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Reflections on the past (assessment of ISAF etc up to 2015)
Moderator's Notice
This the last of five new threads on Afghanistan 2015 onwards and its focus is on Reflections on the past (assessment of ISAF etc up to 2015).
Currently there are 345 threads in the OEF arena, amidst which are many which appear to be reflective, some long before the ISAF mission for one example was rethought and redirected.
Here are a very few. The first started in April 2013 and ended in May 2013, entitled What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us? It is fascinating to read now as January 2015 looms:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=17997
Nor should we ignore the Soviet involvement; as Mick Martin relates in his book, many Afghans in Helmand thought ISAF followed their approach:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9483
Just found this SWJ paper, from April 2013 by a Danish author 'Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from an ISAF Perspective' at:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...af-perspective (ends)
Attached is a draft, nine page paper on the background to the culture and society to be found in Afghanistan, note the focus is Helmand Province. It is IMHO useful for intelligence and information operations staff first.
Please cast a critical eye and let me know your thoughts. It is not my work, but a helper beyond SWC.
There is a short list of recommended books.
It maybe suitable for the Afghan Lessons Learnt website eventually, or at least those nations who are in Helmand Province.
davidbfpo
Reflections on the past (assessment of ISAF etc up to 2015)
This the last of five new threads on Afghanistan 2015 onwards and its focus is on Reflections on the past (assessment of ISAF etc up to 2015).
Currently there are 345 threads in the OEF arena, amidst which are many which appear to be reflective, some long before the ISAF mission for one example was rethought and redirected.
Here are a very few. The first started in April 2013 and ended in May 2013, entitled What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us? It is fascinating to read now as January 2015 looms:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=17997
Nor should we ignore the Soviet involvement; as Mick Martin relates in his book, many Afghans in Helmand thought ISAF followed their approach:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9483
Just found this SWJ paper, from April 2013 by a Danish author 'Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from an ISAF Perspective' at:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...af-perspective
Afghanistan: The Lessons of War
This is an event @ London's Frontline Club, 28 Febuary 2015, 7:00 PM:
Quote:
We will be joined by those who served in Afghanistan and the journalists who covered the country, to take a comprehensive view of the conflict from its inception after 9/11 to the withdrawal. Looking at the decisions that were made and the consequences of those actions, we will be examining the lessons that should be learned by British and coalition forces.
Link:http://www.frontlineclub.com/afghani...essons-of-war/
One UK journalist named so far. Events are open to non-members, for £12.50p and are released as a podcast afterwards.
If anyone is interested in a non-virtual RV let me know!
Change is needed, what change?
Just stumbled across two contributions to the debate over what went wrong in Afghanistan (and Iraq). Both are clearly written with a focus on the UK, with the USA coming second.
First 'Our culture of cracking on must be tempered', which starts with:
Quote:
The British Army has a culture of cracking on.Roughly translated into civilian speak, this means soldiers take a perverse pride in persevering in spite of overly ambitious operations and insufficient resources.Cracking on is absolutely vital at the tactical level; along with black humour it drives the Army on operations. But at the strategic level, cracking on does no one any favours.
Link:https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/our...d-bf34acd55dfd
Second a reply 'There is a danger of over-intellectualising war' and starts with:
Quote:
The recent Fall When Hit article on cracking on contains some nuggets of truth but ultimately fails to prove its thesis.
Link:https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/the...r-9b7db4bdbabf
Malkasian: Thoughts from Garmser and Kabul
A SWJ article 'Thoughts from Garmser and Kabu' in which Octavia Manea interviews Carter Malkasian:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...mser-and-kabul
The last Q&A:
Quote:
SWJ: Iraq and Afghanistan may not be the last time when we engage in such operations. Which are the big lessons that we should keep in mind as we move forward? First, we should make sure the host country has enough police or soldiers made up of its own citizens to defend itself. Second, if our goal is to enable the country to stabilize itself, we may need to be willing to be there for a long time, hopefully with fewer troops rather than more. Third, once we go in, it is very hard to get out.
NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone
Actually the title of a book published in January 2014, but only noted today after a Tweet:http://www.amazon.com/dp/0691159386/..._80jdvb1QPD74R
The publisher's blurb in part:
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NATO in Afghanistan explores how government structures and party politics in NATO countries shape how battles are waged in the field. Drawing on more than 250 interviews with senior officials from around the world, David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman find that domestic constraints in presidential and single-party parliamentary systems--in countries such as the United States and Britain respectively--differ from those in countries with coalition governments, such as Germany and the Netherlands. As a result, different countries craft different guidelines for their forces overseas, most notably in the form of military caveats, the often-controversial limits placed on deployed troops.
