Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn
Can our AFG vets lend any credibility to this?
Quote:
Deploying additional forces could backfire, however, if the United States and its allies don't devise a coherent strategy to defeat the Taliban insurgency, strengthen the Afghan government, bolster the country's economy and deprive Islamic militants of their safe haven in neighboring Pakistan.
The calls for reinforcing the U.S.-led military coalition come amid the worst violence since the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, with the 7-year-old ''forgotten war'' in May and June claiming more U.S. dead than Iraq for the first time.
More foreign troops, however, would do little more than turn more war-weary Afghans against U.S.-backed President Hamid Karzai if they are not part of a broader and more effective counterinsurgency strategy, some experts and U.S. officials warned.
"There is not one strategy with one person in charge,'' said a U.S. defense official, who requested anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly. "If we had asked the Taliban to draw an organizational chart for allied forces in Afghanistan, they would have drawn this one."
As a result, U.S. and NATO troop have had to cede areas to the insurgents or turn over newly reclaimed territory to poorly trained, ill-equipped and illiterate police who often flee when attacked, are in cahoots with the militants or abuse the local population.
''You win every battle but lose the war because you can't hold any ground,'' said John McCreary, a former senior intelligence analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The U.S.-led coalition is also desperately short of soldiers who can mentor Afghan National Police units. An estimated 3,500 more advisors are needed to live and work with newly trained police units.
Another looming requirement is for more experienced U.S. combat troops to deal with what U.S. commanders think may be an influx of foreign militants who might have otherwise gone to Iraq.
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/619363.html
Holistic approach should include more troops
Clearly an increased international effort that uses all instruments of national power is in order for Afghanistan. And reading political tea leaves, I would suggest the increased effort is in the works. The effort cannot be divorced from increased resouces of all types. Thus, leaders working in Afghanistan need more capability which can be provided in part by more Soldiers, Airmen and Marines from our country and others. Speaking from experience, many operations (if not most) are being run on a shoestring. I too am wary of the idea that the "surge" that worked in Iraq should easily work in Afghanistan. However, a "surge" at this point would merely add forces that are sorely needed for a baseline effort.
Keep things in perspective
Of course we need a coherent strategy. As for the other subject, increasing troop levels (for which I have argued for half a year at my place) and killing Taliban will fix the problems with the Taliban.
I am not so worried about the overall problems with Afghanistan. We cannot construct an electrical grid there when our own bridges are collapsing and our infrastructure needs tending to.
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth, and 90% Muslim, but without any of the religious radicalism. Poverty doesn't create religious radicalism. That's just a myth.
I am all for trying to bring stability to Afghanistan and spending the resources to do so, but there is a limit to what we are able to accomplish there. Besides, we could spend until we ourselves were broke, and without ending the religious extremism, all we will have created will be rich religious extremists.
Although there is validity to the approach
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MSG Proctor
The only national identity the Afghans have is as Muslims. Afghans on different sides of the same mountain may have zero relationship and feel no obligation toward Afghanistan as a nation (hence, no motivation to support a national government via its fighting forces). Any strategy with a prospect of success will have to include the Mullahs, Islamic scholars and mosque preachers. [Monograph attached].
"This work argues that engaging Afghanistan’s indigenous religious leadership—mullahs and Islamic scholars—is critical to winning the battle of ideas within local populations of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) theater."
Some of the things I've been reading from the regions history lately tells me that in this particular area that might not actually be the best way to go?
Have to dig some more but on the face of it, isn't the indigenous leadership there almost completely intertwined with the very groups we are seeking to overcome, (and in a much more established and well networked way.
Just pondering
Also: can anyone tell me when and who if ever an empire, state organized grouping under statelike pretenses, etc has actually come from within the area we call Afghanistan other than by being asbsored into a larger movement, being enabled(pressed) by an outside entity, or straight up conquered?
There's mullahs and then there's mullahs
It is true that Islam is inextricably intertwined with the fabric of Afghan society, and it is true that mullahs exert great influence as religious leaders. However, keep the following in mind:
1. To speak of 'the mullahs' as if they were some homogenous group with membership cards and annual conventions is misleading. They are as heterogenous as the society they spring from. Some - the minority - are great scholars respected nationwide or within their provinces; most are dreadfully ignorant with horizons bounded by their valley walls. They do not share common goals and are as subject to ethnic, tribal, and local prejudices as anyone else.
2. Some are less motivated by Islam than they are by the prospect of personal or fiduciary gain. Like certain televangelists, they exploit religious feeling for their own ends.
3. They are less important than they used to be. Urban elites - a small but growing and influential group - disparage them as obstacles to development. More importantly, the current generation of fighters is different from the one that drove out the Soviets. Those guys are dead. This generation - and especially the leaders - were raised far from tribal influence in madrassi in Pakistan or recruited from foreign fields. They are far less likely to respect or heed some threadbare mullah in an isolated mud-brick compound and far more likely to derive their sense of self from more pan-Islamic sources.
None of this is to deny the importance or influence of 'the mullahs', but it is a reminder that all politics in Afghanistan is local, and that 'the mullahs' are a product of that society. Moreover, I have difficulty envisioning an IO message that both appeals to the mullahs and forwards our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their influence is marginalized. They are not a silver bullet - there are none in Afghanistan.
Galloway_McCaffrey on Afghanistan
On Joe Galloway's commentary today:
Quote:
Commentary: A top general says more troops aren't the answer in Afghanistan
By Joseph L. Galloway | McClatchy Newspapers
There's military slang that seemingly applies to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan today. The operative acronym is FUBAR - Fouled Up Beyond All Recognition. That first letter doesn't really stand for "Fouled," and the R sometimes stands for Repair.
One of the sharper military analysts I know has just returned from a tour of that sorrowful nation, which has been at war continuously since the Soviet Army invaded it in late 1979.
Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who retired from the U.S. Army with four stars and a chest full of combat medals including two Distinguished Service Crosses, says we can't shoot our way out of Afghanistan, and the two or three or more American combat brigades proposed by the two putative nominees for president are irrelevant.