Small Wars Council http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/ Professional dialog on Small Wars. en Tue, 21 May 2013 14:45:36 GMT vBulletin 10 http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/images/misc/rss.jpg Small Wars Council http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/ <![CDATA[Pakistan crumbling & rusty: a train journey]]> http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18143&goto=newpost Sun, 19 May 2013 12:02:16 GMT In his last despatch from Pakistan the NYT's Declan Walsh travelled on the crumbling railway system and IMO provides a vivid, human portrait of a country I suspect many SWC readers would prefer to ignore:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/wo...pagewanted=all

There's also a photo series - some tell more than the author writes

Friends have travelled on Indian railways and they bear no comparison to Pakistan - they gave up trying to book long journeys, the booking office didn't even have a computer. ]]> South Asia davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18143 Global Piracy Trends http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18140&goto=newpost Sun, 19 May 2013 03:34:45 GMT http://finance.yahoo.com/news/crime-at-sea--the-world-s-most-dangerous-waters-171430018.html;_ylt=AsE9USdvFkIdVaz4BY32OhWiuYdG;_ylu=X3oDMTQ4bWk5cGo2BG1pdANDTkJDIFRvcCBTdG9yaWVzBHBrZwMzYjExYjU0OS1kOGYzLTNiMDEtOWExMi00ZmQ0MmViZTc1MGYEcG9zAzUEc2VjA01lZGlhQkxpc3RNaXhlZExQQ0FUZW1wBHZlcgM3MDUyZDg4Mi1iZjJj... http://finance.yahoo.com/news/crime-...3BtaA--;_ylv=3

I found it interesting that the most active area for piracy now is off the Indonesian coast again. Navy seems to be doing a good job off the Horn of Africa.

Quote:
Indonesia’s 17,500 islands and their surrounding waters now take the title as the world’s most heavily pirated.
Quote:
Pirates arm themselves no matter where on the globe they operate, but perhaps no pirates on earth arm themselves with such high-caliber weapons as the pirates in Nigeria have over the last year.
]]> Bill Moore http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18140 Movement towards a sane drug strategy? http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18139&goto=newpost Sun, 19 May 2013 02:48:52 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013...ck%3APosition1

Western leaders study 'gamechanging' report on global drugs trade

Review by Organisation of American States on illicit drugs 'could mark beginning of the end' of prohibition

Quote:
Publication of the Organisation of American States (OAS) review, commissioned at last year's Cartagena Summit of the Americas attended by Barack Obama, reflects growing dissatisfaction among Latin American countries with the current global policy on illicit drugs. It spells out the effects of the policy on many countries and examines what the global drugs trade will look like if the status quo continues. It notes how rapidly countries' unilateral drugs policies are evolving, while at the same time there is a growing consensus over the human costs of the trade. "Growing media attention regarding this phenomenon in many countries, including on social media, reflects a world in which there is far greater awareness of the violence and suffering associated with the drug problem," Jos Miguel Insulza, the secretary general of the OAS, says in a foreword to the review. "We also enjoy a much better grasp of the human and social costs not only of drug use but also of the production and transit of controlled substances."
Quote:
In a statement, the Global Commission on Drug Policy, which campaigns for changes in drug laws and is supported by the former presidents of several South American states, said that publication of the review would break "the taboo that blocked for so long the debate on more humane and efficient drug policy". The Commission said that it was "time that governments around the world are allowed to responsibly experiment with regulation models that are tailored to their realities and local need".
This is one area where I hope the global community breaks away from U.S. leadership since we have over politicized this issue to such as extreme we're incapable of providing guidance based on logic. This ties into the privatization of our prison systems and their lobbying power to keep outdated laws on the books so they can maximize their profits. We have a lot of house cleaning to do before we're ready to lead in this area.

