We Cannot Allow a Sleep Gap!
Seriously, this is an interesting - and a rather underappreciated - subject that was examined recently by the JASON panel: Human Performance, JSR-07-625, March 2008.
Quote:
Non-medical applications of the advances of neuroscience research and medical technology also pose the potential for use by adversaries. In this context, we must consider the possibility that uses that we would consider unacceptable could be developed or applied either by a state-adversary, or by less-easily identified terrorist groups. In the following, we consider first the issues of what types of human performance modification might alter a military balance, and how those issues can be evaluated. We then address two broad areas where there are significant, and highly publicized, advances in human performance modification. These are the areas of brain plasticity (permanently changing the function of an individual’s brain, either by training or by pharmaceuticals), and the area of brain-computer interface (augmenting normal performance via an external device directly linked to the nervous system). The present status of technology in these areas is evaluated, and the context for potential threats in the future is described. As will be seen, there are no serious immediate threats, however the advance of technology and the accompanying commercial interest, are such that close attention must be paid to the future potential for threats.
In The RCR, we were lectured that a soldier was supposed to retain more or less full combat efficiency for a period of 7-10 days on 1 1/2 to 2 hours' sleep a day; the basis for this "standard" was that it had all been tested and verified by the Canadian Forces Civil and Military Medical Institute. Needless to say such a claim attracted doubts amongst soldiers, for all sorts of reasons and considerations. That said, if a foreign adversary were able to devise means by which to reduce their soldiers' (or operatives') need for sleep or at least to very substantially increase their capacity for awareness for much longer periods of time than is normal, this could make quite a difference at the tactical level, at least in the short term.
Blame it on Night Vision capability!
Our night vision capability gives our forces such a distinct advantage over the insurgents and the Taliban, that we can't pass up the opportunity to use it. The trouble is that we don't know when/how to stand down during the day. This is exacerbated by the guys in the TOC, who probably don't give a damn about sleep deprivation, nor its lingering effects, on the maneuver forces. So, they plan operations round the clock; and keep the officers and NCOs, who are commanding maneuver forces, in Prep mode or in extensive after-action debriefings when these guys should be getting some rest themselves.
"Fatigue makes cowards of us all!"
Everything I learned about the adverse consequences of sleep deprivation, I learned in Ranger School. Everything I learned about patrolling, tracking, concealment and intelligence gathering, I learned in Recondo School. In the former, we just endured and struggled to stay awake. In the latter, we got stronger, sharper, and better in every way every day. Every day, we crawled into covered and concealed positions at the end of Evening Nautical Twilight; and there we stayed, still and quiet, until the Beginning of Morning Nautical Twilight. (Of course, if Recondo Schools are still run today by Special Forces, I'm sure that Recondos are being trained to take advantage of Night Vision devices as well. I just hope that they are given enough rest to stay alert and to learn their craft.)
I do believe that the battalion S-1 and Medical Officer of each battalion should be monitoring the operational tempo of maneuver forces within the battalion; and should be able to alert the battalion commander and company commanders before their troops wear down. (It is not as easy to track, of course, but the battalion S-2 should be trying to do the same for known enemy forces.) I never saw nor heard of this being done during my limited time in active duty. In Vietnam and Korea, my units never sustained a high tempo of operations for more than a few days without a pause. [And we never (Vietnam) and rarely (Korea) maneuvered at night.] So, it did not seem necessary. But, since we have made it "normal" to do too much with too few troops for several years now, it should be a major responsibility for someone at staff level.
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Warfighter Judgment and Decisionmaking during Prolonged Wakefulness
We learned it long before that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
TLoder
Effective combat should always contain an element and concept of swift rotations. We learned this after Vietnam.
We also relearned it in WW I, relearned it in WW II, relearned it in Korea, relearned it in Viet Nam ...
Now we get to relearn it again. :mad: