Son Tay raid: stop or go? Vietnam
Moderator at work
Another thread 'Definition of a Raid' has meandered into a mainly historical discussion of this Vietnam War era POW rescue raid, so I have attempted to separate the two themes and created this new thread.
Original thread 'Definition of a Raid':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14474
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Originally Posted by
JMA
Rule one on raids: they must be based on good intelligence ... unlike
Son Tay
I know several folks who went on that soiree and all complained of excessive caution and endless rehearsals (one wag said "... and each was a worse cock up than the one before..."). There was at the time some interesting rumors. One claimed that the move of the Allied prisoners was known and the raid went anyway for psychological purposes. Flaky. Another claimed that the move was known and the Raid went anyway as a diversion for another effort. Also flaky. Truth will be out in AD 2030 or so... ;)
Regardless, while it did not accomplish the nominal mission of freeing prisoners neither did it result in a slew of own casualties. Interestingly, one guy on that Raid, SGM Galen Kittelson was also as An Alamo Scout on the more successful raid which freed hundreds of US PWs from the Japanese Cabanatuan Camp in the Philippines during WW II. Pappy and I were in the same unit when we went to Little Rock to put the kids in school. :wry:
You're right on Dieppe. It was always going to be difficult but could have gone much better than it did. One problem with both it and JMM's Marine item is that Amphibious Raids are very prone to interdiction on withdrawal -- you can only do so much on a body of water. I have this vague recollection of reading a Book years ago that discussed it and it was alleged that someone had suggested that the accepted plan was in essence making a frontal assault at the point of heaviest defense and that was the antithesis of the philosophy of a raid... :rolleyes:
The fist "Thunder Run" through Baghdad in 2003 was essentially a very successful raid -- the second stayed in town so was not.
It was noted He implied, they said...
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Originally Posted by
JMA
I said Moorer was an imbecile? No I did not but he clearly made an imbecilic decision.
To you it is clear, others without your vast knowledge, experience and inside information do not know enough to make that call... ;)
You may, however, make as many standing broad jumps at possibly wrong conclusions as you wish.
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One must surely question how this man reached the pinnacle of the US military without it being established that he was unable to make (in this case) an intelligent decision under stress.
I suspect that he did it like countless others around the world before and since -- by making more, mostly intelligent decisions involving far more persons while under stress than you or I ever had to do. Note also that we do not know that the decision was not intelligent, we only have your assumption based on limited information that it was unitelligent. :rolleyes:
Note also that you're basing your possibly fallacious assumption on one incident of which you are but partially aware and informed as opposed to possessing (or citing) more detailed knowledge of his over 40 years of service in which, among other things, he was both CinCPac and CinCLant, two major commands and something no one had ever done before (or since...).
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Ken, how did Moorer manage to get to CJCS when his was unable to make a simple decision a 15 year old could make and does this indicate the the joint chiefs are merely rubber stamp yes-men?
The 'how' is discussed above. You do not know that it was a simple decision, it merely suits your purposes to so assume. Been my observation that 15 year olds make a lot of hasty --and bad -- decisions. Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs are like ordinary mortals, some are yes men, some are not. All have far more military experience than you, most good, in more areas of the world and more varied circumstances. Most also have more sense than to leap to judgement based on limited knowledge and most are concerned with far more than minor tactical problems. They can be legitimately accused of being excessively cautious but it must be recalled that they are dual hatted as both the military adviser to the President (not Commanders, they command nothing) AND as guardians of the institutions that are the entire US Armed Forces with worldwide and not just current Theater (or current political administration) concerns. Those are somewhat conflicting roles and the balance is always uneasy.
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For the OBL strike it was troops from stateside that were used and not those based then in theatre? A pattern here?
That too is an assumption and not necessarily correct.
However, you raise a good point. The Cabanatuan raid was ordered by the local commander using in-theater troops. There were some unheralded but deep and successful raids in Korea that met those same parameters. Son Tay, OTH was the harbinger of excessive control from Washington and of the use of out of theater forces. That raised those efforts from a military operation to a political action (please note and consider that FACT). As was / is the OBL effort. The OBL thing was a mixed bag, theater wise but was emphatically a Washington orchestration. I suspect little good will come from that trend...
