dissertation help please! US military culture and small wars.
To the valued members of the small wars journal community.
i am currently in my third year studying war in Swansea, Wales, and am writing my dissertation. the title that i have chosen is: 'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'
I was wondering if anyone would care to help me with ideas / book proposals/ suggestions. anything would help! i need particular help in relation to how the american military is changing to deal with the increasing prevalence of small wars - i have read ALOT about everything else, but can find very little about the current policies (force modularity?).
here is my basic outline:
The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so. The dissertation will show how this preference is a result of cultural biases and will extrapolate the various themes that feed these biases.
The essay will centre upon how the American military’s preferred paradigm of conventional war is incompatible with the context of a small war and begin with a summary of why this is so. It will also look at the history of the American Army, and so will comment on the traditional division between the civilian sector and the military. It will outline this split and will look at how it came to exist, with particular reference to Upton’s ‘reforms’ of the Army in the wake of the civil war. It will also look at the Jominian basis for the army over a Clausewitzian ‘politics by other means’ stance, and discuss how this influences the United States’ ‘Big War’ paradigm, although this description and analysis will be kept to a minimum for reasons of brevity.
Of major importance to this work will be the concept and ramifications of the so called ‘Vietnam Syndrome’. In itself the syndrome is incredibly significant in regard to the Big War paradigm, however the changes in doctrine that followed it, namely the ‘Never Again’ school, the Weinberger and Powell doctrines and the more recent ‘Decisive Force’ concept have damaged the U.S. Army’s small war fighting capability by codifying the idea that the expenditure of huge amounts of firepower can create a quick resolution to a conflict. This discussion will feature an analysis of the real impact of the Vietnam Syndrome, which Cassidy believes to effect the military’s willingness to fight wars far more than it effects the populations support of them: a paradoxical issue which may prove useful in discussing how cultural issues within the military may actually reinforce each other. The essay will widen this subject to include the ‘CNN’ and ‘bodybag’ effects in order to give a true account of the Vietnam Syndromes causes and strength as a concept, while referencing instances such as the withdrawal from Somalia and non-involvement in the Balkans to illustrate its impact. The war in Vietnam itself will be looked at of course, both to partially explain the Syndrome but also as a useful case study of how conventional warfare is inapplicable in a small war context. The war is again useful because the extensive amount of material regarding it has thrown up a number of cultural analyses which have exposed the Army’s cultural dedication to ‘Big War’ at the time.
As part of the essays investigation into the American Army’s devotion to conventional warfare the issue of doctrinal forgetfulness will be reviewed, with particular reference to the small wars that the U.S. has fought, such as the Indian wars, the war of independence and obviously Vietnam itself. It will draw the conclusion that because of this cultural devotion to a big war paradigm, small wars are not accepted as pertinent, and so the lessons that are learned while fighting them are forgotten as soon as the war ends. One of the instances linked to this is that even during the irregularity of the Indian wars, the American Army was developing itself as a reflection of the Prussian (conventional) model of organisation. This section may also include reference to the power of the military industrial complex and interest groups in rejecting the change required to fight small wars.
As with any work regarding unconventional warfare, the essay will give an overview of what is required of a military to win a small war, such as force limitation, the use of native forces, the importance of legitimacy (Kaldor’s book: New and Old Wars is particularly useful in this regard) and the relevancy of the political campaign. It will also talk about the currently changing nature of small wars, with reference to Al Qaeda and in particular its religious motivation. The essay will talk about these changes only where they effect the chances of American success, such as how the increasingly religious nature of such conflicts is making the political aspect of the campaign harder to win. It will also talk about the paradox of a large power fighting a small one, and so will discuss the relevancy of support, means and aims in relation to each side of the conflict. The main area of this will be a discussion of the asymmetry of will which is inherent in every small war engaged in by a large power and its relevancy in regard to the Vietnam Syndrome and conventional warfighting in general. This will conclude, in short, that small wars are long term affairs which often take decades to complete and that a conventional war stance is unprepared for such a time frame. It will also state that the unprofessional and inexperienced U.S. Army is unable to fight such protracted campaigns because of issues with public backing, a statement which will obviously refer back to both the American preferred paradigm of big war and the Vietnam Syndrome / bodybag effect.
In explaining how American small war fighting methods can be improved, the essay shall feature an analysis of British examples of success in this field and why the British model is so effective. This will include an assessment of historical reasons for this effectiveness which will centre on the regimental system. The conclusion that will be drawn will be that the close nit nature of the regimental system serves as a home-away-from-home and as the support that American forces usually get from the public. It will also show how the colonial history of the British Army means that the public is more accepting of unclear missions and of casualties that occur in faraway places. An analysis of successful British unconventional missions will echo the tenets of the previous paragraph regarding what is required to win small wars, and will emphasise the minimal force emphasis of the Northern Ireland and Malaya campaigns. It will also look at how the British have traditionally taken a Fabian approach to warfare, with the Napoleonic wars and, again the colonial campaigns as the main instances of this. This approach, while lessening the Army’s effectiveness in conventional wars has made it more affective in unconventional confrontations.
