Gun Control in Counterinsurgency
This article showed up on today's SWJ Blog, Chad Machiela, with pdf Gun Control in Counterinsurgency: A Game Theory Analysis.
The author's BLUF, BLOB & CV:
Quote:
Application of populace and resources control measures in counterinsurgency is often more art than science, and in Iraq’s Salah Din Province in 2006 the battlespace commander’s attempts to reduce the number of weapons available to insurgents actually caused residents otherwise uninvolved in insurgency to violate the law, while effectively ensuring that the population had no means to resist insurgent theft of supplies or forcible recruitment. Game theory offers a means to analyze the options available to different actors in a conflict, and to help identify courses of action more beneficial to all.
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In conclusion, whenever any authority criminalizes a legal activity in an attempt to reduce the incidence of an illegal activity, second and third-order effects are generated which may result in an outcome not only less effective than hoped for, but even counter to the desired effect. In the case of the al Jazeera desert in Iraq during 2006, the coalition forces’ attempt to minimize the number of weapons available to the insurgents operating in the area contributed to the insurgents’ means of support. The farmers were unable to do anything but support the insurgents regardless of whatever preference they might have for a functioning Government of Iraq. The presence of criminals and the coalition forces’ inability to protect the population resulted in a lack of support for both the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq and coalition forces, and provided the farmers no incentive to follow the rules of an authority that made criminals of a group without criminal intent. By analyzing the options available to the farmers, local commanders could have shifted policy to provide incentive to the farmers to protect themselves, perhaps eventually resulting in less of a need for weapons at all, and a willing reduction of arms.
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CW3 Chad Machiela is a Special Forces warrant officer assigned to 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Joint Base Lewis McChord. He holds a M.S. in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School and a B.A. in Public Law from Western Michigan University. The opinions expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Of course, I've omitted all the good stuff that is writ large between the 1st and 2nd quote snips.
This is simply an interesting article, dealing with a topic that has been discussed in the MSM and Net (with spin and heat) re: the US-Mexican border, etc.
I'd as soon this NOT turn into a political (Second Amendment) discussion - and simply ask that folks stick to evidence (with sourcing) about the first, second and third order effects of gun control - as Chief Machiela has done well in his article. In light of SCOTUS's Second Amendment cases, this topic has both legal and practical aspects.
Now, Truth in Lending: As those here who know me well already know, I'm an NRA Life Member (from the 1970s); when I was a "barrister", a pro bona participant in the Second Amendment Foundation and its Legal Assistance Program; and my idea of Gun Control is the almost-perfect 1000 yd, 10X 5-shot group with a .338 Lapua (slightly modded to a "300 Hulk" ;) ), Sarver Sets Amazing new LG Record, 1.403", 50/ 5X (gif of target), in this webpage.
While I'm perfectly capable of slugging it out about Second Amendment issues, I do NOT want this thread to turn into that kind of political discussion. What I would like to see are rational, evidentiary postings regarding the various order effects of gun control in the arena of Small Wars (those that favor gun control, those that don't and those that are inconclusive).
Regards
Mike
Naw, Steve, I don't want to ...
be into "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" - I'm a low kinetic person. ;)
I'm positing indigenous "COIN", where the people in my district are my people (some well-guided, some misguided and some uncertain). I'm not positing non-indigenous FID (much less foreign "COIN" or some half-assed form of co-belligerency) because that introduces too much complexity that clouds even more otherwise complex issues that have to resolved first.
Tactical alternatives to "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" abound - basically the opposites are being the bull in a china shop or a boa digesting a meal (making haste slowly). You may judge where you think my ground would be to stand snorting or to lay sleepily.
Rather than first moving into specific tactics, I'd first have to decide on the strategy to enter the district in the first place. I see two basic options:
1. "Clear, hold and build" (pretty much "standard COIN" for the last 40 years) - the direct approach with the most apparent short-term results - which I've tended to follow (as in post #7) as something of a norm in examples cuz that seems more familiar to most folks; OR
2. "Build, hold and clear" (build an unconventional force which will infiltrate and subvert the insurgent shadow government and forces; hold and expand strategic base areas and disperse the insurgent forces; and clear by the juncture of conventional and unconventional forces) - an indirect approach with slow apparent results (it took Giap four bites at the apple).
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Those more inclined to the first course of action (which I do not reject out of hand), especially those who like the "clear" phase, might be more inclined to Heinlein's Starship Troopers.
On the other hand, the second course of action is somewhat akin to what we find in Isaac Asimov, Foundation - the Foundation's strategy, especially as found in Part IV, the Traders; as "engineered" by Limmar Ponyets and Eskel Gorov.
Limmar Ponyets and Eskel Gorov are not among Asimov's major characters, but I like their style in doing their "things" - infiltration, subversion, etc.; and using the target's weaknesses to create the conditions for the target's defeat (and often demise). Or, perhaps, the motto "Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right." ;)
Part IV can be found here; e.g.:
Quote:
Part IV, The Traiders
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TRADERS-… and constantly in advance of the political hegemony of the Foundation were the Traders, reaching out tenuous fingerholds through the tremendous distances of the Periphery. Months or years might pass between landings on Terminus; their ships were often nothing more than patchquilts of home-made repairs and improvisations; their honesty was none of the highest; their daring…
Through it all they forged an empire more enduring than the pseudo-religious despotism of the Four Kingdoms…
Tales without end are told of these massive, lonely figures who bore half-seriously, half-mockingly a motto adopted from one of Salvor Hardin's epigrams, "Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right!" It is difficult now to tell which tales are real and which apocryphal. There are none probably that have not suffered some exaggeration…
Encyclopedia Galactica
Review here (pp.44-45 of pdf) of the original version of “The Traders.” (Astounding Science Fiction, Vol. 34, No. 3, Issue 167, October 1944 as “The Wedge”).
