"The era of the big footprint is over."
Heard Professor Bruce Hoffman say that, almost in passing, during a talk on Al Qaeda (on the march, 2008 will be "al Qaeda's year" he thinks) on Friday. He's certainly not the first, I have an old paper Steve Metz co-wrote somewhere on my hard drive arguing that we shouldn't be basing ground forces expansion on the expectation of more OIFs.
But have Iraq and Afghanistan, and the modern media climate, soured the West on large-scale, boots on the ground COIN? Are small, interagency advisory teams scattered around the globe the way of the future in fighting insurgency? Or did the failure to catch Bin Laden in 2001 prove the need for Western commitment of substantial amounts of ground troops in key circumstances?
US does not win COIN, the threatened country must
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Granite_State
But have Iraq and Afghanistan, and the modern media climate, soured the West on large-scale, boots on the ground COIN? Are small, interagency advisory teams scattered around the globe the way of the future in fighting insurgency? Or did the failure to catch Bin Laden in 2001 prove the need for Western commitment of substantial amounts of ground troops in key circumstances?
Bin Laden is a threat and must be captured or killed (though how and when it happens will have important IO implications- we have to be ready to exploit the success) We have to conduct intelligence and when feasible military operations to stop him and his network.
Conducting COIN around the world is a different problem set. I would ask in which other country to we expect to conduct operations on the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan? Kenyan, Sudan, north Korea, Colombia, Pakistan??
What we have to understand is that the US cannot win a COIN fight unless the US is the nation directly threatened. Only the indigenous people can win their COIN fight. The US can only provide external support to the government and its security forces. The US cannot win the COIN fight in any country other than our own.
We handily achieved military victories in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We deposed totalitarian regimes and and both nations were left with no functioning security forces (a political decision that can and will be long debated in Iraq). This made the aftermath more difficult and complex. But I would ask where are we going to commit forces on this scale again to conduct operations such as we are in Iraq and Afghanistan. I would submit that the better examples (and they are each different and unique in their right) are our commitments in Colombia, the trans Sahel, the Philippines, and even Indonesia (with virtually no military presence, less some small CA and PSYOP there but a strong assist from our intelligence organizations). In all of these situations the local forces are in the lead with our support. A deployment of large scale US forces would be counter-productive because it would undermine the legitimacy of the host nation government and we would not be capable of achieving long term success. Just my 2 cents.
The enemy will surprise you
Allot of the poll can be attributed to context - but as a rule I'd hate to have the enemy bite me - particularly when you don't expect it, and cannot adapt to the change in conditions. If the poll is in regards to Iraq, I'd say its unlikely, but not inconceivable - we've missed the boat on big things before and paid for it in our military history - others have as well - politics/policy also plays a role, and there are more interests then just AQ at work in the ME (and for that matter the wo. It comes down to asking "so what does this mean" within the conditions I'm operating or expect to operate in, and at the level of war your looking at?
If we are talking outside of Iraq, the ungoverned spaces where the enemy dominates and can build resources and defences, then I think we have to be preapred to do the big operations - consider what it would take to go into the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan - particularly on the Pakistan side and challenge the stauts quo to extend governence - even past the beginning, maintaining influence in such a remote and immature infrastructure will require building the sustainment mechanisms to make that possible - it would be more along the lines of the "inventing" level (or building vs. rebuilding).
If your foot print is lessened because you are working a long term SFA (Security Force Assistance) type campaign as part of SSR (Security Sector Reform) efforts - you may be able to "lessen" your physical footprint, but you may increase your timelines, commitments, as well as the risk associated with not achieving your political objective - both with a degree of finality (enough to justify the original or continued commitment of military force to solve the problem) and in time to make a difference - one ex. we do not want AQ ever becoming strong enough to effect a coup and gain control of nuclear weapons.
As many have said before here, we have to use great caution when using the current conditions (and even the starting conditons, or the ones of recent past) to determine DOTLMPF requirements that might leave us unprepared to meet the missions we are asked to perform. We must be full spectrum to meet uncertainty.
Best, Rob