Scenarios for the Insurgency in Iraq
From USIP: Scenarios for the Insurgency in Iraq
Quote:
...Participants in the three scenario workshops, held in November 2005, January 2006, and April 2006, sought to anticipate possible outcomes of the insurgency in Iraq. To do this they tried to understand the underlying forces and trends and the uncertainties related to their development and impacts. Unlike most academic and intelligence analyses—which focus mostly on information known with confidence—scenario analysis focuses on uncertainties. This term refers to factors or forces whose development or impacts are impossible to forecast accurately.
Participants made no assumptions regarding historical continuity or change. Instead they focused on plausible developments in underlying forces and trends—in this case over a three- to seven-year period.
They considered multiple potential outcomes and the developments that produce them rather than forecasting a single outcome. Given the complexity of the insurgency, we recognized the value of having several potential outcomes for which we would evaluate U.S. and Iraqi goals and options.
The scenario process exposes and illuminates not simply the views of expert observers, but the assumptions underlying those views and the implications of conditions and uncertainties that might not have been considered. It includes the group’s exploration of possibilities, with a give-and-take that adds richness and nuance that otherwise might be more difficult to achieve. Finally, the process can preempt surprises by anticipating developments before they occur...
Two Updated Assessments from CSIS
26 Jan 07: Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War
Quote:
This report provides an overview of both how the Iraqi insurgency has moved towards civil conflict from its inception in the spring of 2003 through 2007, of the ways in which insurgent tactics and methods have changed over time, and the current level of civil conflict and risk of overall civil war. It is divided into five general sections:
• The first section examines Iraq under the rule of Saddam, the immediate post-war aftermath and the development of a violent insurgency in the spring and summer of 2003. It chronicles the insurgency’s inception and how it has evolved from 2003 until 2007 and examines Coalition operations to counter it.
• The second evaluates insurgent patterns of attacks, and Coalition and Iraqi casualties. It also examines insurgent tactics, methods of attack, and the political, psychological and informational warfare lessons from 2003-2006.
• The third section assesses the composition of the insurgency including Iraqi Sunni Arabs (both “Islamists and “Nationalists”), foreign jihadists, and the uncertain status of the Shi’ites. It also addresses the degree to which these factions cooperate or conflict and the role of Iraqi’s neighbors in the insurgency.
• The fourth considers Iraqi views of the threat.
• The fifth and final section offers an assessment of probable outcomes of the conflict and lessons of the war.
29 Jan 07: Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and the Evolving Insurgency: Developments through late-January 2007
Quote:
...Little progress has been made in political conciliation, the key step in reducing the level of violence in Iraq. As a result, the overall patterns in violence have broadened and grown more intense. The end result is a fragmented civil war driven more by sectarian and ethnic cleansing than killings and large-scale acts of violence....