An investigation into the problems that big powers face while fighting small wars shall be carried out by looking into the Soviet and Russian experiences of unconventional warfare in Afghanistan and Chechnya. This section shall serve as a summary of many of the points that have already been made in the essay, but shall serve to show the similarities between the American problems and those of other large powers, and so shall support the asymmetry of will and paradoxes inherent within such confrontations. This section will be useful again because it will compare the cultures of each military and extrapolate relevant information from it, with particular relevance regarding the problems of big war when instigated in the wrong context.
rest to be added in a second....
the stuff that didnt fit...
As a continuation of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines renewal of the conventional war dedication, one section of the essay will deal with how the belief in Decisive Force is self defeating. It will concentrate upon several distinct areas; technology, denial and self validation. In regard to technology the section will look at how such developments do not help the fighting of small wars. To do this it will look at a number of different authors arguments on the subject as well as drawing conclusions from previously successful irregular wars. Part of this will also look at the arguments for and against the relevancy of the current (disputed) revolution in military affairs (RMA), many critiques of which will prove useful not only for this section, but for the dissertation as a whole. The idea of self validation will look at how the first Gulf War ‘proved’ the relevancy of conventional warfare to the military leadership and is related to the previous assessment because the first Gulf War was enabled by technological superiority and is given by many as the evidence for the existence of the current RMA. This section will illustrate how the success of the Gulf War paradoxically weakened American military power and also how it relates to the military’s forgetfulness in regard to irregular war: President George H.W. Bush’s speech in which he claimed that America had finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome is the centrepiece for this argument and is a grand instance of denial.
The final section of my dissertation will be a discussion of the changes that are taking place within the American military, such as the ‘Modular Force’ concept, and their, and its, relevancy. This section will, like so many others, be intentionally brief so as to not dominate the piece, but must be included if my essay is to be an accurate account. It will feature a summary of the proposed changes and their foreseen effects, with particular reference to the culture of individual units of the Army and how this culture will be altered with the implementation of these changes. The marine corps shall serve as the personification of this change because of their developed unit culture and individual lexicon.
particular focus is upon the vietnam syndrome and the conventional warfighting stance of the U.S.
for those that have spent the time reading this and helping me out, i thank you from the bottom of my heart.
Xander
Perhaps another title for your dissertation
might be "Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?" I suggest that because I'm unsure that what you've posted here justifies your thesis. In any event, some thoughts for you:
Is the British model superior and if so what recent proof exists of that?
You might wish to be careful with "the withdrawal from Somalia and non-involvement in the Balkans..." The former was an aberration and a political miscalculation due to another political miscalculation; the latter was due to the misplaced belief that Europe could and would take care of a European problem of little concern to the US. I.e. both events were due to political -- not military -- errors and thus have little bearing on your thesis.
While this is true and deserves mention "...power of the military industrial complex and interest groups in rejecting the change required to fight small wars." you should also consider that the US Congress has as much or more say in that seeming and nominal 'complex' than do the military and the industrialists.
Caution is needed with this as well: "This will conclude, in short, that small wars are long term affairs which often take decades..." while that may historically be marginally correct; need it be that way? I'd say no.
Same here: "It will also state that the unprofessional and inexperienced U.S. Army is unable to fight such protracted campaigns because of issues with public backing, a statement which will obviously refer back to both the American preferred paradigm of big war and the Vietnam Syndrome / bodybag effect." Unprofessional or just undertrained and poorly focused (for counterinsurgency small wars; one presumes you did not mean to apply that to large wars as well -- else you'll have a dichotomy... ;) ) -- the two are not at all synonymous. I do not disagree at all with your preferred paradigm statement but I do think the Viet Nam syndrome and bodybag effect can be and are overdone. The One Third Rule applies. I also believe that if you talk to the British Army today, they will not concur that the US army today (as opposed to five years ago) is either unprofessional or inexperienced with regard to small wars.
This statement: "and will emphasise the minimal force emphasis of the Northern Ireland and Malaya campaigns." is subject to serious question on many levels. For example if X force for Y years is minimal, then is X force for (Yx4) years still minimal? Far more importantly, be very sure you consider the fact that in both those operations, Britain WAS the government; a situation the US has not been involved with since the Indian wars of the 19th Century and the Philippine involvement in the early 20th. It makes a difference. A big difference. I think you need to be rather careful in the assumptions on this one...
When you complete your dissertation, I look forward to reading your treatment of this: "As a continuation of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines renewal of the conventional war dedication, one section of the essay will deal with how the belief in Decisive Force is self defeating."
