Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency
My latest article excerpt:
Quote:
In Greek legend, Sisyphus was a king condemned by the gods to roll a huge rock up a hill only to have it roll down again for eternity. Students of counterinsurgency often feel like Sisyphus, as the United States Army continually resists institutionalizing counterinsurgency across the force, only to have to re-learn the lessons at a heavy price later before preparing to discard them again.
About a month ago, I was asked to deliver a short presentation to the Canadian Army on tactical counterinsurgency lessons learned over the past years in Iraq. What initially seemed like an easy task quickly became difficult as I synthesized the complex and varied experiences of US Army units into relevant and concise points transferrable to a foreign army. After a long night, I produced ten observations that reflect enduring lessons from Iraq that would resonate with military audiences. They are:
• Learn from the past.
• Learn to ask understanding questions.
• Data is not understanding.
• Mass all of your resources to achieve the objective.
• Security matters.
• Population control is critical for success.
• Build human infrastructure alongside the physical.
• Understand perceptions matter far more than truth.
• Communicate effectively.
None of these are new, nor are they all inclusive, as significant areas are not covered. They do represent a start point for discussion about counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level.
The rest is on the blog here.
Comments welcome.
Works everywhere in most COIN conditions, the problem
is adequate capability in both quantity and quality and, as always, being at the right place at the right time.
Lacking adequate capability, failure to be in time and selection of the wrong places can complicate the processes significantly. Lot of varied political inputs and impacts on those factors, many unfortunately outside military control...
Niel, thanks for a simple, effective and
hence useful piece.
best,
Mark
Having operated under conditions allied to all your positions
in several countries, I'm totally convinced that Position 2. is the most likely to lead to success and Position 3. is the worst possible choice with one caveat -- unless a viable operational reserve is maintained and used as stated below. Even then it offers what will appear to most observers as a very tentative and excessively cautious effort that can be an incentive to the bad guys to try harder...
In any of your positions, such a reserve is not a waste it can and should be used on economy of force and presence (read; saturation patrolling in random areas) missions throughout the region while avoiding decisive engagement to enable commitment to rapid reinforcing missions -- among other things, this can preclude excessive use of less than discriminating air power or artillery.
You will accrue higher casualty rates. You'll also enhance your chances of success in a shorter period.
You're correct in western terms, no question.
CavGuy:
For the ME and South Asia where cities and capitals are a recent phenomenon, the certainty is far less if it exists at all -- though there is no question that AQ, The Talib, et.al. are smart enough to use that parameter as a psyops tool even if they know better. Rural populations worldwide don't think nearly as highly of cities as urban dwellers do, nor do they care much for or have much respect for urban dwellers. That is particularly true among mountain folks.
Pakistan is indeed an example of the principle -- it has suffered such bombings in the cities since 1947. It's still there...
Added note: % of Population urban; Iraq > 70; Afghanistan ~ 24 , Pakistan ~ 34%