Should we destroy Al Qaeda?
In a recent Foreign Policy article, Gustavo de las Casas contends Destroying al Qaeda is not an option, yet. This discussion is found in different threads throughout SWC, and Mr. Casas makes a compelling case to keep them around.
Quote:
The old al Qaeda is no more. At least 40 percent of its leadership circa 2001 has either been killed or captured. New faces have fared no better; since July 2008, 11 of the organization's 20 most wanted have been put out of commission. And middle management is almost gone, many of them victims of Predator strikes. What remains is probably a hollow organization, represented by a core of insulated figureheads, such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, surrounded by eager cadres of jihadist newcomers. Before long, the West may just hold a barrel to al Qaeda's collective forehead. Should it press the trigger?
Gut instinct and righteousness scream "yes!" But a better answer might be "not yet." The world would be wise to keep al Qaeda alive, paradoxically enough, for security reasons. Like it or not, keeping a battered al Qaeda intact (if weak) is the world's best hope of funneling Islamist fanatics into one social network -- where they stand the best chance of being spotted, tracked, and contained. The alternative, destroying the terrorist group, would risk fragmenting al Qaeda into thousands of cells, and these will be much harder to follow and impossible to eradicate. It's the counterterrorist's dilemma, and the only real choice is the least unsavory: Al Qaeda must live.
I really enjoyed his article, but I'm still not swayed. My rebuttal goes back to the fundamentals of insurgency theory relying mainly on Mao's protracted war. Insurgencies and terrorist groups need several things:
1. Ideology- something to validate their worldview and actions
2. People- technical bomb experts, grunts, suicide bombers, etc
3. Guns
4. Money
If AQ fractures, then funding sources, recruiting bases, technical skills, and support networks and infrastructure decline thus diminishing the capabilities of follow-on organizations. Moreover, competition amoungst groups would cause additional infighting and diminished capabilities.
That's my take. Any thoughts?
Mike
AQ, SWJ, and social networks
Interesting, insightful commentary from all. I'll attempt to address Schmedlap's statement.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Schmedlap
I disagree that "funding sources, recruiting bases, technical skills, and support networks and infrastructure decline." Rather, I think they will just do what the author asserts - they will shift to another social network that we have less knowledge about.
During the 1980s, the AQ/Taliban provided an outlet for "the call of jihad" for disenfranchised or adventurous Muslims to fight the Russians. They had advertisement and recruitment, transportation, funding (ironically from us), training camps, indoctrination, and employment. Most importantly, they had an established ideological backing.
During the 1990's, AQ/Taliban extended that fight into Kashmir and eventually began targeting the far-enemy.
From 2003-2008, AQ put out the call for Jihad in Iraq.
Now, that call is back to A'stan, Pakistan, etc.
While dispersed in social networks, this infrastructure and support networks are manpower and resource intensive. If we destroy them, then it will take a long time to recover.
An example of this could be SWJ. This site is well recognized as the place to go to study small wars. If someone publishes in another site or printed publication, it will normally be cc'd here. If SWJ was shut down tomorrow and the entire database deleted, individuals could venture to other sites, but the collective mojo would be lost for awhile until another site picked up the slack. At that point, LE could shut down that site.
I guess I'm just saying that we should take away AQ's mojo :cool:.
Death and bankrupt ideas methinks
Slap (No.8) stated:
Quote:
Exactamundo, when they figure out they (AQ) are not 10 feet tall and the price to pay will be death and bankruptcy, you will see a big change. Until then they will keep right on doing what they are doing.
I have asked in meetings where have all the jihadists gone? I mean the often cited tens of thousands who went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and to a lesser extent those who went to places like Bosnia and Kashmir. Yes, many are maybe dead, some integrated locally - often cited in the FATA, others returned home or to other places.
No-one seems to have a complete answer and I wonder if they have given up the Jihad.
So Slap perhaps AQ has already been affected? Death and bankrupt ideas methinks. (Apologies if I'm repeating myself here).
davidbfpo
An alternative view on AQ
A review by an academic expert of a book The Third Alternative: Between Authoritarianism and Surrender (by an AQ author; NT Google):http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb...&article=24121
Quote:
The book is the latest development in what can be called a second wave of modern Islamist de-radicalization.
The new body of literature, which is composed of more than 30 books, mainly deconstructs the eight major arguments of jihadism: al-hakimmiyya (God’s exclusive right to legislate), al-riddah (apostasy, mainly of ruling regimes), al-jihad/qital (fighting) for the Islamic state, jihad al-daf‘ (defensive jihad), ahkam al-diyar (rules of conduct in the “abode of Islam” and the “abode of infidelity”), methods for sociopolitical change, the inevitability of confrontation, and the “neo-crusader” arguments.
(Concludes}Most post-jihadist literature does not take a clear stance on democracy. But accepting the “other,” moderating rhetoric and behavior, and participating in electoral politics may be the only viable options for these groups if they want to remain politically significant. In other words, if jihadism heralded the inevitability of armed confrontation, post-jihadism might well entail the inevitable acceptance of democratization.
The review author has written on Ending Jihadism: the transformation of Armed Islamist Groups:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb...&article=23805
Will copy this to the 'What are you reading' thread.
davidbfpo
"Evidence" is needed in court; "perception" is needed in insurgency
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
Once again, it seems to me that you're conflating AQ's fight against foreign military intervention with domestic resistance to authoritarian government in the Arab world to a greater extent than is supported by evidence.
AQ's may fight foreign militaries when they come into the region, but their fight is not "against foreign military intervention." It is your position on this point that is unsupported by evidence. Foreign militaries are a convenient target of opportunity to carry forward his larger agenda.
His priorities have always been to take down the Saudi royals, and to humble the US in particular; and in general to break Western influence over the governments, and thereby the people, of the Middle East.
Conditions of insurgency have been sky high in most of the countries that bin Laden carries his message to for decades; but with the populaces held in check by the security forces of these despotic governments. This is what created the fertile fields of populaces for the seeds of bin Laden's message to take root in. If the people had been satisfied in their situation, then bin Laden's efforts would have had little effect. This is the nature of UW. You can't start a fire if the fuel is wet. A satisfied populace is like wet fuel, it just doesn't ignite very easy.
Galula talked about events much like the ones currently going on in across the Middle East in his first Chapter in the section on "Revolution, Plot, Insurgency."
"A revolution usually is an explosive upheaval - sudden, brief, spontaneous, unplanned (France, 1789; China, 1911; Russia, 1917;Hungary, 1956). It is an accident, which can be explained afterward but not predicted other than to note the existence of a revolutionary situation.
Ok, I would not call such events "accidents," but Galula wrote from the perspective of a man who had lived his entire life as a colonist or as a military officer dealing with insurgencies in his country's colonies. This colored his perceptions; but what he calls "existence of a revolutionary situation" in his example countries are what I call "conditions of insurgency." The fuel is stacked high and waiting for a spark. The "accident" is that event that suddenly ignites the fire of populace discontent without warning.
The fuel was and is tender dry and stacked high across the Middle East, and bin Laden has been conducting UW much like a state, but with the beneficial sanctuary that comes from being a non-state actor. With no state to be held at risk it allows a little guy to play on the big stage with the big guys.
But to your point, if one waits until they have "evidence" in this social science of human dynamics and perceptions, one is likely to get burned, as the first evidence is often a bright flash not unlike a match landing in a gasoline soaked pile of brush.