1 Attachment(s)
Analyzing the Iraq War Surge
This is my first council post. I am working on a Master's thesis that explores how and why the strategic shift of 2007 (to borrow a phrase from Dr. Steven Metz) occurred. The general gist of my research plan is that a cultural preference within the army for "big" wars blinded many to the adaptations required for success in Iraq. If you are a glutton for punishment take a look at my prospectus for more specifics. This research is based on my own experience as a young officer in 2005 that did what he was trained to do, which was mechanized high-intensity war, and didn't really accept counterinsurgency until I was facing the prospect of defeat as a member of one of the last surge units in 2007.
What I am looking for is: 1. general feedback on my research question, and
2. personal anecdotes from any soldiers out there (my research is admittedly army-centric) who may or may not have shared the confusion that I felt from 2004-2006 about our strategy and tactics in Iraq (I'm specifically comparing the Casey transition strategy - big FOBs and transition to ISF - and the Odierno/Petraeus surge strategy).
Many thanks,
Brent
Cavguy, if you haven't already ...
Iraq War and Marine's View
Talk to Bing West, read his books...his anaylsis is spot on (at least in my opinion) because he startes at the eyeball to eyeball level of war and moves it to the strategic very effectively. In addition, he has spent a considerable amount of time with the Army and can compare and contrast approaches and tactics. :wry: