Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame
I've been reading the discussion on our SOFA negotiations with Iraq, and thinking about what the means for Security Force Assistance. I did not start out to write a long post, it just came out that way as I got deeper into the what I htought "sustainable security" meant with regard to Iraq. Anyway, I thought it might be worth discussing so here it is:
Greater stability in Iraq is a supporting policy goal of our desire for greater stability in the Middle East. Iraq has the potential to add to greater ME stability, or to detract from it. Key to greater stability in Iraq is sustainable security of the sort that accounts for its ability to defend itself against all enemies foreign and domestic. To do this a state requires a security sector that has accountability and oversight and is resistant to the abuse of power. It needs to assist the political leadership in considering the threats to its sovereignty and support the development of the ends, ways and means required to realize its domestic and foreign policy objectives. The security sector must fit the political, economic and cultural environment in which it is to operate. It must develop systems and processes which not only meet the requirements of the moment, but help set the course for meeting enduring requirements.
There is much in the news about our future security negotiations with Iraq, and whether our positions are impinging on their sovereignty, or impeding their ability to govern, etc. Maybe we need to discuss where we are in the movie with regard to sustainable security of the type that could facilitate more stability. I think there are several questions that might be useful in considering how our SFA (security force assistance) efforts (from advising to IMET, and from internal to external defense) can best help them achieve sustainable security. These are the same types of questions we go through ourselves when drafting our strategic security documents. Maybe it is worthwhile to try and consider Iraq’s pursuit of its security as if we were faced with their security issues. I am not saying impose our U.S. values on Iraq – I mean just given some of the geo-political issues they face.
1) What are Iraq’s interests & supporting objectives (short and enduring)?
2) Who would oppose those interests and why?
3) Of those who would oppose their objectives, why would they?
4) What do their enemies see at risk with regard to their own interests and objectives? Why?
5) How would they oppose Iraq’s interests? Would they oppose Iraq in a competitive, non violent (meaning everything short of violence), or would they oppose them through war (everything from IW to conventional)?
6) What does Iraq have in terms of resources, access, etc. that potential enemies might see of sufficient value as to go to war to obtain it (resources, security, access or denial of access, etc.)?
7) Who can be counted among Iraq’s allies? Why? What do they bring to the table?
8) Are their potential allies with like interests who remain formally uncommitted? Why?
9) What are the gaps in Iraq’s ends/ways/means equation that prevent Iraq from achieving its own goals of sustainable security while preventing others from achieving those goals which threaten it?
Question 10 is one that might concern us with regard to our own interests, objectives and SFA efforts, and how they match up with Iraq’s.
10) How do our current and future actions and efforts better enable Iraq to achieve its security goals while satisfying our own interests and objectives?
How best do our objectives and those of Iraq reflect something satisfactory for the U.S., Iraq, and the broader regional and international states and actors who have legitimate interests in Iraq’s future,? We need to consider it from multiple perspectives in terms of suitability & feasibility for the most relevant participants to get sustainable security. One of the things that I’ve been thinking about is the difference between securing yourself against four categories of threats: internal domestic; internal but foreign supported; external but domestic supported; and purely external threats. The four categories represent different combinations of threats and require different things from a state’s security sector. It is not meant to be along the specificity of the U.S QDR quad chart – this is meant to be more generic.
For the last few years the immediate threat has arguably come from the first two categories (internal domestic; internal foreign supported), our military efforts in support of Iraq have been geared toward combating those forces directly and in building Iraqi security forces in capabilities and capacities that can take over that effort (our by, with and through efforts). We have also been engaged in the Iraqi security sector in terms of the development and reform of those ministries and supporting institutions which provide accountability and oversight toward sustainable security. We have also assisted Iraq in development & reform of the economic and political sectors (reform should not be seen here as imposition of our values – just the reformation of things with the purpose of congruence in the objective environment as negotiated between Iraq and the United States). These efforts have become part of our FID & COIN operations, and our broader strategy.
