Clausewitz and World War IV
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Eighteen threads, many very small, a few large, have been merged into one, Just found a 2010 thread Applying Clausewitz to Insurgency and merged that in. October 2015 three threads merged in; one thread remains outside - as it is in a Members Only forum(ends).
Armed Forces Journal commentary - Clausewitz and World War IV by MG Robert Scales, US Army (ret.).
Quote:
The essence of every profession is expressed in the writings of its unifying theorists: Freud for psychology, Adam Smith on economics, Justice Marshall on law, and — depending on one's preferences — Marx or Jefferson on governance. War is no exception. The 19th-century Prussian writer Carl von Clausewitz is regarded as a prophet whose views on the character and nature of war have held up best over the past two centuries.
Periodically, changes in the culture, technology, economics or demographics induce movements to revise the classic masters. After the Great Depression, Keynes amended Smith, behavioralists supplanted Freud, Marshall gave way to Oliver Holmes, who eventually surrendered to the revisionist doctrines of Hugo Black and Earl Warren. The profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, has been — is "blessed" the right word? — by intellectual revisionists more frequently perhaps because armed conflict is the most complex, changeable and unpredictable of all human endeavors. And history has shown, tragically, that failure to amend theories of conflict in time has had catastrophic consequences for the human race.
Changes in theories of war come most often during periods of historical discontinuity. Events after 9/11 clearly show that we are in such a period now. Unfortunately, contemporary revisionists to the classical master have not been well treated in today's practical laboratory of real war. In the moment before Sept. 11, 2001, the great hope was that technology would permit the creation of new theories of war. This view, influenced by the historical successes of the U.S. in exploiting technology, has been carried to extremes by some proponents of "effects-based and net-centric operations." These true believers visualized that sensors, computers and telecommunications networks would "lift the fog of war." They postulated that victory would be assured when admirals and generals could sit on some lofty perch and use networks to see, sense and kill anything that moved about the battlefield. Actions of the enemy in Iraq have made these techno-warriors about as credible today as stockbrokers after the Great Depression.
Theory abhors a vacuum as much as nature, so newer revisionists have popped up in profusion to fill the void left by the collapse of technocentric theories of war. One philosophy proposes to build a new theory of war around organizational and bureaucratic efficiency. Build two armies, so the proponents argue, one to fight and the other to administer, and the new age of more flexible and adaptive military action will begin. Another group of theorists seeks to twist the facts of history into a pattern that brings us to a fourth generation of warfare, one that makes all Clausewitzian theories of state-on-state warfare obsolete. Thus Western states are threatened by an amorphous, globally based insurgent movement. The inconvenience of Middle Eastern states collapsing and reforming in the midst of a state-dependent terrorist environment makes this fourth generationalist assault on the master difficult to sustain, if not actually embarrassing.
To be generous, each of these revisions contains some elements of truth. But none satisfies sufficiently to give confidence that Clausewitz can be amended, much less discarded. To be sure, networks and sensors are useful, even against terrorists, particularly in ground warfare at the tactical level. Armies should be reorganized to fight irregular wars more efficiently. And the influence of the state in irregular war must be revised to accommodate the realities of nonstate threats or, perhaps more accurately, not-yet-state threats; Osama bin Laden's first desire is for his own caliphate, or even emirate. But at the end of the day — and in light of the bitter experiences of recent years — it's clear that none of these rudimentary attempts at revision possesses the intellectual heft or durability to challenge the tenets of the classic master of conflict theory...
Follow the link for much more. Hat Tip to John at the OPFOR Blog.
His wife found the manuscript of the book and had its published
In fairness to Clausewitz, his manuscript was apparently not finished at his death. That suggest that he was not around for the editing process. Nevertheless, he still managed to communicate some insightful things about war.
The Prussian gets a bad rap
Wow. Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?
I have a soft spot in my heart for old Carl, dialectic approach and all. At one level, he provides a thorough taxonomy. At another, I find his truisms to be generally true. More like the Encyclopedia Britannica than <pick your favorite scholar/pundit with an axe to grind>. And he wrote as excellent historical analysis, not trying to displace Nostradamus or Jean Dixon.
Clausewitz's shortcomings stem less from him than from our own reckless application of his subtle nuances into steadfast bumper-sticker principles. Since he presents the pros and cons of just about all conflict, it is painfully easy to grab a sound bite from him saying whatever you want. And I'm not even one of those "read him in the original German and split hairs about translation" geeks.
Indictments in Tony Corn's commentary re expecting a clean, over-simplified, technological fix to all problems are viable. Symptomatic of American culture today. We've had it too good for too long, and are getting weak. We do, however, have a generation of young warriors who have seen the ugly side of things. I pray that, as they rise in rank, they will apply well the cold hard truths they have learned.