The Importance and Role of Training in Creating/Sustaining the Best Possible Forces
Many times the subject of training has come up here on the SWJ – we’ve discussed it here in regards to COIN skill sets: such as those associated with operating in a COIN environment; the traits, skills and attributes needed to advise foreign forces; how SOF has benefited from DOTMLPF; retention of soldiers and leaders (to include the attraction to PMCs), and we’ve even shared some lessons about training and how to make units good. SWJ member Ken White has written on many occasions that our biggest deficit resides in the funding of, the planning of, the execution of, and the lack of respect for proper training. We have also had many serious and in depth discussions on organizational (ex. best squad configuration, mech vs.light), equipping (materiel –ex. MRAP, small arms), doctrinal (ex. 3-24, 3-0), leader (ex. Best generals, the Yingling article), etc. – but I don’t feel we’ve spent the same quality time on training. It could be because its not so sexy, hot button, or emotional as many others – but the truth is, you can have the best quality folks with the best gear, and with poor training, somebody else will come along and ruin your day. We’ve succeeded because we do have “better” training then most of our opponents, and that when you sum up our efforts across the DOTMLPF spectrum – we do reasonably well as an aggregate.
The genesis of this thread came out of the final chapter of Field Marshal Viscount Slim’s book: Defeat into Victory, his account of the Burma Campaign during WWII. In the chapter entitled “After Thoughts” Slim ponders a number of things that I believe are timeless and as relevant today as when they were penned. Within that chapter there is a section marked “Special Forces”, where Slim ponders their utility based on his own experiences. He certainly had an opportunity to consider them, as he saw various special formation in his AOR, and many times had them assigned to him as part of the campaign plan – most notably for many is probably Ord Wingate’s Chindits.
You have to keep in mind, Slim was a superb trainer - having taken over a Corps in the midst of withdrawal in contact with the Japanese Army back to India, Slim had to face some tough realities – lacking resources, facing tough political pressure, and in the face of a foe that had been attributed bogeyman proportion, Slim grew formations of general purpose forces that eventually became better then their mythical opponents and conducted daily operations of seemingly great complexity under conditions that we’d have to scratch our heads at and wonder how they pulled it off. The terrain and weather in Burma are some of the most inhospitable to large combat operations and the enemy held many advantages at the time – Slim had few resources being among the lesser important areas in comparison to North African and Europe, or even the Pacific theater of operations. Slim had a host of challenges to overcome – he waged Joint and Combined Warfare (working with the Chinese, and the Americans), he had to train and equip indigenous forces from as far away as Africa (a BN, Regiment or Division of this and one of that), he had to overcome politics and egos, he had to overcome insurgent forces that had been brought over to the Japanese side (some Indian and some Burmese), and he had a tenacious enemy who had a great deal of wind behind them – he was not exactly primed for success – certainly not if your in 1942/43 looking forward vs. 2008 looking back! But Slim new he had to start with training – he opened a Jungle School, worked Air Operations (air landings, resupply, parachute, air mechanization, close air support, etc.) - hard given the operational conditions, and he worked staff training – Slim new training was the only thing that would make up for deficiencies in other areas. Slim had a vision and new the path led through some tough training that would prepare the men of what would eventually become the 14th Army for operations that by today’s standards would be those of SOF.
My own experiences lead me to believe that Slims observations are largely correct (since I was not there I’m limited to what I know through command and staff and applying it to what I read). I was once given a largely blank check about training – for 1 year my team of my 1SG, my PLs, my PSGs, and their NCO leadership had a surplus of resources – time perhaps being the most critical followed closely by land and ammunition to take a 100 man light Infantry company and transform it to a 170 man Stryker equipped rifle company – this is not about the vehicle, but it adds a level of complexity to it that requires additional time (and other resources) to train. We had a great team behind us helping us out – the BN and BDE CDRs and their staffs – but largely the task fell on the soldiers and leaders of the company. The rational behind opening up the flood gates fro resources were that a/1-24th of the 1/25th SBCT would be one of two companies to conduct the IOT&E (Initial Operating Test and Evaluation) of the SBCT concept at Fort Knox in the Summer of 2003 and big Army and many others from DoD would be watching to examine the results – there was (and remains) a war on.
So from about August of 2002 following the MAV-CE (Medium Armored Vehicle –Comparison & Evaluation) test at FT LEWIS between a platoon of the improved M113A3 and the Stryker (I was one of the BN AS3s at the time and involved with the observations and AAR of the TTP used by the platoons) back in the South Rainier Training Area – then took A/1-24 to begin NET fielding) – we were off and running. For about 1 year we were given a lion’s share of resources to ensure that training deficit would not enter into the results of how the IOT&E played out. I had lots of ammunition, land and a long, long leash (then LTC Emmet Schaill and COL Bob Brown underwrote allot of mistakes and risk on my part - this is also a good place to mention 1SG Joe House, BN CSM Art McCann & BDE CSM Carlton Dietrich - all critical leaders in the endvour). We went about it I think in a smart manner that addressed the task and challenges associated with the scope of the mission. We were all over the place – all of FT Lewis and Yakima, the only folks we played second fiddle to were 3/2 SBCT preparing for their OIF deployment, 2/75th and occasionally the Washington ARNG as it prepped for its OIF deployment – but even then since time was provided, we found ways to train. We had shared vision from the BDE CDR down, and the resulting training of continuous distributed operations from squad through company (with BN and BDE attachments) was exactly what was needed.
