The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman
From the SWJ Blog - The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman by Josh Manchester.
Quote:
Consider for a moment the differences in informational-warfare responsbilities of junior leaders in the Marine Corps -- corporals -- and the propagandists in insurgent and terror cells -- cameramen.
Infantry squad leaders -- often, corporals -- know (or should) that the behavior of their Marines sends signals to those always watching them in an insurgency: the people and the insurgents. When the Marines are comfortable with their weapons; seemingly unafraid to interact with the locals; understanding of native customs and mores; and treat the populace with dignity and respect, then the sum of all of these attitudes conveys a certain perception to both the people and terrorists who watch them: it hastens cooperation from the populace and hard-targets them from insurgent attacks. This is the basic informational component of a strategic corporal in Iraq.
Consider now a strategic cameraman. Numerous attacks in Iraq and elsewhere are filmed for propaganda purposes. The classic case is that of the IED or VBIED. Numerous IED videos circulate throughout cyberspace for recruiting or fundraising purposes.
From an informational standpoint, the area immediately affected by a corporal with a squad of Marines is local and physically located. The area immediately affected by a cameraman posting attack videos online is global and virtual.
If our enemies can manage to squeeze virtual and global effects out of tactical and local actions, why can't we?...
The Strategic Cpl. As the Strategic Cameraman
This is a terrific piece, and could as easily (perhaps more appropriately) have been filed under Media and Info Ops as Triggerpuller. The recognition that the vision of the "Strategic Cpl" is a negative one, ie, make a mistake even at the squad level and you can have a strategic impact given today's media, is, I think, an accurate one. But so too is the recognition that it doesn't have to be only a negative impact.
Other folks have noted here the idea (captured in the piece) that it makes sense for troops to make sure that even down to the platoon level there are always cameras present, but that the change in thinking that needs to take place is that those cameras need to be used to document all the things that the troops accuse the media of not documenting -- school openings, wells being dug, hospitals being rebuilt, and just simple day-to-day interactions between people and troops.
That essentially inverts the way the enemy uses his "strategic cameraman," producing footage that is of propaganda value for us because it is positive, not negative. What it does, in effect, is to turn our Strategic Cpl. into a Strategic Cameraman -- for our side.
And the architecture, as the piece mentions, with outlets such as YouTube (and now the MNF-I channel there), and Liveleak, is already in place. Good video goes viral very quickly. This is all besides the fact that once the troops are in the habit of filming everything, the footage will also be available, as a natural side benefit, to counter false propaganda claims. Nothing answers a claim better than visual evidence, and nothing answers visual claims better than other visual evidence.
There have been several instances in which propaganda claims have lingered, have not been dealt with in such a way that all doubts were removed, because there was, for whatever reason, a reluctance to release official visual product. (For example, in one case because it was believed that it was more important to protect the security of Predator video, to preserve doubts regarding how good those cameras were, than it was to end debate over whether we had killed innocent Afghans without cause.) But if the cameras were privately held off-the-shelf videocameras owned by individual soldiers, it will be far easier to release the footage immediately, as soon as false claims are released to the press.
The irony is that during the combat phase, while certainly the entire battlefield was not being visually documented, more of it was being filmed than any in history (proportionally, I'd bet.) If this challenge is taken up, between our cameras and theirs, the same may be true again, except that since none of the cameras will be operated by professional (ostensibly "objective") photojournalists, there will be questions about the authenticity and trustworthiness of every bit of footage.
More irony: I bet the very networks which have been seamlessly integrating insurgent-provided footage for four years will only take soldier/marine provided footage with every possible visual and verbal cue imaginable.
Blood Trails and Body Counts
I think its about impossible to squeeze global and virtual affects from the local and tactical actions for several reasons: first is the fact that many civilians don't easily identify with COIN. There is a serious civilian disconnect between the need of understanding enemies and their culture and killing them. We are a task and goal driven people and there should be some limited blood trails and dead jihadis shown to Mom and Pop back home. Civilians are not immune to violent death nor unable to deal with it and come to grips with it. Surely to God the Pentagon doesn't think civilians would be shocked and traumatized by the sight of dead bodies, do they? they need to get out on the interstate more and stroll the tough neighborhoods from time to time and visit some of the many thousands of funeral homes in full operation. From the over-kill exposure of Viet Nam, it's gone to the other extreme of no-kill exposure in Iraq. Remember that picture of the soldier carrying that wounded little girl in his arms? Who do you think that picture resonnated the most with - the military or civilians? Point specific on the picture is that everyone can identify with rescuing a hurt child but many can't identify with killing the enemies that had no compunction about having that child in the line of fire. Your job, from the civilian perspective, is to kill the extremists that were willing to sacrifice that child. Bloodshed is one dimensional because the other side blames us for having put that child in danger in the first place and their take on that picture is one of guilt and shame on the part of the trooper carrying her out of the fire fight, not heroism and compassion. Maybe your focus should not be so much on selling COIN to Mom and Pop back home but rather exposing the forces for what they are that oppose COIN. Your extreme sacrifice is expected and demanded but at least you are accorded trust and full faith that no elected politician can ever have.