The relationship between the CSA’s message on advising & Key Ldr Development PT 1
Given the thrust of the CSA’s recent message about advising FSFs, and the emphasis placed on it by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the CJCS, and the Secretary of Defense, its worth considering how we assign value to “key” leadership developmental assignments. When we think of the path to command what comes to mind? Why do we hold command above all else? These are not easy questions; nor are they accusatory. They simply are. It might be said we hold command highest because it is the recognizable manifestation of value to one’s efforts and professional life. It is recognition in a way that is far beyond increased prestige and financial worth, it is a recognition founded on the trust of lives, acumen of skill, worth to a cause greater then one’s self. Even though we know that the majority of time for most will be spent in some other job besides command, command at its various levels is still the apex for most. Undoubtedly there is also a darker human side to command, the attraction of authority, the sublime energy that accompanies it, the need for recognition, etc. – but publicly and privately we fight to eschew those darker qualities and emphasize & reinforce those positive qualities. How is the CSA’s message the first positive step toward the Army institutionalizing SFA and the advisory mission? How does it relate to what we value most? Why was the CSA explicit in his reference to the future of relevant Land Power? First we need to consider what we assign value to and why.
Developing our Sense of Value
We seek to promote based on demonstrated potential and suitability for increased responsibility and authority? However, because those are somewhat subjective, we have a value system that takes the form of evaluations and assignments. This is a personal history that indicates why that person should be advanced as someone whose character espouses what we value. The two go hand in hand, and drive current performance and future assignments. At an early age in their professional career a LT learns that among the most sought after jobs he or she competes for amongst their peers in their first assignment is to specialty platoon leader – for a Combat Arms officer, those goals are along the lines of Scout PL, Mortar PL, and Support PL(before modularity). The first – Scout or Recon PL comes with a healthy amount of independence and trust – the perception is your platoon is providing the basis of the intelligence which will drive the BN’s operations. The Mortar Platoon is the BN CDR’s organic fire support – slightly less sexy then the Scout PL, but still a specialty platoon with a healthy part of the BC’s combat power – your range gives you a different perspective and impact on the course of operations. The Support Platoon (and I understand that with modularity we’ve changed the MTO&E but stay with me because this is just as much about those leaders who grew up under that MTO&E as those who are growing up modular) was less sexy still, but among the most important functions as it was the BN CDR’s logistics and sustainment lifeline. From there, these LTs would become company XOs (if they were not already) or an “A” in the staff – “S3A” being among the most important to them as it was about operations.
It is worth considering our perception of how we advance, and what are the other things that occur as a result? How many times do we hear a higher echelon CDR refer to when they were a “this” or when they were “that”? There is also the consideration of what development occurred within that LT as a result of what assignments he was given. How does that shape their perception of what to assign value? These are not qualifications of good or bad, just of relevance. However it does get to the issue of how we institutionalize value. As a LT you learn that there are some jobs that have more value then others, and you start to understand why and what qualities make the assignment of those jobs or missions more likely. You also begin to notice things about the leaders above and around you, and you begin to enquire about what jobs they had, and construct a theory about how they advanced. You make decisions about what kind of leader you intend to be and construct a plan on how to get there. There are variables and ripples that occur before and after, but it is usually not too far off the mark.
As a CPT we yearn for command (for us Army types it’s usually the first time we get to put commander in our job description). Usually we are assigned to a staff position first – probably on either a BN or BCT staff, but it is not unheard of to get “stuck” on a higher echelon staff. This gives us time to season, but also time to be evaluated by those BN and BCT commanders who want to ensure they put round pegs in round holes and don’t place a guy in command before they’ve done all they can to develop that leader. In rare cases, it may be that the doubts are so high as to that CPTs ability, the higher echelon commander wants to see if the faults are such that they are unsuitable for command – but this is unusual as the developmental experiences have developed the CPT’s abilities as to do good enough.
As a staff CPT we learn about the personalities in the organization and we further refine our values that we began as a LT. We consider the advice of our immediate boss, that of the BN CDR, and to varying degrees, that of serving commanders. I say that because at this point we usually are critiquing the guys whose jobs we want, and our perspectives are subject to staff and self bias – it always looks easier until you have to actually go out and do it while hewing on the responsibility that comes with it. We are further planning out how things will go. We know which commanders are rotating when, we learn about their companies, sit through their QTBs, hear about the things they did right and the things they did wrong and we convince ourselves that it can be done better. We also assign value to those over us, some of which is based on where they come from, what they have done, and how they are to work for. We associate and infer – often inaccurately attributing a flaw or strength to an assignment vs. the character of the leader.
