firing signature ~Armbrust). A folding grip and a rail interface for different day/night/computerised sights.


The problem is that this would be a portable assault gun for short range (300-600m) grenade support. It would not suffice as a real anti-MBT weapon even in the short range.
Its grenades would need to stand a comparison test against 40x46mm MV HEF.

[Tukhachevskii]

According to Spiegel; German Soldiers Face New Enemy in Kunduz (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,688434,00.html) Taliban forces opposing German units are equipped with TBG-7V thermobaric RPG rounds and are being supplied by the Islamic Army of Uzbekistan.

The militants who killed three German soldiers in Kunduz on Good Friday were equipped with much more modern weapons than is usual for the Taliban. Members of the feared Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are providing arms and training to their fellow fighters in Afghanistan, but Germany is struggling to find adequate answers.

[Firn]

Going back to the rifle grenades, which could be part of the solution under specific circumstances.:


German AT rifles were converted for long-range rifle grenade fire in the midst of WW2.

Rifle grenades can have a sustainer rocket like RPG, but accuracy (or lack thereof) and possibly a rocket smoke trail may rule it out.


Indeed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzerb%C3%BCchse_39), although I'm not sure if the grenades could stand the full power available through that large cartridge. Wiki states that they only were sighted out to 150m, which would support this line of thought. But why convert then at some cost a bulky rifle into a role which could have been taken by a simple K98k?

American units did also use mortar bombs as improvised rifle grenades for (very?) short, devastating punch in urban combat.


Use of 60mm mortar shell (http://www.efour4ever.com/street_fighting.htm)

"The 60-mm mortar shell was extensively used for direct fire through windows. The shells were launched from rifles by wiring them to the grenade projector adapter, M1."

Overall a very considerable deal of rifle grenades were produced in WWI and WWII. Several variants of them could still be use today, but can not to replace the 40mm or larger shoulder-fired weapons.


Firn

[GI Zhou]

American units did also use mortar bombs as improvised rifle grenades for (very?) short, devastating punch in urban combat.
Firn

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines have mounted a 60mm HE mortar bomb on the tail of the PG-2 grenade for use with their RPG-2s built in jungle factories. A great weapon to break contact with.

[Firn]

Taking the 40mm and a the heavier AT weapons (AT-4, Pzf 3) for granted it seems to me that rifle grenades still have some uses.


A grenade or shell fired from a rifle has these principle advantages compared to a hand-thrown grenade:


Rifle grenade warheads can be projected from a rifle to a much greater distance than typical grenade launcher rounds.
A rifle grenade can carry a larger, heavier payload a greater distance than a hand-thrown grenade.
A rifle grenade is more accurate than a hand-thrown grenade, and is much more accurate when used against distant targets.
A rifle grenade has the advantage of detonating upon impact, as compared to a hand-thrown grenade which commonly uses a timed detonation.


Offsetting these strengths are the heavier weight and bulk of rifle grenades compared to most hand grenades, combined with very high levels of recoil.

In comparison to a dedicated grenade launcher, the rifle grenade has four advantages:

Rifle grenades can use a variety of different sizes and shapes of warheads and payloads.
Rifle grenades can be projected from any infantry rifle with the appropriate muzzle
Rifle grenades weigh less than an under barrel grenade launcher.
Training rounds are re-usable.


Disadvantages of modern rifle grenades:

Relative inaccuracy compared to a dedicated low-velocity grenade launcher
Use of the rifle grenade also temporarily disables the normal use of the rifle in combat.


The development of the rifle grenade is quite interesting, as are the old tactical solutions for the different tactical settings. For example the French used later in WWI 4 out of 16 soldiers in their demi-platoon as dedicated grenade launchers. The German Skitroop manual says it is desirable the squad of 11 has at least 1 scoped rifle, 1 grenade discharger, 2-3 semiautomatic rifles and 2 submachine guns. (It says that half of a large raiding parties should have SMG and semiautomatic rifles with as many telescopic sights as possible. Yes the scoped rifles should be semiautomatic.)

German assault troops in WWII did have as most nations in WWI also dedicated rifle grenadiers, with a wide array of ammunition. The grenade discharger was semi-permanent. Several HEAT and HE grenades (up to 61mm), smoke and flash were (sometimes) available.

Today the rifle grenades might still be of use as specialist weapons even if the squad has already 40 mm UGL. Medium and heavy rifle grenades (0.5-1kg) with and without rocket booster (SuperEnerga) could provide much bang for the weight and be also tailored with greater ease for specific tasks, like the SIMON. A lot of different warheads could be employed. While every member of the squad can make use of them a dedicated grenadier with good, specific training and a modern LRF/FCS sight could get in most situations the most out of them.




