Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency
This article has been making the rounds among the USMC leadership - comes highly recommended!
Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency by David Kilcullen.
Quote:
Introduction
Your company has just been warned for deployment on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence and Robert Thompson. You have studied FM 3-24 and now understand the history, philosophy and theory of counterinsurgency.
You watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and you know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life.
But what does all the theory mean, at the company level? How do the principles translate into action - at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don't understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen?
There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted: you are not the first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply, to link the theory with the techniques and procedures you already know.
What is counterinsurgency?
If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: this is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything weaker than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people and societal disruption that fuels and perpetuates the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For your side to win, the people do not have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks.
Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity - but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.
Preparation
1. Know your turf...
2. Diagnose the problem...
3. Organize for intelligence...
4. Organize for interagency operations...
5. Travel light and harden your CSS...
6. Find a political / cultural adviser...
7. Train the squad leaders - then trust them...
8. Rank is nothing, talent is everything...
9. Have a game plan...
The Golden Hour...
10. Be there...
11. Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions
12. Prepare for handover from Day One...
13. Build trusted networks...
14. Start easy...
15. Seek early victories...
16. Practice deterrent patrolling...
17. Be prepared for setbacks...
18. Remember the global audience...
19. Engage the women, beware the children...
20. Take stock regularly...
Groundhog Day...
21. Exploit a "single narrative"...
22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves...
23. Practice armed civil affairs...
24. Small is beautiful...
25. Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces...
26. Build your own solution - only attack the enemy when he gets in the way...
Getting Short...
27. Keep your extraction plan secret...
Four "What Ifs"...
Conclusion...
28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative...
Open the link above for the full article and an explanation on each of the 28 articles of company-level COIN.
Local forces should mirror the enemy
Tom,
I focused on this one also, but don't completely buy it hook, line, and sinker. I don't think trying to create symmetry is necessarily the right answer, because that puts us more in a react mode than an offensive (or taking the initiative) mode. Note insurgents do not have to model us to defeat us, they use their strenghts effectively, and we need to do the same. None the less the author's intent is well taken.
Furthermore I have seen many of our FID efforts produce limited results because we heap technology, weapons, and tactics, techniques, and procedures that are relevant to our culture and our military culture, but not the developing nation we're attempting to assist. FM 7-8 works for us (within limits), but not for armies without a NCO corps. Technology without robust maintenance systems or educated forces to employ them will soon be gathering rust, and we simply wasted millions of tax dollars. How many times have you seen our donated weapons, vehicles, etc. in category four condition throughout Africa during your tours?
It would be great if we could develop an officer corp in our military that could adapt to their environment instead of the dogmatic doctrinal officer corp we have now. We're still producing the same officers we produced out of West Point in the Civil War, and unfortunately more Westmorelands.