As commanders, we learn the value of a second command – in much the same way we leaned the value of specialty PL or trusted XO. However this time, we associate more “command time” with future potential for command at higher level. It may be as an HHC/HHT/HHD, or it may be in the Old Guard, or some other formation – the important thing is it’s a “command”. Again, it is neither good nor bad, just a matter of relevance.
Following command there are several options. However we learned some important things from command. We learned the BDE S3 job is the “king maker” so to speak (we also learned its allot of hard work and a family time killer – as well as often pissing off damn near everybody because there is no way to make everyone happy) – we learn that just by observing. We may not like the BDE 3, but we generally respect the position and the potential it brings. We also get exposed to the BCT CDR as our senior rater. We start to ponder how he does his job, and how did he get his job? What is his background? What did he do? How well did he do it? We learn about the relevancy of resident war college, SAMS and a host of other developmental schools and assignments. Not good or bad, but relevant here in that we have to make decisions about our viability for future command. Hopefully the BN and BCT CDR come forward, and tell you during your OER counseling (and informal or formal periodic counseling throughout). This is where guys and gals need to make life changing decisions, there will be other factors – family, age, ambition, competing priorities, interests, etc.- but most folks I know make significant decisions here.
The years between command and a KD job as a FG also matter. One of the best jobs to prepare you for doing well as an “S3” or “XO” was to go and be a CTC OC (Observer Controller). There you could benefit by the experiences of many units and leaders who came to the CTCs in preparation for deployment - or before the war as an indicator of that unit’s readiness to deploy (I list both because our point of reference for how we use the CTCs varies with our age and experience). As company commanders we knew many BN & BDE S3s and BN and BDE CDRs who at some point had been an OC at a CTC. In our OER counseling we were often gratified to hear our rater or SR tell us they’d like to see us at a CTC as it would improve our ability to be good BN and BDE CDRs. As an OC (most of us have done OC duty somewhere either at home station, as an OC augmentee, or at a CTC) you get immersed in tactics, a chance to consider how doctrine works, and most importantly the chance benefit from “observing” and thinking about how a multitude of leaders and units conducted their selves under a variety of conditions. You get to do this without having to take on the responsibilities associated with those positions.
It is another “key developmental” experience afforded by the Army because the need for useful feedback to the unit is combined with the opportunity to step outside and look from a unique perspective. That “value” is demonstrated down the road because as “3”, “XO” or “CDR” that experience can be leveraged to make better decisions. Since not everyone can or should be an OC at a CTC, the value is increased. The same is true with other assignments or experiences we assign the value of “key developmental” experience to.
part 2 posted below
The relationship between the CSA’s message on advising & Key Ldr Development PT 2
The “Value” assigned to Advising
This gets to the question of where does an assignment as an “advisor” fall out in terms of being ascribed as “key developmental” or KD toward future assignment and promotion. This is a question as to if the “value” is such that it has persistent and future value, vs. its being just an assignment that must be endured temporarily or tolerated until such time as we can return to what we have institutionalized and demonstrated as having value through our actions. It gets beyond the CSA’s making it a KD assignment and giving CSL credit; it is about how we perceive its worth.
There are three parts to this I think. The first part is recognition and acceptance by the institutional leadership that there is a persistent requirement for both quality and quantity. In this case OIF and OEF have changed our (the USG’s) thinking to include accepting and expressing that working by, with and through FSFs is an undeniable and critical part of our strategy. I say that because while many may have expressed it for some time, it was not until it physically manifested itself and exposed our gaps in capabilities and capacities that we were forced to address it – preparation for war, and the conduct of war were and will remain different. The institution has officially recognized and accepted this need in the form of the CSA’s, CMC’s and SECDEF’s verbal and written communications. This sets the conditions for the second part, reconciling recognition with actions.
How the institutions go from articulating value to demonstrating it matters. To borrow from Dave Kilcullen (first place I heard it) – it is about matching our actions to our narrative. If the Army does what is laid out in CSA’s note in spirit as well as in letter by advancing those who have taken on his guidance in the next round, it will demonstrate immediate value. Two other actions the Army might take is to:
- One, follow the Joint lead and designate an Army proponent for SFA (Security Force Assistance) that reflects its value to big Army – not just a special slice. That is not a swipe at Army Special Forces – but it’s a recognition that when you make something “special” you may also isolate its level of institutionalization – since this as much a capacity issue as a capability issue it is a GPF issue, and if institutionalization in the GPF is what is required then designating a proponent that only affects a special slice or creating a specialized corps of advisors jeopardizes that. At its heart this is about how we perceive and view the employment of “Land Power” which why I think the CSA is explicit in mentioning it in his email.
