How Operational Art Devoured Strategy
How Operational Art Devoured Strategy
This is very much worth reading, but careful reading. It slaughters, or maims, a few sacred cows so emotional reactions are likely.
Having said that, I am becoming increasingly impressed with this guy Kelly. If anyone knows him, please pass it on.
I think it's a pretty good paper, Tom. Your objection on Rwanda is certainly valid
and one could argue that Bosnia and Kosovo were not strategic failures, rather the former another failure of moral courage and the latter getting schnookered and buying into a line of BS. East Timor seems to me to fall between those two poles. The rest were what they're tagged as...
I agree that your version of the US espousal of "The Operational Level of War" was the stated reason but I also suggest it was a specifically European theater and counter Soviet oriented construct which is not universally applicable -- and we have a bad tendency to make our 'doctrine' work even if all of it may not fit a given situation. There was also a flag officer space justification effort involved IIRC. I would contend that in both Afghanistan and Iraq the theater or nation IS the operational level of war. We can be pretty inflexible nowadays. Didn't use to be true, yet another bad habit we picked up post Viet Nam.
I think their principal point is summed up with this quote:
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"By taking a hierarchical view and linking discrete responsibilities to specifc levels of command, we risk degrading the intimacy of the conversation among ends, ways, and means, making it easier for strategy to make unreasonable demands; for example, in Iraq in 2003-2006, with ways overtaking ends; or in 1950, MacArthur’s precipitate pursuit to the Yalu, with tactics to taking on a life of its own. " (Pg 10 Document / Pg 18 of the .pdf... emphasis added /kw)
The heirarchial view issue...
As I said, we tend to be awfully inflexible. We say there is an Operational Level, therefor we must have one. They also mention that we, the US, do not do the political aspect of warfare at all well. True IMO and we have not since FDR. Truman never got it, nor have any subsequent Presidents other than Eisenhower who wisely stayed out of most stupidity. I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.
The 'we' to whom I referred is the US Army, period.
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Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
Again. Ken, let's define who the "we" is... You just made the same leap and are like them chasing the wrong fox.
Nope. You misconstrued the initial 'we.' While I thought what I said was clear, perhaps it was not. There were two distinct items in that paragraph of mine you quoted. Here it is again:
""As I said, we tend to be awfully inflexible. We say there is an Operational Level, therefor we must have one. They also mention that we, the US, do not do the political aspect of warfare at all well. True IMO and we have not since FDR. Truman never got it, nor have any subsequent Presidents other than Eisenhower who wisely stayed out of most stupidity. I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.""(emphasis added / kw)
The items in bold apply to the US Army, those underlined to the broader US government; two separate 'we's there. I agree with you on the interagency and US strategy issue. However, I still think the Army is remiss, doctrinally rigid and has a tendency to tailor its 'doctrine' to the exigencies of the day.
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If there is a problem with strategic thought in the USG--and I agree whole heartedly there is--hardly any of the problem relates to the so called "leavenworth heresy". Their premise is both a red herring and a reductionist; it is the wrong argument and an over-simplification at that.
I agree but I didn't read their paper that way. Also, this:
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... Somehow if we just put operational-level back in the box, strategy will emerge. Bull.
I didn't get that from it. I did get that the operational level as the US has adapted it is a distractor -- and while you may not, I totally agree with that. As I said, we're awfully inflexible. Not least because of this:
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...On the other hand I could and I am sure you could cite numerous examples of the need for levels because they limit those who would become the epitome of the squad leader in the sky.
The problem being that our adaptation of levels has not stopped the squad leaders in the sky -- it has encouraged them. Now that guy doesn't even have to leave air conditioned comfort and get in a bird that can be shot down, he can simply watch a video feed while three nations away...:mad:
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Again I give it a C.
That's cool, give it a D even -- or an F -- but do realize the broad message I drew by not having anything to get defensive about may be correct-- dangerously so. ""I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.""
The Army cannot fix the strategic issue as you say -- the Army can and should fix the issues of over centralization 'squad leader in the sky;' inflexibility; and excessive orthodoxy.
I think we're walking and talking past each other...
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Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
I would have to assume that you feel my debating the clarity of these two authors' writing is defensive.
True -- but only in that you caught their flaw in assigning blame to 100-5 and went to work on that, thus ,IMO, missing the broader points that you acknowledge are a problem -- and the point that we have become very (dangerously???) doctrinaire.
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Hardly the case as if one is going to write something and publish it hinged on a weak point, my criticism is neither defensive nor is ad hominem. It goes to the heart of their argument--the negative influence of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and the term operational level of war. They state it is causal. I would argue that at best it may be symptomatic and at worst it is a red herring.
Herring perhaps. Sympotomatic? I'd say absolutely. We adopted 'the operational level' for a variety of reasons -- none particularly compelling, IMO (YMMV) and we tend to try to apply it where it is inappropriate because we're slaves to the book...:(
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Our national leaders have found it more convenient to contract strategy to think tanks than to actually think strategically.
I sadly suggest that truth is partly due to the fact that the Armed Forces (as a result of mutual distaste) have not attempted (deigned?) to give strategic advice to a DoS and several Administrations who were, umm, not particularly friendly, toward the Services. I'm not sure how to fix that but I think we need to try...
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In agreement on the issue, if not the cause:
Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp...we are as you know doing just the opposite.
We've beat this stud to death but I don't disagree with a thing you said -- other than your first line on the thread:
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I judge such works by how the authors form their argument. They lost me with this:...
I understand that but at my age, I've found out that I neglected a lot of good ideas due to having the same attitude and I've lately become inured to putting up- with some often specious arguments to still extract some idea with a bit of merit. I even look up dumb stuff to see what people are up to. The old bit about even a stopped clock being right twice a day sort of applies.
I'd say they arrived at the right destination by the wrong route and that happens often.
Keep on pushin' ;)