Good to see you here too,
I have agree about the definition and the need for somewhat more implicit guidance. The problem however as several of those among us who've been talking about it for a while know seems to be the my piece of the pie syndrom.
By this I simply mean that because real Information Operations is and should be inclusive of all the varied areas of study mentioned in joint pubs and more. With this being the case it has been my experience that those of any particular discipline percieve and approach it in that light. The EW guys can naturally find all the different ways to gain information superiority with their systems, the same goes for all other groups and as such what you generally get reflects who you've got.
The statement I've heard most often has been that it seems to get too complicated when you actually start breaking down all the various components and capabilities and there is often an assumption that those charged with doing it won't be able to do it well enough. I would tend to agree with MAJHEFNER in that
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IO is nothing more complicated than the art of influence.
. It's just made harder by those who try to place it in their own boxes.
I would suspect that 99% of what a good IO planner works with and the skill sets used are not much different than what most anyone does within the confines of their own lives on a daily basis. That said OK lets get a definition that is more explicatory, the toughest part is going to be making it such that all who read it don't read too much, or too little into it, but rather accept it for what it is.
BTW remember I always like to over simplify things:D
IO in a nutshell (or two)
IO is really A PAIN:
Availability
Privacy
Authenticity
Integrity
Non-repudiation
In its offensive form (nutshell #1), one denies one's opponent the above attributes of information.
In its defensive form (nutshell #2), one assures one's own side of the same attributes.
PSYOPS, OPSEC, EW, Fires, Information Assurance(IA)/Cyberwar, etc. are all TTPs one may use to achieve the above goals. Like pretty much everything else in the world of operations, each is METT-TC dependent.
What are we trying to build?
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Originally Posted by
Schmedlap
I was surprised that there is so much confusion on this issue...
Could that be because we're trying to pin down a process that is being learned on the fly and is in considerable flux?
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I think that much of the discussion on this thread is borne of misperceptions of IO rather than of some defect in the concept of conducting operations in the information environment. The real issue is how we organize our staffs and how we task various assets to accomplish it.
True and as wm said:
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...Like pretty much everything else in the world of operations, each is METT-TC dependent.
Could it be that the search for clarity and coherence in an effort to simplify (possibly oversimplify???) a very complex and conditional process might obscure the flexibility needed to adapt and cope with multiple changing environments?
Sounds like a way to inadvertently design a straight jacket to me...
Or is that a strait jacket... :D
IO really isn't as hard as we make it
Well, this is a fascinating discussion about what we think the definition of IO should be versus trying to figure out how to work with the definition that we've got. The longer we continue to debate "how come," the longer it will take to get things going in the right direction. All the debates about whether the definition of IO in JP 3-13 definition fits "what we're really doing downrange" appear to be lacking in the distinction among tactical, operational, and strategic applications of IO, which clearly employ different assets and different methods.
To answer the earlier question about whether or not IO should be used as shorthand for PSYOP and message management by Irregular Warfare practicioners, the answer is simple: "Only if you have no interest in being doctrinally correct." The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept specifically states on p36 that Information Operations fits into the current concept for Irregular Warfare, thusly "Conduct information operations (operations security, information security, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, computer network attack and defense; and physical destruction) in support of IW campaign objectives." Although the IW JOC itself got the definition of IO wrong (why should JOCs be constrained by doctrine??:mad:), the intent is clearly to employ a lot more than just PSYOP and message management. With regard to the use of IO as shorthand for "PSYOP and message management," it clearly sounds like a tactical (or possibly operational) application of IO by an element that doesn't have any other assets. In other words, IO for a unit that only has PSYOP and "messaging" assets will obviously only include those assets. Other units with more assets will conduct a wider variety of operations and use more assets when they conduct IO.
We seem to expend a lot of energy worrying about how "my IO doesn't look like your IO" when the real objective of IO is not to employ a specific set of capabilities, but to employ all available capabilities in order to influence the thoughts and actions of adversary and neutral parties. Fortunately, that includes killing those who need to be killed so they don't have thoughts or actions any more.:D
This stuff really isn't that difficult.