- Two provide commanders a powerful tool for organizing their formations to the tasks associated with working with FSFs, we need to assign some type of ASL or personnel code to all soldiers, not just officers. We have many soldiers working in some advisory capacity who not only should get some credit for their work, but whose skill sets might get lost. These soldiers could become unit trainers, etc. and when the unit gets assigned the mission may prove invaluable in an advisory position vs. their primary MOS. This is not about identifying them for unit taskings, its about empowering commanders with critical tools to the benefit of the mission.
The third part and I think the most institutionally enduring, and also the most difficult is how its value translates to big Army. When a LT or CPT looks to a successful BN or BDE S3, or his BN CDR or BCT CDR and attributes that leader’s success to a tour as an advisor, it is truly institutionalized. When that BCT CDR pulls off something and that CO CDR says, “Damn Sir – where did you learn that?”, and the BCT CDR says “I picked it up advising foreign security forces in ……” and then follows with, “ you know Bill, you should consider a tour as an advisor when you leave command, it will round you out in ways no other job can.” we’ll have made it a part of our culture. When its recognized as part of the path to higher command because its value to the challenges of command at those levels is not only viewed as enhancing, but is undeniable it will be part of our culture. At that point value is established because its credibility is manifested in what we value most. At that point it is not a painful forcing function which must be endured, but it is an attractive function which is desired. We resist those things which take us away from our goals, but we find ways to those things which lead us to our goals.
It is also worth discussing the issue of making some advisory positions “KD” and thus on par with other relevant jobs. While the job of S3 or XO has value in preparation for command, what of the comparative value of the Advisor if a guy or gal can only do one or the other? I think here it comes down to two things. First, we need to get beyond valuing the quality of the assignment to the exclusion of the quality of the man. An assignment does not qualify someone for increased responsibility and authority – I’ve known at least one FG who served as both a BN 3 and a BN XO, and got BN CMD only to fail – a good guy, but we all knew he should not have been a BN CDR even if the Army did not. I’ve also known a few folks that did not have the resume but their actions could not be more in keeping with increased responsibility and authority – the Army missed them to our detriment. We’ve got to get more invested in how we assess those we advance. Second we need to consider what we think we’re going to be doing in the future, since nobody can do everything, maybe having a balanced team vs. a one size fits all is healthier for our organization. If having relevant land power in the future is at least partially contingent on our ability to work by, with and through, then having that experience resident in the BN and BCT senior leadership would seem critical. I’d argue that there are things you will learn as an advisor that you will not learn elsewhere – so maybe its value to the future of land power was worth making it a KD job. However, if we have leaders that when a guy shows up the first question out of their mouth is not oriented on finding out what do they bring to the table, but where were they an S3 or XO, then we really did not institutionalize it as “KD”, we just gave it a wink and a nod, and we failed.
Conclusion (what it means more broadly)
I think this is one of the reasons why I think BCTs should be the basis for a good chunk of our Army SFA efforts. Not only do we require full spectrum forces in order meet the commitment to our national security, and not only do we have some incredibly talented folks in the BCT, but to really effect cultural change we must change some part of what we value most, not create an alternative value structure which is in competition. When we do the latter we weaken one at the expense of the other. I think we can in fact leverage existing structures such as the BCT and the JTF to meet most of our needs. While the BCT does in fact have a ceiling with regards to its functionality, we might consider building a CJIATF around something like a TMAAG, but inclusive of a heavy JIIM (Joint Inter-Agency, Inter- Governmental and Multi-National) assessment team, and then based on the initial assessment and follow on re-assessments build the capabilities and capacities required to meet the policy goal.
I bring this up in the conclusion because in my view it’s a related issue. Creating new permanent organizations does not necessarily change the organizational culture. It is really about relevance and perspective to a frame of reference. We have assigned both relevance and value to the BCT and to the JTF; where possible we should show the increased value with respect to established frames of reference. In the case of using the CJIATF structure on which to build the means for sustained engagement, it would require a CJIATF CDR who understood how to work with foreign security forces. To get there we need to institutionalize the value at the lower echelons first. The CSA’s directive may not in and of itself assign the level of value that gets instant institutionalization, but its an important first step, and one we can build on.
Best, Rob
Strongly agree with your conclusion.
Refining the details of the mtt fellowship
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
Everyone wins. The Army invests heavily in it's upcoming leaders, and the families get a much needed break in one of the best places to live in the US.
