MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[Pete]

Anyway I think nobody questions the capability of a well-proven, open-sighted WWII era bolt-action rifle like the Enfield.
The Enfield line had aperture sights, but with apertures large enough to acquire targets and see in low-light conditions. The SMLE had a flip-up ladder-type rear sight mounted forward of the chamber; the No. 4 and 5 Enfields of World War II and the early Cold War had aperture sights mounted behind the receiver.

Around 1900 U.S. Army Ordnance and the American arms industry emulated Mauser by favoring cock-on-opening bolt action rifles. The Enfield line was cock-on-closing, which allows a faster rate of fire. From around 1900 until around Pearl Harbor rapid manipulation of the bolt was a major Infantry task taught by NCOs in both the British and U.S. Armies, with the SMLE and M1903 Springfield respectively.

The M1903 Springfield was really more of a target rifle than a combat weapon, its design having been heavily influenced by the competitive shooters in the U.S. Army. The "amber shooting glasses" crowd had taken over firearms design and Infantry tactics in U.S. Army Ordnance -- just take a look at an early-model M1903 and try to figure out what all the settings are for on its rear sight. For a while during the late 1930s the NRA was implacably opposed to the M1 Garand because it challenged the holy icon status that had been gained by the M1903 Springfield.

[Pete]

The No. 5 Enfield had a prominent role in the emergencies in Kenya and Malaysia, though from what I've read the special ops troops there who could get them carried the U.S. M1 Carbine when they could lay their hands on one. That too was a carbine that was not without its deficiencies.

I read that the "Jungle Carbine" appelation given to the No. 5 Enfield was the invention of a U.S. mail-order arms dealer advertising in the American Rifleman during the 1960s, probably the one which used to advertise on the inside of the back cover. The advertising was lurid -- "a military-made sporter, complete with a flash-hider and recoil pad." The name stuck and is still used today.

[Kiwigrunt]

Not only the Taliban...

http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2011/08/04/canadian-rangers-to-retire-lee-enfield-rifles/

[Pete]

Some years ago it was said on an American gun forum that during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s the U.S. Government purchased Canada's war reserve of No. 4 Enfields and sent them there. It was the ideal weapon for that place, rugged and virtually maintenance-free. However, the statement about the Enfields and their shipment there was not backed up with any references, footnotes, links or anything else to verify its accuracy. Thus it's more dubious chaff on the Internet, maybe true, maybe not.

[Fuchs]

Afghanistan and a certain area in Pakistan had afaik three phases of favourite unauthorised copies of foreign weapons:

#1 some 19th century blackpowder rifle, forgot the designation or pattern
#2 Enfield rifle
#3 AK

[Pete]

People in the Indian subcontinent are genuises at reverse-engineering firearms, car parts, and parts for household appliances -- stoves, refrigerators, so forth. An Indian guy I talked to 20 years ago said he thought we were nuts for junking cars and appliances the way we do. He thought the entire repair-parts industry was a rip-off because craftsmen could make the parts for much less. The difference has to do with pay scales in the U.S. compared to the Indian subcontinent.

The problem has to do with manufacturing quality. Which Browning Hi-Power 9mm would you want, one from FN in Belgium or a handmade knock-off from Peshawar? What quality or grade of steel is being used?

Britain pulled out of India in 1947. Since then India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh have tried to keep the rail and ferryboat systems the British built them going with their negligent version of maintenance. Every year there are stories about railroad bridges collapsing, trains jumping the tracks, ferryboats sinking. The news stories talk about 150 dead here, 350 there.

[ganulv]

Not only the Taliban...

http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2011/08/04/canadian-rangers-to-retire-lee-enfield-rifles/

That photo makes my right hand ache. Is a bolt action more reliable than an automatic in frigid temperatures? I have read about urinating on M1 actions in Korea, for example.*

*Though I have a couple of Korean War veterans in my family and neither has ever mentioned doing any such thing. Maybe because they were hillbillies who knew their way around a rifle prior to wearing a uniform. :p Though I don’t understand how you would get off more than at most one magazine’s worth of rounds before your formerly warm urine had iced up the mechanism.

[jmm99]

a nice, sunny day (note shadows) - and these guys are probably too warm (most hoods are flipped back):

http://cdn5.thefirearmsblog.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/canada_ranger-tm-tfb.jpg

Down here in the south, we have a rather temperate winter climate (usually above 0 F; lake effect from Lake Superior) - so I've never had to pee on a weapon. Though I did pee on a partridge once. Damn bird was under the snow cover (deer season) and came out right between my legs. :D

Regards

Mike

[120mm]

Afghanistan and a certain area in Pakistan had afaik three phases of favourite unauthorised copies of foreign weapons:

#1 some 19th century blackpowder rifle, forgot the designation or pattern
#2 Enfield rifle
#3 AK

#1 would be Martini-Henry, or a 1853 Enfield Musket-rifle, I am sure. It's about 50/50 what I see the most.

I'd call it four. #1 1853 Enfield, #2 Martini Henry, #3 Enfield bolt action, #4 AK

[120mm]

One thing we could do, as an Army, to improve Small Arms effectiveness, is to stop buying complete crap for supporting gear and installing gear correctly.

#1 on the complete crap list is the Blackhawk! Serpa holster. Fragile, effectively locks the pistol into the holster at random intervals, and has been proven to fire the piece upon extraction from the holster. Most reputable stateside training companies have banned students from bringing them. But 95% or so of all soldiers you see with a pistol have it riding in one, assumedly paid for by Uncle Sugar.

#2 on the installing gear correctly list is the M68 Aimpoint Close Combat Optic. Designed to be mounted as far forward on the upper receiver as possible, and aimed with both eyes open, it has become SOP within the US military to run it all the way back, safety wired on by some moron armorer. Soldiers still complain about it "obscuring their vision" which just reveals that they were trained incorrectly on it.

#3 on the complete crap gear list is the "Grip-pod". It is a fragile POS that is only really useful for propping up M4s in the DFAC. Too long to serve as a vertical grip, the bipod inside it makes it too fragile for hard use.

[Kiwigrunt]

I'd call it four. #1 1853 Enfield, #2 Martini Henry, #3 Enfield bolt action, #4 AK

In the not unforeseeable future to be replaced by #5 M16....kindly supplied and sponsored by....:wry:

[120mm]

In the not unforeseeable future to be replaced by #5 M16....kindly supplied and sponsored by....:wry:

Frankly, the market for crappy M16s is somewhat saturated by domestic makers like Bushmaster, Armalite, DPMS, Olympic and Rock River Armory, so I don't think the guys making guns in a cave in Darreh Adam Khel will be able to compete for the M16s.

[Pete]

The No. 4 Enfield .303 was actually a 1931 design that the British didn't put into production until '43 or '44 due to funding cutbacks during the period between the world wars. There is a lot of parts commonality between it and the earlier SMLE, which was the main rifle used by the British and Commonwealth forces during Wars I and II. The No. 4 Enfield wasn't replaced until around 1954, when the FN-influenced Self-Loading Rifle replaced it.

Those 7.62mm NATO rifles of the Cold War of the '50s were IMHO the Golden Age of military rifles -- the SLR, FN-FAL, the M14, and H&K's German G-3. They were rugged, reliable, accurate to long ranges, and had knock-down power.

[JMA]

Those 7.62mm NATO rifles of the Cold War of the '50s were IMHO the Golden Age of military rifles -- the SLR, FN-FAL, the M14, and H&K's German G-3. They were rugged, reliable, accurate to long ranges, and had knock-down power.

Pete, you are going to start something now. There is a whole generation of soldiers who have never fired a proper rifle in anger. Sad.

[Pete]

Those old 7.62 rifles were designed for the old proverbial "Full Spectrum of Operations" -- be it armor and mech infantry stuff in Western Europe, the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam, the hills and mountains of Korea, and just about everywhere else. You could do rapid fire in a close-range 30-yard engagement or you could do careful aimed fire at targets 600 meters away, with the sling wrapped around your arm.

Edit:
Some of the problem regarding the M1 and M14 had to do with training, not the rifles themselves. Ordnance gave us these fine weapons with all their capabilities, but the main-force U.S. Army prefers to put guys through shake-and bake rifle markmanship qualification courses and then leave it at that. Thus the old statististics about how most kills are at short ranges and that therefore a rifle like the M16 is the way to go.

The "Amber Shooting Glasses" crowd needs to realize that this isn't the 1930s any longer, when the Army spent the whole summer at the range popping caps. To improve marksmanship the shooters need to propose curriculum changes that add only a few more hours on the range, not a lot. Their proposed changes to marksmanship instruction should be to add 20 more hours of instruction, not 200 more. If they do the latter nobody in the Army will listen to them.

[ganulv]

#1 would be Martini-Henry, or a 1853 Enfield Musket-rifle, I am sure. It's about 50/50 what I see the most.

I'd call it four. #1 1853 Enfield, #2 Martini Henry, #3 Enfield bolt action, #4 AK

I don’t know if it has made the rounds on the forum, but this morning I was browsing C. J. Chivers’s website for Libya updates and came across this (http://cjchivers.com/post/2164511162/reporters-notebook-no-10-in-afghanistan-artifacts).

[Fuchs]

Pete, you are going to start something now. There is a whole generation of soldiers who have never fired a proper rifle in anger. Sad.

I'd be happy if there was never again a generation of soldiers who have fired a rifle in anger.

[kaur]

At page 16 this thread, there was talk about Australian with AK.

Here are Americans with AK.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/video-taliban-counterstrik/

[davidbfpo]

Kaur,

The video is for an "armchair observer" slightly confusing, at first I thought those with AK47s were contractors, then some were in uniform, with vests and helmets. Then I spotted an unusual shoulder badge, 00:45 & 00:54 for examples and that is the flag of Macedonia - who have a small, company sized detachment in country.

For flag and details see:http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php

[kaur]

It seems that you are right. Take a look also at machine gun at 1:06.

[davidbfpo]

Kaur,

I'm no good on the muzzles of machine guns. My first guess was a MG42, but I doubt if that is in the Macedonian or US armoury.:wry:

[Fuchs]

Kaur,

I'm no good on the muzzles of machine guns. My first guess was a MG42, but I doubt if that is in the Macedonian or US armoury.:wry:

MG3 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rheinmetall_MG3)

MG 74, the Swiss SIG 710-3, MG 51, MG 1, MG2 and MG 42 look almost identically.


The only non-related machinegun with such looks is the CETME Ameli (http://world.guns.ru/machine/sp/cetme-ameli-e.html).


