Not being a fan of pomp and ceremony, I didn't miss it in two earlier wars.
Some did and some will regret its absence now but the kids will do what every generation before them has done -- just get on with life. Some will stay but most will leave the services and they will contribute more than their non serving peers, that too is historical fact. In another twenty years or so, reasonably accurate histories will appear and we may get a good book or two out of it. Iraq is better off if only slightly at this point but the prognosis is good. The ME has changed a bit and change for the better continues by the people there. Hopefully for the better, anyway. Not sure the ME can change much with any degree of rapidity. How much our action contributed to that is to be determined...
I thought after both those earlier wars, the Army (not the Nation or the politicians but the Army) would have learned lessons. It learned little from either -- and many lessons it did learn were the wrong ones. More correctly, lessons were learned and then selectively discarded so the institution would not have to budge much from its 1919 mentality. Maybe, just maybe, three Army failures in a row will lead to better thinking and some positive results for a change.
What cannot be done by the Army is to change Congress -- they are a big part of the institutional inertia problem -- and were a part of the Iraq in totality problem. I doubt they learned anything from Iraq. Makes little difference, we just need as a people to continue to vote them out until they reform themselves.
Other than that, another day, another dollar -- million days, a million dollars... :wry:
Look Backward, Move Forward
Of things I have read lately, the most interesting is a Small Wars thread from 2006: "Victory In Iraq," where the Jack Keane/Fred Kagan Plan for the Iraq Surge is described and analyzed
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1627
Of all the comments, Jedburgh's 12/18/2006 ones, IMHO, gets the Gold Star for understanding the scope and limitations of what was being proposed; the bullet (asterisk) is the plan; the unbulleted paragraphs below it are Jedburgh's comments.
Note: Much relevance to similar current/recent threads on Afghanistan.
Quote:
* We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority.
Securing the population should have been the first priority once we destroyed the regime. However, given that we completely dismantled all existing security force elements in Iraq, training Iraqis to secure and police themselves is inextricably linked with the goal of securing the population. One cannot be ignored in favor of the other - but we have yet to develop an effective combined focus of execution.
* We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the Spring of 2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.
* These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.
* After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.
* As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local government.
Baghdad is a critical center of gravity. If we - meaning the coalition and the nascent Iraqi government - cannot secure the capital, we cannot succeed in the larger conflict. Unfortunately, resolving the Baghdad issue will require a far more complex fusion of kinetic and non-kinetic factors than the easy rhetoric of "sending in more troops" and paste in some reconstruction aid as they do their thing.
* The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard units will have to accept increased deployments during this period.
* Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from non-deploying active duty, National Guard, and reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.
Has this guy been paying attention to the state of the force? These would have been great had they been the standard in '03 - along with all the other common sense factors that were ignored through a unique fusion of utter stupidity and criminal negligence. However, in my personal opinion, at this stage of the game executing those recommendations effectively is not doable (except for the part about mobilizing industry for more rapid replacement of equipment).
* The president must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The president must insist upon the completion of reconstruction projects. The president should also request a dramatic increase in CERP funds.
This goes back to the very first bullet. We've already poured uncounted billions into Iraq reconstruction aid. But our abject failure to secure the population has rendered much of it moot (the few exceptions proving the general statement). Of course, we must continue to repair and improve and repair again basic infrastructure - the people must have clean water, sewage, electricity, etc. But, repeating myself, that is all part of securing the population. First things first.
The 16,000 US Embassy (Baghdad) guards
Steve The Planner,
You referred to:
Quote:
.. the 16,000 US Embassy Mission..
Please confirm sixteen thousand Marines are the US Embassy guard. That is incredible, I don't have my IISS Military Balance to hand, but IIRC there is a SWJ article that refers to the Corps being 240k.
The logistics for the mission must be - well - interesting.
A typical Embassy has about 10-20 Marines.
The large ones, London, Paris, Tokyo, Beijing etc. have more while most smaller nation have less than a dozen. (LINK). In addition to the Marines, Embassies also have State Department Diplomatic Security officer, DoS civilian employees (LINK) and may also have civiilian contract security elements.
I think the total footprint in Iraq next year for US DoS and DoD (military training missions and military equipment delivery teams, no combat elements) and other agencies like Commerce, Agriculture and so forth (to include Contractors) is purported to be less than 6,000. Still a bunch, though Iran back in the days of the Shah had over 3,000 at times.