Breaking the taboo about drugs

In an open letter, former Latin American leaders call for legal regulation to help undermine organized crime

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2...cy-drugs-trade

Quote:
After more than four decades of a failed war on drugs, calls for a change in strategy are growing louder by the day. In Latin America, the debate is positively deafening. Statesmen from Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay are taking the lead for transformations in their own drug regime, which has set a strong dynamic of change across the region and around the world. Their discussion has expanded to the US, where public opinion toward regulation is also changing.
Quote:
The leadership demonstrated by President Santos and the OAS secretary general is welcomed. But the report is just the start leaders across the Americas need to take this study seriously and consider how their own policies can be improved. In doing so, they will be breaking the vicious cycle of violence, corruption, and overcrowded prisons and will put people's health and security first.
Signed by,

Fernando Henrique Cardoso
former president of Brazil, chair

Cesar Gaviria
former president of Colombia

Ricardo Lagos
former president of Chile

George P. Shultz
former Secretary of State, United States, honorary chair

Paul Volcker
former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve and of the Economic Recovery Board

Louise Arbour
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, President of the International Crisis Group

Ernesto Zedillo
former president of Mexico ]]> Bill Moore http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18139 ANSF attrition rate just over a third per year http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18134&goto=newpost Fri, 17 May 2013 19:57:37 GMT As the alliance strategy for drawing down in Afghanistan depends on the ANSF "standing up" finding the attrition rate is over a third is not good news:http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/05/01...f-352000-goal/

A UK newspaper report, which I missed in March 2013, based on a British assessment of the ANSF:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...s-8555238.html

Hat tip to this subject comes from a blogger's analysis 'What Is the Attrition Rate for Afghan Special Operations Forces?':http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/05/16...ations-forces/

Quote:
Afghan Special Force size cites merely the authorized number of commandos, not the actual number that were assigned at the time, which, as of late November, 2012, was only 83% of the authorized level.

Now note that the Defense Department stated that 621 new commandos were trained from April through September of 2012. Yet, if we look at the SIGAR data, actual assigned force level dropped from 10,617 to 10,193 in the closest comparable time period (May through September of 2012). Taken together, those numbers suggest that over 1000 personnel disappeared from the ranks during this time period. If we are generous and take this loss of 1000 as representing how many are lost in six months instead of five, we still see an overall loss of 2000 commandos per year. For a force size of just over 10,000, that is an attrition rate of almost 20% a year.
A 20% annual attrition rate in the elite Afghan units, who are reported to be far more reliable, motivated and trained, makes me wonder from afar what the main ANSF attrition rate is. ]]> OEF - Afghanistan davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18134 GCHQ on Cyber Security http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18125&goto=newpost Thu, 16 May 2013 21:43:23 GMT
Quote:
Sir Iain Lobban, Director GCHQ, contributed an article entitled "Countering the cyber threat to business" for the Spring 2013 edition of the Institute of Directors Big Picture policy journal.

In the article, Director describes the nature and scale of the threat to businesses from cyberspace, why cyber security should be at the top of boards' agendas and the role GCHQ is playing in helping counter the threats.

The article acts as a foreword to some practical steps on how business leaders and boards can make their organisations safer from cyber attacks.
From the GCHQ press release, which has a link to the 4.9 Mb article (size is due to artwork, colour etc and is only sixteen pages):ow.ly/l66VP ]]> davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18125 Report - Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18119&goto=newpost Wed, 15 May 2013 20:39:12 GMT Came across this report by the Board on Army Science and Technology. They discussed possible changes to the squad organization, but nothing in-depth. Mostly about training and reducing the weight of combat gear. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18321 Came across this report by the Board on Army Science and Technology. They discussed possible changes to the squad organization, but nothing in-depth. Mostly about training and reducing the weight of combat gear.

http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18321 ]]> gute http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18119 Winston Churchill on Afghanistan http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18109&goto=newpost Tue, 14 May 2013 15:11:41 GMT
Quote:
Financially it is ruinous. Morally it is wicked. Militarily it is an open question, and politically it is a blunder.
Taken from an article by Con Coughlin, the author of a new book ' Churchill’s First War: Young Winston and the Taliban', published by Pan Macmillan:http://www.amazon.com/Churchills-Fir...nd+the+Taliban or http://www.amazon.co.uk/Churchills-F...nd+the+Taliban