Macedonia uses former Warsaw Pact weapons according to Jane's Infantry Weapons 04/05. I wouldn't be surprised if they received some reserve stocks from Germany as part of standards harmonisation with NATO, though.

[Vojnik]

Different time. While daring action occurs on a small scale and locally today, it is not broadly tolerated in the west. Those days are gone, they were killed off by the politically correct movements of the 70s and are highly unlikely to return short of a major, existential war. Risk avoidance is all too prevalent today, a societal (and thus quite difficult to reverse), not a military impact.

Ken, I will respectfully disagree. In fact, when I was a young LT in the Army fighting in Iraq in 2003, my platoon single-handedly escorted the 82nd Airborne Division Chorus (see link) across Fallujah from Division HQ in Ramadi.

If a bunch of Soldiers in ascots singing and dancing doesn't epitomize "daring action", then I don't know what does. :wry:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P1IjaJwLz58

My post is related to the topic at hand b/c I'm pretty sure every one of my soldiers wanted to shoot the Chorus with something larger than 5.56mm.

[Ken White]

My post is related to the topic at hand b/c I'm pretty sure every one of my soldiers wanted to shoot the Chorus with something larger than 5.56mm."...it is not broadly tolerated in the west." :D

(emphasis added / kw)

Friend of mine was at one time the CSM of the 407th S&T Bn and thus was the Godfather of the Chorus at the time -- and he wanted to shoot 'em. :confused:

I missed them. Fortunately, they came along after my time. :wry:

[davidbfpo]

As always an expert report on what happened on the ground from FRI; which rather demolishes the NATO footage of Macedonian & US rifle fire on the suspects:
I originally thought it was undisciplined fire from Afghan Security Forces who were shooting at ghosts, as there was only one spot in the city with active shooters. Turns out I was wrong. Most of the shooting The Bot was hearing came from the ISAF Headquarters where the Macedonian guard force joined by Americans from the HQ staff started shooting at a building 1000 meters away with AK 47’s (Macedonians) and M4 rifles (Americans). What they thought they were doing and where all those rounds impacted is a mystery to me. I can guarantee that none of them came close to hitting the 6 gunmen who were outside the effective range of ISAF battle rifles. Apparently the shooting from the ISAF HQ lasted over two hours and only stopped when they ran out of ammo..

There's more on:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=4475

That NATO public relations thought the footage was to ISAF's advantage is now to say the least embarrassing.

[Fuchs]

For several years, I have held the suspicion that

(1) Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine guns and sniper rifles that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines.

(2) Western infantry superiority is being overestimated due to plate armour, Medevac and non-platoon-organic support fires.

(3) Taliban are not as much into killing as into fighting, and thus consider many engagements a 'success' while ISAF/OEF does count them as a success, too.


P.S.:

How exactly do you set up and use a 82 mm recoilless gun INSIDE a building?
Does this probably explain the meagre amount of 82mm shells fired and meagre 'determination'?

[Kiwigrunt]

How exactly do you set up and use a 82 mm recoilless gun INSIDE a building?


The photo of the building from where the kickless cannon was fired shows the building to be in construction, with no windows. So air pressure as such should not be too much of a problem. I'd want to be wearing ear-muffins though!

[kaur]

HK's 5 cents.

http://www.hkpro.com/forum/hk416-hk417-hq/145899-militarized-mr308-now-g28.html

[kaur]

HK IAR


USMC M27 IAR Production Order Awarded

Last week HK Inc received the production contract for 3,300 M27 Infantry Automatic Rifles (IAR's) for full fielding in Marine infantry units. First deliveries are expected in November on the US Marine Corps birthday. This effort started in 1999 with a "Field Experiment" but has now been put to bed - or has it? Some believe this could lead to possible replacement of the USMC M16A2/A4 in service with the Marines as the Marine Corps is not officially signed on to the Army's ongoing Individual Carbine competition.

http://www.hkpro.com/forum/hk416-hk417-hq/145820-usmc-m27-iar-production-order-awarded.html

[Kiwigrunt]

The new Kiwi DMR (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2011/10/21/new-zealand-army-adopts-lmt-ar-10-for-new-designated-marksman-rifle/)

[Vojnik]

Regarding the USMC's IAR...isn't this roughly the same concept as the British Army's LSW? Or for that matter, the RPK or Browning Automatic Rifle?

Maybe I'm missing something, and I'm open to ideas, but I'm not sure I can see the benefit of a 5.56mm light support weapon firing from 30-round magazines instead of a belt-fed weapon.

[Ken White]

Regarding the USMC's IAR...isn't this roughly the same concept as the British Army's LSW? Or for that matter, the RPK or Browning Automatic Rifle?

Maybe I'm missing something, and I'm open to ideas, but I'm not sure I can see the benefit of a 5.56mm light support weapon firing from 30-round magazines instead of a belt-fed weapon.Reliability, weight and ammo conservation in that order to the second. Belt fed weapons are a maintenance and ammo burden on a Platoon for little benefit. Belt fed weapons can do more damage when employed in pairs and at Company level...

[kaur]

In May 2010, the USMC announced the adoption of the HK IAR as the M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle and placed them with units in combat areas. The M27 has proven that it provides better firepower than the SAW without the steel links in belt-fed ammo that add bulk and weight for the gunner, make reloading a two-handed evolution and take the gun out of the fight to clear some stoppages. Is this just my opinion? No. These are facts passed to me at Quantico by Chris Wade, a Marine Corps Battalion Gunner, while I was knocking down targets with three-round bursts with the M27 at 500 meters—something that would have taken half a belt with a SAW. If the HK IAR makes a salty Marine Gunner happy, I am not going to argue the point.

http://www.tactical-life.com/online/exclusives/usmc-m27-infantry-automatic-rifle-video/?right=related

[Fuchs]

Bursts...500 meters.

I smell propaganda (or incompetence).

[kaur]

First hit; second, third missed?

[Fuchs]

Even IF he was hitting consistently (and wasting 2/3 of the cartridges with burst instead of single shots):

His "I was knocking down targets" creates the illusion that such hits would be effective, which is grossly misleading. 5.56 mm is at that range more like a small calibre pocket pistol bullet at short range.

[ganulv]

5.56 mm is at that range more like a small calibre pocket pistol bullet at short range.

Which would kill anyone not wearing body armor dead enough.

[carl]

Even IF he was hitting consistently (and wasting 2/3 of the cartridges with burst instead of single shots):

Isn't 33% hits at that range a very good result for somebody who has not been to some kind of special school?

[Fuchs]

@ganulv: Such hits are lethal only in a handful spots.


Isn't 33% hits at that range a very good result for somebody who has not been to some kind of special school?

Fifth week of basic I scored 70% hits with G3 (with an old 4x scope) on 450m and was asked why I was missing so much (I did because I was erroneously compensating when in fact I was hitting, but target didn't fall because it was already too perforated).

More evidence it's propaganda:


(...)than the SAW without the steel links in belt-fed ammo that add bulk and weight for the gunner(...)

As if magazines were weightless.

Textile belt pouch + steel links weighs less than textile mag pouches + mags IIRC.

[ganulv]

@ganulv: Such hits are lethal only in a handful spots.

Oh, I know. If you at one point in your life thought a used lever action .30-30 was the best Christmas gift you could possibly receive you might still be a little bit of a redneck. :D I realize that lethality is ideal if you soldier for a living, but that doesn’t mean I want anyone pointing their .22 rimfire anywhere near any part of my body.


Textile belt pouch + steel links weighs less than textile mag pouches + mags IIRC.

You Germans and your hang-up with optimal engineering. :p I’m speaking ironically, I don’t think it is a bad thing. My undergraduate advisor’s father (http://www.whorunsgov.com/Profiles/Philip_E._Coyle_III) served as DOT&E (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director,_Operational_Test_and_Evaluation) under Clinton and from time to time pops up in the American media portrayed as a shill for the Democrats. My advisor told me that his father’s guiding principle in life is “Does it work?” and that that was more than enough to earn him plenty of ire in D.C.

[Vojnik]

Understand your point Ken...I don't know, when I was on exchange with the British Army they were not too keen on the LSW (5.56mm mag fed weapon). While it has been over a decade since that experience, the general feeling seemed to be that the LSW was really only a DMR.

Of course, the other argument is that the gunner carrying the SAW only has 100rds in a "nutsack" available for immediate use.

Kaur, I understand the "3 rds in 18" at 500m" concept, but that seems like that's not quite the point of a squad suppressive weapon. I thought a "machine gun" was supposed to provide a beaten zone of fire in order to kill/injure within that beaten zone, to provide sustained or cyclic grazing fire in the defensive, or to suppress the enemy to allow fire and maneuver...i.e., I don't just want one guy getting shot in the chest, I want 7-8 guys to either be hit in a cone of fire, or at least fixed and unable to move or shoot back at me whilst I try to blow them to smithereens.

So if I can't use the IAR for suppressive fire...what do I do with it? In what situation should I be using automatic fire from a magazine fed weapon at greater than CQB range?

Not being saractic, I'm honestly open to new ideas.

[tequila]

Isn't 33% hits at that range a very good result for somebody who has not been to some kind of special school?

Getting hits @ 500m with a SAW is nothing special, especially if one in the prone. The SAW, in my experience, is a very accurate weapon - as accurate as the M16A4, a weapon with which it is hard to NOT score 8/10 or better hits on a USMC KD range @ 500m with iron sights.

The other problems with the SAW (weight, maintenance issues, the inherent issues with an open-bolt belt-fed weapon) exist to a more or less manageable degree, but in my experience accuracy has never been a SAW problem.

[carl]

Fifth week of basic I scored 70% hits with G3 (with an old 4x scope) on 450m and was asked why I was missing so much (I did because I was erroneously compensating when in fact I was hitting, but target didn't fall because it was already too perforated).

True I'm sure but how many guys who are on patrol today in Afghanistan can do that or would be able to make 33% hits at 450m when shooting at people?

[Ken White]

Understand your point Ken...I don't know, when I was on exchange with the British Army they were not too keen on the LSW (5.56mm mag fed weapon). While it has been over a decade since that experience, the general feeling seemed to be that the LSW was really only a DMR.Granted, though I wonder how much of that was predicated on the myth of automatic fires as suppressive...
Of course, the other argument is that the gunner carrying the SAW only has 100rds in a "nutsack" available for immediate use.Depends on several things; the Marines have always had another FT member carrying extra rounds for the BAR / SAW. There are also now reasonably reliable -- and they'll get better -- large capacity magazines (NOT speaking of C-Mags and other flawed mechanical types...).

