USIP: Constitutional Reform in Iraq: Improving Prospects, Political Decisions Needed
Constitutional Reform in Iraq: Improving Prospects, Political Decisions Needed
By Neil J. Kritz, Sermid al-Sarraf, and J Alexander Thier
September 2007
U.S. and Iraqi politicians and analysts consistently agree on one central point concerning Iraq: serious political reconciliation amongst Iraqi groups is needed to reduce the violence and create a viable government. Centrifugal forces fueled by armed conflict, competition for power and resources, and the intervention of foreign powers and neighbors has stalemated the political process in Baghdad for months.
Several key benchmarks of political progress are tied to the ongoing constitutional reform process. In accordance with Article 142 of the constitution adopted by referendum in 2005, the Council of Representatives (COR) established a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) in late 2006, responsible for proposing amendments to that document. The principal reason for this constitutional review so quickly after adoption of the new constitution was to provide Sunni negotiators an opportunity to engage in the process of constitutional design from which they felt they were excluded in the prior round—the 2005 constitution is mainly a Shia-Kurdish compact. The CRC has 29 members representing the political blocs in the parliament, 13 of whom served on the committee that drafted the 2005 constitution.
On May 22, the CRC submitted its report to the Council of Representatives (COR), proposing dozens of amendments. Given the sectarian tensions in the background of this process, it is notable that Sunni members on the CRC have indicated that they achieved the majority of amendments they were seeking and are inclined to urge their party leaderships to support the proposed package of constitutional revisions.
What is needed now is a top-level decision to move ahead with amendments in as many areas as possible. Without that, improved prospects may never be realized and the constitutional revision process will—like so many other things in Iraq—fall victim to stalemate and uncertainty.
Rest here: http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_br...form_iraq.html
How, Where & When does Peace Happen
Rex, a worthwhile bit of reading that should simulate some discussion,
I heard a piece on D.C.'s NPR Channel (AMU I think) on the way home tonight. They were interviewing two men who had recently been facilitating a discussion between Iraqis with opposing points of views & fears of each other. These moderators' credentials were that they had both been involved in peace and reconciliation talks in N. Ireland and S. Africa (their on homelands) during the periods where it was hard, but necessary to get the different sides talking. Both had personal stakes during their own trying times, and both had experience with reconciling fractured societies.
I thought it raised some good questions about how peace occurs, when peace occurs and where it happens first?
We tend to focus on an organizational political body as the reflection of reconciliation, integration, tolerance, stability and peace, but does that mean it is the only means to accomplish the ends? If a government adopts a policy or enacts legislation, but for whatever reason the populace will not or cannot accept it - does that still make it valid? Will a domestic policy be sustainable if it does not have domestic support? Will a politician push or support domestic legislation if the constituents he or she represents threatens to abandon them?
This is one of the problems I have with what I understand about the GAO report on political benchmarks, be they good or bad, do they reflect the willingness of the people to reconcile, share, integrate, etc. We say we'd like Iraq to adopt some form of democracy where individual freedoms are expanded, but to do so means walking a messy path that citizen and politicians alike are likely to find slippery at times - changes in political philosophy - even small ones are slow-go terrain because they challenge other cultural values. One of the problems I have with the idea of a timetable that demands large scale political progress is that it doesn't match the reality of how people overcome fears, learn to trust, and profess a willingness to change.
I think we need to consider the side of our own politics that caters to voters - the one that fights for federal dollars for its districts and states, the one that spends millions on campaigns to get elected/re-elected. We need to consider why politicians cannot find the general consensus on tough domestic issues here to enact legislative reform, and why their approval rating is so low. Then we need to consider why the Iraqi government finds it so hard to move forward on issues of reconciliation.
I think a more accurate barometer for Iraq's path to security and eventually stability at this juncture might be found at the grass roots level because if the people and their societal leadership have decided they can or cannot live with it, it will come to be reflected by the risks the politicians are willing to take. If we want an accurate assessment of potential and progress, we probably need to stop mirror imaging the type of consensus we wish we had in our own domestic politics, and instead see the challenges as they are.
From a military perspective, I don't think we think and talk enough about peace or what it takes to build and maintain it. We describe it as a political solution that people can live with, but when described like that I think it emphasizes "politics" and "politicians" over the vast amounts of people they represent. There is something inverted about that.
TT, I hope you'll weigh in on this. I'd greatly appreciate your thoughts:)
Best Regards, Rob
Just as an addendum to that last post...
I think this really illustrates some of the points I was making. Have fun...
Marc