RÉPERTOIRE DES PRINCIPALES GRENADES À FUSIL TIRABLES AVEC LE FAMAS

Grenade à fusil mixte APAV de 40 mm Mle F1
Poids : 500 g
Tir vertical à 450 :
Portée : 125 m à 335 m
Ø d’efficacité : 10 m
Éclats dangereux jusqu’à 100 m
Tir tendu AP(anti personnel) ou AV (anti véhicule):
Portée : 100 m
Perforation : 12 cm d’acier 36 cm de béton

Grenade à fusil antipersonnel de 34 mm Mle 52/60
Poids : 500 g
Tir vertical à 450 :
Portée : 145 m à 400 m
Ø d’efficacité : 10 m
Éclats dangereux jusqu’à 100 m

Grenade à fusil fumigène de 47 mm Mle F3
Poids : 517 g
Tir vertical à 450 :
Portée : 130 m à 355 m
Émission de fumée : 45 s

Grenade à fusil antichar de 58 mm Mle F1 PAB
Poids : 537 g
Tir tendu AC :
Portée : 75 m
Perforation : 25 cm de blindage sous incidence nulle

Grenade à fusil fumigène
de 50 mm Mle F4
Poids : 535 g
Tir vertical à 450 :
Portée : 145 m à 400 m
Émission de fumée : 40 s

Grenades à fusil (http://www.webchercheurs.com/16/945-fr-grenades-a-fusil-pour-le-famas.html)


Firn

[JMA]

First any new weapon system must be lightweight. If an Infantryman cannot carry it up a mountain it is useless. If he needs to use a vehicle to transport the weapon system it is useless.

Maybe the converse should also be considered?

If an infantryman can't carry a particular weapon up a mountain HE is useless. etc etc

We are talking more and more about how overloaded the modern infantryman is. Where is the benchmark? We used to do training and competions such as "march and shoot" or "approach marches" where a section (or whatever) of infantry (in full batledress) would be required to march 5 or 10 miles to the range when they would be required to go through a shooting sequence.

I say that the weight must be benchmarked for hot, cold, wet enviroments and soldiers must train under the applicable weight conditions.

[William F. Owen]

We are talking more and more about how overloaded the modern infantryman is. Where is the benchmark? We used to do training and competions such as "march and shoot" or "approach marches" where a section (or whatever) of infantry (in full batledress) would be required to march 5 or 10 miles to the range when they would be required to go through a shooting sequence. We did in my day and they still do.


I say that the weight must be benchmarked for hot, cold, wet enviroments and soldiers must train under the applicable weight conditions.
There is literally tons of research done on this, showing how weight and temperature degrade performance, going back to the 1870's.
The problem is that is it wilfully disregarded because of things like 16kg of body armour!
Put bluntly we have all the answers. We just decided to ignore them.

[B.Smitty]

I recall reading somewhere about a Dynamit Nobel program to build a guided version of the Pzf 3. Anyone know if there has been any progress on this?

It seems like they could have the makings of a pretty flexible weapon system if they could use the same base fire control unit with guided/unguided Pzf 3 and Bunkerfaust rounds, and maybe expand it to fire the RGW 90mm and 60mm rounds. A 1200m range, guided 60/90mm round could be very handy in Afghanistan.

Also, does anyone know how their new Wirkmittel 90 hopes to achieve any kind of reasonable hit rate at 1000m with an unguided round?

[Fuchs]

I recall reading somewhere about a Dynamit Nobel program to build a guided version of the Pzf 3. Anyone know if there has been any progress on this?

It seems like they could have the makings of a pretty flexible weapon system if they could use the same base fire control unit with guided/unguided Pzf 3 and Bunkerfaust rounds, and maybe expand it to fire the RGW 90mm and 60mm rounds. A 1200m range, guided 60/90mm round could be very handy in Afghanistan.

Also, does anyone know how their new Wirkmittel 90 hopes to achieve any kind of reasonable hit rate at 1000m with an unguided round?

A computerised sight offer 600m (official) effective range for Pzf3, that should suffice for most purposes.
I didn't hear about a guided version yet. A guided version would need a new sight and as every munition of the Pzf3/Bunkerfaust system has its own barrel, it would also need that one. In the end, a guided weapon would necessarily have nothing or almost nothing in common with a Pzf3.

[B.Smitty]

Maybe it died on the vine.


In 1993 it was learned that an extended-range guided round was being developed for the Panzerfaust 3. Developed in conjunction with the Israeli Rafael organization, the new round integrates an ogive having a laser seeker with the standard projectile. A “bang bang” actuator and two canard control surfaces are fitted, along with the electronics module. Four wings are at the rear of the ogive; they mount the laser radiation detectors at their tips. The ogive is designed so as not to disturb the formation of the shaped-charge jet. A laser illuminator is mounted on the launcher. Once the projectile is launched, the guidance component senses its deviations from the projected laser beam and issues course correction commands to the aerodynamic control surfaces. This new projectile has not yet been offered on the market.

http://www.dfeeler.com/forecastinc/sampledocs/Ordnance/Panzerfaust3.doc

[B.Smitty]

The problem with a computerized sight on an unguided weapon is that, while your claimed effective range is 600m, the hit percentage drops significantly the further out you go. Hitting moving targets is an exercise in (now computerized) educated guesswork.

OTOH, guided weapons have less of a hit chance drop off as range increases.

Just seems like if you could build a CLU that was lighter than Javelin and use a large range of existing unguided and guided munitions (60mm, 90mm, 110mm, maybe 124mm with HEAT, bunker buster, HESH, timed-airburst), you could more effectively tailor munition to METT-TC.

One would also hope it'd be a lot less expensive than the Javelin CLU/missile combo.

[GI Zhou]

And for the readers who don't understand military acronyms METT-TC means?

[B.Smitty]

And for the readers who don't understand military acronyms METT-TC means?

Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, Civil considerations.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch5.htm#par2-1-1