My overall perception is that your effort is based on common wisdom (Heh) and perceptions. They're not totally incorrect but they do bear a great deal more thought than they seem to have been given thus far. Good luck.
I suspect you might attract a few more responses after the US Thanksgiving holiday -- which essentially lasts until next Monday. Gian may stop by...:D
If you were writing a dissertation (thesis/paper)
for me, I would be telling you to NARROW YOUR FOCUS! :D A common fallacy among new thesis writiers is to try to do too much. The second thing I would tell you is that you clearly believe that you know what the answer is so you should be developing this as a hypothesis to be tested. By testing I mean that you must state your tentative conclusion in a form such that you can collect and analyze data so that it could prove your hypothesis false or wrong. If you can't disprove your hypothesis then it will stand as a firmer conclusion.
In the case of your topic, the evidence is all over the map. There are cases which support your thesis and other cases which tend to disprove it. All the caveats theat Ken mentioned apply. Here are a few sources you could look at: the 4 colonels report on El Salvador, Schwartz's Rand study of the same, Chapter 7 of Max Manwaring and my Uncomfortable Wars Revisited which refutes both studies of El Sal, my 1995 article in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." Also see John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife and Richard Downie, Learning From Conflict.
Good luck
Cheers
JohnT
I agree with Wilf on all that and as for
reinventing the wheel -- that's due to massive egos and arrogance "I don't need help, I have all the answers" is as American as the proverbial apple pie. We're arrogant twits at times... :eek:
On the fads, that's our short attention span and constant search for quicker and better ways to do things (never cheaper...). :D
War is a very human endeavor; the attitudes and proclivities of people permeate it and will influence the way they go about it. While people are people the world over, Americans are rather different from Europeans in many aspects of collective psyche. :wry:
Wilf gives good advice ...
and for Sam, I believe that Taylor & Francis (who bought out Frank Cass) the publisher of LIC&LE and Small Wars & Insurgencies would reproduce all the articles in these journals (and their others) for a price. :rolleyes: I do suspect that the UK libraries will have the journals. In the US, I am sure that the libraries of the military graduate schools have these journals - CARL at CGSC (Leavenworth), the AWC, the NDU library. All work with interlibrary loan. Indeed, that is probably the best way to go (but you may have to tell your librarians where to look.
Cheers
JohnT
Serious flawed logic in my opinion
xander day wrote,
Quote:
The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so.
xander, like the others I applaud your efforts, but find your thesis statement flawed.
First, when you state that the American military has difficulty fighting small wars, that implies that other nations don't and are actually good at it. I would argue that most modern countries (especially democracies) have major difficulties waging small wars, especially small wars that endure over a long period. I'm sure you can list many failed European attempts to hold onto their colonies.
Furthermore, the recent trend to compare Malaysia to Vietnam is shamefully deceptive and unproductive. Put the Malysian Emergency in perspective, it was a British colony, and the Brits defined the rules, which gave them considerable freedom of movement. And while the emergency was serious, it paled in comparison to the problem set in Vietnam. As Owen stated the Vietnam War was not just a small war, combat with NVA regulars was as conventional as it got, and it was the conventional fight in the end that was decisive when NVA regulars rolled into Saigon.
Concurrently there was an insurgency, and some criticism directed against the U.S.'s early COIN efforts in Vietnam is deserved (although it frequently over hyped in my opinion). However, what seems to be overlooked is our many successes in Vietnam against both the NVA and the insurgency. GEN Abrams developed an appropriate COIN strategy, so we did learn, and we did concurrently while waging a conventional fight, and in a country where we didn't write all the rules. When we pulled out the VC were largely contained, at least to the point that they were not a vital threat to S. Vietnam, and the NVA was back in their box.
There are some new historical books coming out without the political agendas of the past, that shine a new light on our conflict in Vietnam. By all means criticize our shortfalls, but please keep it in perspective. If you want to compare America's performance to Europe's colonial wars, then I recommend you look at our conflict in the Philippines. We adapted rather quickly and in most respects did better than other modern countries.
Second, since your thesis is focused on the American Military's shortfalls, which there are many, but I think Ken put in perspective well when he explained the political and social factors on our homefront that shape our military policy and strategy.
I have to thank William Owen for this statement,
Quote:
When left to their own devices, the US are actually pretty/very good. ...and they do learn fast, and there is ample material to support this, but what they learn the do seem to forget. Why they do, may be worthy of some study.
We do have the doctrine for small wars, and we had it long before the new COIN manual came out a couple of years ago. Why we failed to adapt to the situations we were in sooner still confounds me, but we do adapt.
My final point is that some small wars are not winnable for America or anyone else because the objectives are too lofty, too expensive and take too much time, which means the social and political factors that Ken addressed will preclude success. That is not a problem unique to America.