Regarding military misfortune

While waiting for my copy of Military Misfortune (Cohen, Gooch), I thought I'd ask folks in the know how American institutions currently deal with instances of failure from the strategic down to the tactical point of view; particularly where specific rather than systemic incidents of poor performance are at issue and no criminal culpability attaches. I'd like the broad view, but I'd appreciate anecdotes as well. For example, to what extent do we hold generals and senior field grade officers accountable for success or failure in a given operation? Are careers always on the line when missteps emerge. Does a record of past performance weigh heavily or weakly when presented with a really spectacular fiasco? In other words, how much rope does the leadership historically gives a commander to do his job and is it too much or too little?

There's a center for lessons learned that writes nice reports that apparently don't get read that much.

I suggest you locate Norman Dixon's 'The Psychology of Military Incompetence', that might help with the context and is a classic on management.

See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_incompetence and for the book: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Psychology-M.../dp/0712658890

davidbfpo

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

There's a center for lessons learned that writes nice reports that apparently don't get read that much.

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CALL's products are primarily targeted to the tactical level. Even their Commander's Guides on various topics tend to be for small unit commanders, not those at the senior decision-making levels.

Given that focus, their reports are much read, debated and integrated into small unit training. They have a great deal of impact and effect at the intended level.

Roughly the same can be said for the MCCLL.

There is no center for general officers' lessons learned. It would certainly be interesting to see the product that place could churn out.

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Originally Posted by Jedburgh

CALL's products are primarily targeted to the tactical level. Even their Commander's Guides on various topics tend to be for small unit commanders, not those at the senior decision-making levels.

Given that focus, their reports are much read, debated and integrated into small unit training. They have a great deal of impact and effect at the intended level.

Roughly the same can be said for the MCCLL.

There is no center for general officers' lessons learned. It would certainly be interesting to see the product that place could churn out.

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Arguably, that is the purpose of Combat Studies Institute, when established by GEN Don Starry in the early 80's. They have produced many high quality studies, some by council members (Tom Odom). Other institutions include the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.

As far as to why we perhaps seem to not learn "lessons", I would venture that history only provides insight into problems, not answers. Which may be why the vast majority the successful generals throughout history were voracious military scholars/readers of military history, social science, and the classics.

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

Arguably, that is the purpose of Combat Studies Institute, when established by GEN Don Starry in the early 80's. They have produced many high quality studies, some by council members (Tom Odom). Other institutions include the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.

As far as to why we perhaps seem to not learn "lessons", I would venture that history only provides insight into problems, not answers. Which may be why the vast majority the successful generals throughout history were voracious military scholars/readers of military history, social science, and the classics.

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You are both correct. I would say however that CSI was established to help re-integrate history into the Army's thinking in the renaissance of the 1980s. As a CSI guy we targeted tactical history and to a certain degree operational. The War College and the Center for Military History were supposed to look at strategic. The reality was that CSI was and still is much more productive and we broadened our scope--filling the void by action. In my case, getting apporval to even write on Africa was something of a rock soup drill--started with the rock called peacekeeping and then I started asking for goodies by way of research on the Congo.

Our audience was primarily the company and field grade officer corps. But we had a following in the senior ranks. My current boss of course wrote his LP on Korea. Hopefully the controversy over the CSI project on Watan valley will not derail CSI or force it back into the mode of only writing dead guy history.

Best
Tom