Military Governance versus Stability Operations
Moderator's Note
The author has requested a title change; the thread started as "Area Support Group", and now becomes "Military Governance versus Stability Operations" (ends).
All,
I am looking into the old concept of a rear area and specifically how we used to be designed to administer territory and the population of that territory once we took it over. In the post WWII days the US Army used military governors. The next time we did anything close to that would be Kosovo, but I am not sure it worked the same.
In any case, I am looking for a reference, preferably open source, that can provide a little background on how we used to think about how to administer occupied territory before we decided that there was no rear area. If anyone has any insights on why we dumped the ASG (who, if I recall correcely, was in charge of the rear area) I would appreciate it.
Also, for the Marines in the audience, did you handle things differently when you occupied small countires?
How about the UK or Australia - do you even consider post war administration in your doctrine.
Thanks
Cookbook for Occupation Laws
The 1944 Law of Belligerent Occupation (JAGS Ann Arbor) is a practical how to do manual. It allows either COA suggested by Bill, former government structures or parallel shadow government structures.
Quote:
from Bill:
Since the doctrine back in the day apparently advocated using local laws, it may be implied that we would assert control through the former government structures in cities, provinces, states, etc. For unconventional warfare we use the term area commands, but if your objective is to overthrow the existing the system it seems like the best of course of action would be to build parallel shadow government structures with the existing structure to facilitate a smooth as possible as transition.
See CHAPTER III LAW-MAKING POWER OF OCCUPANT for the rest of the story.
Moving from WWII to the present, everyone should be aware that just war academics and advocates (I include Kilcullen in the latter category) are developing a jus post bellum - the law after the war; as well as a 2012 ICRC symposium of experts.
2010 The Aftermath of War: Reflections on Jus Post Bellum (with Michael Walzer) (Youtube 1.25 hrs)
ICRC, Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory (2012).
These more recent additions, IMO, are less satisfactory from a military point of view than the WWII manuals.
Regards
Mike
Transformative Occupation
I really need to keep up on this international law stuff. Did not even realize that the very idea of spreading democracy violates international law (not that I believe in international law). Learn something new every day.
Quote:
The 2003 occupation of Iraq ignited an important debate among scholars over the merits of transformative occupation. An occupier has traditionally been precluded from making substantial changes in the legal or political infrastructure of the state it controls. But the Iraq experience led some to claim that this ‘conservationist principle’ had been largely ignored in practice. Moreover, transformation was said to accord with a variety of important trends in contemporary international law, including the rebuilding of post-conflict states along liberal democratic lines, the extra-territorial application of human rights treaty obligations, and the decline of abstract conceptions of territorial sovereignty. This article argues that these claims are substantially overstated. The practice of Occupying Powers does not support the view that liberal democratic transformations are widespread. Human rights treaties have never been held to require states parties to legislate in the territories of other states. More importantly, the conservationist principle serves the critical function of limiting occupiers’ unilateral appropriation of the subordinate state’s legislative powers. Postconflict transformation has indeed been a common feature of post-Cold War legal order, but it has been accomplished collectively, most often via Chapter VII of the UN Charter. To grant occupiers authority to reverse this trend by disclaiming any need for collective approval of ‘reforms’ in occupied states would be to validate an anachronistic unilateralism. It would run contrary to the multilateralization of all aspects of armed conflict, evident in areas well beyond post-conflict reconstruction.
Transformative occupation and the unilateralist impulse
See also International Law, human rights and the transformative occupation of Iraq
Three Categories of Military Intervention
OK, from what I can determine there are three types of military intervention that could be considered "Stability Operations." I exclude COIN as it still has their own separate doctrine (although it could fairly be argued that it is a subset of Stability Operations). The manual does mention Peace Operations in regards to conflict prevention
Peace Operations including Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and conflict prevention: military force invited or sent in to deal with a failure of the local state to deal with a crisis. This can be at the behest of international organizations or of the failing state itself although the term “host nation” seems to indicate that this is most often at the request of the state.
Occupation: A military force invades and occupies the territory of another sovereign. They become the de facto government but generally only administer government operations on a temporary basis with the intent of eventually turning it back over to the sovereign.
Annexation: A military force invades and occupies the territory of another sovereign. They become the de facto government and permanently displace the prior sovereign.
The current doctrine on Stability does not seem to deal with Occupation at all. It also does not mention the laws of the host nation except that the new or restored government must be legitimate in the eyes of the people. We are either in a Peace Operation mode or we are Annexing territory via the mechanism of regime change (and ultimately democratization).
Arguably, under some interpretations of human rights law, using the Right to Protect, we could argue that sovereignty exists in the body of the people and is only vested in the government by the population’s grant of authority. If that is the case, then we are in fact an occupying force since we are acting as the de facto power until it can be returned to the sovereign which is in the body of the people. It would take some tortured logic to assume that if we are instituting regime change the "host-nation" is found in the body of the people and they are supposed to be adminstering the government. In any case the invading force should be required to install a military government until there can be a transfer to civilian transitional authority can be formed and eventually a new local government created.
Under international law it is the military’s responsibility to administer this government in occupied territories with a constabulary force. It also makes the most sense since no other USG agency has that capability.
Quote:
The demand for civilian power exceeds the supply. Despite this clear preference for civilian-le responses, U.S. military capabilities are “more readily available, more strategically postured, and certainly better resourced” than its civilian tools.
Rethinking Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction
So, it would appear that our current doctrine is missing something.