Mechanization hurts COIN forces
Study co-written by Princeton and West Point scholars:
Quote:
Empirical evidence suggests that Great Powers and weak states alike are increasingly unable to wage successful counterinsurgency campaigns. We argue that this decline can be explained by rising levels of mechanization within state militaries. Unlike their earlier counterparts, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit the creation of information-gathering networks among local populations. Mechanized militaries therefore struggle to wield their power discriminately, pushing fence-sitters into the insurgency. We test this claim using a new dataset of 238 insurgencies (1800-2000) and a microlevel comparison of two U.S. Army Divisions in Iraq (2003-04). We find that mechanization is associated with a decreasing probability of incumbent victory; that regime- and power-based explanations only account for nineteenth century outcomes; and that oft-cited factors such as terrain or ethnolinguistic divisions are largely unconnected to outcomes in counterinsurgency warfare.
http://www.princeton.edu/~jlyall/Rage2.3.pdf
Competing factors at play.
Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...
Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:
Quote:
" 'Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail.' - General George C. Marshall."
Combined arms still needed
Most people recognized that sufficient mounted armor forces could have made a significant difference in the Blackhawk Down battle in Mogadishu.
We also know that dismounted forces are more effective at going into a neighborhood and protecting the people and also gathering intelligence on enemy activity.
It is also inarguable that we have a real advantage against the enemy when we can call in an air strike on on a sniper trying to pin down the dismounted troops.
I am not sure why there is an argument against the combined arms approach, Historically, it has been been pretty effective. We shouldn't be arguing about driving a vehicle with one of its wheels removed.
Light Infantry is willing to fight in squad sized elements
Mech, to include Strykers doesn't do that. Mech has to protect their vehicles and Rob misunderstood my earlier comment; yes, Mech can put out a substantial force (particularly the SBCTS) but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles. There is also a comfort factor, the Mech guys I've know were reluctant to get too far from their vehicles. That may not be the case with SBCTs but I suspect it is with the Bradley guys... :confused:
Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot... ;)
That's not to take anything away from the re-roled guys who are doing better than expected or anyone who's over there busting their hump.
I agree that the mounted mentality adversely impacted our efforts in Iraq early on; that and I'll also restate my earlier point that the right Commander will do his METT-T thing and do well regardless of background or type of unit involved and the wrong one will err regardless of what type units available.