There's also the fact that I'm old and grew up with the BAR so the concept isn't alien to me...:D
...that's not quite the point of a squad suppressive weapon. I thought a "machine gun" was supposed to provide a beaten zone of fire in order to kill/injure within that beaten zone, to provide sustained or cyclic grazing fire in the defensive, or to suppress the enemy to allow fire and maneuver...I agree with what you say about a "machine gun" -- I submit that a squad suppressive weapon (a) need not be a "machine gun," (b) and question whether an infantry squad needs a suppressive weapon organically -- no question they need to have them available. In discussing suppressive fire, the issues of accuracy, maintenance of rates of fire, size of beaten zones and, most tellingly, caliber and capability arise.
So if I can't use the IAR for suppressive fire...what do I do with it?...Final protective fire. :cool:
Not being saractic, I'm honestly open to new ideas.Hopefully, we all are -- but old habits are hard to break... :wry:

[jcustis]

Regarding the USMC's IAR...isn't this roughly the same concept as the British Army's LSW? Or for that matter, the RPK or Browning Automatic Rifle?

Maybe I'm missing something, and I'm open to ideas, but I'm not sure I can see the benefit of a 5.56mm light support weapon firing from 30-round magazines instead of a belt-fed weapon.

The quote listed below is one of mine from a different forum, so don't mind the odd grammar. The foot stomp is that the M27 should not be compared to the M249 SAW. It is absolutely aimed at filling the automatic rifle role in the fireteam, but the standard response for employment is not automatic fire, or even bursts for that matter, unless a specific type of target (generally massed individual tgts) presents itself.


During the course of the conversations I had with the assembled Gunners, something formed in my mind that I think was on the tip of my tongue through the 13 pages of this thread, but I just could never really articulate (Chris or somebody else might have, but I don't recall ). In the process of the experimentation, requirements development, testing, etc., the Marine Corps was not in a pursuit for a replacement for the SAW, although a lot of headlines were churned out that made people think so. That's where the whole discussion gets bogged down and twisted...what the Corps has been trying to do is field a weapon suitable to equip the billet that exists in the fireteam (AR rifleman), and also serves (doctrinally) as the asst. tm ldr - an automatic rifle. The SAW is not and never will be an AR, but rather a LMG, and although there are still acolytes to the power of belt-fed suppression, we seem to be moving forward smartly.

People point to the Brit LSW and the Diemaco LSW, decry them as failures, and look at the M27 to as a copy of the LSW concept and presume that it will fail. There is a considerable amount of empirical data accumulated through testing and experimentation, and now combat operations, to demonstrate that the M27 is better than the SAW at the team level.

Can some guys rock the SAW well? Absolutely, and I think I was one of them, but when you look at maintenance, training, and other employment issues like mobility, they point to a need for the M27 and a movement of the SAW back to the role of the light machine gun where it should have never left.

Think of it as less a LSW, and more of a precision, lightweight rifle with the capability to engage select targets with controlled automatic fire when necessary. If the unit wants a full-time lead slinger at the squad level, then they need to send the emma gees.

[Chris jM]

If I may be so bold, I'd appreciate it if someone could clarify a point of mystery of mine - why did they choose another 5.56 rifle to fulfill this role? I could understand if they went for a 7.62 (or even a 6.X) rifle, as it provides additional range, reach and lethality. I'm mystified by the selection of the HK416, though. If the IAR concept is needed in the 5.56 calibre, why not pull an M16A4 off the shelf, provide a 6x optic (or similar), a bipod and a heavier barrel at the most?

[jcustis]

That's a good question. Several companies tried to provide articles for testing, and the HK offering was chosen. IIRC, Colt even had the opportunity to provide a sample, but it either did not pass muster or the company simply did not choose to compete.

I don't think we are in the ordnance/arsenal business like we used to be years ago, where the Govt develops the design and then turns to industry to say, "okay, make me more of these!" The Navy does some work at Crane, IN, and the Marine Corps has it Precision Weapons Section in Quantico.

The IAR holds better minute of angle accuracy that the M16A4 does, and in fact reportedly shoots better than the DM rifles that were built out of M16A4s, specifically for a DM role.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Marine_Corps_Squad_Advanced_Marksman _Rifle

[kaur]

Vojnik:


Kaur, I understand the "3 rds in 18" at 500m" concept, but that seems like that's not quite the point of a squad suppressive weapon. I thought a "machine gun" was supposed to provide a beaten zone of fire in order to kill/injure within that beaten zone, to provide sustained or cyclic grazing fire in the defensive, or to suppress the enemy to allow fire and maneuver.

The question is what makes suppression effect. I think that this is threat to be killed. This is related to precision. IAR is very precise according to comments. IAR is good suppression weapon then :)

jcustis:


The IAR holds better minute of angle accuracy that the M16A4 does, and in fact reportedly shoots better than the DM rifles that were built out of M16A4s, specifically for a DM role.

I have been thinking also isn't there identity crisis in the heads of squad DM's? Do IAR people and DM people participate same courses now?

[Vojnik]

So what's the best tactical situation to use precision, automatic fires at the 400-500m range?

I feel like we're talking in circles.

"What does the Automatic Rifleman do?"

"Oh, he's the guy who fires his rifle automatically."

"Why does he do that?"

"Because he's the Automatic Rifleman."

Of course, this is the military so that makes perfect sense...

[kaur]

Vojnik, if you open MAJ Ehrhart's paper then he is writing about taking back infantry half-kilometre. As far as I understand IAR helps squads to do that. I found there answers to Automatic Rifleman questions you asked concerning automatic mode.

[Ken White]

We often forget that -- and we do not do it at all well... :mad:
So what's the best tactical situation to use precision, automatic fires at the 400-500m range?Situation dependent obviously but generally in the defense in open terrain. Other than that, little call for it.

Some will say it can be used in the offense as 'suppressive' fire. Been my observation that against even marginally trained or experienced troops automatic fire does not suppress, precision (or more correctly, accurate) fire does suppress. The volume of fire makes little difference other than as noise and a psychological reinforcement to those who have to go forward -- well trained troops do not need -- or want -- that noise. :cool:
I feel like we're talking in circles.

"What does the Automatic Rifleman do?"

"Oh, he's the guy who fires his rifle automatically."

"Why does he do that?"

"Because he's the Automatic Rifleman."

Of course, this is the military so that makes perfect sense...Actually, it does make sense. He provides the capability to do just that on the rare occasions when it's actually beneficial as opposed to just cosmetic. That will generally be in providing aimed fire at point targets (not area targets, that's what MGs are for) in support of offensive movement and for final protective fires in the defense and a combination of those techniques for ambushes and counter ambushes.

[Fuchs]

I'm sure I repeat myself, but I cannot resist:

You should usually avoid giving your position away to a really dangerous opponent (= not Taliban).

A competent enemy will rarely be visible + identifiable at long ranges (and if so, he'll still be no easy, stationary target).

Long-range rifle fire is more inaccurate in a firefight and tends to require more ammo = more weight.

5.56 mm at 400+ m distance isn't exactly powerful. A soft torso armour vest + clothes + pouches and their content = bullet can do at most a smallish injury.

It's 100% predictable that harassing fires at long range will lead to a more careful enemy, and thus cancel your opportunities of observation at long range. It's better to harness superior discipline in order to enforce caution without enemy harassing fires and to prohibit own harassing fires in order to preserve the value of observation.

Skilled infantrymen are a scarce resource in an army. Their availability should not be risked in petty harassing fires that are 100% non-decisive. They should be kept ready for actually useful, decisive actions.


My conclusion is that the firefight at long ranges (300+ m) should be left to designated marksmen with suppressor (= no flash), expert camouflage and some spacing to the rest of the team AND to mortar fire missions.



Again, it shows that small wars with their marginal capability opposition press conclusions onto standing armies that would be totally wrong in a great war setting.

[Ken White]

:D
I'm sure I repeat myself, but I cannot resist:
...
Long-range rifle fire is more inaccurate in a firefight and tends to require more ammo = more weight.
...
My conclusion is that the firefight at long ranges (300+ m) should be left to designated marksmen with suppressor (= no flash), expert camouflage and some spacing to the rest of the team AND to mortar fire missions.I agree with all you say, including these two statements -- however, both those deserve caveats.

The first on the basis that its veracity is a matter of training. Truly well trained troops can provide accurate fire up to 500m easily IF they have a weapon that makes that worthwhile. IMO, they should have such a weapon, others will differ. There are times when such fire is necessary, times when it is not. See remark below.

The second is unquestionably desirable in most circumstances, however, for many reasons it is not always possible. See remark below

Remark: Armies, regrettably should always train for the worst case. If they can perform adequately in bad situations, they will perform superbly in lesser fights.
Again, it shows that small wars with their marginal capability opposition press conclusions onto standing armies that would be totally wrong in a great war setting.We can -- as always -- totally agree on that that. We, the US, are picking up some bad habits to add to those from Viet Nam that we still have not shed... :(

[Vojnik]

Vojnik, if you open MAJ Ehrhart's paper then he is writing about taking back infantry half-kilometre. As far as I understand IAR helps squads to do that. I found there answers to Automatic Rifleman questions you asked concerning automatic mode.

I've read the paper, but I will reread again. I appreciate the comments and will do some research.

[jcustis]

So what's the best tactical situation to use precision, automatic fires at the 400-500m range?

I feel like we're talking in circles.

"What does the Automatic Rifleman do?"

"Oh, he's the guy who fires his rifle automatically."

"Why does he do that?"

"Because he's the Automatic Rifleman."

Of course, this is the military so that makes perfect sense...

I think you may be getting wrapped around the term 'automatic rifleman'. He isn't the just guy who fires his rifle automatically. The M27 is distinct from the Browning Automatic Rifle in that the standard response in the offense is not to respond to a target by flipping the safety to automatic and dispatching the enemy as quickly as possible with multiple bursts. Good BAR gunners could squeeze off very short bursts or single shots when the slow rate of fire was selected, but it was still an automatic weapon.

What the Marine Gunners and infantry guys have essentially concluded is that the IAR gunner should move as a rifleman would. He doesn't need the rest of the team or portion of the squad to seize his next firing position for him, as he struggles to relocate to this new firing point. The rest of the team need not fight to protect him as a primary task, and he is not expected to be that "suppressive firepower" fight-stopper that I think too many folk envisioned the SAW gunner was supposed to be.

The standard response for the IAR gunner is accurate, semi-automatic fire delivered against a point target(s), and he ratchets up to bursts of fully-automatic fire against massed targets, or perhaps enfilade targets, and definitely against area targets. Even in a counter-ambush scenario, the answer is not to spray-and-pray wildly, but you have 28-30 rounds to put out there quickly...if you're not already dead at the initiation. For targets at the 400-500m range, if I need to use automatic fires due to the nature of the target, I'm going to be using a machine gun first if I have one.