Well, you have to force the families not to live on Fort Ord, because everyone who does hates Monterey, because the weather sucks there. They need to set up special housing for the fellows at Del Monte Beach, which is the "guaranteed best weather" strip in Monterey. Plus, life is always better when you are "steps" from the beach -- it's a bear to pack kids into a car to go to the beach, much better to be able to hoof it.
Otherwise, it's a neat idea.
Regards,
Jill
Former Resident of the Surfside Apartment Complex
WM and patmc hit a couple of buttons...
Wm with this:
Quote:
"...A main driver in the reduction of Army institutional training course lengths in the past was that all of the folks in the training account apply to end strength numbers but are producing no "bang for the buck" at the pointy end of the spear.'
The statement of course is totally correct but I railed against that 'logic' for over 30 years. It is so incredibly short sighted and "current quarter" oriented that it is scary. An Army is people. That's where the investment needs to be made; not in toys.
Patmc also hit one:
Quote:
"The basic fact is, majority of people do not want to live and work with Iraqis or Afghans. Those who do, wear different color berets. If the Army's future is in advising, it needs to accept that many people do not want to do it, and will likely not sign up or stick around."
I can't speak to that with respect to the current nations of interest but based on my observation of KMAG in Korea (in both war and the later peace) and MACV in Viet Nam as well as the old Armish-MAAG in Iran, he's totally correct. I'd go a step further and say that among those who want or are willing to live and work with indigenous forces, it should also be borne in mind that not everyone is really effective as an Adviser for many reasons.
Sargent said
Quote:
"To the extent that it's true... I think that such a position reflects more ignorance and familiarity with stereotypes than any real sense of what it actually means to live and work with them. I also have a suspicion that such a mindset has influenced the tone of the COIN mission -- if you don't much like folks, you aren't going to take their protection very seriously, are going to be more likely to take an aggressive approach to those suspected of "enemy" activity, and so forth -- whether that suspicion is ultimately warranted."
I'm not sure that's a correct assumption. It may apply to some but I've seen too many who went into the job with an open mind and later became either disillusioned or just totally frustrated at an apparent lack of progress. I believe the acceptance or not of the other culture is quite complex, hard to predict and infinitely variable among people. Lot of factors at play from food to sleeping arrangements to combat capability and most things in between. Probably best not to try to judge until one has been there. I know one retired Colonel who was an Adviser in KMAG and loved the job and the Koreans; he was later a Province Adviser in Viet Nam and he was not a happy camper, not at all. Know another guy who was an Adviser in Viet Nam and hated it and later was a happy and good Adviser to the Iranian Army. It's a quite complex thing, I think...
jkm_ said:
Quote:
"To be honest, the TT job I had was the best ever in the Army...as far as deployments go."
I think that's great and I'm glad he did enjoy it -- and I've known many others who enjoyed the job elsewhere. My son was not an Adviser in Afghanistan in either of his two trips to OEF but he likes them and would be willing to do that, OTOH, with an OIF 2 tour, he would rebel if he got assigned to do it in Iraq.
It's like anything else; some people like it, some do not and as we all know, some people do some things better than others do them -- the process needs to accept that as reality. It probably also should be cautious in judging those that do not want to be Advisers because it's very much dependent on the individual and how he sees the nation and the people concerned.
Not that DA cares but I'm opposed to an Advisory Corps for several reasons and that factor is one of them. I think it's a bad idea on several levels as I said in a SWJ Blog Post some months ago. :mad:
Lastly, for wm -- I agree on Carmel and the valley. Probably why my wife and I are much more familiar with that area than we are with Monterey, Seaside and Ord proper. :D
Hmm. Proves even a stopped clock is right twice a day...
Now the question is which of us is ticking??? ;)
Seriously, good point on the careerism angle. I knew there was something else that bothered me but couldn't put a finger on it. It does sort of pander to that...
As to just assigning people to do it, you're correct, I think. I got assigned as an Adviser in Viet Nam and for a variety of reasons, did not take to the job at all -- mostly because I believed I was wasting time and accomplishing nothing and a significant personality clash with the second Bn Sr Adviser didn't help. So I left and went to a US unit tromping the boonies looking for Clyde and lived happily ever after. Later, as an Adviser in Iran, I believed I was more productive and that I was accomplishing something -- even if it was little and painfully slow (nature of the beast). My observation has been that the majority of folks so assigned did their best and did some good; a few gifted or lucky ones did great things, in fact.
I hope we are not overdoing the well known American pendulum over swing thing...