High Value Target HVT / Political Assassination
An interesting piece can be found here on Israel's failed 1997 assassination attempt in Jordan against Hamas leader Khalid Mishal.
Quote:
On September 25, 1997, the Mossad espionage agency suffered one of the worst debacles in its history, when it bungled an attempt to assassinate Hamas political bureau head Khaled Meshal. The incident also jeopardized decades of secret cooperation with Jordan.
Quite apart from the failures in planning and execution, it highlights issues of inter-service (in this case, Mossad vs Shin Beth) boundaries, political pressures, and especially the failure to anticipate the possible political consequences of an operation (especially a failed one).
Why under 'Intelligence'?
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An assassination (or "selected target engagement" or "surgical strike" or "command and control node target" or whatever euphamism is prefered) is an operation. It is (should be) conducted in support of strategic and operational objectives. It is not the collection, management of collection, or analysis of information. Why does it end up under the Intel rubic in so many instances? The best possible operator for this sort of direct action might be a passible but specialized intel collector, but at the end of the day that is not his or her primary task.
By putting the intel name on sexy operations like this, good collectors, collection managers, and analysts get some very confused notions about what should fall under their perview. Yes, intel and ops need to work next to each other on this sort of thing, but operators and policy maker should be driving this bus.
[/rant]
This is an outstanding study of how not to do it, a real rush job from the word go. To conduct such a volatile type of operation without doing a serious branch and sequel analysis and good coordination is gross negligence.
Assassination of Enemy Leadership
One rationale for avoiding assassination or targeting of enemy leadership for military strikes is that it can leave the "other side" with no one who is able to "turn the machine off" in the advent of surrender. This makes perfect sense in a conventional war of limited aims; in a total war or against non-state actors it may or may not be an appropriate. It depends on whom you are dealing with and the larger strategic picture.
In WWII Japan had approximately 2 million men in its armies in China and Southeast Asia with a ferocious track record, even in engagements where the Imperial Army had taken a severe beating ( against the Soviets at Khalkin-Gol/Nomonhan and Chiang's all-out defense of Wuhan). It was feared by Allied leaders that these sizable forces would simply go down fighting even if the home islands fell. Therefore, Stimson and Marshall wisely kept the Emperor's palace off the target list for conventional bombing, starting with the Doolittle Raid, and Tokyo off the target list for the atomic bomb.
In Europe, Allied intelligence was aware of the plot to assassinate Hitler by Stauffenberg's conspirators, thanks to Allen Dulles contacts with Gisevius and the Abwehr in Switzerland, but nothing was done to encourage the plotters beyond accepting their information. In contrast, British intelligence took out the dreaded SS intelligence chief, Reinhard Heydrich, via assassination not because of his crimes or intel role but because of his very effective ( in a political sense) occupational governorship in Bohemia and Moravia.
In postwar eras, the U.S. and/or the CIA has been accused of complicity in the assassinations or deaths of Nkrumah, Ngo Dinh Diem and Salvador Allende. In each case, there were local actors with their own agendas involved in the overthrow who were beyond U.S. operational control ( and whose necks were in the noose if the coup failed). Where American control of such covert operations was direct, as against Arbenz in Guatemala and Mossadegh in Iran, no assassination actually took place. Operation Mongoose, about which much has been written, was a spectacular failure as Castro's continued existence in elderly dotage attests
I think a more important quote is:
Quote:
"HVT more effective against early stage insurgents or those with limited regenerative capability.
- - Governments unlikely to use HVT when it would be most effective."
Simply because it highlights a problem that has essentially put us where we are today -- governmental dithering and failure to robustly respond to threats emboldens the attackers or others to increasingly dangerous action until massive effort is required. This invariably with more human, fiscal and political costs than would have been incurred had early, prompt and adequate action been taken.
Steve is correct -- and five prior Presidents should have known better.