Insurgency Defined and COIN Principles
The USMC – Joint Forces Command co-sponsored Joint Urban Warrior 05 War Game included a special cell tasked to examine future Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This special cell was comprised of personnel from all U.S. services, coalition / multinational partners, interagency organizations and senior “grey beards” (retired military and diplomatic personnel). The range of operational experience included Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Haiti, Horn of Africa, Timor, Colombia, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Vietnam and other ops / deployments...
The cell members; most experienced, well-read and studied in COIN; had current doctrine and historical studies at their disposal. The first order of business in the cell included an agreement on a definition of insurgency and a set of COIN guiding principles to enable a base for follow-on discussion and debate. The definition and principles follow:
Insurgency Defined…
Insurgency is competition involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change.
COIN Principles…
1. Effect political primacy in pursuit of a strategic aim.
2. Understand the complex dynamics of the insurgency, including the wider environment.
3. Apply power discriminately to influence human will.
4. Promote unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies.
5. Isolate the insurgents from their physical and moral support base.
6. Sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period.
While the definition and principles may appear outwardly obvious – they remain a matter of debate in light of the global reach and goals of Al-Qaeda and associates. Your comments here are most welcome…
Foreign Policy Failed States Index
The July/August 2005 Foreign Policy Failed States Index shows a graphic on pg.59 identifying 12 criteria for use in identifying potentially failing or failed states. One listed is "Group Grievance." Failing states may include insurgencies, and they may merely provid an environment conducive to the growth and spread of insurgency. Perhaps some of the other criteria may be useful for the NDU discussion.
The mission from god syndrome
Myke makes a good point about the enemy's motivation, even though bin Laden has stated grievance dating back to the 12th century, they all relate to a form of real estate worship, i.e. any land that was ever controlled by Muslims is Muslim land. The real importance of Myke's point is that it makes clear that the enemy cannot negotiate anything short of his objectives without losing his ticket to paradise. What that means for those fighting him is that the enemy must be destroyed. There will never be a signed peace agreement.
With respect to Shari'a law, little has been written about what a barbaric legal code Shari'a is. This dark ages legal code does not deserve respect, much less implimentation. It is a code where cruel and unusual punishments are the usual. It is surprising how few legal scholars have taken a critical look at Shari'a law.
Why no discussion about Shari'a?
Much of this may link back to Political Correctness. As soon as someone calls another culture "barbaric" or something similar they can be branded as racist or worse by the popular media.
Why do we need a definition
While interesting to debate, do we really need to define insurgency to develop a successful strategy to counter one?
The danger of a definition, especially one that doesn't fit the situation you're dealing with, is that our American planners are prone to fall back on a doctrinal answer book to look for cues on what their courses of action will be. It precludes a detailed non-bias examination of the present security challenge by pre-disposing the planners to see it as a "classical" insurgency, then they fall back on the wrong set of solutions.
There are unique factors in every insurgency, or conflict, due to personalties, social factors, political factors, economic factors, and the list goes on and on. Sometimes our search for clear cut definitions reminds me of senior officers sitting around trying to explain why Clausewitz was all knowing and seeing, and then attempt to drive a square peg into a round hole in an attempt to demonstrate their point by using Clausewitz to explain a modern day security problem. The nature of a conflict is unique to itself, even if it may have many factors in common with similiar conflicts.
Does a security problem really a definition for us to address it? Why?
I'm not arguing that this type of discussion doesn't have value, but is it germane to solving the problem at hand in Iraq?
SECDEF as Quoted Today...
29 Nov. AP - Don't Call it an 'Insurgency': Rumsfeld.
Quote:
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld argued on Tuesday that the guerrillas fighting U.S.-led foreign forces and the American-backed government in Iraq do not deserve to be called an "insurgency."
Asked at a Pentagon news conference why he did not think the word insurgency applied to enemy forces in Iraq, Rumsfeld said he had "an epiphany."
"I've thought about it. And, over the weekend, I thought to myself, you know, that gives them a greater legitimacy than they seem to merit," Rumsfeld said.
Rumsfeld instead referred to the guerrillas in Iraq as "the terrorists" and "the enemies of the government." U.S. military statements also have referred to insurgents as "anti-Iraqi forces."
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines an insurgent as "a person who revolts against civil authority or an established government."...
Now the definition is important
Our SECDEF has a unique ability to concisely summarize the situation; however, he may have over simplifed it this time. Saying we shouldn't call it an insurgency because it gives too much legitmacy is like saying you can't call the ocean blue because you don't like the color blue. However, for reasons stated previously I think Secretary Rumfield is right, these guys are not a true insurgency. I know it can be argued effectively they are based on some definitions out there, but lets see where we're at once we get a Iraqi government in place. Let's see what the so-called insurgents are fighting for then. They're going to have to put alternative plan on the table, hell they have been fighting for almost three years. We know they don't have one, and will soon simply be recognized is wacked out, semi-sophisticated, anarchists.
Even though I'm currently leaning towards they're not insurgents, I still think much of our COIN doctrine is applicable in dealing with the problem. Don't throw the baby out with the bath water.
Rumsfeld's War On 'Insurgents'
Swamps, Drains, and Gators
Frankly I would say someone is trying to drain a swamp while a gator enjoys a rump lunch. The SecDef had similar discussions in 2003; his defintion of "insurgent" is irrelevant. The definition that counts is how the Iraqis see the insurgents or whatever label we care to tag them with. And therein lies the heart of the problem because that definition is is definitely split along ethnic (Kurd versus Arab) and religious (Sunni versus Shia) lines. Those lines were definitvely drawn long ago and were certainly active when the former asst SecDef told Congress in 2002 that Iraq did not have ethnic schisms ala the Balkans. That statement made as much sense to me then as "epiphany's" today in the current fight.