Providing critical insights into the realities of alliance and coalition warfare, NATO in Afghanistan also looks at non-NATO partners such as Australia, and assesses NATO's performance in the 2011 Libyan campaign to show how these domestic political dynamics are by no means unique to Afghanistan
Misunderstanding War: set in the Afghan context
Dr. Rob Johnson, of Oxford University's Changing Character of War programme and SME on Afghanistan & COIN of late has a review of three books, one Jack Fairweather's is on Afghanistan and the other two are on strategy (Clausewitz & Sun Tzu):http://www.the-american-interest.com...rstanding-war/
Many here I expect will be taken back by this passage on President Karzai:
Quote:
Fairweather argues that Hamid Karzai, the President much criticized by the West, was hamstrung not by northern warlords who had helped him into power but by the international community, which “consistently prevented him from taking the necessary steps to help Afghans take control of their own future.” That is not how many Afghans saw it. The problem was not, as some Western critics claimed, that Karzai lacked legitimacy. He was not a marginal “tribal” leader, but the representative of one of the most prestigious families of Poplazai-Barakzai Pashtun heritage; he had more claim to leadership, by any historical reckoning, than the Ghilzai-led Pashtuns of the Taliban. While the Bonn Conference created an overly centralized government structure that was beyond the capacity and historical experience of the country to accommodate, the real problem, most critics now agree, was creating a peace settlement in which the vanquished were not invited. Be that as it may, the real problem was, in fact, that Karzai did not have the requisite apparatus of government to have his decisions implemented. He tended to meddle in detail in large part because the system functioned so weakly. In consequence, too much government depended on personality rather than on accountable bureaucracy. This situation, of course, is not unique to Afghanistan.
The Arabs at War in Afghanistan
Notice this week of this new book by Leah Farrell and Mustafa Hamid, available for UK£16, with free worldwide P&P (if you register with them):http://www.hurstpublishers.com/
The book PR refers to:
Quote:
The Arabs at War in Afghanistan offers significant new insights into the history of many of today’s militant Salafi groups and movements. By revealing the real origins of the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the jostling among the various jihadi groups, this account not only challenges conventional wisdom, but also raises uncomfortable questions as to how events from this important period have been so badly misconstrued.
Musa Qala: what lessons were learnt?
The return of GIRoA control and flags to Musa Qala, a Taliban-held twon in northern Helmand in December 2007 is explained by the UK commander, Brigadier Andrew Mackay, in a reflective article:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/...9-83e619460e1f
Maybe it is an AAR? Good photos apart it has some key passages and admissions. The author is well known as an advocate of 'influence', an argument that appears in other threads. Meantime here are some "tasters".
Quote:
We were surprised at how little was understood about the people who inhabited this conflict area.What was the status of the tribal culture that had endured so much conflict and been criminalised through opium and heroin production?
(Later) My intelligence cell presented me with a different view. Over 30 years of conflict, population movement and the impact of opium and heroin production had fractured the tight tribal structure. Control of the drugs trade trumped wider tribal loyalties. Families and the smaller unit of the clan came before tribe. The tribes were a potent force, but in northern Helmand they were not positioned to drive the Taliban from Musa Qala.
Rather contrary to the reporting "Iraq first":
Quote:
Drones from Iraq were sent to Kandahar and aircraft were dispatched from aircraft carriers....Hundreds of helicopters, aircraft and drones were now being co-ordinated and readied. Most of them were American and many were being redeployed from Iraq.
IIRC Musa Qala appears in several threads and now ret'd as a Major General Mackay appears in several SWJ articles:http://smallwarsjournal.com/search/node/mackay
A look at how the US-led coalition lost Afghanistan's Marjah district to the Taliban
A good, short reflective piece from Stripes (which I rarely read); sub-titled:
Quote:
Misunderstanding Afghan ideology key to coalition’s failure to maintain control
Link:http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-e...liban-1.389156
Our (US) generals failed in Afghanistan
A sharp critique by an Afghan veteran, ret'd Brigadier James Dempsey, and IRRC many of the themes appeared here at the time. His slim bio:
Quote:
Jason Dempsey retired from the Army in 2015, last serving as special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He deployed to Afghanistan in 2009 as the operations officer to an infantry brigade and again in 2012-2013 as a combat advisor to the Afghan Border Police. He returned again briefly in 2014 to assess the advisory mission.
Link:http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/18/...n-afghanistan/
Missionaries of Modernity: book review
A book review in the British Journal of Military History (BJMH) of 'Missionaries of Modernity: Advisory Missions and the Struggle for Hegemony in Afghanistan and Beyond' by Antonio Giustozzi and Artemy Kalinovsky, which was published in April 2016.
Link:http://www.bjmh.org.uk/index.php/bjm...e/view/159/128
Alas the format stops any "cut & paste", but whilst it says the focus is global the focus is Afghanistan, so that is why it is here! Note the Soviet period is covered.
Link, with no reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Missionaries-...ords=giustozzi
Nor on UK:https://www.amazon.co.uk/d/Books/Mis...s+of+Modernity
The publisher's summary:
Quote:
This volume is an historical survey of advisory and mentoring missions from the 1920s onwards, starting from the Soviet missions to the Kuomintang and ending with the mission to Iraq. It focuses on Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and after 2001, but also deals with virtually every single advisory mission from the 1920s on-wards, whether involving 'Eastern Bloc' countries or Western ones. The sections on Afghanistan are based on new research, while the sections covering other cases of advisory/mentoring missions are based on the existing literature. The authors highlight how large scale missions have been particularly problematic, causing friction with the hosts and sometimes even undermining their legitimacy. Small missions staffed by more carefully selected cadres appear instead to have produced better results. Overall, the political context may well have been a more important factor in determining success or failure rather than aspects such as cultural misunderstanding
Too damm expensive, so a library search wen next in London.