Churchill wrote in his own book these words as a criticism of Imperial (British) India's policy of 'Forward Defence' in Afghanistan, that had been followed for sixty years at the time:
Quote:
Churchill wrote these words in 1897 when, as a young cavalry officer, he found himself fighting the great-great-grandfathers of the modern Taliban movement. Churchill came very close to losing his own life during the six weeks he spent on the North-West Frontier, and his summary of the British effort in the 19th century eerily echoes the sentiments many British soldiers must now feel as they seek to wind down operations in Afghanistan.
Link:http://www.standard.co.uk/comment/co...e-8600516.html

An independent review of the book:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/890...s-own-destiny/

IMO his words apply today. ]]> OEF - Afghanistan davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18109 Ground truth from Helmand PRT: two civilian views http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18104&goto=newpost Mon, 13 May 2013 20:07:35 GMT An up beat, nay optimistic report by the UK head of the Helmand PRT, which opens with:
Quote:
As always, I’m spending plenty of time persuading friends, colleagues, and anyone who will listen, that: no, it isn’t all going fall to pieces after 2014.
Then there's:
Quote:
If people trust their government they will support it – and this, rather than external support, will be the stoutest defence against the threat of relapse into extremism. With this in mind the focus of my team in Helmand has been on boosting the legitimacy of government in the eyes of the people....As we approach 2014 and accelerate our own draw down, we have to be candid about the risks. Our job is to mitigate them to the extent possible, not to be in denial. Many are concerned that the Taliban are poised to retake many districts as NATO troops pull back.
Link:http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/catrionalain...ent-extremism/

The author refers to an interview the American, Carter Malkasian who was the District Transition Advisor for Helmand PRT in Garmser for two years and the author of 'War Comes to Garmser'. I have the book, but have too many to read, perhaps one day. The interview is very interesting.

Amidst it is this passage:
Quote:
Today’s government has brought schools and healthcare and just a little freedom for women. I do not think most Pashtuns want to see the Taliban return to power. Nor do I think most Pashtuns see the Taliban as hated enemies. I think that they would prefer peaceful reconciliation to years of war.
Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...t-the-war.html

Incidentally there are threads on the USMC in Helmand, the British in Afghanistan and PRT / political advisers. ]]> OEF - Afghanistan davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18104 The first-order duty of people to speak truth unto power. http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18086&goto=newpost Fri, 10 May 2013 20:34:03 GMT The title is taken from testimony by Lord Hennessey, a journalist-cum-historian, who with two others gave evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence on: ---Quote--- a strategic inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review. ---End Quote--- Not an exciting matter... The title is taken from testimony by Lord Hennessey, a journalist-cum-historian, who with two others gave evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence on:
Quote:
a strategic inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review.
Not an exciting matter for the great British public and I expect many others. Within the testimony are many gems on how the UK does and doesn't do defence policy:http://www.publications.parliament.u...i/uc109001.htm

Here is one passage, Quinlan's law (named after a MoD civil servant of note):
Quote:
A theorem: In matters of military contingency, the expected, precisely because it is expected, is not to be expected. Rationale: What we expect, we plan and provide for; what we plan and provide for, we thereby deter; what we deter does not happen. What does happen is what we did not deter, because we did not plan and provide for it, because we did not expect it.
Another witness, an academic strategist, Professor Julian Lindley-French, who is British and currently based in The Netherlands, has some enlightening remarks, especially on alliance matters. His blog is:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/

In one post the Professor is straight-talking:
Quote:
The Royal Navy’s motto is; if you want peace, prepare for war. Thankfully, Britain today does not have to prepare for war. However, in a world full of friction if Britain is to help prevent conflict injurious to its national interests it must think and act strategically. Therefore, SDSR 2015 must finally look beyond Afghanistan and not simply re-fight it better. Indeed, the switch from so-called campaigning to contingency operations will make the 2015 review as close to a grand strategic year zero as Britain has known for a century. It is an opportunity to be seized not squandered.
Link:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/...-of-spear.html

No wonder Whitehall-Westminster prefer to make grand statements, but as our American allies know capability is needed with will. Just whether the UK has a strategy today is a moot point, plenty of policy or is it called retrenchment?

