Combat Power, Conflict Resolution, and US Economy
The recent conversation about the utility (and impact) of conscription in the United States has led me to consider the relationship between the US economy, combat power, and conflict resolution. The downward spiraling relationship between US military expenditures and declining US combat power is already well-established. For you visual folks, here is a visual depiction:
http://s7.postimage.org/kljs1mod7/Untitled.png
The graph is a quick overview of US combat power from 1973 to 2009.
So, I ask, what is the future of US military readiness and security given that the JCC believes we live in an unprecedented dangerous world? My questions are:
- Is there a relationship between any economic indicators (wealth concentration, unemployment, tax revenue) and US military expenditures and/or combat power?
- Is there a relationship between US combat power or US military expenditures and conflict resolution (conflict propensity, conflict intensity, and conflict termination)?
- Of the terminated conflicts, is there a relationship between US combat power and definitive and favorable terminations?
Platform numbers vs platform capabilities
I don't think 10000 aircraft in 1973 have greater combat capability than 4000 in 2009.i thought there were way more sm 1991 than what's reflected I could be wrong
. The answer I think is a false reasoning cycle ie we always draw down after war
Napoleon Dempsey and James Rommel, the Desert Mason...
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Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
By JCC I presume you mean the CJCS. ;)
I wouldn't put too much stock in that "unprecedented dangerous world." It's been far worse several times. !942 was not a good year. Even 1962 was fearful to many. There have been others in the last 70 years or so. The system requires danger or an approximation thereof to keep the budget up to the maximum possible extent. DoD and the JCS are not above hyping the 'threat' to do that. Way the game is played in Washington...
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Is there a relationship between any economic indicators (wealth concentration, unemployment, tax revenue) and US military expenditures and/or combat power?
There's a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures. Precisely what that relationship happens to be varies from time to time depending on Administration and perceived threat levels. There's an indirect relationship between wealth concentration and the other economic factors but it also can vary considerably over time due to many things. The relationship between any of those -- including military expenditures -- and combat power is tenuous and infinitely variable. As you have correctly stated, recent large expenditures have not produced more effectiveness. Indeed, some say the opposite has occurred, a surfeit of money has enable and enforced mediocrity...
Most of that variability is produced by humans; they after all are the one who start wars and who fight in them and that's why the metrication of warfare and attempts to produce empirical norms, rules or 'doctrine' are rarely successful
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Is there a relationship between US combat power or US military expenditures and conflict resolution (conflict propensity, conflict intensity, and conflict termination)?
Not consistently because propensity and termination are under political control; intensity is not solely under US military control, the opponent gets a vote as to an extent do politicians from both sides. Heh -- even the weather can interfere... :wry:
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Of the terminated conflicts, is there a relationship between US combat power and definitive and favorable terminations?
Not since World War II other than for Grenada, Panama and Desert Storm -- all of which were aberrations. In most of the others, certainly the three largest, US combat Power was held on a very short leash; much was not used due to some military and a great many political factors. In any counterinsurgency or similar operations, a definitive conclusion is generally not achievable, a compromise of varying satisfaction is most likely. Subutai would not understand. :D
Napoleon Bonaparte had some problems but he won a bunch before he lost the one that counted -- he's alleged to have said "...morale is to the physical as three is to one." If he didn't, many others certainly did over the centuries because it is an absolute truth. Combat power comes from capability, capability is in part dependent upon expenditures but actual capability ultimately relies on people. World War II was an exercise in expenditure but it was brought to a successful conclusion by many people from many nations, all of whom suffered under far more pervasive and discriminatory wealth concentration and unemployment problems due to a major depression than many today can comprehend. Tax intake was higher on a percentage basis due to the value of money but net revenues were lower due to that same factor.
That said, Of the Troops has a point. Ship, Aircraft, all Equipment -- and soldier -- capability (not performance allowed...) today is far greater than was the case in 1973 so straight line comparisons can be very misleading. To use one factor I've mentioned elsewhere, the average infantryman in Viet Nam walked around with about $2,500 (inflation adjusted) worth of gear on his body; his counterpart today has about ten times that and near concomitant capability. There is a difference between the two other than that -- the earlier guy was allowed to take his even more mediocre training than today's Troop and put it to use; he had fewer constraints. Combat power is comprised of many factors and the economic aspect may be only a third or so, Political and Military will are important while training and experience are also a variable that can have salutary effect.