We had a maintenance problem, and a training problem, and a mobility problem, with the employment of the SAW within the team and squad. Time will tell if the IAR is the answer, and if we are looking for a panacea at the end of a length of extruded metal, pins, welds, and polymer, we are already behind the power curve. It has been tested, evaluated, and weighed against the SAW in terms of hits-per-tgt and rounds expended per hit, and it won, but still needs to be looked at as a system.

Effective suppression is hits on target, and giving dirt naps to the knuckleheads who need them.

BREAK--

Fuchs, everything you stated above is really stating the obvious, it seems, for great war settings.

[Chris jM]

Thanks for your last reply.


We had a maintenance problem, and a training problem, and a mobility problem, with the employment of the SAW within the team and squad...

Do you think the USMC has this problem as a service specific issue, or do you think it is universally applicable to all armies with belt-fed weapons in the squad/section?

I ask this as I have never heard of any issues with the M249 in my army. I wonder whether this is due to a lack of low-level combat experience compared to the USMC, or whether it is a cultural/employment issue.

[Chris jM]

Just to clarify my last post so it doesn't appear inadvertantly condescending - by 'low level combat experience' I mean small unit, not low intensity, and by 'cultural/employment' I'm referring to where the weapon is located in the unit, how it is employed and to what end, etc.

[Fuchs]

What the Marine Gunners and infantry guys have essentially concluded is that the IAR gunner should move as a rifleman would.

He IS a rifleman. That weapon is almost indistinguishable from some assault rifles.


I concluded a while ago that the IAR will be introduced as SAW replacement, it will be hyped as super-successful and then it will replace the M16 in the infantry.
The whole program looks like a M16 replacement program done specifically to avoid the pitfalls of the many earlier M16 replacement programs.
This replacement program comes with its own ideology/doctrine ("automatic rifleman") and a heavy dose of BAR-nostalgia.

The current pro-IAR propaganda was predictable and prepares for the replacement of the M16 PLUS it distracts from the general incompetence of the Marines in regard to procurement requirements and program management.

[kaur]

Fuchs, good news for Germany's export oriented indutry! HK first won IAR contest, next Army new carbine contest :)

About wound ballistics. It depends a lot what area you hit. Accurate weapon is more lethal with "weaker" ammo. According to one Swede here, shot placement is key to lethality.

http://www.google.ee/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=small%20arms%20arvidsson%20ndia&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fndia%2F2005smallar ms%2Fwednesday%2Farvidsson.pdf&ei=yNWnTvKMLYbj4QTs0qXoDw&usg=AFQjCNEgGcz34XSuoANGuQh7X2YhqD4vog&cad=rja

[Fuchs]

Shot placement is impractical. You gotta be glad if you hit at all*.

You better switch to auto if you're close enough to even consider shot placement.


*: Assuming competent enemies who are a powerful enough to be a believable threat to your nation at all.

[JMA]

Belt fed weapons can do more damage when employed in pairs and at Company level...

That is if you always deploy in company strength. If not you should move your firepower down to the level of deployment.

[JMA]

For several years, I have held the suspicion that

(1) Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine guns and sniper rifles that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines.



Agreed. So the logic is to increase the number of machine guns and move them forward, yes?

[Fuchs]

Agreed. So the logic is to increase the number of machine guns and move them forward, yes?

No.

"(1) Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine gunners and snipers that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines."

There, fixed it.

You cannot turn most riflemen into high firepower soldiers because competent armies select their best infantrymen for the high performance weapons and equip the low performance infantrymen with assault rifles (to suggest to them that they ain't more porters than anything else).
Low performance infantryman + high performance weapon = still low performance

You cannot kick all low performance infantrymen out of the infantry (just some real duds) quickly because that would be inefficient. You'd have too few infantrymen. It's better to choose your small unit leaders, machine gunners and scoped riflemen carefully and assign helper infantrymen to them.
It would take major personnel system improvements to solve this without resorting to a tiny all-SF infantry force.

Btw JMA, I already wrote about this a year ago (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/07/on-infantry-small-unit-development.html).

[Vojnik]

He IS a rifleman. That weapon is almost indistinguishable from some assault rifles.


I concluded a while ago that the IAR will be introduced as SAW replacement, it will be hyped as super-successful and then it will replace the M16 in the infantry.
The whole program looks like a M16 replacement program done specifically to avoid the pitfalls of the many earlier M16 replacement programs.
This replacement program comes with its own ideology/doctrine ("automatic rifleman") and a heavy dose of BAR-nostalgia.

The current pro-IAR propaganda was predictable and prepares for the replacement of the M16 PLUS it distracts from the general incompetence of the Marines in regard to procurement requirements and program management.

THIS. This is what I was trying to say.

Thank you Fuchs.

The USMC evaluated the Colt Automatic Rifle in 1977 and decided to go with the Minimi instead, correct? So, 30 years later they say "Ooops...got that wrong"? But yet still retain the 3-round burst on the M-16A4? Or hell...still retain the M-16A4 period...

[Fuchs]

The USMC also had a period during which it used a LMG version of the M16A1 with bipod. There's next to no innovation in the current "I"AR, and quite the same concept was afaik found lacking a generation ago.

[kaur]

Vojnik, this is Fuchs' speculation that confirms his hypothesis :)

Ballistics.


The Corps has considered a variety of options to improve stopping power in recent years. In 2007, it weighed fielding a 6.8mm weapon after rank-and-file troops assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command designed it with their command’s approval to address deficiencies in standard 5.56mm ammo. Neither SOCOM nor the Corps adopted it, in part because of the logistics and cost required. Gen. James Mattis, now commander of U.S. Central Command, advocated behind the scenes that the Corps consider adopting 6.8mm ammo as recently as last year, but the service adopted SOST ammo instead.

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/09/marine-corps-passes-on-army-carbine-updates-091110w/

IAR and SAW


Currently, the Marines have two battalions of M27s in Afghanistan and another three preparing to deploy. Marine battalions will also keep nine M249s per rifle company to allow commanders to beef up firepower when needed.

http://www.military.com/news/article/corps-to-replace-saw-with-automatic-rifle.html



Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine gunners and snipers that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines.

Fuchs, how you define sniper in this context? What skills, what gear?


it used a LMG version of the M16A1 with bipod

What barrel, how the bipod was attatched to barrel etc? They lost the accuracy (we are talking here about half km) to technical solutions.

[Fuchs]

I define sniper in the context of an infantry squad or platoon as quite the same as designated marksman.
* an emphasis on camouflage, concealment, cover and deception to the point that he becomes quite invisible even while shooting (including muzzle flash and dust cloud concerns)
* aimed single shots of unusually good accuracy

To me the difference between a sniper and a designated marksman is
* DM is organic to infantry small unit, sniper at most attached to it
* sniper is more extreme; more specialised weapon, more fieldcraft training
* sniper is trained as forward observer and usually better at ranging
* sniper has greater freedom of movement relative to small infantry unit.
* sniper has his own fire discipline
* sniper isn't meant to participate in assaults

So in the context of this discussion they're practically the same and I become occasionally lazy enough to not differentiate between them.

M16A1 LMG (http://world.guns.ru/machine/usa/m16-lsw-lmg-e.html).

[Ken White]

Fuchs:

Heh. No one who ever carried a BAR is the slightest bit nostalgic about that monster... :D

This:
You better switch to auto if you're close enough to even consider shot placement.is just flat wrong. It's a dangerous fallacy created by the Russians who also fielded half trained Soldiers to compensate for that lack of training and one that has been since adopted by people who should know better. Full auto, Shotgun, Rifle, Pistol, Howitzer, Mortar -- whatever -- shot placement is critical. Inaccurate fire is totally worthless and a full auto capability encourages its use and thus the resultant inaccuracy.
Low performance infantryman + high performance weapon = still low performance.That's true but it is not because 'competent' armies HAVE to do it that way, it is simply the way they've always done it -- and it's wrong. Most Armies have too many Infantrymen and the majority of them are only marginally trained.This is partly induced by the myths that Mass is critical; Infantry is 'cheaper' than armored vehicles; and Infantry can do everything. In reverse order, it cannot and should not; proper infantry is more expensive than an armored unit -- there's nothing that's more cost inefficient than an Infantry Battalion in peacetime... :D

Mass is vastly overrated as an effect simply because we are inheritors of 'tradition' -- and inertia.
It would take major personnel system improvements to solve this without resorting to a tiny all-SF infantry force.Yes -- sorely needed, too. I have read and agree with much of your linked Blog post IF Armies intend to continue doing business as they have. I contend a new model is needed and that infantry as levee en mass is woefully outdated -- and a habit. I agree psychological selection is important -- I'd say imperative -- and agree that the 80% exist -- they can be Artillerists and Armor crewmwen, MPs Engineers and so forth which really do -- and should -- vastly outnumber the infantry. Infantry do not need to be trained to high end SOF capability but they need to be more than space fillers...


JMA:
If not you should move your firepower down to the level of deployment.Nope. Keep that firepower consolidated for proper training and employment -- which can include detaching pairs of guns with trained crews including Ammo bearers to Platoon or smaller elements as needed.

No armed force IMO should ever always deploy in any set strength; METT-TC and all that... ;)

Vojnik:
The USMC evaluated the Colt Automatic Rifle in 1977 and decided to go with the Minimi instead, correct? So, 30 years later they say "Ooops...got that wrong"? But yet still retain the 3-round burst on the M-16A4? Or hell...still retain the M-16A4 period...During peacetime, the Marines are captive to Army procurement. Congress tends to insist that one size fits all (it never does...) and that everyone should use the same equipment. Stupid and shortsighted, nominally based on cost grounds and generally wrong on that but there it is. The Marines tried to resist the M16 altogether back in 1963 -- they did not succeed. They tried to resist the M249 (as did some in the Army). The Army through Barry McCaffrey (then AC at USAIS) was pushed into the M4 based on that fatally flawed 'automatic fire is required for all' mantra though they in a bow to the flaw in that argument insisted on the rather dumb three round burst bit -- yet another attempt to substitute technology no matter how flawed for training. Given the 'Stan and Iraq, the Marines developed some independence in their procurement -- independence they should never have been denied in the first place.

That said, Fuchs is probably right and its a slick way to get rid of the very flawed M16 / M4. More power to 'em. :D

[Fuchs]

Ken; statistics on shots fired by policemen (all semi-auto), the range involved and hits 'scored', are disgusting.