Hat tip to 'Red Rat' for the pointer to the testimony. ]]> Europe davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18086 SWJ and Open-Source Education http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18065&goto=newpost Thu, 09 May 2013 14:03:14 GMT What role – if any – could Small Wars Journal play in the open-source education trend that is disrupting higher education? What role – if any – could Small Wars Journal play in the open-source education trend that is disrupting higher education? ]]> Small Wars Council / Journal bourbon http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18065 The Future of AQ: Foresight Project (CSIS) http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18062&goto=newpost Thu, 09 May 2013 10:18:09 GMT Hat tip to a "lurker":
Quote:
CSIS (the Canadian one) has done a really rather good foresight paper about the future of AQ
Link:.https://www.csis.gc.ca/pblctns/cdmct...130501_eng.pdf

Just over eighty pages looking forward to 2018, with sections on: AQ core & AQ in Iraq, AQIM, AQ in East Africa and AQAP.

This thread fits in with other strategic threads in this section. ]]> davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18062 Ranger Training 1942 http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18045&goto=newpost Mon, 06 May 2013 02:00:33 GMT Excellent series of 9 videos on utube demonstrating practical and extremely tough physical and mental conditioning. Some of the most pragmatic obstacle course training I have seen. Suspect we wouldn't be allow to run these today, but then again they were training for combat with peer competitors and the outcome was uncertain. You can get the jest of it in the first three videos, but recommend looking at video 9 also.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=98G_xIPSgXA ]]> Trigger Puller Bill Moore http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18045 <![CDATA[Comparing British & French CT; tough and tougher?]]> http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18025&goto=newpost Thu, 02 May 2013 20:22:29 GMT A new book this week 'Countering Terrorism in Britain and France’ by Dr Frank Foley, has had some coverage here:
Quote:
He, too, had long been baffled by the varied approaches. And one thing that has become clear from his research is that the reason has little to do with the European court and much more to do with the different recent histories of the two countries and how their institutions have developed.
Link to an article focussing on the UK's inability to deport Abu Qatada:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...h-jihadis.html

An ICSR podcast:http://icsr.info/2013/05/icsr-semina...in-and-france/

Three years ago I posted the thread 'Londonistan: Muslim communities in France & UK:
Quote:
Largely for historical reasons IMHO neither the UK or the USA closely look at how France has responded to the violent Jihad and Muslim communities. Plus of course the language barrier.
Link:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16376 ]]> Europe davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18025 Eleven and a half years after 9/11, we still don’t know. http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18024&goto=newpost Thu, 02 May 2013 19:39:33 GMT An opinion piece by Marc Sageman 'The Stagnation of Research on Terrorism':
Quote:
After the Boston Marathon bombings, it is time to reflect on what has been learned over the past 11 and a half years. The surprise is that, over all, the same stale arguments about “how can this happen?” are debated over and over again—with very little new insight....

Americans have an unshakable belief in technology, and the bulk of the original money went to “disruptive technologies” using advances in computer science to defeat an abstract enemy.....The hope was that those cutting-edge tools would anticipate the tactics of the enemy, but they failed to deliver on their promise....What the government did not support was the methodical accumulation of detailed and comprehensive data.
On the government's analysts:
Quote:
Young analysts have access to a wealth of classified information but have no formal methodological background to be able to synthesize new insights. They are under constant pressure to produce timely short pieces and have little time to read widely or reflect. The system forces them to jump from topic to topic, quickly looking for confirming evidence, and generally neglecting refuting evidence.
He ends:
Quote:
As it stands now, we are condemned to rehash the same old tiresome and irrelevant arguments that prevent us from asking key questions about the turn to political violence.