Note the blinking yellow lights...
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Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
I agree in principle, but I also must finding a starting point in measuring security threats, and the testimony of the highest ranking military officer and the highest ranking intelligence official seems like a good place to start.
Mmm. Be careful. My observation over many years is that is a flawed assumption. My two pet, if minor, examples of the error of that approach are the testimonies before Congress of then General Louis Wagner as CG AMC that the Sergeant York DivAD was the finest air defense weapon in the world (shortly before it shot up a Latrine on the Range at Fort Bliss at its Press introduction (and shortly before it was cancelled)... :D) and then General Robert RisCassi, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army that the Dragon (LINK)was the greatest anti tank missile in the world just before we canned it and started buying Javs. :rolleyes:
Omitted from the Wiki article is the disconcerting tendency of some Dragons to go a few feet out of the launcher and plop on the ground -- and the fact that the gunner had to be unusually well trained and experience in firing the missile to obtain an even marginal hit.
Generals, like all humans, have agendas so be careful...
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Right now, I am focusing on combat power and military expenditures.
You're probably aware that there are numerous hookers in the defense budget and several blind alleys. There's also a lot of Congressional vote buying concealed therein...
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It would seem, at least superficially, that there is a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures, but the last ten years of a simultaneous increase in military expenditures and decrease in tax revenues calls into question the nature of that relationship.
True and you'll also find other incongruous periods -- the overall trend for a multi decade period, five or more, will I believe give you more accurate data.
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The F-35 costs between 197 and 237 million dollars. One of the aircraft it will replace is the F-16, which cost 14 - 18 million dollars per unit.
Check the new costs for the F-16 when it appeared in the 1970s and adjust for inflation. Using only current publicly available prices can badly skew your data.
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If we assume that the amount of combat power that a dollar can buy is fixed, then in order for the F-35 to be "worth it", it must provide at least 1,316% more combat power than the F-16. By anyone's definition of combat power, does it?
I think that is a bad assumption; that the costs must be very accurately assessed and compared; and that the mechanically derived variance factor all must be approached with great caution. Combat power is a function of both capability and of application not only of the equipment but of its operators and support systems. How much, if any, better trained are today's pilots and how much more capable are all the mission systems? A Sidewinder is a Sidewinder but the AIM-9X is a vastly different creature than an AIM-9B. Mission planning capability? Sortie generation? Maintenance man hours versus flight hours? Sensors? How much is the 'Stealth' feature of the F-35 worth...
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Operational expenses and the base budget are calculated separately, so we can see clearly in the documentation that the increase in spending is related to the cost of maintaining the forces in the field after they have already been trained and equipped.
As I'm sure you're aware, many items in the O&M budgets of all the services are spent on things other than supporting elements deployed or in the field -- much of it goes to maintain the massive (and unduly expensive...) garrison and base operation in CONUS. Much also is spent on Exercises and add-on training, on TDY and travel to esoteric meeting in CONUS and around the world. Lot of fluff in there... :wry:
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The data so far strongly suggests that the cost to maintain forces in the field has far outpaced military appropriations and US economic capacity to finance it. This means, if trends continue, the amount of combat power that the US can deploy or the amount of time such forces can be sustained will diminish. This is a major economic and security problem if true.
I suspect you will discover that (a) it is quite true and (b) little is being done about it. :mad:
May the wind be always at your back...
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Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
If all these factors are the same, but one aircraft costs X amount more than another aircraft, then in order to be cost effective that aircraft must also see a proportional increase in its combat power.
I doubt many blue suiters would agree. I'm a retired and retarded no suit wearer and I sure don''t. Your problem in that statement is the "if"...
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Whether or not they used it for expenses elsewhere doesn't matter, since that money paid for overseas combat expenses in totality.
That implies that you do not believe money spent elsewhere has any or much application to combat power...
I advised caution on your assumptions. This response adds to my belief that your study will likely not do what you wish it to do. Howsomeever, the best of Irish luck to ye... ;)