I was taught to switch to auto on G3 at 25-30 metres, and I am a fan of that considering that shooting auto with G3 meant to score multiple hits per trigger pull against "kneeling" cardboard targets.

Full auto till mag is empty was not debatable with the G3's recoil, but long bursts (4-6 cartridges) are surely more effective than trusting the quickness of your index finger with semi-auto when a second more or less can decide about life or death.


Btw, about auto fire on the attack in general:
Back in WW2 the German infantry squad was a machine gunner with assistant and escorts/porters. That was changed (at least on paper) to two machine gunners, two assistant machinegunners and escorts/porters. The NCO leading the squad was often armed with a submachinegun (so he didn't participate in most firefights, but was most useful at short range as escort) and he assigned targets/directions to the machinegunner.

Later, in 1944, assault rifles became available and some experiments were done. Assault rifles have a better range than submachineguns (and Soviet all-SMG companies were known to be dangerous on the attack and in urban settings).

One of the experiments ditched the machinegun and equipped all-assault rifle infantry. This infantry was meant for offensive actions, firing full auto on the attack. As far as I've read about it, this approach worked quite well.
Keep in mind that by '44 the German infantry needed all morale boost it could get and the Soviet one wasn't exactly composed of personnel of choice any more (= many infantrymen were older than preferred for infantry).

Full auto assaults at that time were quick and had two main advantages;
(1) the noise was impressive and provoked the "flee" panic reaction
(2) the storming troops were impressive and provoked the "take cover and freeze" panic reaction.

There are certainly less dangerous ways of provoking panic reactions, but every discussion of full auto weapons tactics has to take into account the psychological effects (confidence in own troops and fear in the enemy troops). Weapons development, procurement and squad/platoon design (TO&E, tactics) should be in great part about psychology.
(This, of course, damns the rejecting UK Army reactions to the poor SA86 reputation as utterly incompetent.)

[JMA]

JMA:Nope. Keep that firepower consolidated for proper training and employment -- which can include detaching pairs of guns with trained crews including Ammo bearers to Platoon or smaller elements as needed.

No armed force IMO should ever always deploy in any set strength; METT-TC and all that... ;)

If as you end with everything is METT-TC governed then how can it be dogmatically stated that firepower should be consolidated?

I would be interested if someone can explain to me why there needs to be ay intermediate weapons between the standard service rifle and the FN MAG 58 (M240).

The troopies in Rhodesia carried the gun and 500 rounds (if more were needed for a particular op the others would share the extras). These were not supermen just your average colonial 18/19/20 year olds. Weight was not a problem.

I can't remember any gunner near me having a stoppage. If they had they would have been in deep sh*t but what the troop sgt would have done to them would have been nothing like the savage ridicule they would have suffered from the other troopies. See photo below... an ops briefing on the go, gunners told to make sure their weapons are 100% will be briefed later. A question of priorities.

An aside. At a recent regimental reunion in the UK I met an old troopie of mine who told me that after 30 years he had finally understood why I had taken his MAG away and given it to someone else back then. He said it was the greatest humiliation he had suffered in his whole life and the other troopies had mocked him for years thereafter.

http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5168/5282872956_90a532434f.jpg

You put the fire power where you need it and you get more weapons if you need them. In Rhodesia there was one MAG per four-man stick (callsign). To be a MAG gunner was a badge of honour. Then of course there was a hierarchy among the gunners as to who had 'ripped' the most gooks.

[Ken White]

Ken; statistics on shots fired by policemen (all semi-auto), the range involved and hits 'scored', are disgusting.Yep. Have a son who's a police department firearms instructor and SWAT sniper -- he'd agree with you -- and tell you, as do I, their training is inadequate.
I was taught to switch to auto on G3 at 25-30 metres...but long bursts (4-6 cartridges) are surely more effective than trusting the quickness of your index finger with semi-auto when a second more or less can decide about life or death.We can disagree on that. I acknowledge that for most marginally trained troops who undertake less than six month initial entry training and / or fire less than ~3K rounds in that training that you are correct. I also know that is the norm today theoretically on cost grounds. I disagree that approach is cost efficient and I know it does not produce affective infantrymen. We need to redefine Infantry...



Btw, about auto fire on the attack in general...
...
Full auto assaults at that time were quick and had two main advantages;
(1) the noise was impressive and provoked the "flee" panic reaction
(2) the storming troops were impressive and provoked the "take cover and freeze" panic reaction.

There are certainly less dangerous ways of provoking panic reactions, but every discussion of full auto weapons tactics has to take into account the psychological effects (confidence in own troops and fear in the enemy troops). Weapons development, procurement and squad/platoon design (TO&E, tactics) should be in great part about psychology.I am aware of and agree with all that but point out that by the time in question, the number of trained or experienced troops on both sides was small -- there were a lot of marginal performers who could be so easily impressed or intimidated. That of course happens in major wars of attrition with levee en mass armies that are infantry heavy due to the cost factor or production constraints for vehicles. I simply contend that situation should be avoided. One has to plan for and be prepared to accept that worst case but one IMO should not plan for and accept that as the only certainty.

Wiser strategies and planning can preclude getting to that point in most cases; to plan on it happening -- and to train for it -- is to invite the monster. It becomes a self fulfilling prophecy...

I'm still working on my effort to smarten up the Generals and Policy makers... :(

[Fuchs]

Ken, you're in "small wars thinking" mode.

In great wars 6 months training is unheard of for infantry.
In great wars, lavishly trained peacetime infantry melts away and the few still fit survivors are being sent to NCO school.

You may redefine infantry into something that requires more than six months and more than 3k rounds of ammo, but you'd end up with special forces light.
You wouldn't get enough infantry to at least keep an eye on the whole battlefield in a great war.

(That's why I distinguish between expert infantry in small numbers, reserve infantry a.k.a. national guard for great numbers and recce/scouting-related infantry for very low force density jobs.)

[JMA]

Ken, you're in "small wars thinking" mode.

Fuchs, when was the last "big war" and when will the next one come?

[Ken White]

If as you end with everything is METT-TC governed then how can it be dogmatically stated that firepower should be consolidated?I did not say firepower should be consolidated, I said the MGs should be consolidated at Company level to insure better training and therefor increased ability to flexibly support when and where needed in accordance with the factors of METT-TC to include detachment to Platoon and lower as required -- that ain't dogma, that's enhanced effectiveness and flaxibility... ;)

Training is training, Tactical employment is tactical employment. The former facilitate but does not dictate the latter.
I would be interested if someone can explain to me why there needs to be ay intermediate weapons between the standard service rifle and the FN MAG 58 (M240).I can't -- I agree with you on that, only saying that the MAG, good as it unarguably is, is not the only solution to an infantry MG in design or caliber. The PKM/PKP and SS-77 are arguably as good and there better cartridges and calibers available now.
The troopies in Rhodesia carried the gun and 500 rounds...an ops briefing on the go, gunners told to make sure their weapons are 100% will be briefed later. A question of priorities.Yet again you guys designed, trained and worked fairly briefly at one war against one enemy in one place in one existential war. Everyone does not have that impetus (or is that those impetii???). Any military organization has the ability to adjust its peacetime, legislatively driven TOE to METT-TC. The US really does that fairly well considering its extremely bureaucratic nature. Our history from way back to the current fights show (an admittedly decreasing, bureaucratically induced) ability to do that. Were we to face a more significant threat or opponent than we now do, I have no reason at all to believe we would not adapt.

In the interim, we have to train for world wide service in a variety of terrain types against a variety of potential opponents. Organization and training must be adaptable to METT-TC, not the reverse.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs, when was the last "big war" and when will the next one come?

For my country the last big one was 1945, for the U.S. it was about '51.

The next one... hopefully it will keep us waiting for generations.

Meanwhile, all other wars are petty nonsense because only powerful enemies can really threaten us. The others can merely sting us a bit and get happy by watching an overreaction.


Bee stings are a nuisance that's difficult to tolerate, but harmless unless you overreact.

[Ken White]

Ken, you're in "small wars thinking" mode.Au cointraire, you, My Friend are in the WW II thinking mode... :wry:
In great wars 6 months training is unheard of for infantry. In great wars, lavishly trained peacetime infantry melts away and the few still fit survivors are being sent to NCO school.As it was in the beginning, is now and forever shall be? Why?

Not to mention those lavishly trained peacetime infantry units in the past most often melted away due to flawed employment -- or that they will provide the cadre for your expansive Army...
You wouldn't get enough infantry to at least keep an eye on the whole battlefield in a great war.Certainly true -- and a desirable state of affairs.
(That's why I distinguish between expert infantry in small numbers, reserve infantry a.k.a. national guard for great numbers and recce/scouting-related infantry for very low force density jobs.)No quarrel with that, we probably are just quibbling over numbers and locations. ;)

[Fuchs]

WW4 maybe, not WW2.

Early infantry employment in a great war will inevitably be poor. There's no way to avoid that. We are now about as clueless about modern great war warfare as our predecessors were in 1913. We got some clues, got some thinkers - but only actual warfare will sort out the fools and force lessons on us. We simply lack good experiments (I am somewhat in awe of the USN experiments of the early 30's, plan orange and the marines' anticipation of the island hopping - but that kind of foresight is unusual and even the majority of these examples didn't have much impact).


As it was in the beginning, is now and forever shall be? Why?

It's unaffordable to have enough personnel trained before the war.
It's highly unlikely that the war begins with a long drle de guerre.
Infantry losses are typically so great and the need for replacements so great that long training is prohibitive.
Training requires the rotation of skilled NCOs from the front to training units, and when you multiply the training effort you end up with a hollow force on the front.
Basic training is meant to be the basis for later unit and formation training - but units and formations on the front don't conduct the later any more. At most they give very green units the opportunity to learn under easy conditions (green battalions doing the job of companies, green companies doing the job of a platoon etc).

Short wars are desirable because they are typically less destructive than long ones. To win a war quickly you need to work for it - not prepare for a long one. Now don't counter with the German and Japanese experiences in WW2. Their decisive fault wasn't to prepare for short wars, but to go to war against too great military powers at once and to give up too late after committing that error.

[JMA]

For my country the last big one was 1945, for the U.S. it was about '51.

The next one... hopefully it will keep us waiting for generations.

Meanwhile, all other wars are petty nonsense because only powerful enemies can really threaten us. The others can merely sting us a bit and get happy by watching an overreaction.

Bee stings are a nuisance that's difficult to tolerate, but harmless unless you overreact.

Petty nuisance for all but those on the receiving end - speak to the Brits and yanks facing IEDs everyday.

