Kandahar Province: catch all thread
The Senlis Council, 29 Aug 07: The Canadian International Development Agency in Kandahar: Unanswered Questions
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The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
This report is the result of research conducted by The Senlis Council in response to the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). As a reaction to our reports demonstrating that the work of CIDA was not visible in Kandahar, we were invited to verify their work for ourselves. The suffering of the Afghan people in Kandahar not only neglects our humanitarian obligations to our allies in Kandahar, it creates a climate that fuels the insurgency and undermines the already dangerous work of Canada’s military in this hostile war zone....
I was just about to say...
That CIDA's reputation in Sub-Sahara was actually quite good in the late 80s and early 90s. Their work mirrored USAID's supporting agricultural development and economic growth.
They were also at times entertaining...gotta love that Canadian French :)
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Originally Posted by
marct
We've talked a lot about US problems integrating civil-military operations but, I have to admit, Canada has done a lot worse by relying on CIDA. In the 1990's, CIDA got rid of must of their field project people and became, pretty much, a contract oversight office (I did some project work with them in 2003).
I agree with your last paragraph
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Originally Posted by
tequila
CIDA claimed it gave aid to the hospital itself and was monitoring the hospital. Senlis visited and saw no CIDA aid in the hospital. Where does the sovereign Afghan government come into the picture here? They were not the ones CIDA supposedly gave the money to.
Aid is worse than useless if it doesn't reach the ground. If policymakers are told x dollars are being sent, the policymaker may make the false assumption that this money is doing good and no more is required. If x dollars are instead being stolen or never makes it to the ground level, the policymakers and taxpayers need to know this.
but I suspect you and I draw different lessons from that.
There is no way in most nations in the ME or many other parts of the world to insure more than incidentally that the aid money will in fact not be misappropriated. As that statement I just made has been true since 1947 and has been amply demonstrated again and again, I'm not sure that the taxpayers knowing this makes much difference and I am very sure that the policy makers knowing it has made absolutely no difference. We still keep trying to funnel money into such nations. Beyond an exercise in futility.
There is in every western nation a group of both governmental and non-governmental agencies who focus on obtaining and dispensing money in aid of something. Too often, they are merely self perpetuating bureaucracies who have done some good and a lot of harm. One merely has to spend time in a 'third world' country and watch these fools (not all but entirely too many) and their first world life style to come to the realization that too many (again, not all) are more focused on themselves than they are on the people they're supposed to be helping.
I've met a number of folks, gov and non-gov, who really cared and worked at it smartly. They did some good, sometimes under amazing handicaps. I've met more who did not do those things. They generally did more harm than good.
Most of the good programs aimed at getting the locals to help themselves and work their way out of the situation; most of the harmful efforts were grants and donations with few or no strings,
Idealism is responsible form much progress in the world. It is also responsible for much that is wrong and donated aid internally to the US or overseas has done as much harm as good. Altruism and generosity are great (seriously) but a level of simple logic is required in determining what is productive expenditure of funds and what is wasteful.
We are, as a nation, altruistic. However, we don't perform that simple logical exercise of determining whether an idealistic grant will just end up in a Swiss Bank account. Perhaps we should do that and better focus our efforts.
Insurgent Operations in Kandahar Province
A Violent Impediment:the evolution of insurgent operations in Kandahar province 2003-07
Abstract
Theorizing about Taliban operations in Afghanistan has its limits and it is possible that Kabul-centric strategies do not adequately address the unique circumstances of each region in the country. How exactly has the Taliban gone about attaining its objectives in Kandahar province and how have those approaches evolved since 2002? And how have the Taliban adapted to coalition forces' attempts to compete with the insurgency and stamp it out? The answers to these questions are critical in the formulation of any counterinsurgency approach to Afghanistan.
Night time ambush near Kandahar
An embedded UK reporter, with US NG unit; who fall victim to an IED on a road near Kandahar en route to Helmand: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...an-ambush.html
Accompanying video indicates how confusing post-explosion the attack was.
For an armchair observer a nunber of questions arise, notably why move at night? Nore, a moment of silence for the one KIA, 37yr NYState NG.
davidbfpo
I know. I wasn't offering a counterpoint,
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Originally Posted by
Uboat509
...I did not mean to imply that NVGs were not valuable or that this unit did not need to be employing them. I was only offering a possible reason why they were apparently not using them. SFC W
just amplifying on what you and Schmedlap said and reminding some that one can also operate at night without NVG -- but you gotta train to do that...
Some questions on the story
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Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
raised by several at this LINK. As usual, the first blush report is perhaps a bit overdone and as the dust settles, a bit more usually comes out. Without being there at the time, hard to say what's right...