The IOT&E turned out to be a great test – continuous operations across pretty much the entire training areas available (at the time most of it), some mounted, some dismounted, offense, defense, stability, security, etc – for three 14 day iterations with some smaller excursions in between we trained. It was fully resourced and some of the best training I’d ever seen – even when compared to my CTC experiences. We emerged a fantastic company, and I left command of Alpha shortly thereafter to take the BN HHC.
In the meantime LTC Schaill and COL Brown (COL Schaill now has the EBCT at Bliss and BG Brown is out at PACOM) had been refining their ideas about training to extend it to the rest of the BN and BDE. COL Brown and his staff came up with some great ideas and resources to extend the quality of training to the other BNs and special companies in 1/25th and fostered that kind of thinking in subordinate leaders all the way down to lowest PVT (if you Google COL Robert Brown, Lancer BDE, SBCT, Agility and Adaptive Leadership – you’ll probably find several great articles he penned). The 1/25th went on to have two great MRE/MRXs at the NTC and JRTC, then a deployment to Mosul that went up against a tough enemy – for some good reading take a look at Michael Yon’s blog as he covered it.
My point in writing about all this is to inform some of our non-uniformed folks in the SWC about the critical role good training (and there is such a bad thing as “not so good training”) and resourcing training play in creating good soldiers, leaders and formations that deploy and win in the adverse and challenging conditions in the places where we fight our wars. It is also to show what is possible in a relatively short time when “better then adequate” resources are combined with good leadership containing a vision about the challenges that will face that force when it goes from training to facing a cunning and creative enemy that wants to survive and win as much as you do.
I’d also like to ask if we think we could do better? Is the training and resourcing available to our SOF the best we can do, or could we extend that level of training and resourcing to the larger force like I had it extended to me and A/1-24th (and later the whole of 1/25th)? I think the regular forces can achieve a great deal more then given credit for (we certainly see it in Iraq and Afghanistan) on a consistent basis if given the resources and the responsibility/ authority to achieve those results. It’s a case of priorities and underwriting junior leaders so we grow (and sustain) a culture of innovation, adaptiveness and agility that flourishes not only in war, but in our peace time preparations for war – so regardless of where we go or when we go, we can seize and retain the initiative much faster. Some of it is culture, some of it is resources – but the consequences are of vital importance to the health of our armed forces.
A few additional thoughts
Is the thinking that its too resource intensive to provide the quality of training available to SOF to the larger GPF/MPF force pool? Or is it the thinking the GPF/MPF formations can not achieve the same (or close to) standards of the smaller elite force populations? Or is it the idea that only SOF forces require that level of training as they are deployed on a smaller scale, in immature AORs and must be better trained to cope? I'd say with the current challenges ahead to the existing force structure if its the last on we can certainly justify the need.
Best, Rob
A really good thread Rob!
I think much of the disconnect between the non-uniformed (not meaning uninformed in the least, though) out there who may postulate about the military, technologies, and strategic underpinnings, is the fact that it often takes a uniformed mind to appreciate the impact of training.
The realities of the training grind are often lost on those who would propose wholesale shifts in capabilities, mission, T/O&E, etc. Heck, it's even lost on the procurement folks who at times throw equipment at the troops when it has only been tested by Marines in their formal MOS school.
I concur wholeheartedly that main forces can do so much more (and probably have a baseline of training to do so well) than they currently have the authority for. It's that trust and confidence that's lacking. The opposite attitude rears its ugly head when SOF cannot accomplish some things (I'm currently reading Robert's Ridge) and the more conventional folks start to throw the Rambo moniker around.
When I was in Australia this summer, I had an interesting discussion with one of my counterpart umpires. He mentioned that among the Australian Army, the main forces are generally considered better prepared for COIN, humanitarian assistance, FID, and all-round small wars, while their SOF formations are better trained to execute conventional ops.
This is a great thread...
Thanks, Rob. It preempts a blog article I was working on but that's good -- hopefully, it'll get more discussion here. Everyone above has some great points!
Rob asks:
Quote:
"I’d also like to ask if we think we could do better? Is the training and resourcing available to our SOF the best we can do, or could we extend that level of training and resourcing to the larger force"
That is an important question and it gets obscured here and elsewhere because, IMO, the issue becomes not one of roles, missions, capabilities and the attainment of the desired effects for the US but rather a battle of egos, turf, dollars and spaces. Having been on both sides of the Big Army and SOF curtain I have no doubt that BOTH sides are guilty of this.
