1 Attachment(s)
Plan,Organize and Train for SFA
Given one of the question posed on the AAB thread by a SWJ Council member (JKM) I thought it might not be a bad idea to post a document I have been sending out to units inquiring how they should plan, organize, train and to their ability educate when preparing to support the development of FSF (Foreign Security Forces).
This is rough document and I apologize for any grammatical or technical issues. I've gotten good feedback from units and others on it though. What we wanted to do is show how those planning tools we already use can be adapted to support SFA. This is a take on analytical planning methods such as the MDMP (Military Decision Making Process).
There is a section on how to organize based on conditions and a section on how to look at your resources within your unit and identify those who might better serve as advisors than others, there is a section training, and there is a smaller section on education.
There are now some good AARs floating around on those units who have been successful in these mission and if possible I'd recommend you get your hands on them - most however are in .ppt format and as such may lack the context that goes with briefing them. I welcome any feedback, and where possible we will roll it into the making of the guide I described on the Fundamentals of SFA thread in the "Working with Indigenous Forces" category here on the SWJ Discussion Board.
As with all things if its useful use it, if not scrap it - or help inform what might be changed.
Best Regards, Rob
A different take on relative combat power
One thing worth including in the document may be that of relative combat power, but with a twist on development. In one of the case study interviews the BSB SPO had referred to the transition teams as IBUs i.e. "Itty Bitty Units". At the time I had only thought of it in the context of his logistical problem and a concept of support for the outlying small units he had to sustain.
Recently though it popped up in a different context, a CDR saw the advisor teams he inherited as a supply burden and did not see them as a tool of influence or as a means to support the development of the FSF. Basically what he saw was 11 guys who he had to be responsible for and who he did not fully understand how to employ.
This got me thinking about how might a unit CDR "sees" his advisor teams. We have concepts for who "fights" what and for what is battle tracked - they are built around echelons. BDEs fight/employ & track companies, BNs fight/employ & track platoons and companies fight/employ & track squads and sections and while I know digital tracking allows a different perspective, in terms of admin such as senior rating, readiness, QTBs, etc. we are still conditioned to think along the two levels down model.
While in terms of "combat power" or the ability to accomplish a tactical task like seize, clear, defend, an advisor team is something akin to a section or a squad, in terms of the adviosr team's potential to influence and develop a FSF it may be the most important unit in the BDE CDR's organization, and as such the selection criteria for his advisor teams based on individual capabilities may be the most important organizational decision the CDR makes. This requires the CDR have an understanding of the fundamentals of SFA, and at least wrt to the LOE that includes developing sustainable capability and capacity in the FSF, that mission success equates to that partner's ability to generate, employ and sustain.
I think that until CDRs understand that, the advisor teams will often still be seen and resourced as something they "have to support" vs. "the organization that can best facillitate mission accomplishment" wrt to supporting the development of the FSF. This is true regardless I think no matter if a BDE falls in on advisor teams, or if it is organic to the BN. This is not a question of who owns what, but of relative value based on understanding the requirements of the mission. Providing guidance and action that clearly elevates the importance of the advisor team when conducting this mission to at least the level of the rifle/tank company/troop will probably help the CDR get the most out of his advisor elements. I know that in some cases CDRs have come to this conclusion in mid tour, but understanding it during planning, training and organization could put the unit on a better operational footing from day 1 in country.
Best, Rob
You've sure stated the problem
in such a way that it becomes clear why John Nagl came up with his notion of and advisor corps. That, IMO, is a bridge too far. So, the practical question is how we get the BDE commander to SEE his advisor teams as his primary maneuver force. My answer would be selection of the BDE commander.
A commander of a BDE that will be employeing advisor teams should be selected individually from among the eleigibles by an interview with the senior operational commander. In Iraq, the interviews would have been conducted under my concept by Petraeus and Odierno with, my preference, Crocker participating. Send home the guys who don't pass and give them their brigades in some other environment - with a letter in their 201 file explaining that they showed no aptitude for the SFA mission. :(
Cheers
JohnT