... and those getting the bee stings. ;)

The problem with Afghanistan is that for the Brits (and probably for the yanks as well) is that they have not taken the war there seriously enough. Yet they have lost through KIA and WIA (unable to return to battle) the equivalent of three battalions. Shocking.

Had they adapted to the war instead of feeding cannon fodder through the theatre on short tours it would have been an intelligent course of action and not an overreaction.

[Fuchs]

Hardly. 4k men died in Iraq, 1k in AFG.
Almost none would have died if there had been no invasion of Iraq and no occupation of Afghanistan.

The overreaction was waging these small wars. The tiny casualty rates were kinda inevitable and a self-evident minimum of human costs of such small wars.


Military forces should prepare for wars of necessity in which they face opponents who could actually invade and overrun your country or your formal allies' countries.
In regard to small arms choices this means a squad should be able to radio for a mortar strike, not give away its position, when it spots opponents at more than 200-300 m distance. Hence no need for a widespread firepower beyond 300 m.

Let DMs carry a semi-auto rifle that's good for penetration of walls and trees and for hitting targets at 500+ m. Let snipers carry a bolt-action rifle of the same calibre. Have company machineguns and vehicle machineguns of the same calibre. Have mortars for precision and area fires on call.
Meanwhile, almost everybody should have AP and AT value only up to 200-300 m, with high ambush firepower (great lethality during first few seconds).

[JMA]

I did not say firepower should be consolidated, I said the MGs should be consolidated at Company level to insure better training and therefor increased ability to flexibly support when and where needed in accordance with the factors of METT-TC to include detachment to Platoon and lower as required -- that ain't dogma, that's enhanced effectiveness and flaxibility... ;)

You spoke of 'firepower' not MGs.

The moment you start to group these weapons centrally you end up having to 'attach' them to callsigns they have not trained with (enough) and this is not good for unit cohesion as they may be 'detached' again the next day. LMG (certainly the FN MAG) weapon handling is not rocket science and should not be considered a specialist weapon. In the hands of the right people it can be devastating but universal training on it should be mandatory. I mean what the hell do these soldiers do between tours?


Training is training, Tactical employment is tactical employment. The former facilitate but does not dictate the latter.I can't -- I agree with you on that, only saying that the MAG, good as it unarguably is, is not the only solution to an infantry MG in design or caliber. The PKM/PKP and SS-77 are arguably as good and there better cartridges and calibers available now.

The tactical employment for a particular war trumps the training and should lead and dictate where the training emphasis should lie.

Yes there are probably other good LMGs but my point remains there is no need for an intermediate weapon. I think we agree on this.


Yet again you guys designed, trained and worked fairly briefly at one war against one enemy in one place in one existential war. Everyone does not have that impetus (or is that those impetii???). Any military organization has the ability to adjust its peacetime, legislatively driven TOE to METT-TC. The US really does that fairly well considering its extremely bureaucratic nature. Our history from way back to the current fights show (an admittedly decreasing, bureaucratically induced) ability to do that. Were we to face a more significant threat or opponent than we now do, I have no reason at all to believe we would not adapt.

We adapted effectively because it was the same people fighting throughout and they were able to draw on experience to know how and where to adapt. Compare this to the bizarre situation in the Brit army where officers with a six month tour under the belt is considered (and indeed probably considers himself) a battle hardened and experienced soldier. Six months experience counts for little over six years of war.

An army needs focus on a particular war. That does not come from rotation but rather from continuity. Yank soldiers are normally smart but something is preventing them from acting intelligently on this.


In the interim, we have to train for world wide service in a variety of terrain types against a variety of potential opponents. Organization and training must be adaptable to METT-TC, not the reverse.

Yes BUT... when a war breaks out you allocate units to that war with 100% focus. Yes other units can carry on with preparations for the next mountain war or Arctic war or jungle war or whatever BUT... it is insane to prosecute any war (even the smallest) in a halfhearted manner.

[Ken White]

WW4 maybe, not WW2.That'll be with rocks and sticks -- no one will be able to afford the other stuff for long...
We got some clues, got some thinkers - but only actual warfare will sort out the fools and force lessons on us.True.
We simply lack good experiments...No way yet discovered to do that.
Basic training is meant to be the basis for later unit and formation training - but units and formations on the front don't conduct the later any more.Also true -- and a good argument for not doing things the way we now do them.
Short wars are desirable because they are typically less destructive than long ones. To win a war quickly you need to work for it - not prepare for a long one.I thought that was what I said??? ;)

[Ken White]

You spoke of 'firepower' not MGs.No, you spoke of firepower. See the attached screenshots. Merely responded to your usage.
The moment you start to group these weapons centrally you end up having to 'attach' them to callsigns they have not trained with (enough) and this is not good for unit cohesion as they may be 'detached' again the next day.All arimeis are not compoised of Bands of Brothers. Many fight with crowds of people that don't know each other -- and some take so many casualties because of the type of warfare that turnover in units is often above 50% per week. I doubt you've had to deal with those factors. Some have.
LMG (certainly the FN MAG) weapon handling is not rocket science and should not be considered a specialist weapon.In order, true and I disagree.
The tactical employment for a particular war trumps the training and should lead and dictate where the training emphasis should lie.We can agree. Pity that most Generals and the Politicians do not. Once again reality trumps the ideal.
...Yank soldiers are normally smart but something is preventing them from acting intelligently on this...Yes BUT... it is insane to prosecute any war (even the smallest) in a halfhearted manner.Again, I agree. Again reality intrudes and -- this time the Generals get a bye -- the politicians don't seem to realize how dotty they are... :(

[jcustis]

Weapons development, procurement and squad/platoon design (TO&E, tactics) should be in great part about psychology.

I have to vehemently disagree.

Following that course is akin to hoping and wishing that you got it right.

As for IAR doctrine, there is none. I wish that weren't the case, but beyond the mindset of the antagonists who led the experimentation and testing back in the late '90s and first part of the past decade, there has been zero doctrine, or TTPs for that matter, pushed out in support of the IAR. If you know of any, please share.

I agree that you could argue about the ideology note, but again, don't confuse sound bytes with practical ideology.

[kaur]

Fuchs:


Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine gunners and snipers that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines.


I define sniper in the context of an infantry squad or platoon as quite the same as designated marksman.
* an emphasis on camouflage, concealment, cover and deception to the point that he becomes quite invisible even while shooting (including muzzle flash and dust cloud concerns)
* aimed single shots of unusually good accuracy

To me the difference between a sniper and a designated marksman is
* DM is organic to infantry small unit, sniper at most attached to it
* sniper is more extreme; more specialised weapon, more fieldcraft training
* sniper is trained as forward observer and usually better at ranging
* sniper has greater freedom of movement relative to small infantry unit.
* sniper has his own fire discipline
* sniper isn't meant to participate in assaults

So in the context of this discussion they're practically the same and I become occasionally lazy enough to not differentiate between them.

M16A1 LMG.

WW II most efficent Finnish sniper Simo Häyhä used rifle that was used by regular infantry with open sights. No optics, no tuning, just marksmanship and discipline. He killed approx the same number of Soviets with Finnish SMG. Single shot rifle plus SMG. If you have red interviews with German WW II snipers then shooting distance 500m was quite rare. Today US military has rifles with Trijicon sights. Hyh would envy. It all depends on training like Ken says.

M16A1 LMG. Just two thoughts. Those rifles didn't have free float barrels and barrels for accurate shooting at longer distances.

I have been thinking for some time why we need those small unit level marksmen at all, when there is possibility that machine gunners can hit the same target with 10th round? ... or why we need machine gunners if we have marksmen in small units? Machine gunners were in the beginning compensating low shooting speeds of regular infantry with bolt action rifles. That fire power aspect. Second, due to the bipods and tripods machine guns are more stable for long range shooting. Today you can attatch those shooting aides to your rifle rails. And here we are talking about marksman's kind of machinegun IAR :)

Like many here have mentioned here there is ballistics aspect. 7,62x51 flies further and penetrates better than 5,56x45. That's why MG's are still good asset for regular infantry with 5,56 ammo. Will this change with 7,62 IAR?

[kaur]

Here is 21. century infantry's MG Maxim (if we are talking relative fire power) :)

http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2011/10/18/leupolds-marines-cqbss-50-m2-40mm-mk19-mount/

[JMA]

No.

"(1) Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine gunners and snipers that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines."

There, fixed it.

You cannot turn most riflemen into high firepower soldiers because competent armies select their best infantrymen for the high performance weapons and equip the low performance infantrymen with assault rifles (to suggest to them that they ain't more porters than anything else).
Low performance infantryman + high performance weapon = still low performance

You cannot kick all low performance infantrymen out of the infantry (just some real duds) quickly because that would be inefficient. You'd have too few infantrymen. It's better to choose your small unit leaders, machine gunners and scoped riflemen carefully and assign helper infantrymen to them.
It would take major personnel system improvements to solve this without resorting to a tiny all-SF infantry force.

Btw JMA, I already wrote about this a year ago (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/07/on-infantry-small-unit-development.html).

Your article is good as usual.

In cases of general mobilisation where you have little time and little ability to select you are correct (probably without reservation).

The problem I see is that the upward flow of training seems to be faulty.

I think we can believe that everything is built on the foundation of individual training. One understands that when a mobilisation takes place training gets shortened, less experienced and qualified instructors are used then the troops get to be commanded by rapidly promoted, probably poorly selected, under qualified and experienced officers (and probably also NCOs) in battle.

What are the basic skills required of basic infantryman?

Basically he gets trained in fieldcraft, minor tactics and all platoon weapons and equipment (including bits and pieces on map reading, medical, radio voice procedure, survival etc etc) - I have a 1979 18 week training programme somewhere.

All recruits do range firing classification on both their personal weapon (FN) and the platoon LMG (FN MAG) in week 9.

The whole guiding training design is to teach the recruit how to close with and kill the enemy using the tools of his trade.

Not to conduct presence patrols (while playing hop-scotch with the IEDs), handing out sweeties to kids, bandaging cuts on kids hands and feet, escorting veterinary services around the place and securing LZs for VIP visits (etc etc).

You take an 18 year old and you turn him into a killing machine. In a peacetime army his is a volunteer and in a general mobilisation you have no option. Giving this type of training to conscripts in peacetime has ethical connotations about which I have concerns.

After the basic training you concentrate on the next level from fire-team (or in our case the 4-man stick) to section and so on.

My read based on the information I have is that Brit independent platoon level operations are 50:50 while any independent deployment at section or fire-team levels is simply out of the question even against a mediocre enemy such as the Taliban. They have let something slip.

