Is It Time to Get Out of Afghanistan?
by John Hinderaker @ Power Line
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archive.../04/028748.php
Who in the American domestic target audience still believes that Afghanistan and Afghans are worth it?
Who is supposed to be strategically communicating to the American voter what we're trying to do there, how well we're doing it, and why?
In 2005 Newsweak invented a story about Koran desecration at Gitmo. Seventeen Afghans died rioting. It is painfully obvious that we learned nothing from that. Why did we learn nothing?
Many questions. The only answer I have is that is indeed time to drastically reduce our headcount while at the same time dramatically increasing the Taliban's bodycount.
And for God's sake do not evacuate the Kabul Embassy via helicopters on the roof.
1 Attachment(s)
Here is my reasoning for being in Astan ...
30 Aug 2009 - AQ means ...
Quote:
"The Base" - and as such, is supporting to efforts by other groups on a global basis to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on its analysis of each group and its plans. It also was (and probably still is, to a lesser extent) capable of its own direct action operations.
By analogy, AQ can be viewed as waging unconventional warfare in the classic sense of our FMs. A SFOB hinges on its personnel and functions, not on its location (or locations, which can be multiple - though obviously network-linked). So also AQ. That is COL Robert Jones' concept, which makes sense to me.
As to the 2001 invasion of Astan, two reasons were (1) retribution and reprobation; and (2) specific deterrence[*]. Both reasons would have been satisfied by a complete destruction of the AQ leadership in Astan as we then knew it. That goal was not realized (Tora Bora et al).
The direct action effort against the AQ leadership still persists (separate US command); but has been submerged by the much larger efforts of UN-NATO ("nation-building" and peace enforcement in favor of the Karzai government) and the US FID-SA effort with major combat support (as noted by Bill Moore).
Since AQ (as a "base" of personnel and functions) is a moving target, the linkage between the effort against it, and the much larger Astan efforts, is not very clear to me. I expect I shall be enlightened.
The Taliban, very intentionally on their part, simply got in the way of our direct action efforts against AQ.
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[*] Specific deterrence deters the individual wrongdoer (you execute the serial killer). That may have no general deterrence effect on serial killers to be.
30 Aug 2009 - Two kinds of deterrence
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We've done a decent job on specific deterrence of AQ on three fronts: (1) intelligence + direct action (military); (2) intelligence + detention (law enforcement); and (3) disruption of network nodes, especially financing support (intelligence + counterintelligence).
As to general deterrence, not a real clue because I see no real plan to do that. By analogy, we need something akin to the European socialists who were anti-communist, but scarcely supportive of USG announced policies. I suppose support of certain Muslim governments (which ones ?) would be the answer. I also expect the tradeoff would be a much lesser role for the US in the Muslim world. That seems to be where Kilcullen is heading at the end of his book (Accidental Guerrilla).
As Ken noted, we are just getting into this - e.g., changes in Cold War strategy over decades.
Anyway, this is really a question for the younger generations.
So, what are your solutions to gain specific and general deterrence re: AQ ?
25 Jul 2010 - Well, one can question ....
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whether a "COIN" strategy ever existed in Astan; and whatever the "Plan", the political side of the ledger was feeble at best ("lipstick on a pig" and the the rest of the cliches).
That didn't bother me cuz my rationale for being in Astan in the first place (and I never saw a reason to change the rationale) was to mount direct action operations against the AQ leadership cadres in Astan and Pstan (more a matter of "rental" operations), based on principles of retribution, reprobation and specific deterrence.
Other folks at much higher pay grades than mine, had different ideas.
Anyway, agreed: alia jacta est - and we are now in the period of Afghanization and exit strategy(ies).
The foregoing rationale (to me) constituted an overriding "but", even though Astan is in the middle of my personal "Never Again, but..." region - which looks like this:
Attachment 1432
However, that "but" only goes so far - especially when state building (or nation building) - which doesn't start to meet my "but" test, gets in the way of the direct objective for which we (US) started in 2001 Astan.
Frankly, if we would have a better chance of killing our tall brother and his shorter comrade, by letting Astan revert to its pre-2001 condition (and by using better targeting methods than used in the Clinton era), I'd say let that happen.
Both OEF and OIF had a certain initial cleanliness and clarity (the run up to Tora Bora and the run up to Baghdad) - and I count those among the most beautiful military efforts I've seen in my cognitive lifetime.
So, my question to those who have been or are there (such as 120mm, who must have much of the time in for Astan citizenship ;)) is this:
Is what we are doing now substantially advancing the direct objective I've outlined above ?
If not, then we should revise the "Plan"; and if that requires a tactical withdrawal, so be it. If it requires other affirmative actions in Astan or Pstan, so be those.
Regards
Mike
More blogging on this subj:
It’s time to leave Afghanistan
http://jbsanctuary.wordpress.com/201...e-afghanistan/
Time to leave Afghanistan?
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2011/0....html#comments
Should we give up on Afghanistan?
http://thisainthell.us/blog/?p=22807
The comments on these blogs are an indicator that some of the most sympathetic and supportive members of the domestic target audience are disgusted and demoralized. Whoever does the SITREP Live from Afghanistan for the MILBLOG Conference will need to slip down to Dubai and spend a night in a Holiday Inn Express or La Quinta before they strategically communicate to that crowd.