A contrary point of view - The Guts to Try...Regardless
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Mag.../1195raid.aspx
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Bad News Develops
Bad news developed in Washington when a usually reliable intelligence source in Hanoi stated that the Son Tay prisoners had been moved. Reconnaissance aircraft tried to get last-minute photographs of the camp November 18 but failed. However, another report indicated that the camp was occupied by "someone."
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird was briefed on the possibility that no prisoners were in the camp. General Blackburn and DIA Director Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett recommended the raid proceed, weather permitting. Mr. Laird agreed and so advised the President, who acknowledged that it was worth the risk. The "go" message was sent to General Manor at Takhli.
General Manor laid on the mission for the night of November 20. In the Red River Valley, little cloudiness was expected, as were good visibility and light winds. As the General reported later, "The night of 20/21 November 1970 was the only night for many days before and after that date that launch would have been possible."
Vice Adm. Frederic A. Bardshar aboard USS Oriskany was sent his go-ahead planning message, which said simply, "NCA approval received." The aircrews of fifty-nine strike and support aircraft were briefed but not told why they would be flying over the major North Vietnamese port of Haiphong and dropping only flares, not bombs. They were given permission to fire their Shrike air-to-surface missiles and 20-mm ammunition against any enemy radar-controlled SAM defenses that posed a threat to US forces and to support search-and-rescue missions if anyone were shot down.
Sounds like single-source reporting said one thing, and the planners attempted to verify, but could not, but made heavy decision nonetheless. That's what they get paid to do. It certainly doesn't sound like the information about moved prisoners was as definitive as some articles allege.
It for sure doesn't sound like they were risk averse and wanted to wrap the members of the raid force in pillows. Shudder to think that they would risk casualties or a KIA (here's my not-shocked face...okay, it's gone now).
You miss a lot of points...
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Originally Posted by
JMA
There are none so blind as those who will not see.
Ain't that the truth... :D
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I say again Ken, explain the scenario to a random 15 year old and see what an epic fail the CJCS's action was. How he wasn't summarily dismissed (forced into retirement) remains totally amazing.
What is totally amazing is that a mature South African with considerable and successful military experience is making judgements like a 15 year old.
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Ken, you can attempt to mock me as much as you like to entertain your like minded around here. (by now you should have realised that those tactics do not work on me)
Understand one thing -- I am not mocking you. I am stating that you espouse some bizarre theories. Nor am I attempting to entertain anyone -- I am trying to suggest to you that you, as the saying goes, should "engage brain before putting mouth in gear." You are smarter than some of the odd comments you make for whatever reason.
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... but at the critical moment he failed. So (being thankful he killed no one in this case) you thank him for his service, give him a service medal and pack him off post haste into retirement.
That's just asinine. You apparently totally misunderstand the role of the CJCS. None of that was his call.
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I don't have anything to do with 15 year olds.
Nor do I so stop suggesting we call on one for answers to questions about which most will know little. An attribute apparently widely shared. :rolleyes:
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The question is how they managed to claw their way up the promotion ladder. Officers of that rank (one would like to think) would be a cut above us mere mortals, yes?
Not at all. Pontificating, sycophantic, overly aggressive, less than thoughtful and other less than stellar types exist in all ranks, Private to General. If one thought as you say one should like to, then one would make some terribly flawed judgements about people. Obviously.
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So did Hannibal's elephants, but did that make them any more than mere elephants?
Yep, they were combat experienced Elephants. ;)
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The simple difference Ken, is that I did not serve long enough to reach my own level of incompetence... obviously many of the guys you mention did.
Still groping, I see...
Yep, many of them did -- many of them also did not. Same applies in all fields of human endeavor. As you know...
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Maybe most do. But then obviously some are so intellectually challenged that they allow an attack to go ahead on an empty camp 23 miles from Hanoi. The mind boggles.
Yes, the boggle is quite noticeable.
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Don't worry the Brit have there problems as well. Remember Arnhem?
On D-1 an Ultra decryption revealed the movement of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem. Also airphoto-reconnaissance and intel from the Dutch underground confirmed the panzer presence. Eisenhower was concerned, Montgomery laughed it off and Eisenhower did not have the balls to overrule Montgomery. (seems to be a problem at the top levels of the US military, yes?) The rest is history. Only 8,000 casualties, what the hell, hey Ken? (can't criticise the generals can we?).