What makes a young man adopt extremist views?

How exactly does the Internet affect that transformation?

How large are pools of potential violent extremists in the West?

What triggers an extremist protester to turn violent?

What kind of signals does someone, who turns to violence, give off?

What specific signal distinguishes a violent from a non-violent extremist?

Eleven and a half years after 9/11, we still don’t know.
Link:http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversat...-on-terrorism/ ]]> Intelligence davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18024 What is the state of al Qaeda and Terrorism two years after Bin Laden? Vote here! http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18023&goto=newpost Thu, 02 May 2013 13:23:40 GMT Two years ago, Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan marking one of the most significant milestones in the history of terrorism and counterterrorism. Two and a half years ago, I began conducting surveys to assess what the impact might be if Osama Bin Laden ever met his demise. #These surveys have... Two years ago, Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan marking one of the most significant milestones in the history of terrorism and counterterrorism. Two and a half years ago, I began conducting surveys to assess what the impact might be if Osama Bin Laden ever met his demise. #These surveys have since become an annual assessment I generate to gauge public perceptions of the threat of al Qaeda and terrorism in general. #While Bin Laden may be gone, terrorism continues and the past year has demonstrated how terrorist attacks might manifest themselves in a variety of ways from Benghazi to the Boston Marathon bombing.

Today, I'm launching the fifth iteration of the al Qaeda Strategy/Post Bin Laden Survey. Thanks to those that have participated in versions #1 - Does Bin Laden Matter- Jan.2, 2011, #2 - AQ Strategy 2011-2012 - April 27. 2011, #3 - Terrorism Post-Bin Laden - May 2, 2011, #4 One Year After Bin Laden - May 2, 2012.#You can find the results at this link which hosts the results of past surveys.

This poll is shorter and a bit different than past surveys. #Realizing there have been changes in terrorism, I opened the questions up a bit to include new emerging trends. #However, I did repeat some questions verbatim so we can see how our collective thinking has changed over time.

Thanks in advance for contributing to the survey. And anyone is welcome to participate - the more votes the better the results. I'll begin posting the results and comparisons with past data sets in a few weeks. #Here is the link to the survey:https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/2yearsafterBinLaden"

Thanks to all Small Wars Journal Participants for taking the surveys over the years and I look forward to posting a copy of the results here! ]]> Catch-All, GWOT CWOT http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18023 <![CDATA[Colonel Mathieu, the para CO, in the film, the 'Battle of Algiers']]> http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18022&goto=newpost Thu, 02 May 2013 12:01:07 GMT The controversial film 'Battle of Algiers' appears in may threads on SWC, but the linked article is about the actor who portrayed Colonel Mathieu and is worth reading. Some of the pithy comments will resonate on the dilemmas of fighting an internal war, as France saw Algeria and other 'small wars'.

Maybe the Colonel was a man for his times, not today?

Quote:
Mathieu is the key to the central scene of the film: the moment when he is cross-examined by international journalists about torture. Accused by journalists of being evasive about the methods of victory, he rounds on them. He reminds them of the consequences of blind terrorism:

"Is it legal to set off bombs in public places?... No, gentlemen, believe me. It is a vicious circle. We could talk for hours to no avail because that is not the problem. The problem is this: the FLN want to throw us out of Algeria and we want to stay".

He underlines that there was a political consensus, from right to left, in support of destroying the FLN rebellion.

"We are here for that reason alone. We are neither madmen nor sadists. Those who call us fascists forget the role many of us played in the Resistance. Those who call us Nazis don’t know that some of us survived Dachau and Buchenwald. We are soldiers. Our duty is to win".