But what about as we look down the road? The second category (internal but foreign supported) has been altered to include Iranian support, intimidation and interference, and because the interest have become more contested they have become linked to the third category (external but domestic supported). Linked in terms of how others see Iraq connected to their own interests and objectives. We continue to make progress in assisting Iraq with resisting this category through our development of the security, economic and political sectors – our BPC efforts. Between Iraq, and its allies (the U.S. and broader coalition) and there is evidence that sustainable internal domestic security is achievable. I’m not saying it’s a done deal, in fact I’d argue that it is reversible if we withdrew our support in a manner that did not fully consider the consequences of the action and did not account for the range of effects such an action would have.
One of the issues we must help Iraq consider is how to transition their security sector in a manner and at a time that allows them to address all four categories with assistance that meets their needs while not impairing their sovereignty. What direction and scope should our SFA activities take as we move from a focus on FID to one focused on deterring regional aggression and ultimately to one of fostering security cooperation between partners with like interests? Questions such as how soon can the Iraqis (with our assistance) develop committed, competent, capable, and confident police and other domestic services so that the military and supporting intelligence services can better assume those roles the state requires to defend it from external aggression? With the establishment of events that marks the ability to transition the Iraqi Military, the question arises of what type of SFA activities best support those Iraqi and U.S. policies with regard to not only Iraq, but the region, and how do we implement them with an eye toward sustainability? For our own requirements, what type of demand signal does the send in terms of SFA? And will we have the resident capabilities and capacity to assist Iraq? If we don’t do we develop them, or do we turn to another partner with interests coincide with ours and Iraq’s, and who now at a time where Iraq’s operating environment may be more politically accommodating is willing and capable of providing SFA? Are their other alternatives which meet both Iraq’s interests and ours?
continued..
Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame (Continued)
Secretary Gates has repeatedly mentioned the risk of losing of the endgame. While there is the ongoing discussion about the level and type of continued support to the government of Iraq with regards to the first three categories, what about the fourth category (external)? What are the external threats to Iraq’s sovereignty? As a consequence of those threats how are our own interests at risk? How can our security force assistance plans account for the fourth category and help Iraq reach its own strategic objectives? Our approach to securing the endgame must account for sustainable security in Iraq that looks beyond those security issues that we see most visibly right now, and consider the competitive environment in which Iraq must exist further down the road. As a region we know the Middle East will be competitive from both within and without for reasons that range from human security to regional intolerance and fear, to global energy consumption. These issues are often intertwined and overlayed with one another and/or masked by other out growth issues. The SOFA and SFA (Strategic Framework Agreement) negotiations set not only the tone of military cooperation, but also much of our future political and economic cooperation. A successful negotiation that both Iraq and the United States see as supportive of their interests and policies support both sustainable security and the securing of the endgame.
Our endgame with regard to Iraq is greater stability of the type that by its nature resists extremism and supports regional access and openness. It is underpinned through sustainable security. The development of committed, competent, capable, and confident security forces that are rooted in accountability and oversight are operational objectives. They must be in tune with regard to Iraq’s geo-political environment, and they must be in tune with Iraq’s political, economic and cultural realities. The endgame may not represent the “end” so much as it represents a point where the policy goals we share with Iraq are for most purposes irreversible and require what we might think of as the type of routine SFA interactions we have with other partners and allies for opportunities that strengthen interoperability and open the door for other areas of cooperation via increased familiarity and trust.
Best, Rob
The policy wonk and implementers
sure do forget it. Worse, there are millions out there (many of whom like to comment volubly on both sides of the political weblogs) who have never learned
Quote:
"...the quest for a silver bullet solution to foreign policy problems is very much like the quest for the Holy Grail."
Too much effort is expended in attempting to achieve the impossible...
Those are the understatements of the week...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
... but I think that has more to do with the entrenched power structures in Congress than anything else.
Part of the key may lie in the Department of State, but I'm not sure if their infrastructure is sound enough to carry consistent policy evaluation these days. If current events are any clue, I would say that it is not...:mad:
Me, too... :mad:
Good post and I agree. What you say tracks
with my observations over many years. My concern is that State doesn't get listened to (or adequately funded and manned) by Congress. That and the fact that the DoD geographic commands effectively end up setting foreign policy -- which is not their job and in fairness, most of them and most of DoD know that, it just happens by default no matter how much the GCC try to avoid it.
We could probably stop with the political plum Ambassadors, too...