The Fallacy of HIC vs COIN
The misleading notion of Nagl vs. Gentile
The HIC vs COIN debate that has been popularized by personas of LtCol. Nagl and Col. Gentile is erroneous in that it detracts from why we find ourselves involved in two ongoing COIN conflicts. In Iraq, it can be argued that we are involved in a COIN conflict because we handled the initial operations poorly, and failed to win in a matter that destroyed the enemies ability to continue to fight and that we failed to plan for after the shooting. The COIN fight in Afghanistan may have been unavoidable to some degree, but it can be argued that our failure to properly conduct the conventional operations has made the COIN fight harder. No conventional forces in theatre to trap and destroy Taliban and AQ forces allowing many to escape to fight again, and poorly planned operations by US forces later in the conflict such as Operation Anaconda are examples. What types of operations due we as country find ourselves most likely to initially conduct? My review of history suggests that punitive raids and preparing for major wars as a means of deterrence and policy role are the most likely. COIN operational knowledge will have little to do with our ongoing conflict with terrorism (that I predict we will see a resurgence of when the current OIF/OEF operations come to a close) or in our ability to deter aggressive nation states from attacking our allies overseas. In this sense Col. Gentile is right that we can not lose focus on our HIC capabilities. However, I would argue that we do combat operations incorrectly and that some of the fixes for this would lead to better performances in COIN and HIC operations. Properly trained, equipped, and supported forces can do both operations very effectively as has been discussed in depths in other threads on this board. So why do we have this argument about COIN vs HIC? I see three main reasons.
One, the command environment and culture leads to micromanagement and consolidation of forces. This further affects how we train and how we allocate resources.
Two, our methods of unit manning and training do not allow for units to develop a depth of combat knowledge and skills needed to operate in multiple conflict spectrums.
Three, despite vast public lip service, the armed forces failed to ever successfully incorporate the dreaded concepts of stability operations. This last point has dragged us into more COIN conflicts then anything else.
I will expand on the three points in follow on posts.
Reed
I'm not sure the debate you're concerned with is critical.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
reed11b
I just wanted to address why the debate exists in the first place and what aspects of military culture and doctrine have lead to the belief that COIN and HIC and any other form of warfare are not interchangeable.
Nor am I real sure many disagree with you on that. Certainly both Gian and Nagl have said we must be capable in operations during both forms of warfare.
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My conclusion is that certain failings in how we conduct all levels of combat have a greater recognizable effect on our ability to conduct COIN and other LICs then they appear have on our HIC ability...
I agree with that -- and with your comments on micromanagement. Both things are due, I think, partly to a reluctance to change but I think even more so are attributable to a pathological reluctance to admit making a mistake.
I once worked for a Three Star who was a pretty good guy. However, he had hired an aide who was truly dangerous. Said General quickly realized this -- but he would not fire the Aide and admit he'd made a mistake. That guy was an embarrassment fo over a year. The aide, not the LTG...
Appropos of that is the ongoing saga of the M4 carbine and it's excessive maintenenance requirements and its pathetic little cartridge. Unit I was in ran the troop test on the then AR-15 back in 1963. We ended up recommending keeping the M14 for worldwide service. Everyone knows the rest of the story but here we are 45 years later with a marginally effective combat weapon that the Army over engineered and that a couple of fast talking GOs hung their hats on...
Then I ran across this story; LINK. I recalled a number of us who objected to the HMMWV when it was a gleam in TACOMs eye trying to tell them that it was a compromise on too many counts and the Army would be better off buying several different vehicles -- but Lesley J. McNair lives on and the US Army is always trying to buy one GP widget that will do the job of ten. Dumb. The HMMWV was and is dumb vehicle -- I know some say they love it but like the kids (and others...) that say the M4 is good to go, they've never used much of anything else. There's a reason the Pros don't agree with that.
Point on the M4 and the HMMWV is that the Army bought (well, McNamara forced the Army on the M16. The HMMWV is another story) 'em and they aren't going to admit an error so will hang on to both to the bitter end. As I said, I'm not sure you're attacking the right problem...