At which point Mathieu throws the question back at the journalists:

"Therefore to be precise, it is my turn to ask a question. Should France stay in Algeria? If your answer is still yes, then you must accept all the consequences".
Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/martin-...mbodied-france

There is a thread in 'Historians', where this post may be merged to, dependent on the response; France's war in Algeria: telling the story: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15864 ]]> Trigger Puller davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18022 UK CT was lucky this time http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18007&goto=newpost Tue, 30 Apr 2013 20:46:44 GMT After the 1984 Brighton hotel bombing an PIRA spokesman stated: ---Quote--- Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once ---End Quote--- Today six aspiring Jihadist terrorists pleaded guilty to plotting an attack @ Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, in June 2012, on a protest... After the 1984 Brighton hotel bombing an PIRA spokesman stated:
Quote:
Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once
Today six aspiring Jihadist terrorists pleaded guilty to plotting an attack @ Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, in June 2012, on a protest meeting held by the English Defence League (EDL), commonly labelled an extreme right / nationalist group.

Luckily:
Quote:
...by the time the group arrived the crowd of around 450 protestors had completely dispersed.
What is significant IMHO is this is the first Jihadist planned attack on the EDL in the UK. It only failed as they arrived late. The six were all UK citizens, of Bangladeshi and Kashmiri origin, from East Birmingham mainly; their prepared leaflets stated:
Quote:
To the EDL (English Drunkards League). O enemies of Allah! We have heard and seen you openly insulting the final Messenger of Allah... you should know that for every action there is a reaction. Today is a day of retaliation (especially) for your blasphemy of Allah and his Messenger Muhammad. We love death more than you love life. The penalty for blasphemy of Allah and his Messenger Muhammad is death.
The attack was discovered after a routine traffic stop, as one car used came up as being uninsured:
Quote:
The gang had purchased car insurance over the phone earlier that day but because the wrong registration number had been provided, the car flashed up as uninsured.
See:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/ap...dar?CMP=twt_gu

The car was seized and the contents were discovered when the recovery operator opened the boot, to conduct an inventory. Their weapons:
Quote:
..two previously stolen sawn-off shotguns and nine cartridges, 11 bladed items, parts of a partially constructed pipe bomb, a firework-based IED containing 359 nails and 93 ball bearings...
Photos:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22353636

Only then did the police discover what the plotters intended. Needless to say there are other aspects, but the police and partners were not aware of the attacker's intentions or assembly of weapons.

Police press release, with video of the routine stop:http://www.west-midlands.police.uk/l...se.asp?ID=4658

Two BBC reports, general and 'did the police miss the plot':http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22344054 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22344054

A comment by the EDL's leftist opponents:http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/edl-demo-bomb-plot/ ]]> Law Enforcement davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=18007 What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us? http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17997&goto=newpost Mon, 29 Apr 2013 02:52:14 GMT Post up your top five lessons that you hope are gleaned from our long stay in AFG. Whether we have the capacity to grasp the lesson is important, but not critical. In no particular order, mine are: 1) The national policy goals should be clear and concise, and the integrated plan to achieve... Post up your top five lessons that you hope are gleaned from our long stay in AFG. Whether we have the capacity to grasp the lesson is important, but not critical.

In no particular order, mine are:

1) The national policy goals should be clear and concise, and the integrated plan to achieve them must be properly resourced. Make sure everyone understands the goals and the plan.

2) We can't expect a tribal society to drink the democratic Kool-Aid just because we say so. The manner in which Karzai controlled the levers to choose provincial governors, and they in turn the district governors and the police chiefs, should have been a warning that our wants did not nest with reality. Those who benefit from his patronage won't be there to protect him when Karzai is strung up in a Kabul square.

3) The FOB concept was another massive failure, considering the need to secure the population and obvious approaches that work.

4) When the security forces you are training start turning on you, it is a clue. Pay attention and don't blame the victims.

5) Our disregard for the nexus of drugs, narco-warlords, and the Taliban connection, prolonged the war. Good men died because possession of ten kilos of heroin didn't warrant action by the toothless courts, among other rule of law shortcomings.

