Thanks for the detailed reply...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
swerve1
I was a part of 2/4ID staff when it did its transition to the new HBCT design from the Force XXI model and later commanded a maneuver company in the BCT, which included a tour in Iraq. Early on we identified several shortfalls to the new design but made little headway with Big Army in affecting the changes we saw as necessary. Still, there are some definite positives within the new design.
First, the Combined Arms BNs are monsters. They have more infantry than the old tank BNs and more tanks than the old mech BNs. They also lend themselves very well to all companies task-organizing for combined arms opns.
Second, despite how large they are, the BCT HQ have many more capabilities than the old BDE HQ. It can sometimes be very unwieldy, but having so much organic C2 under one roof provides many capabilities.
On the other hand, the lack of a third CAB handicaps the BCT. the ARS has no ability, doctrinally or practically, to do any more than light reconnaissance and screening opns. It can't attack, defend, cover, guard, or screen. It also lacks adequate dismounts to field multiple long-term OPs. The mix of BFVs and HMMWVs wasn't the best idea either. The lack of platoons is also a problem. The ARS needs lots of external support to really make it combat capable. Now in the current fight in Iraq, one could make a credible argument that the ARS was sufficient for its tasks. However, it's very unlikely an ARS would have been able to do the same things 3-7 CAV did during the initial portion of the Iraq War.
The FA BN is woefully inadequate. In order to field more BCTs, the Army watered down its combat power and it's clear in these two-battery FA BNs. Supporting the CABs and the ARS simultaneously is a bridge too far without external support, which makes the BCT incapable of self-reliance.
The engineers are scattered across the BCT. Sometimes this is good, sometimes bad, but the problem is that BFV-equipped engineers get looked at like just another maneuver element instead of engineers who can maneuver if need be. Also, lacking a BDE EN limits the real visibility on the engineer situation.
CS support is inadequate. There's a need for more MPs and other combat enablers. CSS didn't seem to be much of a problem, but that's outside of my scope.
In the future, I wish the Army would reduce the number of BCTs in favor of making the existing ones much more robust and capable - real self-sufficient fighting forces, capable of throwing the kitchen sink at the threat. Add a 3rd CAB, make the ARS into an organization able to fight for information, field additional FS assets - both howitzers and mortars, include more dismounted scouts, and make the MP PLT an MP CO.
The HMWWVs in your recon elements always intrigued me. What was the rationale (assuming there was one) for marrying them with BFVs rather than more BFVs or even MBTs?
The very foolish American proclivity for buying
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Tukhachevskii
The HMWWVs in your recon elements always intrigued me. What was the rationale (assuming there was one) for marrying them with BFVs rather than more BFVs or even MBTs?
General Purpose (GP -- precursor for the once ubiquitous 'Jeep') equipment rather than sensibly buying designed for purpose items.
The M3 Bradley was a political compromise purchased by the Armor and Cavalry folks to assure that the Infantry folks (who were buying the M2 Bradley) supported their buy of the M1 Tank. A part of the cost was cancellation of the XM8 Armored Gun system and of a dedicated Scout vehicle. The HMMWV is a lousy scout vehicle but is the standard, GP 'light' (???) wheeled vehicle.
IOW, there is no rationale. Both items were and are simply available and the best of many poor solutions given a refusal to buy dedicated equipment...
We do a lot of really dumb stuff.
We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...
We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...