'Course, if it was me, I'd say the Army has a whole lot of good people who sometimes don't do as well as they could or should and that those errors in technique you allude to -- indeed, most of the Army's flaws -- are attributable to poor training over the last 25-40 years... :D
Musical chairs and unit effectiveness
The individual replacement system is at the heart of much of the Army’s readiness and capabilities problems. For me, this is the key reason why false arguments like HIC vs COIN even get press time. This is the key as to why training is not at the quality it needs to be, this why the Army has to work harder to do less. An example, the National Guard trains one weekend a month, two weeks a year, and maybe a flood or a forest fire deployment. This equals 36 training days to the Active Army’s aprox 256 training days. Yet studies have shown that National Guard units are close to Active Units in effectiveness after a 30 day train up, and some units surpass Active unit standards without a train up!:eek: Why is this? I have spent 5 years in the Guard after 4 in the Active Army and they don’t get better recruits, and prior service troops, while they help, they still lose skill sets without training as well. The reason is that the National Guard units maintain unit cohesiveness over years, not months. This means that training stays with the unit and only needs refreshers, allowing for new skills training, and effective use of training time. In active duty, a soldier comes from often subpar basic and AIT training to a unit. In this unit a certain percentage of his leadership will have been in the unit for less then three months. This soldier will immediately start working on basic drills. Eventually the team and squad will get comfortable working together and will be ready to learn new skills. At this time they are likely to receive whole new leadership and some squad shake-up. New leader needs to see if soldiers know the basic skills so unit starts to do drills. New members of the team means that it takes time to get back into the routine. Once this happens, there is good chance that soldiers will again be PCSed, shifted around in the unit and/or new leadership enters the fray. Repeat this process ad infinitum. Now if a soldier does well, he may qualify for special schools. Soldier leaves for months to learn new skill set and returns too….yep new soldiers and leaders. The individual manning system is based on the WWI concept of industrial mass production and the need to mobilize a large number of soldiers for a major combat theatre. This does not apply to a volunteer Army. Officer training is similar leads to knowledge being individual based and not unit based. If the commander has never been to school “X” but the S2 has, does this equal the commander having access to the training set from school “X”? This further complicated by the Army’s false presence of being “always ready, always manned” which really means never ready, never fully manned.:wry: A Unit manning and training cycle would allow units to perfect the basics and leave time for continually improving skills and learning new ones. It should also help prevent situations like this…. LINK>>>>
Another thread that I feel relates to this is here……
LINK>>>>
This may be something the Army needs to learn as well.
:mad:I could go on forever on this topic, and I may return to it, but for now I will give everyone a little break.
Reed
The solution was at hand...
Reed,
Have enjoyed your post so far and appreciate your position. I did 5 1/2 years active, then spent a stint in the NG, before coming back on active duty.
The Army had the solution to the personnel turnover problem. It was being implemented when OIF became more than a single 6-month deployment for us all. The Unit Manning process would have locked personnel into a brigade for 3 years. No moves out, and people were going to be encouraged to do a second 3-year stint if the timing was right. This meant that for 3 years, a brigade would have the same people on board. After 6-9 months of a deliberate train-up, culminating in a CTC rotation, the brigade was ready for deployment.
A brigade, once it had completed training and certified for deployment, was now ready to focus on advanced skills. For a heavy brigade, I can imagine this would have included more advanced fieldcraft, maneuver operations at the battalion and brigade level, large-scale combined arms breaching, MOUT under more realistic conditions, advanced live fire training, etc.
Not every brigade would be ready as during the early part of the 6-9 months of standing up, a lot of fire team, squad and platoon training would have to be conducted. However, in the aggregate, we would have more units ready. For instance, 4 brigades in a division, spread over 4 different start points, would end up this way: The 'senior' unit, in its 33d month of activity, would, in the event of a major incident, forego standing down. It is ready for deployment right now. The middle unit, at the 24 month mark, is also ready and can deploy immediately, having been conducting advanced training for quite a while. The next brigade, having been together for 15 months, should have just finished its certification training 4-6 months ago. It is also ready. Finally, the 4th brigade, having just started its training 6 months ago, will probably not be ready for at least 30-60 days. This shows a single division's 4 brigades, with 9 months staggered resets. Even with a brigade that just stood down, 3 brigades are ready to go and the 4th must start training with new soldiers/leadership immediately, with a condensed training cycle to get them in the fight in 4 months or so.
ARFORGEN and OIF killed this. When a brigade is spending 12 months in Iraq, then 12 months at home, before going back again, typical command timelines for BDE and BN commanders became 2 years. This is part of the out-of-sync feeling the Army has right now.
I will not say this will solve all the Army's woes - an interest in quality training versus lots of watered-down iterations is something the Army hasn't grasped yet. And a lot of the support units won't fall into this cycle. But I think it was going to be a really good start.
Hopefully the power holders at HRC didn't kill the unit manning concept. Once our optempo slows, we have to get this back. 3ID and 101st did do this briefly before the war kicked in on second tours for them. I love the idea of having Soldiers who are studs and know it, confident in their abilities and the hard, advanced training they have experienced. As an OC at the NTC, I have often (only 1/2 jokingly) referred to the NTC as the National PLATOON Training Center, based on the level of training some units arrived there at. We are starting to get beyond that now as dwell time increases.
Tankersteve