There is no question of a need for SOF or for SF -- the two are not synonymous regardless of efforts to make them so -- but I believe there are roles and missions questions that will impact training. We are confronted with the fact that a Battalion from the 82d is doing Ranger like missions for a variety of reasons -- and doing them well. We are confronted with the fact that organizations designed for the UW mission (and some of its highly classified adjunct missions) are being employed on ID missions. There are certain skill sets form UW that translate very well to ID; there are also a number of UW skills (to include those adjunct missions) that are not needed for ID.
As Norfolk says, most Armies use their conventional forces for ID and do it well; thus we are confronted with SF being essentially over qualified for the ID mission. We're using Hummers to do pickup truck work. A further concern is the quantity of folks required for ID; the SOF community cannot and should not provide the quantities required, to even attempt to do so will cause a dilution of quality problem in the community. My question is that, accepting the need for a UW mission capable force for a large variety of missions in both peace and war, should that difficult to obtain capability be roled as a primary ID element to the detriment, however slight, of its primary mission?
The Groups are also used for DA missions -- that amounts to using those same Hummers for sports car work. Not that they cannot and do not do the missions well; just that it's misuse and has the potential to do damage as individuals switch between missions. The great guys will cope -- everyone isn't great. The question to me is should DA be a SF mission or are competing skill sets and perhaps a different mental attitude and full time focus required?
Look also at Strategic Recon, an openly known mission. Is SF best for that job? They certainly can do it but in some cases they are again overtrained with regard to total skill sets and perhaps not as well trained in some desired skills as they might be. That mission is so difficult and dangerous that we may be sending that Hummer to do a job better suited to a Motocross bike (IOW, are we spending a quarter mil to train folks for a 60 K job? Can we afford the loss of the hard and long time to develop UW skills to a mission a different training regimen can handle?). The question is should that mission devolve to a new and different sort of unit that is culturally tuned to use extreme stealth?
The issues then for UW versus ID are that the Groups are over qualified and their critical skills are degraded (and this is even more disadvantageous when the DA mission moves to the fore; in the current or most envisioned environments mentoring local Security Forces is perhaps more important than taking down HVTs even if it isn't as much fun), they do not and probably never will have the quantity of people needed for ID in a medium sized nation. Regardless of all that, the question that then arises is can they do it better than conventional forces which have been provided better training? I think not but that is certainly arguable. What is not arguable in that case is that best is the enemy of good enough...
None of that should be construed as SF/SOF bashing, it is not. Been there and done that -- I am merely asking questions that I think deserve honest consideration. This is not the place to answer them in any detail, certainly -- but thinking it through wouldn't hurt.
All that is way off the question that Rob raised; can we do a better job of training our conventional units. I submit that the answer is, emphatically, yes. That we do not is due to habit (we're still operating on WW I parameters), inertia (as Wilf said:
Quote:
"More than you know. US SOCOM is a hostage to the institutions and events that created it. You always get back to the "I wouldn't start from there, if I were you." Look at all the mucking about in the re-creation of the 75th Ranger Regiment. If you started with a clean sheet of paper, things would look a whole lot different. - same for UK SF." (emphasis added / kw)
and parochialism. We really need to take an objective look at what we're doing, realize that the Army of today is not much like the Army of even 2000 -- much less 1918 -- and fix the problem.
Lieutenants today are routinely doing things that the LTs of 2000 in most units could not dream of doing and that's a good thing. Joe today has gear that only some SOCOM elements had in 2000 -- and generally, he uses it well. It's a different Army, it trains better than it ever has before and, IMO, that's still not good enough. It deserves better training, most particularly at the enlisted and officer entry levels.
Another part of the problem is that there are senior people who are not terribly enthusiastic about fighting wars, they'd prefer waxing and polishing combat vehicles, brassoing cartridges, fretting over uniforms and haircuts and worrying unduly about their and their units reputation or mystique -- and I have, unfortunately, worked for folks who did all those things -- instead of truly thinking about how to do the job better and doing what's best for the nation. Those kinds of folks have always been around and probably always will be. There are more of them in the big Army simply because it's bigger; they also exist in elsewhere. They just have to be bypassed.
Norfolk also mentioned the training and employment of Battalion Scout Platoons in Canada and here. I have to agree with him. I've watched Commonwealth Armies do Recon and they have us beaten across the board. Our so-called Recon elements are ideally structured and equipped for Flank Screens, Covering forces and Economy of Force employment and they do those things well -- they are not trained and equipped for reconnaissance and, mostly, do not train for it very well so they naturally don't do it well. That doesn't address the problem of Commanders who do not know how to use their recon elements -- or are afraid to 'risk' them doing their designed job...
I noted the organization for the HBCT Cav Squadron and was happy they had created a true Recon element (except for the M3s, don't get me started on that vehicle) -- until I found out that the new proposal is for three Brad plts and two Tank plts per troop. Great for the combat missions but they ain't gonna be Scouts. Regardless of the fact that both CTCs have nicked most units for poor to non-existent recon work for years and still do so...:mad:
Back to the north German plain...
Rob also posts some more of Slim's thoughts, all of which are still totally valid, all of which we also learned in WW II and all of which we too often ignore today. We need to take care of Joe -- and we are not doing that.