The bonus lesson is that we should have lived intermingled with the population. No commuting to work...no return to the COP at night for hot chow and a cot. If we really want to deal with rural insurgency, we've got to own it, every minute of every hour of every day. The insurgents do, and that's why they will prevail. ]]> OEF - Afghanistan jcustis http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17997 NGOs in Africa: Assets or Liabilities? http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17988&goto=newpost Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:11:05 GMT NGOs in Africa: Assets or Liabilities? (http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=7179), by Abdul Ghelleh. African Executive, May 2013. ---Quote--- I came to the conclusion, however, that the overwhelming majority of the NGOs do more harm than good to livelihoods... NGOs in Africa: Assets or Liabilities?, by Abdul Ghelleh. African Executive, May 2013.
Quote:
I came to the conclusion, however, that the overwhelming majority of the NGOs do more harm than good to livelihoods and sustainable development in Africa. Here is my charge sheet: NGOs artificially sustain a false economy whereby they push huge amounts of cash into the pockets of corrupted local African partners while taking most of the cash back to their private bank accounts in Europe and elsewhere. Yes, they do pay the salaries of a few people here and there who support their families. But that’s not my point. The NGOs actually work against home-grown developmental strategies in Africa.

The NGO operatives don’t want the recycling of aid operations – which creates chronic dependency and corruption within the receiving societies – to end. For example, NGOs are not prepared to cede some power or train local people to take over in the future, and they don’t give the confidence necessary to carry out the work to local government personnel of the countries that they operate in. Africans have the experience and the expertise to own the operations of the NGOs, but actually the foreign bosses of the NGOs want to retain power in order to continue the dependency culture that they have created.
I don’t know anything directly about the subject, but the broader theme of how perverse incentives can infect even the best of intentions is something that I find both fascinating and tragic. ]]> bourbon http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17988 <![CDATA[The World's Most Powerful Mercenary Armies]]> http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17977&goto=newpost Thu, 25 Apr 2013 13:39:05 GMT A quick review by Business Insider:http://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-mercenary-armies-2013-4?op=1#ixzz2RLM04tgP Yes, there are more than Blackwater; although for obscure reasons it has two slots in the article. A quick review by Business Insider:http://www.businessinsider.com/most-...#ixzz2RLM04tgP

Yes, there are more than Blackwater; although for obscure reasons it has two slots in the article. ]]> PMCs and Entrepreneurs davidbfpo http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17977 Voices from Poland http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17973&goto=newpost Wed, 24 Apr 2013 18:02:10 GMT A Book, entitled "How Polish People Helped Germans Murder Jews;" was published recently (January 2013) in Poland.

#http://www.czarnaowca.pl/literatura_...w_m,p720952114
I hope it will be translated into English. The author, Stefan Zgliczynski, is a journalist associated with the Polish version of Le Monde Diplomatique. His book generated many interesting comments on a Polish website:

http://www.polityka.pl/forum/1159278...679#commentBox

The link below will take you to selected observations (translated by me).

#http://csam.montclair.edu/~kowalski/xenophobia.html

Thay are worth reading and thinking about. ]]> Europe kowalskil http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17973 Infantry Magazine http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17962&goto=newpost Tue, 23 Apr 2013 04:17:12 GMT Can anybody tell me why you have to have an AKO account in order to read/subscribe to Infantry magazine? Is there another option to get around this or have the Commies just completely taken over the Army.:( Can anybody tell me why you have to have an AKO account in order to read/subscribe to Infantry magazine? Is there another option to get around this or have the Commies just completely taken over the Army.:( ]]> slapout9 http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17962 The Duffel Blog http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17959&goto=newpost Mon, 22 Apr 2013 15:34:27 GMT The Duffel Blog (http://www.duffelblog.com/) ---Quote--- *About Us* A Brief History Since 1797, The Duffel Blog has been serving the men and women of the American military with insightful commentary and hard-hitting journalism. While other agencies have sometimes run from possibly... The Duffel Blog
Quote:
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Most are probably already familiar. ]]> Blog Watch bourbon http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17959