Quote:
The Foundation now controls the four kingdoms by means of religion, but outlying areas are beginning to see that the atomic religion is only a wedge for aggression, and refuse it entry. It is now becoming clear that religion is played out as a weapon, and that the next mode of expansion, trade, is in the air.
***About 75 years after the events of the previous story, Limmar Ponyets is dispatched to Askone, a world rich in raw materials that has thus far spurned any commerce with the Foundation, for fear that it would lead to the Foundation’s Scientism religion controlling their society. Ponyets’s job is to negotiate for the release of Eskel Gorov, a Foundation agent who was sent to find a way to initiate trade with Askone. This was a violation of that planet’s law, and Gorov is scheduled to be executed.
***The Askonian society is dubious of technology, and practices ancestor worship. The Grand Master (their elderly leader) is firm about not accepting any technology from the Foundation, and about proceeding with Gorov’s execution. However, Ponyets convinces them to release Gorov in exchange for a gold transmuter jury-rigged out of a “food irradiation chamber” (presumably a more advanced version of a microwave oven).
***More importantly, Ponyets accomplishes Gorov’s mission of creating an opening for Foundation trade. He blackmails a member of the governing council, Pherl, to buy all of his cargo, which consists of many devices and machines forbidden by Askonian law. This council member, who does not believe in his culture’s superstitions against technology, then has an incentive to work towards the legalization of those machines, so that he can begin using and selling them to recoup his loss. It is indicated that Pherl, who is young for someone so important in government, will be the next Grand Master shortly, further hastening Askone’s susceptibility to Foundation trade and the controlling religion that it brings with it. Ponyets and Gorov head back to Terminus with a shipload of tin, which Ponyets was able to extract from Pherl as part of their bargain.
Query, should AQ be translated as the "Base" or as the "Foundation" ?
Regards
Mike
Steve, I already know (it has been revealed !) ....
They keep; I Know
from this:
Quote:
from Dayuhan
The populace is heavily and illegally armed, but the weapons are not displayed. The police are local people and are not going to do a thing about it. Military forces know the guns are there but as long as the guns aren't used against them they pretend not to know: they've no desire to stick their heads back into that particular hornet's nest. So the deal is basically that the locals will keep the guns under wraps and not shoot soldiers as long as the soldiers stay low profile and avoid confronting civilians. It mostly works, though it's not ideal.
They are my police (I'm the district civil affairs officer) and indirectly my military. Now, if you're telling me that my cops and troopers won't tell me what they know, then we're into a different problem.
Sounds to me that what you have is a pretty good solution. The local population in effect is its own power center, with its own armed force, so that, at the least, it has something of a Mexican standoff (the Magnificant Seven x2) with both the government and insurgents.[*]
So, this district officer would not rock the boat, but would want to know as closely as possible what potentially harmful stuff is out there. Patience and time would yield those answers - the python who slithers, not the bull who stomps. It would also help if the district officer is at least something close to local - and not some knucklehead born and raised in the capital's suburbia.
Outsiders ?
Which takes me here:
Quote:
from Dayuhan
To illustrate my point above... back in 1988 a group of drunk soldiers fired weapons in the town center here and killed 2 kids, one 2 years old, one 11. Nobody was prosecuted or punished. 20 years have not chilled that memory one bit. My wife still feels very uncomfortable in the presence of anyone from the Philippine military, and most of the populace feels the same way. If the people who shot your kids (it's a tribal society, the kids of one are the kids of all) come around wanting to know how many guns you have, will you tell them?
Were the soldiers (and their Os and NCOs) outsiders ? I could relate to that if a bunch of Trolls (them that live under the Bridge; it being the Mackinac Bridge) were sent up here to garrison us Yoopers. Obviously, my solution (as the fictional district officer) would be different (both preventative and reprobative) than what occured in your town in 1988.
I suggest that, where the folks that represent the government are "outsiders" (wherever the locals draw that line), those folks (1) are very similar to an occupying foreign force; and (2) are practicing what is in effect foreign COIN - as we did in Iraq, and are in Astan, by being the lead sled dog.
So, the ideal is to have locals involved, as Giap had in SVN ca. 1959-1965. By the end of that time, he'd run through about 100K of his Southern-born military and political cadres; and had to use more and more Northern-born PAVN. That did have an adverse effect on the VC (although other factors also entered the picture).
Interesting discussion for me (although I'm a poor fiction writer). I'd say our views are probably similar; but, of course, not in lockstep - which would be no fun at all. :D
Regards
Mike
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[*] Illustrating the practical effect of an armed citizenry, keeping and bearing arms - something that appeals to this libertarian for more than esoteric legal and political theories.
Moving from JMM fiction to Jon Custis fact ....
and thank you, Jon, for a non-armchair response which tells us what the real, practical issues are.
It doesn't need any armchair comments from me; except I have to say that it ends in an astute observation:
Quote:
Right now, learned helplessness is keeping these people on their knees, and it doesn’t need to be that way.
Thou art a worthy successor to the CAP guys of 45 years ago.
Regards
Mike
The response to an incursion is simple...
Quote:
How long would it take for groups of Taliban to start frisking farmers? And one of two things will happen, they'll either come up with a pistol or an empty holster, neither of which indicates long-term survivability for the local.
Hopefully they'll come up with a pistol to their temple. This is the whole point of allowing the common man to be armed. All the farmer need do is present the weapon to said Taliban center-mass areas, pull the trigger, rinse, and repeat as necessary.
I agree though, it requires collective response. We get collective complaints when patrols stop by to conduct engagement...perhaps it is best the collectively address the issues of knuckleheads encroaching on the perimeter of their village.