Patrol Base Density and Proximity - Too many and too close?
I am typing away in a crowded MWR internet center in Manas, Kyrgystan, and instead of simply sleeping until hungry, I was reading up on the Marine Corps' recommendation of a former Corporal for the Medal of Honor. First off, good on the lad for doing beyond what might have been expected in that deadly valley. I linked from that article in the Marine Corps Times, and over to onethat highlighted the struggle of 3/5 to quell the insurgents in Sangin, and it actually made me pose the subject questions.
It seems, in the 3/5 article, that there were a number of patrol bases establised by the British in Sangin, but they consumed so much manpower securing and supplying them that the insurgents actually gained more freedom of maneuver in the process.
This flies contrary to much of what I had come to accept as a basic truth for COIN (in certain cirumstances), which was break away from the super-FOBs, establish oneself close to the population, and actually provide security. It also stands in contrast to much of the doctrinal literature written in the past five years, which highlights how smaller and closer is better. I know there must be more to the analysis of the British effort, so I'm curious what folks here have to offer, either through first-hand experience or other pondering.
And before this thread goes any further, I'm not keen on hearing the B.S. that the Brits didn't patrol enough, and weren't aggressive enough, or were too risk-averse to tame Sangin. Save that for the tabloids and drama yarns. I've seen a few moments of Ross Kemp that tell me otherwise when it comes to the blood the British have spilled, and although I never set foot in Sangin, I dont buy into the hype that is often spun.
I am simply trying to look at the issue and figure out where the tipping point may be, between securing the populace at the cost of becoming over-extended. Are there any historical examples from past small wars that should be factored into the decisions to apply a patrol base methodology? What are some of the measures of effectiveness.
I think you're both right...
Flooding the zone puts so many unigrams out there that the bad guys knowing where they are is immaterial. Yes, it relies on good intel -- but it can and does also rely very much on patterns -- and low level initiative. It also can (and should) involve folks the bad guys will not see until it's too late. :D
The military equivalent of patterns also relies on terrain analysis and determination of natural lines of drift -- and alternatives to those lines. Channeling works... ;)
LE is forced by the numbers (Cops vs. bad guys) game to play 'reaction.' Military forces are also strength constrained as Eden says but they have more flexibility and are less constrained by public attitudes. All that's required is to apply mass locally, aim for surprise and possess a strong desire to initiate contacts instead of responding to them. :eek:
On balance, Armed Forces can initiate more contacts provided acceptance of risk is the norm, not the exception. That can put the emphasis on prevention where it should be. However, the word I get from the 'Stan is a tremendous amount of ennui and 'we're leaving soon' angst, an unintended consequence of the domestic US politically induced announcement of a 2011 drawdown.
Add that we don't do patterns all that well because of the change of analytical teams (and Cdrs with differing idea...) annually or more often, that we go out of our way to discourage initiative at low levels and that force protection ranks well above initiating contacts and you have a recipe for risk avoidance. Thus we react instead of prevent. :rolleyes: