'Dogs of War' Ban Will Rob British Army of Vital Frontline Soldiers
5 August London Times - 'Dogs of War' Ban Will Rob British Army of Vital Frontline Soldiers by Fred Bridgland and Michael Evans.
Quote:
Seven Hundred South Africans serving in Britain’s Armed Forces will have to abandon their careers or surrender their citizenship under draconian new anti-mercenary legislation being enacted by South Africa’s Parliament.
The new Bill, designed to scotch South Africa’s reputation as a rich recruiting ground for “dogs of war”, was approved by 11 votes to one by the Parliament’s defence committee this week despite an impassioned appeal from Paul Boateng, the British High Commissioner.
If the Bill is approved by the full assembly, as now seems probable, it will end a tradition of South Africans serving with the British military that goes back to the First World War, and leave Britain’s Armed Forces overstretched.
Many of the 700 are serving with British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second Lieutenant Ralph Johnson, 24, one of the three British soldiers killed in Afghanistan this week, was born in South Africa. Sholto Hedenskog, 25, a Marine killed in Iraq in 2003, was also South African. It was the activities of a former British soldier, Simon Mann, that inspired the Bill. In 2004 Mann, a former SAS officer, began an unsuccessful coup against President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasago of Equatorial Guinea using 70 mercenaries recruited in South Africa. He is now in prison and Sir Mark Thatcher, the son of the former British Prime Minister, was fined £265,000 for helping to finance the attempted coup.
The legislation, which will greatly strengthen South Africa’s previous anti-mercenary laws, is driven by politics as much as security.
The ruling African National Congress, which came to power in 1994 after decades of apartheid rule, fought in exile alongside Angola’s former Marxist army against such apartheid-era forces as the Buffalo Battalion, the Reconnaissance Commandos and the Parachute Brigade...
MoD Performance Against Key Targets Grows Worse
28 Jan 08: MoD performance against key targets grows worse says Defence Committee
Quote:
The House of Commons Defence Committee today reveals that the continuing high level of deployment of UK Armed Forces is leading to worsening performance by the MoD against its key Public Service Agreement targets. "We are deeply concerned that the Armed Forces have been operating at or above the level of concurrent operations they are resourced and structured to deliver for seven of the last eight years, and for every year since 2002" says the Committee in its report published today (
Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, HC 61).
The MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against its six Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets, which run until the end of March 2008, has deteriorated. At the end of 2007 the MoD did not expect to meet the target for generating forces and expected "only partly" to meet targets relating to defence equipment procurement, and recruitment and retention. For the latter target, manning balance in the Royal Navy and the Army is not expected to be achieved by April 2008 and the Committee says it is very disappointed with the failure to meet harmony guidelines in the Army and the RAF. The Committee considers this to be another clear indicator of the pressure on UK Armed Forces. The Committee calls upon the MoD to set out what impact this is having, particularly on the retention of Service personnel.....
Transforming to EBO: Lesssons from the UK Experience
SSI, 30 Jan 08: Transformating to Effects-Based Operations: Lessons from the United Kingdom Experience
Quote:
This monograph has been subdivided into four parts. Section 1 undertakes a review of the evolution of British defense policy since the end of the Cold War and evaluates the degree to which it has adopted an effects-based approach. Section 2 examines the British operational experience since the end of the Cold War, including an analysis of the lessons learned and its experiences of working with allies. Section 3 analyses the UK’s capability development through its doctrine and acquisition strategies. Finally, section 4 evaluates the implications of these findings for the U.S. Army and makes a number of recommendations....
Complete 71 page paper at the link.
Don't bother reading the paper!
I agree with Wilf's despair at this writing, albeit from a very different viewpoint. As a concerned taxpayer the author neither describes what has happened nor what is necessary. It is also slightly jarring to read the same sentence or information time after time. As for the lessons UK experience can offer the USA not very persausive.
Finally I suggest SWJ members don't bother reading it!
davidbfpo
Lions, Donkeys, and Dinosaurs
Anyone here (particularly British servicemen) read this? Are his horror stories about procurement and the basics of his argument right on? Sure seems that way just from reading the Telegraph every couple of days.
Oh for a leader not a politician
What can I say, this has been going on since Options for Change, an amazing programme where we reduced the armed forces, so that the MOD could take on more civil servants - to er manage the change?
As always the soldiers are the political football, all parties mouth their support then turn around and shaft them. Unfortunately I beleive that GB has an over inflated opinion of its ability to influence world affairs - too many FCO Civil Servants who haven't got round to updating their maps, since the Raj. As a consequence we (GB) believe that we can "punch above our weight". The Armed Forces are used as a projection of this "punch" and inevitably suffer the consequences from muddled foreign poilcy thinking and a genuine desire to show that Britain is still no 1.
What we need is a genuine leader who can accept the reality, state the desired goal, plot the steps to reach that goal and then actually do something about it, this includes what the Armed Forces are going to do for GB, and what they will be used for.
Sorry for the rant - feeling a bit hot under the collar
Geoff
We resemble that remark...
Quote:
"...and money isn't the problem. The people are the problem. There is enough money in the system. We just have very bad decisions being made by people unwilling to change - but they're all frightfully nice chaps! :mad:"
:wry:
Outside looking in, confused.
Although I am British I am a complete outsider, militarily, and do not even know anyone who has served. From this vantage point the problems seems to be confusion over what is expected from the armed force by the public, politicians and - to a lesser extent - the military. This is aggravated by the radically different time scales that politicians and military procurement operate on. As alluded to earlier some sections of the public, and some politicians, seem to be confused about our military capabilities expecting us to be able to project force unrealistically. The politicians try to buy a seat at the big table by volunteering our armed forces' services in all corners of the globe but historically have not funded for that. Due to the very long lead times involved in any major weapons system the politicians need to decide what they expect the forces to be able to do, set long term guaranteed funding to match that goal, with agreed periodic reviews for course adjustments, and then leave well alone. At the moment it seems each government thinks it wise to campaign on 'a new vision for the Army', to differentiate it to the electorate, leading to frequent reviews of the role of the military, with commensurate changes to their budgets, manpower levels and raison d'etre. The result of all this tinkering is vast amounts of wasted money, a military with some bits of good kit but not to the same level in all areas and a compromised ability to operate effectively outside of a coalition. In the military's defence I am generally impressed by how well they seem to manage the tasks they are given - considering how small they are.