Remember with regular soldiers serving on 3/5/7 year contracts you have time to work on the even the dummies to bring them up to the acceptable standard and even beyond.

Remember the four steps of training... demonstration, explanation, imitation, repetition. Good instructors and good platoon sergeants will keep the repetition going until the required standard is met. (Officers tend to get bored too quickly)

I found the motivation of wanting to stay alive worked pretty well for the vast majority.

When you operate independently at fire-team (4-man stick) level you have the commander, the gunner, the stick medic and a buckshee rifleman. Normally the buckshee rifleman is a new kid fresh out of training and holds that position until he graduates up wards to one of the other three positions. You can hide a dummy there for a while but yes later he ends up blocking a spot reserved for feeding through the new kids.

Rhodesia was pretty unique in that it produced some fine young men (from good British stock) - and I am talking as a South African here. I little known fact is that 42% - yes 42% - of Rhodesian second world war volunteers ended up commissioned in the British Military and despite many entering the Air Force as pilots it remains a pretty impressive statistic. So we had them coming through as conscripts. Amazing material for a small country.

Finally, I have always said that platoon weapons must be like the commander golf bag, he makes his selection of what he needs according to where he is, what he is meant to do and who he is up against. Select you clubs for the shots you need to make and leave the rest in the bag.

Good article! Worth a thread of its own.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs:

WW II most efficent Finnish sniper Simo Hyh used rifle that was used by regular infantry with open sights. No optics, no tuning, just marksmanship and discipline. He killed approx the same number of Soviets with Finnish SMG. Single shot rifle plus SMG. If you have red interviews with German WW II snipers then shooting distance 500m was quite rare. Today US military has rifles with Trijicon sights. Hyh would envy. It all depends on training like Ken says.

M16A1 LMG. Just two thoughts. Those rifles didn't have free float barrels and barrels for accurate shooting at longer distances.

I have been thinking for some time why we need those small unit level marksmen at all, when there is possibility that machine gunners can hit the same target with 10th round? ... or why we need machine gunners if we have marksmen in small units? Machine gunners were in the beginning compensating low shooting speeds of regular infantry with bolt action rifles. That fire power aspect. Second, due to the bipods and tripods machine guns are more stable for long range shooting. Today you can attatch those shooting aides to your rifle rails. And here we are talking about marksman's kind of machinegun IAR :)

I know about that sniper, but he was sniping in a specific setting; winter, forests, not exactly competent adversaries (and German snipers did not count kills during combat, jsut kills done when they were on their own).

The widely quoted interviews with IIRC three German WW2 snipers confirmed that shots at 600 m or with 6x sight were rare and rarely needed. The Russians of their period were much-respected for their quick digging and good camo discipline (by the Germans). This yielded less targets, especially at long ranges.
I expect a modern infantryman to be lethal AND at least until the first shot quite undetectable at 100-300 m. So there's no need for a specialist to do that at 100-300 m.
A designated rifleman should in my opinion have a calibre advantage over normal infantry. This distorts the ammo standardisation, but it also emans that the squad has an organic ability to penetrate weak cover (walls, trees) in excess of what most of its guns can do.


The great advantage of machineguns is their effectiveness against moving targets.
The great advantages of aimed single shots are minimal firing signature (including dust) and the ability to hit tiny targets (such as helmet at 300 m) somewhat reliably before they duck into cover.

The only guns that combined both were afaik the HK 21, HK 21E and HK G8 (essentially three versions of the same modular gun).

[jcustis]

The great advantage of machineguns is their effectiveness against moving targets.

By what standard? I'm sorry Fuchs, but can you please provide more depth to this? I'm scratching my head as to where you draw this conclusion. Do you mean machine guns employed in a final protective fire against assaulting troops?

I would nod if you had said that the machine gun is at its best against enfilade, massed targets.

[Fuchs]

I was thinking of lead shooting. Soldiers usually don't get the lead right, and competent opponents don't give them many free attempts.

A machinegunner can use a burst (~20 rds) to cover the full range of probable leads (1m ahead of running man, 2m, 3, 4, 5) in a very short time period (a German "Sprung" run from one relatively safe location to another lasts only a few seconds) thanks to the controllable full auto fire capability.

[jcustis]

Okay, I see what you were saying. Still not sure I agree, because in practice, it tends to be a lot harder than what you describe.

[Fuchs]

Okay, I see what you were saying. Still not sure I agree, because in practice, it tends to be a lot harder than what you describe.

It depends on the bipod/tripod. With MG3 on bipod I was only able to spray into a general direction (some heavier guys had it under fine control, though).
Quite the same weapon on a good tripod saws through the landscape at your will.

[Ken White]

Quite the same weapon on a good tripod saws through the landscape at your will.True of most other MGs as well....

Amazing how well things work when one uses them correctly. :wry:

[Vojnik]

It depends on the bipod/tripod. With MG3 on bipod I was only able to spray into a general direction (some heavier guys had it under fine control, though).
Quite the same weapon on a good tripod saws through the landscape at your will.

Is there still use for the tripod with dismounted Infantry GPMGs then?

I ask b/c I once had a conversation with my ranger buddy during the mountain phase of that school (this was many years ago, so forgive the "one time in training" story). He was badged Navy Seal with one non-combat float under his belt. For the life of him he could not understand the point of having a tripod. At the time, I couldn't tell if that came from the differences between SOF and Conventional Infantry tactics (which shouldn't be that different when it comes to small unit patrolling, methinks), or whether we simply used the tripod in the Infantry b/c that's what we've always had.

Basically the only thing we could come up with is that it was good to have for Final Protective Fires and in a static defense. My later experience is that a tripod was too heavy to use in the mountains of A-stan, and too unwieldly to use in the cities in the Sunni Triangle. But am I missing out on something, besides the usually caveat that METT-TC applies?

[jcustis]

Basically the only thing we could come up with is that it was good to have for Final Protective Fires and in a static defense. My later experience is that a tripod was too heavy to use in the mountains of A-stan, and too unwieldly to use in the cities in the Sunni Triangle. But am I missing out on something, besides the usually caveat that METT-TC applies?

Indirect fire, employed from both a reverse slop defense, as well as a reverse slope support-by-fire position, used to be taught to infantry officers and is still taught in machine gun leader courses. As for application, that tends to be difficult to do when pre-deployment training takes the fore.

[Fuchs]

For the life of him he could not understand the point of having a tripod. At the time, I couldn't tell if that came from the differences between SOF and Conventional Infantry tactics (which shouldn't be that different when it comes to small unit patrolling, methinks), or whether we simply used the tripod in the Infantry b/c that's what we've always had.

Basically the only thing we could come up with is that it was good to have for Final Protective Fires and in a static defense.


This made me recall an article from IIRC the 90's, Infantry Magazine probably. It was about the far ambush and how it's being neglected (IIRC "far" as "beyond hand grenade range").

I agree that the elaborate world war tripods are too much today (they weighed and costed as much as the machine gun itself).

The optimum nowadays is a tripod that does dampen the recoil and dispersion somewhat AND makes use of the shoulder. The point of the whole thing is to make the machine gun more controllable than on bipod, after all.
This is especially important the more lightweight the machinegun becomes (desirable) and the more firepower it has (MG3 is quite extreme in this regard).

More elaborate tripods are only debatable if they at least use a periscope for a fully or almost fully covered fighting position.

[Chris jM]

Is there still use for the tripod with dismounted Infantry GPMGs then?

Absolutely! A decent tripod can almost double the effective range of a 7.62 MG. The combination of tripod-stabilised fire and a tight beaten zone (as you'll normally find with a 7.62 calibre MG) is a potent combination. A bipod-supported MG provides a great platform combining mobility and firepower, but a tripod really enhances the accuracy and range of the weapon in a very small amount of time and with minimal training burden.

Finding the situation in which this capability is of benefit is, as you note, always down to the situation. It's not a capability I'd spurn out-of-hand though. Being able to deliver accurate, sustained fire onto a narrow area from a position of concealment from over 1km away can be a very useful effect to employ from a fire-support position during offensive ops, or more generally during a defensive or delaying battle. It may also be the only effect available to you, especially if your mortars and artillery are unavailable or being used elsewhere (or remaining hidden).

Fuchs are you aware of any current tripod / periscope designs that would allow an MG to fire from behind cover? I'm imagining you'd need to have it on a 'slide' (in much the same way as the SE5a mounted the Lewis gun in WW1) so you could reload / clear stoppages, but I think the concept has a lot of merit.

[Ken White]

We picked up a slew of bad habits in Viet Nam and Ranger School embedded most of them as did IOBC -- interestingly, because of far less Armor branch exposure in Viet Nam, AOBC did not fall into that trap. We are picking up more rand even worse habits as a result of Afghanistan and Iraq.

There is, as noted a considerable difference between SOF operations conventional operations. Small unit patrols are one thing and the tactical efforts are similar -- but both do a great many things aside from conducting patrols (though in the current wars no one is really doing much else...). That is dangerous, a mid or high intensity conflict will shred units with little besides current experience. Thus far in 2011, all ISAF has incurred 509 fatalities (combat / non combat not diffrentiated). In a mid intensity conflict like Viet Nam or Korea, one Division could endure that many killed -- or more, many more -- in a quarter. In WW II like conditions, it could reach that figure in a week or two.

The current fights obviously provide little to no use of tripods -- except for the M2 and Mk19. One has to wonder if the M240 were more often tripod mounted if as many .50s and 40mm would be about.

Chris jM has it right. As he points out, defense is far from the only use for tripods. The use of really accurate fire as a support measure in the offense has great merit -- you cannot provide accurate long range fire from a bipod so no thinking Commander is going to allow his MGs to fire over the heads of advancing troops unless the guns are tripod mounted. That occurred often in WW II and Korea, only rarely in Viet Nam and is even more rare today -- yet it is needed capability. Sometimes the organic stuff is all that's available...

As jcustis notes:
As for application, that tends to be difficult to do when pre-deployment training takes the fore.That's reality -- and that is the danger. Training for the here and now should not be in lieu of needed training, it should be in addition to. We often forget that; we forgot it post Viet Nam. We're forgetting it today. Hopefully we will not repeat that 1970-90 mistake. :(

[Fuchs]

Fuchs are you aware of any current tripod / periscope designs that would allow an MG to fire from behind cover? I'm imagining you'd need to have it on a 'slide' (in much the same way as the SE5a mounted the Lewis gun in WW1) so you could reload / clear stoppages, but I think the concept has a lot of merit.

