Future COIN in Afghanistan
Future Coin in Afghanistan
Some of you won’t like this but I will say it anyway. Is this where we are headed with the next Coin/Surge narrative for Afghanistan? This entry by the SWJ editors certainly suggests such undertones. Will we start to see opeds by AEI neo-cons arguing that in 2007 American troops had basically quit the country and hunkered down on Fobs like they did according to the Iraq narrative in 2006? You sit back and say nobody is saying that but I heard from the mouth of a senior officer who was on a senior commander’s staff in Iraq this past year characterize American troops in Iraq in 2006 as “Fob Rats.” And this officer said this so matter-of-factly that it seemed clear to me that that was the garden variety view of things in the halls of the palaces in the GZ and VBC. I thought to myself well if I and my men were “Fob Rats” in 2006 then how in the hell did some soldiers under my command “just get dead?” So why not, let’s just build the same story for Afghanistan. But perhaps this time instead of saying the Americans screwed up we can go easy on ourselves and blame NATO for not “getting it right.” And again the lean toward hagiography in this entry is striking but still without the temporal insights of history to inform.
Why do we have such a positivist view of American military power and its ability to control and shape ANY environment? Clearly, at least to me, that is what underpins the Iraq narrative and is the start of a new narrative for Afghanistan.
Considering the way life works
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
However, I think it would be really bad for the bad guys to know...
in that part of the world it's probably pretty safe to assume they already have a good idea and utilize that information to their advantage.
Otherwise why would it be necessary to make a big fuss about it publicly in order to bring pressure on those nations to wise up.
In relation to COIN, Afghanistan, and FOBs If we take the region for what it is and remember what they have been through over the last many years, it would seem to be a wiser choice to follow a path that has shown itself to be effective (with local adjustments of course). And in direct relation to FOB's and their utility I sincerely doubt they are truly seen on high as being a place of cowardice as would seem to be the impression by some but merely need to be seen for what they are in the larger picture (as a Forward Base of Operations) Operations which overwhelming take place outside of said FOB's.
I would hope noone would be percieved to be discounting the lives lost by soldiers no matter where or how they were working as in the end they were doing their job.
Politics, Politics, Politics. . .
Eden, great and very informative post. I concur with LTC Odom; please post more, sir.
I think the key to the whole thing really is domestic politics. Doctrine and theory always talks about unity of strategy, purpose, and command, and the major discrepancies between domestic politics just between, say, the US and Britain (let alone between the US and Germany) make that unity impossible. Popular opinion in Europe has not been very supportive of the Afghanistan commitment, and the governments are leery of falling out of favor with the public because of the war. The dynamics in the US that allow President Bush to continue to prosecute an unpopular war in Iraq despite widespread discontent are not present in European countries with Afghanistan. The governments may say the right things, but to them, the conflict is not worth what it is to the US. And the result is caveats on force employment, severe casualty-aversion (and a subsequent FOB-mentality) on the part of the politicians and high command. The command fissure is a result of that discrepancy in purpose and motivation, as is the variance in strategy, at least in my (wayward) view.
Matt
Question about the Opium/Narcotrafficking Issue:
Is it confirmed that the Taliban specifically are getting support from opium trafficking?
I only ask because as convenient as it would be for them, the Taliban were violently anti-poppy as rulers of the country; in fact, so much so they were the only effective counternarcotics policymakers before or since. And while it would be advantageous for them to use narcotrafficking funds to support themselves, they do view it as counter to Islam, and on the religious score, they tend to adhere to ideology. . .
Matt
free enterprise at work...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MattC86
Is it confirmed that the Taliban specifically are getting support from opium trafficking?
I only ask because as convenient as it would be for them, the Taliban were violently anti-poppy as rulers of the country; in fact, so much so they were the only effective counternarcotics policymakers before or since. And while it would be advantageous for them to use narcotrafficking funds to support themselves, they do view it as counter to Islam, and on the religious score, they tend to adhere to ideology. . .
Matt
Drug money goes to whoever controls transport routes and can protect crops. It therefore goes variously to local warlords, the Taliban, the Afghan police, etc. depending on location (and usually all of the above).