PMC / Mercenaries in Iraq (catch all)
... is a consideraton in all future Small Wars. For good or bad, this is an issue we must address in planning for and executing operations. I'll start this discussion by linking to a 4 Dec. Los Angeles Times article - Private Security Guards in Iraq Operate With Little Supervision.
Quote:
Private security contractors have been involved in scores of shootings in Iraq, but none have been prosecuted despite findings in at least one fatal case that the men had not followed proper procedures, according to interviews and documents obtained by The Times.
Instead, security contractors suspected of reckless behavior are sent home, sometimes with the knowledge of U.S. officials, raising questions about accountability and stirring fierce resentment among Iraqis.
Thousands of the heavily armed private guards are in Iraq, under contract with the U.S. government and private companies. The conduct of such security personnel has been one of the most controversial issues in the reconstruction of Iraq...
Security Contracts to Continue in Iraq
4 February Washington Post - Security Contracts to Continue in Iraq by Walter Pincus.
Quote:
The Defense Department plans to continue hiring private contractors to provide security at reconstruction projects in Iraq and to train U.S. and Iraqi military officers in counterinsurgency, despite problems with past contracts for such jobs that traditionally have been done by military personnel.
The contracting out of these wartime activities comes at a time when the United States is stretching its resources to provide the additional 21,500 troops in Iraq that are needed under President Bush's new strategy, which involves stepped-up counterinsurgency operations in Baghdad and the expansion of economic reconstruction activities
During an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, Army Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new top commander in Iraq, said he counts the "thousands of contract security forces" among the assets available to him to supplement the limited number of U.S. and Iraqi troops to be used for dealing with the insurgency.
A former senior Defense Intelligence Agency expert on the Middle East, retired Army Col. W. Patrick Lang, said last week that contracting out intelligence collection and security for Army units and their contractors "results from actual military forces being too small." He added: "I can't remember a subordinate commander considering mercenaries as part of his forces."
Retired Marine Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, who once headed the U.S. Central Command and today serves on an advisory board of a defense contractor, said there is a role for private firms taking on security missions. But he warned that problems can arise "when they take on quasi-military roles."...
Vanity Fair article on PMCs
Interesting article on Tim Spicer in Vanity Fair written by Robert Baer. I couldn't find it on this site. If its already posted, please delete.
As a former C.I.A. agent, the author knows how mercenaries work: in the shadows. But how did a notorious former British officer, Tim Spicer, come to coordinate the second-largest army in Iraq—the tens of thousands of private security contractors?
by Robert Baer April 2007
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/f...urrentPage=all
More PMC than U.S. military trigger pullers in Iraq?
Just saw this on John Robb's blog:
Quote:
There are currently 20,000 PMC trigger pullers in Iraq. These men are guarding facilities and key people across the country. This is likely more trigger pullers (as opposed to support personnel) than the entire US military currently has in the country.
This isn't actually true is it?
Robb is wrong on many levels...
I have no clue if he's correct on the number of shooter PMC bods -- nor do I care. However, with 160K total troops plus or minus in country, nominal shooters or 'combat troops' will run about 33% -- or about 52K. Done another way there are about 30 Bn Cbt Tms plus other elements including some CS units serving as Inf so that puts the trigger pullers over 40K in all probability -- thus if Robb is right, he's wrong. Again.
Abu Buckwheat's right on the money
in terms of resoving the immediate and near term problem. His proposal also goes a long way toward defining what should be the proper command relationship between PSCs and the USG in future operations. What he doesn't address - and this is not a criticism - is the proper role of PSCs (and other contractors.
The expanded role of contractors including PSCs was a long time in the making. I watched contracting expand during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations long before the current war. I have seen contractors, including PSCs, performing appropriate roles extremely well. But I have also seen abuse and, more importantly, role expansion into areas that I believe properly belong to the government and the government alone.
One issue in contracting - especially for PSCs - is the terms of the contract. I am quite sure that the terms of Blackwater's contract with DOS are reasonably interpreted to protect their FSO charges against any and all threats by whatever means are necessary. Such a contract - one that is open to this type of interpretation - is certainly a part of the problem. The culprit here is not the PSC but its client (in this case DOS which seems to have forgotten that its FSOs are commissioned officers of the USG and, therefore, can be required to take risks that other civilian employees do not have to take). At the same time, the PSC should not be off the hook for overzealous (at best) behavior in what appears at first glance to be a "shoot first and ask questions later" approach to personnel security. Mr, Nance's proposal would go a long way toward resolving this problem as well as providing time to develop appropriate policies and roles for government contractors and, especially, PSCs.