Afghanistan and U.S. Interests: Kotkin vs Nagl
The first question one must always ask is "What are our National Interests?"
The Washington Post ran this quote from John Nagle on 31 August:
Quote:
JOHN NAGL
President of the Center for a New American Security
America has vital national security interests in Afghanistan that make fighting there necessary. The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. Afghanistan also serves as a base from which the United States attacks al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win.
U.S. policymakers must, of course, weigh all actions against America's global interests and the possible opportunity costs. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, low-cost strategies do not have an encouraging record of success. U.S. efforts to secure Afghanistan on the cheap after 2001 led it to support local strongmen whose actions alienated the population and thereby enabled the Taliban to reestablish itself as an insurgent force. Drone attacks, although efficient eliminators of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, have not prevented extremist forces from spreading and threatening to undermine both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.
In a well-stated countering perspective, Major Jeremy Kotkin published the following piece here in the SWJ that argues in fact that we have no such National Interests at stake. Though Jeremy is a bit of a protégé' of mine, and a co-worker here in the Strategy Division at USSOCOM, these thoughts are his own. Jeremy makes a good case, and it is one grounded in sound history as well as the principles of Strategy and Insurgency. Frankly, Dr. Nagl's argument has no such foundation to rest upon.
For your consideration: U.S. National Interests and Afghanistan; and the young, untested Major Kotkin vs. the CNAS machine and Dr. Nagl
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...hanistan-in-t/
I think those folks at CNAS have lost the bubble...
Quoth Nagl:
Quote:
...The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. *
I wish he had expanded that and told the world how, without a multi-decade presence in Afghanistan, he proposes we might accomplish that...
Quote:
...al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win.
Clearly? I think not. If it were clear, then even I would see the logic and rationale. I do not. Some said we clearly had to win the 'Cold War.' I didn't see the logic there either -- and regardless of those who say we 'won' it, I suggest that the erstwhile opponent is still around and still causing minor problems. That's the key point -- minor. That, I suspect is the best we can hope for with Al Qaeda and it's clones, derivatives and Allies. We are not going to eliminate terrorism or Islamist fundamentalism. We can through many avenues reduce the problems they bring to an acceptably low level -- major military force is not one of those avenues at this point; it is, in fact, pretty close to counter productive.
As Major Kotkin says, Hezbollah is far more dangerous than is A.Q. and neither poses an existential threat. Both and their allies require a comprehensive diplomatic and low key SFA approach with enhanced strategic entry capabilities predicated on the probable force structure size limitations faced by the US. Executing a series 'COIN campaigns' is not only not the best answer, it is a quite poor answer that will almost certainly fail.
Quote:
The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.
Obviously, Doctor Nagl's math and mine differ.
The US and NATO plus any nascent Afghan forces do not and will not have the manpower to provide anything other than a light footprint. The objectives -- if they are cited above (*) -- are not attainable at an affordable cost and they need a more comprehensive re-look.
I do agree with him that a more comprehensive approach is needed -- simply comprehending that COIN efforts as a large force intervenor do not work would be a good start.
Gaining a sense of things...
Omarali50,
Interesting posts as always.
Speaking of cross posting, while trying to gain a sense of things in Afghanistan a couple of economic questions have popped up and I would be interested in your take on things.
My understanding is that estimates as to the annual per capita GDP range from less than $365 (less than the 'magic' $1/day mark, my source is a 2004 World Bank Hydraulics & Hydrology Study of Afghanistan, Working Paper # 36, Water resource development in Northern Afganistan and its implications for the Amu Darya Basin) to $800 and that some of the small time poppy farmers are in the $6,000 range (WSJ article). Would you agree?
He's still in training...I'll break him in yet.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
tell your sidekick MAJ Kotkin that I like his article, particularly his distinction between national interests and vital national interests:
Somewhat similar thinking is found in Kilcullen's Chap 5 (of TAG) - turning the elephant back into the mouse.
And, there is no doubt that ...
He did not use the phrase "good governance" once. :D
Jeremy came back from his War College training all "regimented" so to speak, and I've been working hard to corrupt him, but he holds his ground and thinks well for himself.
Of course, to be fair, the article is about US National interests, and not the nature of insurgency, so he did well not to just sprinkle around buzz phrases that are totally irrelevant simply to impress his boss!
Success breeds challenges all of their own
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
As Ken says, maybe the CNAS guys have lost the bubble.
I think it's worth noting that the CNAS guys don't come on SWJ, anymore. Maybe rigour isn't welcome. Be nice to be proved wrong - for real.
CNAS has been very successful, puts out some good thoughts, and has tremendous influence currently.
They also are getting into a sticky area of conflicting interests. I suspect Ms Flournoy would like to compete for the SecDef job, and by all accounts she is qualified. John may have an eye on Mr. Vickers office as well....who knows. Like I said, success no matter how well earned creates conflcts of interest that can shape the positions one takes.
I suspect the President may well feel compelled to take a hard stance on Afghanistan for fear that he will be called out as totally soft on terrorism. These guys have to make hard choices, and there is no right answer. I wish the boss was getting better advice though. We don't need to get harder on terrorism, we need to get smarter, and that doesn't necessarily mean we have to become decisively engaged in a course of action in Afghanistan that may well fail the Suitable, Acceptable, Feasible test.
He needs someone to explain the concept of "Good Governance" vs. "Effective Governance" perhaps...:)