Shortchanging the Joint Doctrine Fight
An alternative Air Force view on Dunlap's critique of the new Army/USMC COIN manual. Go to the link below and scroll down to the section called-IN My Humble Opinion-then look for Short Changing The Joint Fight-An Alternative View by LTC. Buck Eaton USAF.
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/
Didn't seem all that alternative to me, Slap
Dunlap revisited, more like. While he offers a slightly different approach, the message is essentially the same.
Not that I totally disagree with what either he or Dunlap have to say; just that I think in both cases they unfortunately come across as a little whiney and "Hey, you left us out..."
Shortchanging the Joint Doctrine Fight
Shortchanging the Joint Doctrine Fight
One Airman’s Assessment of the Airman’s Assessment
by LtCol Buck Elton, Small Wars Journal
Quote:
The traditional, often bitter inter-service battle for resources has been taken to a new level in a senior Air Force officer’s recent assault on service doctrine. In late December, 2007, Air University published a 111-page monograph written by Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. entitled Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman’s Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine. The study analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army and Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution and offers an Airman’s perspective to deliver “fresh” alternatives for joint counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine development. This heavily referenced monograph (438 end notes) relentlessly attacks the Army and Marine Corps doctrine for its almost exclusively ground-centric perspective and failure to reconcile the full potential of today’s airpower capabilities. Although General Dunlap discusses several interesting ideas regarding how the Airman’s perspective can help shape joint COIN doctrine, his undue criticisms of Army philosophies, conventional approaches and dogmatic mindset distract from his argument and recommendations. Readers will likely focus exclusively on the unwarranted and erratically referenced land-power condemnations and accuse the Air Force of advocating a COIN solution that involves Airmen or airpower for their own sake, which the author half-heartedly adds as an imperative at the end of the essay. This Airman’s assessment of “an Airman’s Assessment” will provide an alternative perspective of Field Manual 3-24 and offer counter arguments to many of the monograph’s criticisms...
Download interim version of article as PDF
What can the Air Force do? What will do they do?
I have a well worn, dog earred, highlited, and written on FM 3-24. It is a good manual, but there is room for significant improvement. I believe the intent of releasing the manual in its current state was to get it in the field for comments and then execute a relatively rapid rewrite.
If any service was neglected, then they have an obligation to step up make their case. I would argue that the Navy wasn't addressed either, yet the Navy could play a major role in controlling brown water areas (interdicting insurgent movement and support) and controlling blue water to disrupt international support to an insurgency. The Air Force has a similiar role, but what else does the Air Force do to support COIN?
1. Provide Air Lift (project and sustain ground forces)
2. Conduct interdiction missions and provide fire support
3. Provide intelligence support
4. Provide numerous types of support ranging from medical to EOD.
5. Provide subject matter expertise to the host nation's Air Forces
etc.
Of course the Air Force provides this type of support for all operations, but the only difference the ratio of the type of support provided. In COIN we need less fire support (compared to a higher intensity conflict), but more intelligence and air lift. The C17 pilots and UAV crews are the heroes of this type of fight. Unfortunately, CFC has asked for more Unmanned Aerial Systems to help provide that intelligence, but the Air Force has resisted the call according to media reports and even comments from Mr. Gates our SECDEF. The Air Force apparently wants to provide more interdiction and fire support, which indicates that some of their theorists still don't understand the nature of COIN. The challenge in COIN is controlling the population, then identifying who the insurgents are and surgically removing them, while at the same time convincing the populace not to support the insurgents, so we don't end up in Sisyphus's shoes. I'm not quite sure how dropping bombs on the populace will help us. We're already using the Air Force to effectively interdict "known" insurgent hold outs relatively surgically, so I don't see what their beef is.
So readdressing 3-24, what can the Air Force do to support COIN (and hopefully it won't be trying to redefine COIN to make it look like a conventional fight to justify spending $$$ on weapons systems irrelevant to the COIN fight)? Then what will the Air Force do to support COIN? Will they provide more UAS's, or will they continue to drag their feet on this issue? I don't think the Army or Marines neglected the Air Force's role, I think they were frustrated by senior Air Force leadership.
As a discussion point I would offer going back to the Army Air Corps and allowing the Army to control all tactical / operational air assets, and maintaining the Air Force to support Strategic lift, Strategic Interdiction, and Space. This would allow the Army Air Corps to develop and fund appropriate air platforms and develop doctrine to support ground forces. While this may may be too difficult to do and probably a bad idea, why is it a bad idea?
Quote:
In any event, I am very concerned about what seems to be an over-correction in the Army towards COIN. Yes, we need to have that capability, but I think we also need an Army ready - sooner rather than later - to conduct high-intensity operations against a peer or near-peer competitor - at least in a regional scenario.
For many reasons, I don't want to see our Army become too much of a constabulary force. I am concerned that in a few years the ongoing Army manpower plus-up, as well as over-investment in certain COIN-only equipment, will drain resources from Army modernization.
I don't disagree with this, but at the same time I concur with the SECDEF's statement that we must first win the fight we're in before we divert to much effort towards a "possible" future fight. In certain situations like Iraq and Afghanistan where we conduct a regime change (or move into a failed State like Somalia) we need to provide the COIN force for an interim period until the struggling new government is ready to assume security force responsibility.
However, I don't see how this relates to FM 3-24 being flawed. What should be added that would be value added from an Air Force and perhaps Navy perspective?