I was criticizing Generals before you were born. Generally, though, I tried to have some factual basis rather than my perceptions on which to base that criticism. It might be helpful if you tried that.
Re: the Arnhem effort -- and Son Tay for that matter --you forget or elide the political aspects and the stultifying effect of a large bureaucracy. You apparently never had to deal with that or have forgotten how perncious it can be. Some of us have dealt with it and know better than to discount it -- think of our conversation re: Libya when I suggested those factors would cause exactly what did happen... ;)
Not all bad, I guess -- gave you something to rail about for a few weeks.
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Excuses, excuses Ken. This man blew it. He should have been fired if not worse.
We can disagree on that. You're speaking through your hat...
That's no excuse, it's simply reality with which you have never had to work so you can be dismissive. Those who have to live with it do not have your luxury.
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Ken, with respect, you are now trying to pass the buck to Washington while there is growing evidence that after all is said and done maybe the US military does in fact need political micromanagement.
Heh. I wouldn't deign to comment on that little gem...
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But the US did once have a man of honour. Remember Operation Eagle Claw? As a result of that cock-up Beckwith resigned.
No. he did not. I knew Beckwith and while he was indeed generally honorable, he did not resign over the foul-ups (plural) that led to the failure of Eagle Claw -- which were many, multi-service and both bureaucracy and Washington jinxed from the start and a few of which he also contributed. Charlie didn't resign, he retired with credit for 30 years service and full Retired pay -- the norm for Colonels, then and now. He did that over a year after Eagle Claw. So, once again you make a fallacious comment based on poor knowledge and a lot of false presumption.
You really ought to work on that -- and that, BTW is not mockery or meant to entertain anyone, it is a suggestion for you to consider if you wish to be taken seriously.
Two positive effects of the Son Tay Raid
1. Lowered NV morale because it showed we could hit within 25 miles of Hanoi, with minimal losses to us.
2. Enhanced US PW morale because an effort had been made to free them.
One might also suggest that putting US boots on the ground that close to Hanoi opened up the US psyche to more aggressive actions within North Vietnam itself, culminating in the 1972 Operation Linebacker I and Operation Linebacker II.
One might also consider the effect in 1964 had Linebacker-type actions, as well as US raids, been employed against North Vietnam - rather than the "graduated response" employed by the Johnson Admin.
That's the only sensible thing you've written in this sub-thread.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
I will not continue the ###-for-tat response but rather restate my position.
He said as he again laid out a ###. :D
As for this:
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It is simple.
Nobody (in their right mind) with question the physical courage of the US forces... but it is becoming increasingly clear that moral courage is in short supply in the upper echelons of the US military.
That certainly applies to some, fortunately, not to all even though such blanket condemnation may be perceptively merited in your view. Fortunately, you are not the arbiter. Also fortunately, reality -- and most others -- differ.
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Sticks and stones and all that stuff Ken
No sticks or stones, just another response to your apparent once a month or so relatively pointless excessive negativity cycle. It's yet another plea for you to think about what you're posting rather than occasionally dashing off ill considered and quite uninformed vituperation for no apparent reason other than that you can...
It's too early for the Grinch... :D
Son Tay - Facts and Level of Analysis
My initial reaction was to address this post to JMA; but upon reflection, I am simply going to followup Jon Custis' posts. So, we should address the material facts regarding, and who was involved in, the so-called "intelligence failure" (no POWs); and, more importantly, at what level, should we analyze the end goal of the mission.
In considering those questions, two online sources stand out for factual validation and reasoned policy analysis (fn 1):
Amidon, Mark. "Groupthink, Politics, and the Decision to Attempt the Son Tay Rescue". Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College 2005 (Winter) [cited as Amidon].
Mitchell, Major John, USMC (1997). "The Son Tay Raid: A Study in Presidential Policy". e-History: Vietnam War. The Ohio State University [cited as Mitchell]
1. Events of 19-20 November (the Material Facts)
Amidon's summary (pp.5-6 pdf) is the shorter of the two:
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On 19 November, after the President approved the mission and one day before actual launch, word reached General Blackburn of the North Vietnamese HUMINT source who reported “no prisoners at Son Tay.” This HUMINT report triggered a massive reanalysis of available information and demands for an updated intelligence estimate.
For the next 12 hours, General Blackburn, DIA Director Lieutenant General Donald Bennett, Admiral Moorer, and Secretary Laird struggled with the significance of this news and what impact it should have on the mission. General Blackburn was certain that the mission should proceed; yet his confidence wavered as he expressed great frustration with the quality of the intelligence analysis. “One minute they were ‘sure’ the prisoners were gone, the next they were ‘suspicious’ that POWs had been moved back into Son Tay.”[31] General Bennett appeared before Admiral Moorer on the morning of 20 November with two stacks of “evidence,” one saying “they’ve moved,” and an equally large one saying “they’re still there.”[32] Despite this muddled intelligence picture, General Bennett eventually recommended that the mission proceed, primarily on the basis of the “95 percent assurance” that the raiders could safely complete their mission.[33] Armed with the concurrence of his three subordinates, Secretary of Defense Laird routinely notified the President that the mission would proceed as planned. The White House concurred with the Pentagon’s intentions. With the raid due to launch in hours, the Administration was not interested in doubts. As Admiral Harry D. Train, at that time the Executive Assistant to Admiral Moorer, later put it, “They didn’t want to know.”[34]
31. Schemmer, p. 180.
32. Vandenbroucke, p. 65.
33. Schemmer, p. 180.
34. Vandenbroucke, p. 66.
Mitchell's section on "Intelligence and the Decision: (page 6 & page 7) goes beyond Amidon (snips from 19-20 Nov):
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....
[the meeting of Blackburn, Bennett and Moorer on 19 Nov] Having heard the opinions of both men, Moorer decided to brief Laird the following morning. Hopefully, the additional time would allow for reconsideration and/or confirmation regarding to the new information. If confirmed to be accurate, enough time would be available on the morning of 20 November to brief the NCA and deliver any changes to the raid force prior to their scheduled launch time.
The following morning [20 Nov], Moorer, Bennett, and Blackburn again met to discuss the new developments. As it turned out, Bennett had a change of opinion. He had reconsidered his position based on all the information collected to date on Son Tay. Bennett arrived at the same conclusion Blackburn did on the day before. Therefore, Bennett recommended a 'Go.' That recommendation was enough for Moorer to agree that the mission should be attempted, since he also believed that the POWs were still there. It was good that all three 'confirmed' what they wanted to believe because the raid force mission commander had given the final preparation and execution order to the raid force earlier that morning. It is apparent that Moorer's decision to wait had paid off because anything less than a unified recommendation from his office probably would have led to an abort by the NCA. However, there was still enough time to do just that with another 'Red Rocket' if Nixon or Laird deemed it necessary in light of the Hanoi source information. Therefore, with Bennett at his side, Moorer went to brief Laird on the recent developments.
Laird did not hesitate in agreeing with Moorer's recommendation to proceed despite the new developments. Laird was committed and fully understood Nixon's policy and to what extent the President would go to make his point once diplomatic efforts failed or produced insufficient results on a specific issue. Laird's resolve and conviction over the POW/MIA would be reconfirmed in his eyes because, within an hour of Moorer's departure, Richard Helms arrived to discuss the information obtained from the Hanoi source and also brought additional news concerning the POW issue. The CIA had intercepted recent "traffic" and confirmed that as many as 11 more POWs had died in captivity in addition to those reported on 13 November. Laird knew he must immediately inform the President of these developments. However, exactly what and how he told the President is an issue which is still debatable.
....
Research indicates, and it is the judgment of this author, that the President would not have aborted the mission in light of this information. Whether or not the President was briefed about the Hanoi source information is irrelevant. After all, the final decision to carry out the raid had been made. In other words, there was no political "smoking gun" (any Presidential "wrong doing" associated with the decision to execute or continue) to be found on this specific issue. However, if the Hanoi source information proved to be true, Laird would take all the blame if the mission turned out to be a total failure. Apparently Laird's decision not to brief Nixon would provide Presidential "plausible deniability" in case the mission met with tragic results. Having established Nixon's policy towards ending the war in Vietnam and what part the raid would play in that policy, let us review the leadership, execution, and reaction to the mission in order to understand the complexity and significance of the Son Tay Raid.
Why was the presence or absence of the POWs "irrelevant" to the decisions made at the National Command Authority level ?
cont. in part 2