There's still the classic MG 34 / 42 /3 /74 tripod...

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_V7Ehj7eG65Q/SBZBfavjMdI/AAAAAAAAAA4/08p7xBdHxYU/s400/mg-peri.jpg

link (http://www.fortunecity.com/tattooine/t1000/190/flecktarn-infwaffen029-b.htm)

[kaur]

With the US military reportedly spending over $28 million on the new M240 machine gun variant, the M240L, Special Forces soldiers have found that the new machine guns cannot be mounted on vehicles. The M240L uses titanium in key areas to help lighten the machine gun, and ultimately the load carried by soldiers, by five pounds.

http://kitup.military.com/2011/07/new-lw-m-240-might-not-work-on-vehicle.html

http://s1.postimage.org/f9eevoy6n/Tripod_M240_L_vehicles.jpg (http://www.postimage.org/)
hosting images (http://www.postimage.org/)

[Ken White]

http://kitup.military.com/2011/07/new-lw-m-240-might-not-work-on-vehicle.htmlDevelopers do not like to talk to users, they prefer to adopt elegant engineering solutions. Thus the SOF guys have the SCAR they do not like or want and now the 240L -- which, predictably and as always occurs, is 'lightened' to the point of non-reliability. Amazing as this had already been discovered with the Mk46 / Mk 48...

The article notes that the troops pointed out this shortfall:
When one Special Forces NCO brought this deficiency to the forefront in a meeting to a group of officers who were overseeing the program, “-they looked at me like I was crazy!”I'm sure they did -- they didn't listen to anyone, particularly a bunch of 'dumb NCOs,' during development and were so focused on lightening for the average weapons squad they lost sight of other things. Typical and occurs all too often. Mission focus is necessary -- excessive mission focus has always been a killer.

I shudder to think what might happen if the weapon was confronted with the harsher and more frequent vibrations of Helicopter mounting. :wry:

Messing with things that work well is rarely advisable, not listening to actual users and not testing all conceivable scenarios to save time and money are never advisable. Check out the light weight Tripod in the picture Kaur provided. Durable, huh... :mad:

Using MGs where they are most effective and providing adequately sized crews so the weight can be shifted and shared will lessen the load carrying concern. We've spent probably millions of dollars creating a weapon that is lighter so it can be more easily carried by people who shouldn't be carrying it in places where it shouldn't be used. Flipping brilliant.

[Fuchs]

Ken, I once learned to make the technical mechanics calculations for constructs like that. It's difficult to see the mechanical strength of a design without knowing details and having very much experience in this specialty.


About lightening weapons:

A most extreme example was probably the MG 45, a late-WW2 successor project for the MG 42.
The weight was reduced by much, rate of fire was apparently increased to up to 1,800 rpm (details are not known for sure). I have no idea how they believe soldiers would be able to control this beast on a bipod.


It IS advisable (or at least a debatable option) to reduce weight and durability (not totally the same as reliability) IF you assume that the hardware won't be used much.
Fighter aircraft cannons, weapons for support personnel, infantry weapons in a great war (high attrition) are examples for this.

[Ken White]

...It's difficult to see the mechanical strength of a design without knowing details and having very much experience in this specialty.True and the Tripods may end up as the best thing to come from this.

Even the M240L, properly placed will be okay. I'm just unduly cynical regarding US procurement practices as too much is politically (internal, US Domestic external -- and even foreign policy external) driven for my taste...
It IS advisable (or at least a debatable option) to reduce weight and durability (not totally the same as reliability) IF you assume that the hardware won't be used much.Yep. Good examples are the Mk 46 and Mk 48 -- they're fine for SOF intermittent use, not tough enough to be fully reliable for for normal infantry wear and tear. Same is likely true with the M240L, it'll serve it's current purpose then die...:wry:

[kaur]

Marines got HK IAR, Army goes their own way.


The light machine gun is part of the Lightweight Small Arms Technologies, or LSAT, program, which is managed by the JSSAP, part of the Army's Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center, or ARDEC, at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J.

The LMG is a gas-operated, cased telescoped light machine gun. It is air-cooled and belt fed with selectable semi-automatic and fully automatic fire and fires from the open-bolt position. Its rate of fire is approximately 650 rounds per minute.

The JSSAP team hopes that the LMG will eventually replace the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, knows as a SAW, as the standard issue machine gun used by Soldiers in combat zones.

http://www.defencetalk.com/new-light-machine-gun-aims-to-saw-soldiers-load-38174/

[kaur]

Fuchs, thank you.

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2011/11/sniping-history-theory.html

[Fuchs]

Fuchs, thank you.

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2011/11/sniping-history-theory.html

Only the last 40% of that text are relevant here.
I guess everybody here knows about the history.

[RJ]

Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine gunners and snipers that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines.

Carbines are not the distance weapon, a rifle is.

The exception to your comment about back ing the day bolt action weapons was a WWI battle in an area near Chateau Tierry that Frace renamed "The Wood of the Marine Brigade."

The 5th and 6th US Marine Rifle Regiments with an attached machinegun battallion (4th MG Bn.) assualted dug in German positions and defeated them by accurate rifle and bayonet assualts in a battle that lasted 20 days. The Marines were armed with 1903 Springfiled .30-06 rifles

The German surivors of that action and those of German Regiments who tried to retake the lost positions unsuccessfully knicknamed the Marines "Tuffel Hunds" "Devil Dogs".

I had family in that fight.


Semper Fi, Ken! Merry Christmas to all and to all a good night.

Dec. 7. 2011 70 years ago today.

The Big Marine Rifle Squad is 65 years old and is still taking the hearts and minds of our enemies efficiently and effectively.

M/3/5 0311, 0331 and 0369

[Firn]

Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine gunners and snipers that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines.

Carbines are not the distance weapon, a rifle is.

The exception to your comment about back ing the day bolt action weapons was a WWI battle in an area near Chateau Tierry that Frace renamed "The Wood of the Marine Brigade."

The 5th and 6th US Marine Rifle Regiments with an attached machinegun battallion (4th MG Bn.) assualted dug in German positions and defeated them by accurate rifle and bayonet assualts in a battle that lasted 20 days. The Marines were armed with 1903 Springfiled .30-06 rifles

The German surivors of that action and those of German Regiments who tried to retake the lost positions unsuccessfully knicknamed the Marines "Tuffel Hunds" "Devil Dogs".

I had family in that fight.


Semper Fi, Ken! Merry Christmas to all and to all a good night.

Dec. 7. 2011 70 years ago today.

The Big Marine Rifle Squad is 65 years old and is still taking the hearts and minds of our enemies efficiently and effectively.

M/3/5 0311, 0331 and 0369

Merry Christmas!

I think it is hard to see anything special in that battle apart for those who were involved in it and that it was the first major combat action of Marines in the Great War. Artillery and machine guns certainly played as usual a very important part in the fighting. Maybe the Americans were indeed more "reckless" then usual, which was a rather common among fresh troops with little experience and good fighting spirit.


... prompted his men of the 73rd Machine Gun company forward with the words: "Come on, you sons of bitches, do you want to live forever?"[13]

The first waves of Marines—advancing in well-disciplined lines—were slaughtered; Major Berry was wounded in the forearm during the advance. On his right, the Marines of Major Sibley's 3/6 Battalion swept into the southern end of Belleau Wood and encountered heavy machine gun fire, sharpshooters and barbed wire. Marines and German infantrymen were soon engaged in heavy hand-to-hand fighting. The casualties sustained on this day were the highest in Marine Corps history to that time.[9] Some 31 officers and 1,056 men of the Marine brigade were casualties. However, the Marines now had a foothold in Belleau Wood.[14]

In the end it seems to be a important piece of the history of the USMC as they proved themselves for the first time against a respected foe and it is quite understandable that it is so.

P.S:


Grammar problems

A poster created by Charles B. Falls in 1918 (exhibited further up) was one of the first recorded references to the term.

In German, a compound noun is always a single word, so using two words "Teufel Hunden" is grammatically incorrect. The correct German would be Teufelshunde in nominative, genitive, and accusative cases, and Teufelshunden only in the dative. In either form, the linking element "s" steps between the words. Examples:

Sie waren Teufelshunde. - they were devil dogs.
Er war ein Teufelshund. - he was a devil dog.
Er sprach von den Teufelshunden. - he talked about the devil dogs.

Furthermore, the word "Teufelshund" is unknown in the German language, and may possibly be an example of Denglisch. The nearest equivalent is "Hllenhund" ("dog of hell"), the German translation of the mythical Kerberos; a term that can also be used to describe a reckless and courageous person. All this suggests that the Marines were never actually referred to as "devil dogs" by German WWI soldiers.[1]

Additionally, as far as I know, the nicknames by Germans soldiers for enemy troops were usually short and non-martial, "Ivan", "der Russe", "der Ami", "der Tommy" so this American combination really smells like good propaganda.

PPS: Ironically a German king is said to have shouted, in a famous battle roughly a 150 years earlier to his troops: "You cursed rascals, do you want to live forever?[1]" and I'm pretty sure this motivational line was use even before that.

[Fuchs]

Nicknames supposedly in use with opposing forces have been proved to be propaganda fabrications so often that I generally ignore them.
One such example is "Whispoering death" for the F4U Corsair; the Japanese only learned about their wartime use of this nickname after the war.


By the way; in modern German I would either say

"Teufelskerl" (admirable)
or
"Höllenhund" (not necessarily admirable, often rather despising).

I've never read or heard "Teufelshund" before.

A quick google search yielded pages full of entries where the word was used as a translation for "devil dog" in a fantasy context.

[davidbfpo]

IMHO a "gem" from KoW.

I think this passage fits in here, although it is a general comment on firearms training and not Afg. specific. It is specific to the British Army today, with my emphasis:
For example, they have identified that just 5 to 20 percent of shots have been hitting the target during live fire tactical training, a stunningly low figure. They have identified why this occurs (firing training is often viewed as box ticking exercise) and why it matters (COIN campaigns require precision shooting to ensure we accurately hit the targets we want to and avoid collateral damage against non-combatants). They have even thrown a little history into the mix: drawing a fascinating parallel between the recognition of low small arms expertise during the Boer War, the subsequent focus on firing training afterwards, and the high quality of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914.

Link to the source article which covers a far wider topic and the citation is within the second author's comments:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/02/no-interventions-please-were-british/

[Fuchs]

Dunno if this study was already linked here:

http://www.cfspress.com/sharpshooters/battle-ranges.html
(link at the end: http://www.cfspress.com/sharpshooters/pdfs/Operational-Requrements-For-An-Infantry-Hand-Weapon.pdf )