We Still Need the Big Guns
We Still Need the Big Guns by Major General Charles Dunlap Jr. - New York Times op-ed.
Quote:
The relative calm that America’s armed forces have imposed on Iraq is certainly grounds for cautious optimism. But it also raises some obvious questions: how was it achieved and what does it mean for future defense planning?
Many analysts understandably attribute the success to our troops’ following the dictums of the Army’s lauded new
counterinsurgency manual. While the manual is a vast improvement over its predecessors, it would be a huge mistake to take it as proof — as some in the press, academia and independent policy organizations have — that victory over insurgents is achievable by anything other than traditional military force.
Unfortunately, starry-eyed enthusiasts have misread the manual to say that defeating an insurgency is all about winning hearts and minds with teams of anthropologists, propagandists and civil-affairs officers armed with democracy-in-a-box kits and volleyball nets. They dismiss as passé killing or capturing insurgents...
Thanks for the links to the new article
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
I remember when eating soup with a spoon first came to my attention and there where discussions about it.
Upon first reading it I responded with the following:
Quote:
I can see in his writing that LTC Gentile is a soldiers soldier who see's the job for what it is; that being a fighter who's overarching purpose is fighting.
This being said I would think the true determining factor in how and when a counter-insurgency should be handled would be contingent on the expected outcome in the end.
In other words if one is fighting an insurgency in their own country for the survival of their pre-existing government/leadership infrastructure such as many communist/dictatorial countries have historically then attrition is a definitive goal of their actions.
Also in this context they seek to discourage any further growth of that insurgency through harsh and awe inspiring action designed to create fear of standing against their power.
This is where I think the greatest difference can be found in Iraq. One would not expect police officers to come into a riot/demonstration and shut it down through attritive actions despite how much the adrenalin rush might do for the the officers mental states in as far as believing in their cause.
If the ultimate goal of any military is to provide an environment in which a democratic construct and new culture of empowered populace may come into existence than you kind of have to change your approach from that of a traditional war or counter insurgency standard.
If your soldier staying in a joint station, armed and looking for the enemy is unable to feel relatively safe than one would assume that that local populace definately is not in a situation where they may try to stand up.
As soldiers your job is to fight this is true, just as a boxer's job is to box. There are however countless factors outside of the physical interaction that the boxer must study and be aware of in order to enter the ring confidently. Once the bell rings it comes down to mano y mano but if you know that the other guy can't last longer than 2 rounds than your first step is to avoid contact and keep him moving to wear him down.
This helps to equalize the battle when it does happen. and just as in the boxing match in order to win punches must be thrown so to even in counter insurgency the blows will come ( from both sides).
Long and short I think 3- 24 is not meant to redefine war so much as to guide and encourage thought before during and after the actions take place.
I wrote this in September of last year. I have continued to study, listen and learn all I could in regards to your concerns and yet I consistently come back to one major conclusion.
3-24 was not written to replace 3-0 and as such it would seem that those responsible for developing it would be just as if not more concerned about it being applied in ways not intended. I believe they have shown this is true in their honest responses and continued reminders to all that it's not everything but something very important given current operational environments.
In the effort to build and maintain true Full Spectrum capabilities it is and ( I don't see anyone saying differently) just as important that the force be skilled in large scale manuever and warfare as small and assymetric capabilities. I can tell you one thing I know without a doubt.
Any Brigade commander would have a much better chance of deploying a truly capable large or small scale fighting capability now then they would have between 1990 -2000. Simply if for no other reason than the officers and enlisted now have not only recieved more effective training but most have been there done that on both scales at this point.
Although I understand your underlying concerns, It really would seem that considering the current training and fighting cultures, Forgetting about the big fights would be about the last thing most soldiers would do.
But as I said this is just my take on it for what it's worth
Good post, Ancient One...
Though Cav Guy's picture makes you look younger... :D